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ABSTRACT
The architects of the post-World War II international economic order considered 
the free convertibility of currencies for current account purposes one of the fundamental 
prerequisites of multilateral trade and thus of economic growth. While the Bretton 
Woods system started operating in 1946, the Western European countries only formally 
established currency convertibility in December 1958.
So far, analytical studies of the return to convertibility are scarce. The few 
studies that exist generally treat convertibility as a technical, monetary issue, even a 
simple formality. The prevailing view is that, because of its trade-facilitating 
characteristic, convertibility was a widely accepted and uncontroversial economic policy 
objective shared by the Western European countries. This assumption follows from the 
belief that the Bretton Woods period was characterized by an international consensus on 
the benefits and desirability of international trade and long-term economic growth. The 
collective move to convertibility is regarded as proof of this consensus and of the 
willingness to cooperate to achieve common goals. Therefore, most accounts consist of 
historical narratives of Western Europe’s path to convertibility rather than analyses of 
the development within the context of national policy aims.
The comparison of Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany shows 
that convertibility was a far more complex, even controversial issue than has so far been 
argued in the literature. This thesis analyzes the national policy on convertibility in each 
country, respectively, by comparing the importance of convertibility for trade, 
macroeconomic policy, foreign policy and economic adjustment. Economic and 
political considerations played a crucial role in each country’s policy on convertibility.
The comparative analysis of the three leading countries’ national economic 
policy on convertibility reveals a fundamental divergence in general long-term policy 
orientations in the three countries, challenging the widely accepted idea of a post-war 
consensus among Western European countries on the long-term policy objectives. The 
collective return to convertibility represented a very versatile tool, which the key 
countries employed to fulfill different, often incompatible, objectives. The national 
economic and political circumstances, which determined French, British and German 
policy on convertibility explain why the return to convertibility occurred in December 
1958 and why the key countries coordinated their efforts. In particular, the 
establishment of convertibility was intricately linked to national policies on European 
integration. As a vehicle for national economic policy the return to convertibility 
provides important new insights into the formation of national exchange rate policy and 
international monetary cooperation in the 1950s.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 29, 1958, fourteen Western European countries - Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Portugal and the United Kingdom -
made their currencies convertible for nonresidents for current account transactions/
The move meant that these countries,
freely permitted nonresident current earnings of their currencies in general to be 
exchanged into any foreign (nonresident) currency at rates within the official 
margins, whereas formerly there had been limitations on such transactions?
In addition, fifteen other members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), most of
whom were members of a monetary area with one of the European countries, undertook
to adjust their exchange control regulations in concordance with establishing
nonresident current account convertibility?
Currency convertibility was one of the pillars upon which the system of free and
multilateral trade and payments envisaged by John Maynard Keynes and Harry White at
Bretton Woods in 1944 was to be built? It constituted a vital prerequisite for the
unhindered flow and the flourishing of multilateral trade. Yet until 1958, the European
currencies were not officially convertible.^ The European Payments Union (EPU) had
made European currencies transferable for trade purposes within the OEEC. However,
’ Greece followed the move five months later.
 ^IMF, Tenth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1959, p.4.
" J. K. Horsefield, The International Monetary Fund 1945-1965, Twenty Years o f  Cooperation, Volume I: 
Chronicle, IMF, 1969, p.466.
 ^For an in-depth account and analysis o f the Bretton Woods negotiations, see R. Gardner Sterling-Dollar 
Diplomacy: Anglo-American Collaboration in the Reconstruction o f  Multilateral Trade, Clarendon Press, 
1956; for a brief summary o f the Keynes and White plan see M. D. Bordo, “The Bretton Woods 
International Monetary System: A Historical Overview”, in M. D. Bordo and B. Eichengreen (eds.), A 
Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, University of 
Chicago Press, 1993, pp.30-37.
 ^For the remainder o f this thesis ‘Europe’ will refer to Western Europe unless stated otherwise.
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until 1958, non-residents of the dollar area could not officially convert European 
currencies into the dollar and vice versa, thus presenting an obstacle to the growth of 
trade between Europe and countries outside the EPU. In this sense, the Bretton Woods 
system only began in 1958, when the establishment of official convertibility for 
European currencies for current account purposes, which was followed by many other 
countries in the world, finally completed the formal foundation upon which the liberal 
trade order was to be erected. Convertibility of Western European currencies had been a 
declared goal of European and US administrations since the Bretton Woods conference 
in 1944. The time necessary for the transition to currency convertibility was intended to 
be a brief interim phase.^ This transitional period was certainly not expected to last as 
long as it did, namely 13 years.^ Even when countries established non-resident current 
account convertibility in December 1958 they refused to renounce the privileges of 
Article XIV and accept the obligations of Article VIII, which was one of the 
requirements of the IMF for convertibility.^ The latter step took place in February 1961 
and is referred to as the establishment of IMF convertibility whereas henceforth the 
terms official or formal convertibility will be used to refer to the move that took place in 
December 1958.
If convertibility was vital for the functioning of the Bretton Woods system,^ or.
 ^ The United Kingdom made an unsuccessful attempt at convertibility in 1947; it declared its currency 
convertible into dollars, which led to a run on sterling that within six weeks had drained the United 
Kingdom's foreign reserves to the extent that it could no maintain the par value o f currency and was 
forced to suspend convertibility.
 ^ According to Michael Bordo, the transitional pre-convertibility phase was only supposed to last three 
years after the establishment o f the International Monetary Fund. M. D. Bordo, The Gold Standard, 
Bretton Woods and other Monetary Regimes: An Historical Appraisal, Working Paper No.4310, National 
Bureau o f Economic Research, April 1993, p.26. See also M. Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, in 
Bordo and Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective, p.204.
* Among other things, under Article VIII countries renounced the use o f restrictions on payments and 
transfers for current account transactions.
 ^ according to Howson, convertibility “ushered in the operation o f the Bretton Woods system”, S. 
Howson, “Money and monetary policy in Britain 1945-1990”, in R. Floud and D. McCloskey (eds.). The
10
in other words, if inconvertibility presented “one of the main barriers to the full 
introduction of the peacetime international monetary order set out in the Bretton Woods 
Agreements” ®^, then why did the European signatories of the Bretton Woods 
Agreements wait one and a half decades to make Bretton Woods formally operable? 
This thesis examines the return to currency convertibility in 1958 with the aim of 
understanding why it took Europe longer than expected to return to currency 
convertibility, why the key actors in the move chose December 1958, and why - or 
whether - the European countries cooperated in the move to convertibility. Considering 
the delay in the return to convertibility, and the importance of convertibility for 
multilateral trade and thus for the Bretton Woods system, the choice of the timing of the 
move requires particular attention. What made December 1958 the ‘right’ moment to 
move to convertibility after so many years of waiting? Finally, the return to 
convertibility was a joint move undertaken simultaneously by nearly all Western 
European countries. Such a large scale collective move necessarily raises questions 
about how and why countries cooperated to make the joint move possible. The thesis 
examines what circumstances and national policy considerations coincided to make it 
possible for Western Europe to agree on one date for a joint move.
While the literature abounds with accounts of the creation of the Bretton Woods 
system, with comparative assessments of its performance and with explanations of why 
the Bretton Woods system collapsed when it did, very few authors have examined the 
national economic policy considerations and the international negotiations that led to
Economic History o f  Britain since 1700, second edition. Volume 3: 1939-1992, Cambridge University 
Press, 1994, p.221.
J. Fforde, The Bank o f  England and Public Policy - 1941-1958, Cambridge University Press, 1992, 
p.31.
11
the joint establishment of currency convertibility, which was one the building blocks of
the Bretton Woods system/^
Observers have expressed widely diverging opinions on the relevance of the
move for the international economic system. The German central bank (Bundesbank)
hailed the events of December 1958 as a “milestone in postwar monetary history”^^ , and
Per Jacobsson, the Managing Director of the IMF at the time, called it “the most
spectacular move that has occurred in the monetary sphere since the end of the war”^^ .
More recently, Paul de Grauwe stated that.
It is no exaggeration to state that this step, together Avith the institution of the 
European Economic Community in the same year, contributed towards the 
explosion of growth in trade in Europe, and to the historically unique growth of 
the European economies....Together vdth the steps taken in Europe at about the 
same time towards liberalizing trade flows, the system of convertible currencies 
facilitated international trade and can be said to be responsible for the surge in 
trade, output, and investment experienced by the industrialized countries during 
the decade.
Christoph Buchheim called the move a watershed (“Epochenwende”) for international 
payments in Western Europe, while stating at the same time that the event played no 
significant role for German payments. The British Treasury, on the other hand.
" For an account o f the Bratton Woods negotiations see Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy’, for a 
discussion o f the Bretton Woods system in the context o f international economic relations since World 
War II see W. M. Scammell The International Economy since 1945, second edition, Macmillan, 1983, 
and B. Tew, The Evolution o f  the International Monetary System 1945-88, fourth edition, Hutchinson, 
1988; for an extensive account and assessment o f the Bretton Woods era see Bordo and Eichengreen 
(eds.), A Retrospective. For an a analysis o f the determinants o f international monetary cooperation and 
and assessment o f the Bretton Woods system in comparison with other historical periods, see M. Panic, 
National Management o f  the International Economy, Macmillan, 1988, M. Panic, “The Bretton Woods 
System: Concept and Practice, in J. Michie and J. Grieve Smith (eds.). Managing the Global Economy, 
Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.37-54, and M. Panic, “International Economic Integration and the 
Changing Role o f National Governments”, in H. J. Chang and R. E. Rowthom (eds.). The Role o f  the 
State in Economic Change, Clarendon Press, 1995, pp.51-78.
Geschaftsbericht der Deutschen Bundesbank 1958, p.45.
P. Jacobsson, “Toward More Stable Money”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol.37, April 1959, p.378.
P. de Grauwe, International Money - Post-war Trends and Theories, Oxford University Press, 1989,
pp.20-1.
C. Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschqfi 1945-1958, 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990, p. 170.
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presented the move to the public as the mere technicality of unifying the transferable 
and the official rate for sterling/^ Consequently, J.C.R. Dow claimed five years after the 
event that “[i]t [convertibility] was certainly a more significant step than the Chancellor 
made out"/^ In its Economic Review from January 1959, the National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research stated that the move “will not have much effect on the 
current balance of payments"/^ Similarly, economics textbooks make only brief or no 
mention of the collective move to nonresident current account convertibility in 1958, 
and, by implication, attribute little importance to its effect on the international monetary 
system/^ Books on the history of international monetary relations only briefly discuss 
the event or explain the technical changes it involved for the currencies in question/^
In spite of the widely diverging views on the importance of the event, very few 
attempts have been made so far to analyze, firstly, why European countries chose 
December 1958 to establish convertibility and, secondly, why they chose to move 
jointly to convertibility. Since the opening of the archival documents in January 1989, 
some accounts of the event have been published which make use of this evidence. Most 
of these accounts, however, limit themselves to narrating the story of the negotiations
J. J. Kaplan & G. Schleiminger, The European Payments Union - Financial Diplomacy in the 1950s, 
Clarendon Press, 1989, p.320.
J. C. R. Dow, The Management o f  the British Economy, 1945-60, Cambridge University Press, 1964, 
p.l07.
National Institute o f Economic and Social Research, National Institute Economic Review, Number 1, 
January 1959, p.30.
The widely used economics textbook by Begg, Fischer and Dombusch, for example, contains a section 
on the international monetary system in which the Bretton Woods system is discussed, but which makes 
no mention o f the return to convertibility. D. Begg, S. Fischer and R. Dombusch, Economics, third 
edition, McGraw-Hill, 1991, pp.602-618.
see, for example, Scammell, The International Economy, pp.94-124, Horsefield, The International 
Monetary Fund, pp.466-470. Tew, The Evolution, pp.47-51. R. Hinshaw provided a good account o f the 
path towards convertibility, albeit only up until mid-1958; due to the time o f his writing, however, he 
lacked access to archival documents. R. Hinshaw, Toward European Convertibility, Essays in 
International Finance, No.31, November 1958. In 1961, W. M. Scammell analyzed the importance o f the 
return to convertibility in 1958 and suggested possible consequences o f  the move for international 
monetary stability. W. M. Scammell, International Monetary Policy, second edition, Macmillan, 1961, 
pp.397-406.
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leading to the return to convertibility without providing a critical analysis of why
countries behaved the way they did, or attempting to draw conclusions about the
importance of the event for international monetary relations, for European integration
and for the stability of the Bretton Woods system. In their detailed history of the EPU,
Jacob J. Kaplan and Gunther Schleiminger, both former members of the EPU Managing
Board, give a detailed account of the events leading up to the return to convertibility. In
their eagerness to convince the reader of the determining role of the EPU in monetary
relations in the 1950s, however, their analysis of the key countries’ economic policy
considerations, and their reasons for cooperating in the move remain superficial.^^ The
over 600-page long assessment of the Bretton Woods system edited by Michael Bordo
and Barry Eichengreen contains no analysis of the achievement of convertibility. This is
surprising, especially when considering that Michael Bordo attributed considerable
importance to the event stating that
most analysts would agree that, until the Western European industrial countries 
made their currencies convertible on 27 December 1958, the system did not 
operate as intended. On this calculation, the regime lasted only twelve years.^^
In spite of thus classifying the move as a watershed, none of the authors in the book 
examine how the event came about and why it happened in 1958. Both questions are, 
however, crucial to understanding the rise and fall of the Bretton Woods system and 
allowing one to leam “lessons for international monetary reform”.^ ^
The three key countries in the return to convertibility were the United Kingdom, 
the Federal Republic of Germany and France. The United Kingdom was the first 
country after World War II in Western Europe to put convertibility on the political
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union.
Bordo, “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System”, p.4. 
subtitle o f  Bordo and Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective.
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agenda. It could be argued that initially convertibility was forced upon Britain by the 
United States, leading to the failed attempt at currency convertibility in 1947. The 
traumatic experience with convertibility, unique to Britain, makes it all the more 
remarkable that by 1952, convertibility was back on the economic and political agenda. 
Britain undeniably presented one of the driving forces in the European move to 
convertibility, even though it will be argued later that, contrary to British assertions at 
the time, the British did not lead Europe into convertibility in December 1958.
The Federal Republic of Germany emerged out of a severe balance of payments 
crisis in 1950/1 to assume rapidly the role of the strongest economy and currency in 
Europe. Germany’s unofficial but large strides towards convertibility equaled, if not 
exceeded, British progress towards convertibility, putting great pressure on the latter to 
keep up the pace. The economic and political goals that stimulated Germany’s desire for 
a rapid return to convertibility differed significantly from those of the British 
government and monetary authorities. For reasons explained later, Germany therefore 
never even considered leading Europe into convertibility, even though its favorable 
economic conditions would have easily allowed it do so.
Unlike Germany and Britain, who communicated frequently on the issue of 
convertibility, France hardly participated in any convertibility negotiations throughout 
the 1950s. France’s position was, however, always present in the minds of both German 
and British policymakers when considering convertibility. Part of France’s importance 
must be attributed to the fact that, because of its reticence, it constituted the big 
uncertainty factor in the preparations for European convertibility. Nobody knew for 
sure, when it would act and whether it would act in cooperation with the rest of Europe 
or unilaterally. In the course of 1958, France emerged from the shadow of Britain and
15
Germany and overtook them both, providing the final decisive impetus that propelled 
Europe into official currency convertibility. All three countries were key actors in the 
European return to currency convertibility.
Several of the publications which draw on archival evidence tell the 
convertibility story only from the perspective of Britain or Germany, respectively.^"  ^
Moreover, most authors conteneted themselves with briefly referring or simply narrating 
the event. Some authors have provided thorough analyses of one of the countries in 
question^^ The French position on, and involvement in, the return to convertibility has 
hardly been examined at all, largely because of the difficulty of access to French 
archival sources.^^ Any attempt to understand and evaluate the events of 1958 must.
For Britain, see Fforde, The Bank o f  England, and C. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area: From 
Devaluation to Convertibility in the 1950s, Routledge, 1994. J.C.R. Dow should be mentioned in this 
category even though he wrote as early as 1964. He provided an excellent analysis o f British economic 
policy in the 1950s, including a very insightful discussion of Britain’s policy on convertibility; Dow, The 
Management, pp.77-110. For Germany, see Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, M. Dickhaus, 
Zwischen Europa und der Welt: die internationale Wahrungspolitik der deutschen Zentralbank 1948- 
1958, Ph.D. Dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 1995, and H. Giersch, K.-H. Paqué and 
H. Schmieding, The Fading Miracle: Four Decades o f  Market Economy in Germany, Cambridge 
University Press, 1992, pp.88-123.
^  Catherine Schenk provides an excellent analysis o f some important aspects o f  the convertibility issue 
for Britain. Her discussion on British policy on convertibility is generally very useful since she examined 
in depth the determinants o f  the formation o f  British external monetary policy in particular with regard to 
the sterling area. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area. John Fforde’s book also offers valuable insights 
into British policymaking in the 1950s, including on the convertibility issue; however, he concentrated 
mainly on the actions and attitudes o f the Bank o f England in the return to convertibility. Fforde, The 
Bank o f  England. Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding presented an interesting and insightful analysis o f  the 
German economic policy in the 1950s, including monetary objectives and policies; however, they fail to 
apply their analysis to understanding the return to convertibility, merely stating that “[ujnfortunately, the 
short way to currency convertibility, i.e. the option o f genuinely flexible or at least readily adjustable 
exchange rats, was hardly considered at all by policy-makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s”. Giersch, 
Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, p .l 14. Christoph Buchheim’s book provides a good analysis 
o f  Germany’s economic reconstruction and its external economic relations after World War II, but stops 
short o f the return to convertibility, offering only a very brief and superficial account o f the event. 
Monika Dickhaus, whose work focused on the history o f the German central bank’s external monetary 
policy between 1948 and 1958, confined her discussion o f the convertibility debate mainly to relating the 
discussions within the German central bank and between the central bank and the Economics Ministry. 
Thus her book lacks a clear conclusion on the central bank’s, or Germany’s, policy on convertibility and 
there is no close examination of the motivations determining the policies pursued. C. Buchheim, Die 
Wiedereingliederung, and Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt.
F. M. B. Lynch. “Restoring France: The Road to Integration”, in A. S. Milward, F. M. B. Lynch, F. 
Romero, R. Ranieri and V. Sorensen, The Frontier o f National Sovereignty : History and Theory, 1945- 
1992, Routledge, 1993, and F. M. B. Lynch “Le franc français 1952-1956: Le débat sur la convertibilité”, 
in Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (éd.). Du franc Poincaré à Vécu,
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however, look at the three countries who were decisive in the move to convertibility, 
namely, Britain, France and Germany together. While many authors have examined the 
UK’s external monetary policy and the problem of sterling^^, few have analyzed 
sterling’s return to currency convertibility in the European context. The literature on 
Britain tends to underestimate the extent to which the return to convertibility was 
determined by France and Germany. Thus, most authors treat the establishment of 
convertibility either as the natural outcome of Britain’s policy aims in the 1950s, or as 
an exogenous event, comparable to a freak occurrence, the advent of which cannot arid 
need not be explained since it simply happened.^^ In addition, the literature has not so 
far attempted to place the return to convertibility in the context of European integration. 
The chronological concurrence of the return to convertibility, the coming into force of 
the tariff and quota provisions of the Rome Treaty and the failure of the free trade area 
negotiations is not coincidental. The beginning of the customs union of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) affected France’s, Britain’s and Germany’s policy on, and 
timing of, the move to convertibility, and their decision to cooperate. So far, no 
examination of the link between European integration and the move to convertibility has
Colloque tenu à Bercy les 3 et 4 décembre 1992. Presses de l'imprimerie nationale, 1993, pp.385-395.
See, for example, A. Caimcross and B. Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline: The Devaluations o f  1931, 
1949 and 1967, Basic Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1983, A.C.L. Day, The Future o f  Sterling, second 
edition. Clarendon Press, 1956, Fforde, The Bank o f  England, R. Hawtrey, The Pound at Home and 
Abroad, Longmans, 1961, F. Hirsch, The Pound Sterling: A Polemic, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1965, P. B. 
Kenen, British Monetary Policy and the Balance o f  Payments 1951-1957, Harvard University Press, 
1960, J. Polk, Sterling: Its Meaning in World Finance, Harper and Brothers, 1956, S. Strange, Sterling 
and British Policy: A Political Study o f  an International Currency in Decline, Oxford University Press, 
1971.
Strange, Sterling. Sidney Pollard merely stated that “[s]terling was made fully convertible at what 
looked to be an auspicious time”. S. Pollard, The Development o f  the British Economy 1914 - 1990, 
fourth edition, Edward Arnold, 1992, pp.319 & 357.
The lack o f interest in the move to convertibility in 1958 is all the more striking in the British case when 
considering researchers’ interest in the failed attempt at sterling convertibility in 1947. See, for example, 
L. S. Pressnell, External Economic Policy since the War, Vol. 1: The Post-War Financial Settlement, 
HMSO, 1986 and comment in G. J. Ikenberry, “The Political Origins o f Bretton Woods”, in Bordo and 
Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective, pp. 191-4.
17
been undertaken.
Alan Milward analyzed the path towards convertibility in the 1950s by 
examining the interaction betwee France, Britain and Germany on this issue.^^ 
However, due to the archival constraint at the time he conducted his research, Milward 
only analyzed the path to convertibility up until 1955. Moreover, he put strong emphasis 
on trade objectives as the force which affected the three countries’ respective stance on 
convertibility. Aside from trade considerations, however, exchange rate management, 
and foreign policy considerations also constituted key parts in the convertibility puzzle. 
None of the authors mentioned so far has examined the connection between national 
policies on convertibility on the one hand, and exchange rate stability and national 
policy autonomy on the other.
Most authors have argued, then as well as today, that while economic 
policymakers in Europe considered the rapid return to convertibility desirable and 
necessary per se, economic conditions, such as a shortage of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves, prevented them from acting as quickly as they would have liked.^  ^Kaplan and 
Schleiminger claimed that “Europeans’ interest in convertibility was genuine”, and that
A. S. Milward, “Motives for Currency Convertibility: The Pound and the Deutschmark, 1950-5”, in C - 
L. Holtfrerich (ed.), Interactions in the World Economy: Perspectives from International Economic 
History, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, pp.260-284, A. S. Milward, The European Rescue o f the Nation- 
State, Routledge, 1992, pp. 201, 345-395, and A. S. Milward, “La Livre Sterling, le Franc et le Deutsche 
Mark 1950 - 1955”, in Comité pour Thistoire économique et financière de la France (éd.). Du Franc 
Poincaré, pp.405-418,
The general argument is that the poor reserve levels o f European central banks after World War II - 
caused by a dollar shortage and, in the British case, large outstanding sterling liabilities - impeded a 
speedy return to convertibility. Foreman-Peck argued that in light o f the dollar shortage the UK had no 
alternative but to rely on quantitative restrictions throughout the 1950s, since the British economy needed 
the time and protection to recover from war and adjust to the changed postwar conditions. See A. 
Caimcross and N. Watts, The Economic Section, 1939-1961, a Study in Economic Advising, Routledge, 
1989, p.350 and J. Foreman-Peck, “Trade and the Balance o f Payments” in N.F.R. Crafts and N.W.C. 
Woodward (eds.). The British Economy since 1945, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 159.
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reservations and differences among Europeans “did not involve whether they wanted
convertibility, but only how and when to achieve it”.^  ^ Similarly, contemporary
observers of British economic policy in the 1950s identified a widespread acceptance of
the objective of convertibility:
With the exception of the autarkists and imperialists of the extreme left and 
extreme right, the principle that we should move towards convertibility is 
remarkably generally accepted.^^
This thesis rejects the seemingly well-established view that convertibility was a widely-
accepted policy aim the achievement of which was only postponed by exogenous
economic or monetary constraints. It shows instead that policymakers in the key
countries, in particular the UK, seriously questioned the desirability of convertibility
throughout the 1950s. Among other things, policymakers questioned the desirability of
multilateral and non-discriminatory trade which was the principal argument for
convertibility in the Bretton Woods creed. Thus, as will be shown, multilateral trade
was not the general motivation for establishing convertibility that it has been portrayed
to be. Moreover, there was a fundamental conflict between domestic policy aims and the
maintenance or establishment of the economic conditions necessary for the stability of a
system of free of trade and payments at fixed, though adjustable, exchange rates.
Just as the desirability of convertibility was not generally accepted, so it was by 
no means a foregone conclusion that the move to convertibility would be undertaken 
jointly by all of Western Europe. In the announcements to press and parliament, the UK 
government took deliberate care to emphasize both British leadership but also the
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p. 160. 
Day, The Future, pp.! 19-120.
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cooperative nature of the move. Upon the British Prime Minister’s intervention, the 
original press announcement was changed to state that the establishment of sterling 
convertibility was “part of a co-ordinated European move”, the date of which had been 
“chosen after consultation in the first instance between H.M.G. and the French and 
German Governments”.^  ^On the surface, the collective return to currency convertibility 
in December 1958 might be considered a showpiece of international cooperation. A 
closer inspection of the move reveals, however, that up until 1958 it was by no means 
certain that Western Europe would move to convertibility collectively. Particularly the 
UK showed little interest, throughout most of the 1950s, in cooperating with the rest of 
Europe to ensure a joint move to convertibility. Moreover, the collaboration on the 
move to convertibility did not promote the longer-term stability of the international 
monetary system. This thesis argues that the collective return to currency convertibility 
in Western Europe is not an example of countries’ willingness to cooperate and to 
renounce part of their autonomy over their domestic policymaking for the benefit of the 
collective interest and the stability of the international monetary order.
The key countries in the move to convertibility, France, Britain and Germany 
pursued very different, even conflicting, political and economic objectives with the 
return to convertibility. The contrasts in the agendas that determined national policy on 
convertibility reveal the incompatibility of the membership of these three countries in a 
joint fixed exchange rate regime. For national policymakers, the weakness of sterling 
and the French franc, on the one hand, and the strength of the DM, on the other hand, 
played an important role in the choice of the timing of convertibility. This thesis
PRO PREMl 1-2671, draft press announcement, December 27, 1958.
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analyzes the national policies on convertibility of Britain, France and Germany by 
linking them to the economic dilemma between national policy autonomy and fixed 
exchange rates. It assesses the importance of the move by establishing important links 
between the return to convertibility in December 1958 and exchange rate management 
for each of the three countries and for the Bretton Woods regime. National policy on 
convertibility both affected and was influenced by exchange rate credibility and 
expectations. By affecting expectations convertibility also had an impact on the stability 
of the Bretton Woods regime which is examined in the last two chapters of this thesis.
In addition to exchange rate considerations, national policies on European 
integration played a determining role in the return to currency convertibility. 
Particularly in Britain, policy towards Europe was still evolving in the 1950s, and, in the 
second half of the decade a significant shift in policy took place. This policy shift 
played a decisive role in British decisionmaking on convertibility in 1958, leading to a 
rather dramatic change of course. In the case of Germany, cooperation with Britain on 
convertibility was an important component of the Economics Ministry’s European 
policy. The importance of national policy towards Europe for the timing and the 
collective nature of the return to convertibility, a connection that has so far been 
neglected in the literature, will be discussed in this thesis.
The implications of the return to currency convertibility in December 1958 for 
exchange rate stability and for system stability have not yet been analyzed. As long as 
convertibility was not achieved, the Bretton Woods system could not function as
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intended?"  ^ The reluctance with which European countries approached convertibility 
reflects a more general rejection of the principles upon which the Bretton Woods system 
was built. It is shown that economic policymakers in key European countries questioned 
the desirability of an international system of multilateral trade and payments with 
convertible currencies at fixed exchange rates. Dislike of fixed exchange rates, the 
reluctance to work towards establishing the economic conditions necessary for the 
speedy return to convertibility, the delay in accepting the irreversibility of the removal 
of exchange control set out in Article VIII of the IMF articles of agreement, and the 
readiness to resort to quantitative restrictions, all reveal a hesitancy to implement, or 
maintain, the tenets agreed upon by the individual countries by becoming a member of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).^^ The examination of national policy formation 
on convertibility provides valuable insights into countries’ behavior in, and commitment 
to, an international monetary system. The policies of France, Britain and Germany are 
particularly interesting since all three countries were large enough for their economic 
and monetary policies to affect both international trade and the stability of the 
international monetary system.^^
This thesis shows that the establishment of non-resident current account 
convertibility by the Western European currencies on December 28, 1958, in itself a
Bordo, “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System” , p.4.
The IMF was established on December 27, 1945 when thirty countries attended a signing ceremony in 
Washington. Scammell, The International Economy, p. 18. According to Bordo, the Bretton Woods 
system began on December 18, 1946, when 32 countries established par values for their currencies. 
Bordo, “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System”, p.4.
For an analysis o f the effect o f national policies o f  principal members o f an international monetary 
regime on the regime see D. Calleo and S. Strange, “Money and World Politics”, in S. Strange, (ed.). 
Paths to International Political Economy, Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1984, p.99. and P. Guerrieri and P. C. 
Padoan, “Integration, Co-operation and Adjustments Policies”, in P. Guerrieri and P. C. Padoan, (eds.). 
The Political Economy o f  European Integration, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, p. 1-30.
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very technical step, was used by each of the three key country actors in the move - 
Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany - as a policy instrument to serve 
very different important political and economic goals. The three countries associated 
very different benefits with the establishment of convertibility in general, with 
cooperation in the move and with the timing of the move. The thesis analyzes the 
national policy considerations that enabled a joint return to convertibility in December 
1958.
The interaction between France, Britain and Germany in the progress towards 
convertibility, provides particularly interesting insights into the national policy goals 
which determined international cooperation in the 1950s. The analysis of past monetary 
policy with the help of access to archival documents is invaluable for the understanding 
of the formation of monetary policy and international monetary cooperation in the 
present. The breakdown of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) and the recurrent 
currency crises in the 1990s illustrate the topical need to comprehend the conflict 
between the autonomy of national economic policies and currency stability in a fixed 
exchange rate regime. Increased international capital mobility might have magnified the 
friction between national monetary policy choices and international financial markets 
today compared to the 1950s, in the sense that nearly perfect market information enables 
an almost instantaneous response to changes in economic policies or conditions, but the 
problem is a familiar one. As the British example shows, foreign exchange market 
responses to economic news in the 1950s were already significant enough to trigger 
serious, and sometimes devastating, currency crises, which in turn put pressure on 
national policymakers to act in order to stop speculation. Thus, policymakers in the 
1950s faced the same basic conflict between pursuing an independent monetary policy
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and maintaining a stable exchange rate as they do today. One of the aims of this thesis is 
to shed new light on the always topical discussion over the choice of exchange rate 
regime, by looking at the choices faced and made by policymakers in the past.
Since one of the aims of this thesis is to understand the process of national 
policy formulation and the dynamics of international monetary cooperation by looking 
at the return to convertibility, this thesis relies heavily on primary sources from the 
archives of the Bank of England, the Public Record Office, the German federal archives 
in Koblenz and the archives of the Ministry of Economics and Finance and of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France.
The first chapter defines the term convertibility and examines previously 
rendered explanations of national policy on convertibility. The chapter discusses the 
shortcomings of the hypotheses presented in the existing literature most of which 
concerns itself solely with monetary and economic conditions as determinants of 
national policy on convertibility. It also examines critically previous analyses of 
exchange rate instability, in particular of the weakness of the pound, in the 1950s. 
Finally, the first chapter also provides a background overview over the development of 
currency convertibility in the three countries. The second, third and fourth chapters 
analyze in detail the economic and political considerations that determined the national 
policies on convertibility of the UK, Germany, and France, respectively. The country 
chapters reveal the importance of political factors in the three countries’ national policy 
on convertibility. The different objectives and motivations for pursuing the return to 
convertibility according to country are analyzed to show that convertibility was used as
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a policy instrument for a wide range of problems. The fifth chapter examines the 
cooperative element of the return to convertibility in December 1958. The negotiations 
leading up to the move to convertibility between the three countries and the 
circumstances surrounding the final move to convertibility are discussed. While the UK 
chapter explained the motivations for pursuing convertibility, this chapter analyzes the 
considerations behind its decision to move collectively. The link between British policy 
on Europe and the cooperation in a joint move is established. Chapter five also assesses 
the implications for monetary stability of the decision to cooperate in convertibility. The 
conclusion looks among other things at the general inferences that might be drawn from 
the analysis of national policy on convertibility and draws parallels to topical economic 
and monetary problems in Europe.
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I: BACKGROUND AND PRECONDITIONS 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter places the topic in a theoretical and historical context. It looks at the 
creation of the European Payments Union (EPU) and at previous attempts to explain the 
return to convertibility. The chapter closes with a brief account of the path towards 
convertibility in France, Britain and Germany, respectively.
According to a widely used economics textbook, “ [a] currency is convertible [sic] 
if the government acting through the central bank, agrees to buy or sell as much of the 
currency as people wish to trade at the fixed exchange rate”.* The two principal 
components of this definition are the guarantee of exchangeability and the guarantee of 
exchange value of a currency.^ Brian Tew divided these two characteristics into “market” 
and “official” convertibility, with the former denoting a condition in which individuals 
have access to any foreign exchange market without being seriously impeded by exchange 
controls, while the latter implies that the government or the central bank stand ready to 
supply the market with domestic currency, primarily in exchange for dollars, and with 
dollars - in exchange for its domestic currency - to maintain the fixed parity (within a one 
per cent margin).
Raymond Mikesell organized different notions of the concept into degrees of
’ Begg, Fischer and Dombusch, Economics, p.526.
 ^From December 1958 to August 1971, so Tew, these two forms o f convertibility coexisted with yet another 
kind o f convertibility which was the official convertibility of the US dollar into gold - the commitment o f the 
United States to convert dollars into gold at a fixed price. Together, these different forms o f convertibility 
constituted what Tew called “Bretton Woods convertibility”. Regarding the period after Bretton Woods, 
Tew took into account the changes in the international monetary regime that followed the breakdown o f  
Bretton Woods. He described the floating exchange rate regime that started in 1974 as retaining 
convertibility “in the market” while abandoning “official” convertibility. Tew, The Evolution, pp.50-1. For 
another definition o f Bretton Woods convertibility, see Bordo, "The Bretton Woods International Monetary 
System”, pp.36-37.
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convertibility, all of which satisfy the general condition of “the availability of a currency 
or means of international payment for making payments in international transactions with 
any country or currency area"/ The degrees range from “general convertibility into gold” 
to “convertibility of balances owned by foreign central banks through a multilateral 
clearing union”. According to Polk, no currency can be completely inconvertible, in the 
sense that “given enough indirection, ingenuity, or infraction of law, every currency in the 
world is convertible into every other currency on some terms” Thus Polk argued that 
convertibility and inconvertibility were matters of degree. While this is true, currencies 
can nonetheless be officially inconvertible, with inconvertibility defined in H. E. Evitt’s 
terms as a state in which “any holder of that currency ... has no statutory right to demand 
the conversion of that currency into any other currency or gold”.^
Based on Evitt’s definition, the era of currency inconvertibility in Europe can be 
dated back to 1931 when exchange control was introduced on a large scale in response to 
the financial crisis which ravaged Europe’s currencies in the same year.^ The financial 
crisis was the culmination of currency speculation and financial instability which had been 
plaguing European currencies throughout the 1920s.  ^In September 1931, Britain, - which 
Aldcrofr identified as “the weak link in the system” -, abandoned the gold standard and
 ^According to Mikesell’s eight-tier definition, convertibility may be restricted to residents or non-residents, 
respectively, as well as to current transactions or capital transactions. R. Mikesell, Foreign Exchange in the 
Postwar World, Lord Baltimore Press, 1954, p.479.
 ^Polk, Sterling, p.239.
 ^H. E. Evitt, Manual o f Foreign Exchange, sixth edition. Pitman, 1966, pp.3-5 & 257-163.
Contrary to Tew’s use o f the term, in this thesis, official convertibility will denote the statutoiy right to 
exchange currencies.
 ^ B. Eichengreen, Elusive Stability: Essays in the History o f  International Finance, I919-I939, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.239.
’ For an analysis o f the international economic and monetary conditions o f the interwar period and the 
financial crisis o f 1931, see, for example, D. H. Aldcroft, The European Economy 1914-1990, third 
edition, Routledge, 1993, pp.4-97, Eichengreen, Elusive Stability and R. Nurkse, International Currency 
Experience, League o f Nations, 1944.
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imposed exchange control and import restrictions.* Most European countries followed the 
British example, letting their currencies depreciate with sterling while at the same time 
imposing drastic restrictions on the exchange of currencies and on trade and capital flows. 
By severely restricting currency convertibility, countries sought to isolate their domestic 
economy from the ongoing international depression and to prevent further deterioration of 
the balance of payments, but also to arrest the drain of gold reserves caused by adverse 
currency speculation and gold hoarding. As a result, “by the end of 1932, thirty-five 
countries were already off gold and twenty-seven, including nine still nominally on the 
gold standard, were officially exercising exchange control, while yet others were 
exercising unofficial controls or import prohibitions tantamount to exchange control”.^
Inconvertibility continued after World War II with foreign exchange markets 
straitjacketed by stringent exchange controls. Exchange control varied slightly from 
country to country but in most countries residents were obliged to surrender all foreign 
exchange earnings to the central bank, and the exchange of currencies was strictly 
regulated. In addition, tight controls on imports further restricted the exchange of 
currencies. Importers could only obtain the foreign exchange necessary for payment of 
imported goods for which whey had been granted a license to import, enabling the 
government to regulate and limit currency convertibility through quotas. Currency 
convertibility for capital transactions was even more restricted than for current 
transactions.
The creators of the post-war international economic order, in particular the United
* Aldcroft spoke about Britain’s “persistent tendency to lose gold”. Aldcroft, The European Economy, pp. 
56-57. For a discussion o f  sterling’s interwar experience, see Caimcross and Eichengreen, Sterling in 
Decline, ch.3. Strange, Sterling.
’ Aldcroft, The European Economy, p.76.
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States, wanted to revive the flourishing international trading system of pre-World War I 
and for this goal they considered convertibility a vital prerequisite/^ Looking back on the 
interwar period, the Bretton Woods architects blamed the breakdown of international 
monetary and financial stability, and, in particular, inconvertibility, for the collapse of 
international trade in the 1930s, and, ultimately, for the disintegration of economic and 
political stability/^ More recently Aldcroft argued that in the interwar period, “both the 
volume and value of trade, already seriously diminished before the financial crisis, 
declined even more as countries resorted to restrictive measures to insulate their domestic 
economies from the impact of depression”/^
The belief that convertibility is a vital prerequisite for multilateral trade is in line 
with basic economic theory. A convertible currency facilitates the multilateral flow of 
trade, as a country can use the income it earns from its surplus with one country or region 
to pay for a deficit it might be earning with another country or region. If a currency cannot 
be converted into other currencies then the multilateral clearing of deficits and surpluses 
becomes very difficult, if not impossible. In the Bretton Woods negotiations, particularly 
the United States lobbied for a system which would prohibit exchange control, - at least 
for current transactions -, after a transitional phase, and which would instead be based on a
Thus, “multilateral trade and convertible currencies” were believed to have “facilitated general world 
trading” in the late nineteenth century and those interwar years, the 1920s, when economies had 
prospered. Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.5.
For an account and analysis o f the creation o f the Bretton Woods system, see, for example, Gardner, 
Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy, A. Giovannini, “Bretton Woods and Its Precursors: Rules versus Discretion in 
the History o f International Monetary Regimes”, in Bordo and Eichengreen (eds.), A Retrospective, pp. 109- 
153, Dcenberry, “The Political Origins”, pp. 155-198, H. James, “The IMF and the Creation o f the Bretton 
Woods System, 1944-1958”, in B. Eichengreen (ed.), Europe's Post-War Recovery, pp.93-126, 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, and Scammell, International Monetary Policy, pp. 117-170.
G. Patterson, Discrimination in International Trade Policy Issues, 1945-1966, Princeton University Press, 
1966, pp.3-4 & 9-13. For a discussion o f  the importance o f historical experience in shaping economic policy, 
see Eichengreen, Elusive Stability, pp. 1-14.
'■ Aldcroft, The European Economy, p.74
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system of multilateral currency convertibility/^
Just as the general acceptability of national currency eliminates the costs of barter 
within a single economy, the use of national currencies in international trade 
makes the world economy function more efficiently. To promote efficient 
multilateral trade, the IMF Articles of Agreement urged IMF members to make 
their national currencies convertible as soon as possible.... General ^convertibility 
[sic] would make intemational trade extremely difficult.
Similarly, the Bank for Intemational Settlements (BIS) stated in 1953 that “[o]ne of the
main reasons for the establishment of an effective foreign exchange market [through
convertibility] is, of course, that it facilitates the interchange of goods and services
between nations and thus leads to greater efficiency and a fuller satisfaction of human
needs”.
The Articles of Agreement drafted at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 were 
intended to provide a regulatory framework for the post-war monetary system. Among 
other things, these Articles defined the type of convertibility, which their authors thought 
should be achieved.
Convertible currencies in the central sense in which this term is used in the 
Articles are the currencies of members that have undertaken to perform the 
obligations of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article VIII. These obligations involve the 
avoidance in general of restrictions on payments and transfers for current 
transactions, multiple currency practices, and discriminatory currency 
arrangements, and, in order to facilitate payments and transfers for current 
transactions, a readiness of the members concerned to convert balances of their 
own currencies held by other members into gold or the currencies of the members 
requesting conversion.
13 Patterson, Discrimination, p. 17.
For a discussion of the lessons from the interwar period and how they affected the design o f the Bretton 
Woods system, see, for example, Paniç, “The Bretton Woods system”, pp.37-54, Giovannini, “Bretton 
Woods”, Dcenberry, “The Political Origins” and James, “The IMF”.
P. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, International Economics: Theory and Policy, second edition. Harper 
Collins, 1991,p.527.
The Intemational Monetary Fund was created at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 as the institution 
responsible for monetary and financial matters.
BIS, 23rd Annual Report, April 1, 1952 to March 21, 1953, p. 137.
Intemational Monetary Fund, Reform o f  the International Monetary System: A Report by the Executive 
Directors to the Board o f  Governors, IMF, 1972, p.22.
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The provisions of Article VIII and Article IV set out the three fundamental criteria of 
convertibility, which are the assurances of the use, exchangeability and exchange value of 
a currency/^ A fixed exchange rate is thus an integral part of the Intemational Monetary 
Fund’s (IMF’s) concept of convertibility/^ The IMF applied the three convertibility 
criteria only to payments and transfers for current intemational transactions. The official 
Fund interpretation of its Articles is that Article VIII, Section 3 does not “derogate from 
the right of members to control capital movements: It is therefore, not part of the 
obligations of convertibility that members must refrain from discriminatory capital 
controls”. Thus, the IMF left it up to member governments to decide what to do about 
capital flows (Article VI, Section 3). Under Article VI, Section 1, “a member may not 
make net use of the Fund's resources to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital”, and 
the IMF may even “request a member to exercise controls to prevent such use of the 
resources of the Fund”. The IMF’s constitution is rooted in the belief that destabilizing 
capital movements led to the problems of the interwar period.^® Thus, Bretton Woods 
convertibility was non-resident convertibility for current account purposes at a fixed 
exchange rate.
THE EPU
Europe in the 1940s and 1950s was a prime example of the problems for trade
ibid., p .l.
The choice of a fixed exchange rate, with the theoretical possibility o f occasional exchange rate 
adjustment in cases of ‘fundamental disequilibrium’, at which currency convertibility would be guaranteed 
was also based on previous experiences with fixed and floating exchange rate regimes. The Bretton Woods 
system grew out of the belief, particularly on the American side, that fixed exchange rates were desirable 
because they were conducive to trade, stability and confidence. Eichengreen, Elusive Stability, p.284.
IMF, Reform o f the International Monetary System, p.7.
see James, “The IMF”. Michael Bordo defined Bretton Woods convertibility as “the freedom for 
individuals to engage in current account transactions without being subject to exchange controls”. Bordo, 
“The Bretton Woods Intemational Monetary System”, pp.37-38, footnote 30.
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created by inconvertible currencies. In the words of Kaplan and Schleiminger, “the 
European market in the late 1940s was neither Common [sic], nor free, nor 
unsegmented” Instead, European trade was organized in some 200 bilateral trading 
agreements.^^ In the agreements, two countries agreed on the volume of trade that was to 
flow between them in the coming year, with the idea that the value of each country’s 
exports to the partner country should match the value of its imports from that country. The 
central banks then exchanged their domestic currency at a fixed exchange rate up until the 
prearranged limit. There was only minor room for discrepancies between the value of one 
country's imports from and its exports to the trading partner, which was called a “swing”. 
Beyond the swing, payments, for the most part, had to be made in gold or convertible 
currency, - generally US dollars -, both of which were scarce in Europe.^^
Countries regulated their trade volume largely through their control over the 
granting of import licenses and by exchange controls, with the value of trade being 
determined on the basis of fixed exchange rates. There was some small leeway in the form 
of bilateral credits, should one country’s imports temporarily exceed its exports to the 
trading partner. Thus, if one country ran a deficit in its trade with its trading partner, it 
could be granted a credit, albeit only for a very limited period. Countries generally did not 
run persistent or large bilateral deficits with their trading partners because ultimately any 
deficit would have to be paid in US dollars or gold, both of which the European countries 
lacked. The problem was that dollars and gold were the only convertible means of 
exchange at the time - convertible meaning that any government accepted payments in 
dollars or gold - which implied that a country could not use the foreign exchange it earned
Kaplan and Schleiminger offer the most in-depth account o f  the European Payments Union so far. Kaplan 
and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.7.
“  ibid.
23 Tew, The Evolution, p^ .\5-\6.
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from a bilateral surplus with a non-dollar area country to pay for a bilateral deficit it might 
run with another country. Important exceptions to the system of bilateral trading 
arrangements were the sterling area, the franc area and the dollar area, where the pound 
sterling, the franc and the US dollar, respectively, “circulated without restriction as 
multilateral means of settlement” These were essentially imperial arrangements run by 
the three metropolitan central banks. The crucial difference between the dollar area on the 
one hand and the sterling and franc area on the other - making the former a “hard” 
settlement and the latter two “soft” settlement areas - was that sterling and francs were 
only allowed to circulate freely within and were not convertible into currencies of 
countries outside their respective areas. Specifically, members could not use sterling, 
which they had accumulated as a result of intra-sterling area trade, to make payments in 
convertible sterling to the dollar area.^^
The trade-impeding effects of limited convertibility and bilateral trading 
arrangements are obvious. One country’s exports to another country were limited by the 
latter’s imports from the former. Even if one country ran a surplus in its trade with another 
country, it could not use the proceeds of that surplus to offset a deficit it might be running 
with a third country, since European currencies could not be converted into one another. 
Instead it would have to pay the deficit to the third country in either dollars or gold, both 
of which it couldn't afford to lose, precisely because they were the only convertible 
currencies. In the longer run, a country could thus only export to another country as much 
as it was importing from that country.
ibid.
ibid., pp.16-17.
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The EPU was created in 1950 to overcome the limitations that currency 
inconvertibility placed on the development of intra-European trade/^ It provided a 
mechanism by which countries could offset surpluses with one country with deficits with 
another country. It was essentially a clearing union for trade payments made in any 
member cu rrency In  the course of the existence of the EPU from 1950 until 1958, 
Western Europe made the transition from a system of bilateral trading arrangements to a 
multilateral system of trade and payments within Western Europe.^^ In monthly 
settlements a country’s overall receipts from its trade with all other EPU members were 
added up and then subtracted from its overall payment obligations to all EPU members. 
This mechanism stood in stark contrast to the previous strictly bilateral trade, where a 
country’s receipts from one country could only be offset by its payments to the same 
country. The EPU monthly settlements left a country either in overall balance, or in an 
overall debtor or creditor position with respect to the whole of the EPU. Countries that 
were overall debtors in the EPU had a limited automatic credit facility - a debtor quota - 
upon which they could draw for the financing of their overall balance of payments deficit 
towards the EPU. As they drew more and more credit, however, the ratio of the credit that 
they had to pay back in gold increased in steps or tranches. Once a debtor country had 
exhausted its quota it had to settle its debt with the EPU entirely in gold, unless it was able
In the late 1940s, gradual steps had been taken to multilateralize intra-European trade and payments, in the 
form o f the Agreement on Multilateral Monetary Compensation o f November 1947 and the first Intra- 
European Payments Agreement (lEPA) in October 1948. These pre-EPU agreements are discussed in W. 
Diebold Jr., Trade and Payments in Western Europe: A Study in Economic Cooperation 1947-1951, Council 
on Foreign Relations, 1952. For literature on the EPU see, B. Eichengreen, Reconstructing Europe’s Trade 
and Payments: The European Payments Union, Manchester University, 1993, Kaplan and Schleiminger, The 
European Payments Union, A. S. Milward, The Reconstruction o f  Western Europe 1945-1951, Methuen & 
Co., 1984, pp.320-334. Tew, The Evolution, pp.38-43, and R. Triffm, Europe and the Money Muddle: From 
Bilateralism to Near-Convertibility, 1947-1956, Yale University Press, 1957.
It was administered by a Managing Board whose task was “to supervise the operations and recommend 
improvements in the system”. For a brief summary o f the EPU, see Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European 
Payments Union, chapter 5, “EPU System in a Nutshell”.
Brian Tew called the EPU system a “binary system”, since there were parallel arrangements for hard and
34
to convince the Managing Board of its need for a special credit?^ Similarly, there were 
creditor quotas for countries that had overall surpluses with the EPU. Within the first 20 
per cent tranche of their quota, creditors’ surpluses were settled by giving a credit to the 
EPU. But for all the later tranches, that is, as surpluses grew from 20 per cent of their 
quota to 100 per cent, they received 50 per cent in gold or dollars and 50 per cent in credit 
for these surpluses. In addition to this tranche system, the ratio of gold to credit at which 
EPU settlements were made if a country used its entire quota, was also gradually increased 
over time.^  ^Initially, the gold/credit ratio had been 40:60 for a country that had used its 
entire quota. In July 1954 the proportion of gold to credit was raised to 50:50 for all 
settlements, creditors and debtors alike. In August 1955, the gold/credit ratio was again 
increased to 15:25?^ Increasing the gold element in the settlements mechanism performed 
two functions. Firstly, EPU debtors had to pay back their credits increasingly in hard 
currency that was still scarce. A growing gold element in EPU settlements was thus a way 
of imposing greater disciplinary constraint on deficit countries by deterring them from 
pursing expansionary policies which increased domestic demand, and thus imports, at a 
faster pace than in the rest of the EPU. Secondly, an increasing gold element 
correspondingly raised the degree of gold convertibility of European currencies, and, 
consequently, their convertibility into dollars. The EPU thus made European currencies 
transferable throughout the EPU area, while the ‘hardening’ of the EPU made them 
partially and increasingly convertible into dollars.
soft settlements, with the EPU being the soft settlement area and the dollar area the hard settlement area. 
Tew, The Evolution, p. 15.
These special credits had strings attached to them, which deterred some debtors firom seeking them even in 
situations o f extreme debt.
Each country had its own quota which was the same for the debit and the credit side with the size being 
determined by a percentage o f its trade volume in 1949 (15 per cent).
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.94.
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Lately, questions have been raised as to whether the EPU actually paved the road
to convertibility or whether it in fact delayed or obstructed quicker progress toward
currency convertibility.^^ The EPU made Western European currencies de facto
convertible for trade purposes within the EPU. Thus, the EPU arguably facilitated intra-
European trade, at the expense of trade between Europe and the rest of the world, in
particular trade between Europe and hard currency countries. In addition, as long as the
surpluses were not settled 100 per cent in gold or hard currencies, the agreement
guaranteed overall debtors within the EPU an automatic credit. Since especially deficits
with the dollar area had to be paid for in gold or hard currency, it was argued that a
partially soft EPU might have induced countries to maintain discrimination against dollar
goods and thus ensure that they ran a deficit with the EPU rather than with the dollar area.
Eichengreen examined the trade-diverting effects of the EPU and found that
[t]he discriminatory features of the EPU emphasized by contemporaries do appear 
to have significantly affected the direction of international trade. Participants 
traded significantly more with one another than would be predicted on the basis of 
their economic characteristics and the behavior typical of other countries. They 
traded significantly more with one another than they did with the rest of the 
world.^ ^
Trade distribution is important for understanding these countries’ stand on the EPU, and, 
consequently, for understanding their policy on convertibility. The country chapters will 
examine to what extent the discriminatory features affected each country’s policy stance 
on the EPU and thus on a move to convertibility.
Another criticism leveled against the EPU was that structural deficit countries 
within the EPU, such as France, might have resisted not only a hardening of the EPU but
see, for example, Eichengreen, Reconstructing.
Eichengreen, Reconstructing, pp. 116-117. For the econometric analysis see pp. 101-117.
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also a move to currency convertibility, since, for reasons explained later, the latter would 
have spelt the end of the EPU and thus of automatic credits. Rather than promote global 
convertibility, the EPU might have led to members preferring to keep trade within the 
EPU and associated monetary areas, instead of exposing their economies to global 
competition, in particular from the United States. Another principal problem of the EPU 
was that, while its progressive ‘hardening’ arguably imposed greater discipline on deficit 
countries, by forcing them to pay back an increasing portion of their debts in gold or 
dollars, the ‘hardening’ made it increasingly attractive for surplus countries to accumulate 
surpluses in the EPU since they received hard currency payment for a growing share of 
their surpluses. Thus, while the ‘hardening’ of the EPU put greater pressure on deficit 
countries to adjust their economies to balance their external balances, it did not increase 
pressure on surplus countries to adjust economies to reduce their surpluses. The lack of 
pressure within the EPU to correct structural payments surpluses was particularly apparent 
in the case of Germany. In their attempts to obtain a change in German economic policy 
that would lead to a reduction in German surpluses, EPU members were restricted to 
appealing to German good will.
The EPU was created to facilitate intra-European trade in the absence of currency 
convertibility while at the same time preparing European economies for convertibility. 
Once European currencies had become convertible established, the EPU lost its primary 
purpose of existence.^ "^  According to James, the EPU “had a specific task to perform and 
was redundant after the completion of that mission”.^  ^Depending on their trade patterns 
and national trade policies, countries are likely to have had very different views on the
As will be shown in the country chapters, proponents o f the EPU argued that in the course o f  its 
existence the EPU acquired a role as a forum for intergovernmental consultation and cooperation that 
justified its continued existence even after convertibility.
H. James, “The IMF”, p.96.
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establishment of convertibility, not only of their own currencies, but also of other 
European currencies, particularly when convertibility implied the end of the EPU. 
Moreover, aside from the trade, countries might have attributed other economic or 
political costs or benefits to the EPU, for example as a forum for European economic 
cooperation or consultation. To understand countries’ national policy on convertibility, 
one must therefore examine their attitude towards the EPU, and in particular towards a 
termination of the EPU. The analysis of the return to convertibility must therefore explain 
why convertibility replaced the EPU when it did and why countries might have hesitated 
to end the EPU. Barry Eichengreen’s Reconstructing Europe 5 Trade and Payments from 
1993 is one of the few attempts that have been made so far to analyze Europe’s return to 
convertibility. His analysis will be discussed in the following section.
PRECONDITIONS FOR CONVERTIBILITY
T h e  E ic h e n g r e e n  H y p o t h e sis
In examining the problems of the economies of Eastern Europe in 1990, Janos 
Komai identified several necessary preconditions for the establishment of viable 
convertibility.^^ These preconditions were, “a realistic exchange rate consistent with 
balance of payments equilibrium”, “sufficient foreign exchange reserves”, “elimination of 
monetary overhangs to prevent domestic absorption from crowding out exports and 
spilling over into unsustainable balance of payments deficits”, and “adequate wage 
discipline”.^  ^Barry Eichengreen applied Komai's preconditions to Western Europe after 
World War II to examine whether the EPU was necessary or whether countries could have
J. Komai, The Road to a Free Economy, Norton, 1990.
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moved directly to currency convertibility?^ He found that, “[m]ost of the obvious 
preconditions for the viability of current account convertibility appear to have been met 
when European countries opted instead for the European Payments Union in 1950”?  ^
Eichengreen claimed that a slightly larger devaluation than the one undertaken in 1949 in 
the UK and the Scandinavian countries would have been sufficient to eliminate current 
account deficits. He argued further that “[rjelative to the trade that had to be financed, it is 
not obvious, ... that the EPU countries possessed inadequate reserves”."^  ^ Moreover, he 
contended that the monetary overhangs, - the result of price controls and pent-up demand - 
, had been eliminated in most economies by the early 1950s and in the UK by 1955. 
Regarding wage discipline, Eichengreen acknowledged that wage costs in Europe 
continued to undermine the competitiveness of European goods vis-à-vis the US 
throughout the 1950s. Nonetheless he estimated that, with the exception of the UK and 
France, from the early 1950s onwards, labor costs would not have threatened the viability 
of convertibility at pegged exchange rates. Overall, Eichengreen concluded that 
convertibility could have been established and maintained as early as 1952 or even 1950. 
Therefore, he claimed, the choice to delay convertibility can be explained by a consensus 
among European countries on the advantages offered by the EPU which convertibility 
could not provide.
Eichengreen, Reconstructing, pp.44-5. 
ibid., pp.39-69. 
ibid., p.62. 
ibid., p.55.
In particular, he argues that “[a] critical function o f  the EPU, ..., was to help seal the domestic and 
intemational bargains upon which the post-World War II generation o f European economic growth was 
based”. Domestically, the EPU was “one o f the web o f institutional arrangements that ‘locked in’ the 
domestic distributional compact”. “Internationally, the postwar settlement involved a commitment to 
trade and European integration. For countries to restructure their economies along export-oriented lines, 
they had to be convinced that their neighbors embraced the same commitment. Here the EPU acted as an 
institutional exit barrier lending credibility to the commitment to trade and integration.” Eichengreen, 
Reconstructing, pp.4-5.
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Eichengreen’s analysis suffers from some shortcomings and oversimplifications. 
First, his analysis of the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves only looked at the 
development of the reserves of the EPU countries as a whole, ignoring the growing 
unevenness in the distribution of reserves among the EPU countries. Thus, Germany’s 
reserves grew at a rate that was disproportionately high, contributing significantly to the 
increase in overall reserves of the EPU countries, while UK and French reserves stagnated 
or even declined. Germany’s holdings of gold and dollar reserves as a portion of the 
world's gold and dollar reserves increased from one per cent in 1948 to 11 per cent in
1957. Whereas France's gold and dollar reserves accounted for 20 per cent of the world 
total in 1928 its share had dwindled to one per cent of world holdings in 1948 and was still 
one per cent in 1957. Britain’s gold and dollar reserves similarly remained stagnant at four 
per cent between 1948 and 1957 after having accounted for six per cent in 1928 and ten 
per cent in 1938.^^
Second, and more importantly, in examining the preconditions, Eichengreen 
implicitly assumed that the EPU countries worked like a democracy when it came to 
deciding when to return to convertibility. His assessment is based on the assumption that 
since the necessary preconditions were fulfilled for the large majority of countries in the 
early 1950s, EPU countries’ decisions to delay convertibility must be attributable to a 
consensus shared by all EPU countries to prefer the EPU over convertibility. This 
assumption allows him to brush aside his finding that in the UK, and to a lesser extent in 
France, the Komai preconditions for viable convertibility were either not fulfilled or only 
later than in the other EPU countries."^  ^ In assigning equal decision weight to all EPU
Figures from H. Kasten, Internationale Wahrungsreserven und die nationale Reservepolitik, Fritz 
Knapp Verlag, 1959, p. 19. Total world holdings exclude the reserves o f intemational organizations.
In the case o f France, Eichengreen argued that the monetary overhang had been removed by inflation, 
implying that inflation was higher than average in France. Thus France replaced one problem, monetary
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countries, Eichengreen ignored that, of the EPU countries, only three, namely, France,
Britain and Germany, had the political and/or economic power to affect, individually, the
timing of the move to convertibilityEichengreen’s analysis, while very valuable in
proving that, according to Komai’s four preconditions, most EPU countries could have
established and maintained convertibility in 1950, failed to recognize the
disproportionately greater importance of the economic conditions in the three key
countries in determining the move to convertibility. Moreover, the assessment that
Western Europe delayed convertibility because countries preferred the advantages offered
by the EPU neglects the fact that Britain continuously worked against the EPU from its
inception, trying at several stages in the 1950s to end it."^ ^
A third criticism of Eichengreen’s analysis relates to his argument that
convertibility was delayed because of a ‘coordination problem’. According to
Eichengreen, the establishment of convertibility in the early 1950s would have had to be
undertaken jointly with a devaluation of at least some of the EPU countries in order to
assure a “realistic exchange rate consistent with balance of payments equilibrium”.
However, the effectiveness of a devaluation in restoring balance of payments equilibrium,
that is, the price elasticity of exports, “depended on the number of other countries offering
market access”. Eichengreen argued that
it was not feasible for any one country to devalue and adopt convertibility on its 
own, but if all the relevant countries devalued, restored convertibility and opened 
their markets simultaneously, the strategy might prove viable. Devaluation was 
difficult to coordinate internationally, as both 1931 and 1949 had shown. Unable 
to solve this problem cooperatively, it is said, cautious governments retreated to 
inconvertibility."^^
overhang, with another, namely inflation. The latter, however, undermines exchange rate stability, 
making the prospect o f viable convertibility questionable.
^  In 1955, many believed that “if the U.K. moves they will all move, none being willing to be left behind”. 
BoE G 1/99, George Bolton reporting to the Governor on US views, April 4, 1955.
^^Milward, The European Rescue, pp.350-66.
Eichengreen, Reconstructing, p.42.
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This analysis applies to Belgium and the Netherlands. Both countries signaled their 
interest in establishing convertibility at several times between 1954 and 1956."^  ^
Eichengreen is correct that these countries most likely refrained from acting because for 
them a successful move had to involve as many other countries, and, in particular, as many 
of their big trading partners, as possible. They only considered acting in concert with the 
rest of Western Europe. However, the British plans for convertibility in 1952 and 1953 
show that UK policymakers worried little about other countries not following it into 
convertibility."^  ^In general, as the UK chapter will show, trade, and, particularly, access to 
European markets played a minor role in determiiiing British policy on convertibility.
In Eichengreen’s study, Britain emerges as the country with the least satisfactory 
overall record of fulfilling the preconditions for viable convertibility. According to the 
preconditions hypothesis, Britain should therefore have been the least likely to advocate a 
return to convertibility. However, Britain was one of the first countries in the 1950s 
publicly to contemplate the establishment of convertibility. Eichengreen, while very useful 
in offering an explanation for the ensemble of smaller countries’ policy on convertibility, 
cannot explain Britain’s policy on convertibility in the 1950s.
Finally, Eichengreen’s analysis does not explain why convertibility was 
established, jointly by all Western European countries, when it was, namely in December
1958. Up until 1958, France's competitiveness was deteriorating due to inflation that was 
growing more rapidly than anywhere else in Western Europe, with the possible exception
See, for example. The Banker, “Sterling Now”, June 1956, pp.333-4.
The early UK plans for convertibility, particularly Robot, envisaged very little if any consultation, not 
to mention coordination, with EPU members preceding a British move to convertibility. Similarly, the 
failure o f these plans is not linked to the fear o f detrimental effects on UK trade. For a discussion of the 
early and unilateral plans for convertibility, see Fforde, The Bank o f  England, Milward, The European 
Rescue, and Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union.
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of Italy. Judging by free market exchange rates, France’s currency was one of the weakest. 
Moreover, France trailed way behind the European average in trade liberalization. Up until 
1958, nothing indicated that France was ready, or was preparing itself for the 
establishment of convertibility. Between 1952 and 1958, France was one of the strongest 
opponents to the establishment of convertibility. However, in December 1958, France 
took the biggest leap forward by combining a massive domestic economic reform with 
trade liberalization, devaluation and the establishment of convertibility. Eichengreen’s 
analysis fails to explain the drastic turnaround in economic policy that took place in 
France in 1958.
F o r e ig n  e x c h a n g e  r e s e r v e s  a n d  c o n v e r t ib il it y
Corresponding to one of Komai’s preconditions for convertibility, one of the 
principal concerns of British policymakers regarding the establishment of convertibility in 
the 1950s was whether foreign exchange reserves were sufficient to support a move."^  ^ In 
early 1955, the President of Barclays Bank claimed that the level of UK foreign exchange 
reserves were still too low to be able to defend the convertibility of sterling.^® How can 
reserve sufficiency be measured? What level of reserves can be considered sufficient to 
allow the establishment of convertibility? Many opponents of convertibility in the 1950s 
argued that intemational liquidity was insufficient to meet the needs of rapidly growing 
world trade.^  ^ The inadequacy of intemational liquidity allegedly made it impossible for
In her examination o f the external monetary policy o f the Bundesbank in the 1950s, Monika Dickhaus 
similarly listed sufficient currency reserves as a necessary prerequisite for convertibility. She claimed that 
currency reserves were viewed as confidence-building and considered necessary to prevent a run on the 
reserves. Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, pp.33-4.
L. Camu, “La convertibilité et les Banques”, in Revue des Sciences économiques, March 1955, p.22.
For contemporary views on the international liquidity problem, see Kasten, Internationale 
Wahrungsreserven, R. Harrod, The Pound Sterling 1951-1958, Essays in Intemational Finance, No.30,
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countries to earn sufficient foreign exchange reserves to allow the establishment of
convertibility/^ Examining the reserve requirement in the context of the Bretton Woods
system of pegged convertible currencies, Obstfeld argued that
... countries need to have on hand a buffer stock of internationally liquid assets - 
essentially gold or dollars -available to smooth consumption or stabilize 
investment in the face of unexpected income shortfalls or deteriorations in trading 
opportunities.
... The individual country's need for an adequate stock of intemational liquidity, 
both as a buffer and to peg exchange rates, motivates the definition of external 
equilibrium that is probably most relevant for the Bretton Woods period: a target 
on change in net government holdings of a widely accepted intemational means of 
payment or of foreign assets quickly convertible into such at low cost.^^
The ability of reserves to cover short-term deteriorations in the trade balance is one
indicator of reserve sufficiency. Reserve sufficiency with regard to the trade balance can
be measured by the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to average monthly imports. The
second test applied to reserve sufficiency in the 1950s centered around the ratio of a
country’s foreign exchange reserves to its foreign liabilities. Third, according to one
prominent Belgian banker in the 1950s, the level of reserves that is considered sufficient
depends on the level of confidence the currency inspires. '^*
A look at the development of the foreign exchange reserves in Britain, France and 
Germany in the 1950s shows consistently growing reserves for Germany, which contrast 
with relatively stagnant reserves in both France and Britain. Figure I.l shows British, 
French and German quarterly gold and convertible currency reserves converted into US 
dollars between 1952 and 1959.
Princeton University Press, 1958, and R. V. Roosa, “Reforming the Intemational Monetary System”, in 
Foreign Affairs, Vol.42, N o .l, October 1963, pp. 107-122.
^Jjames, “The IMF”, pp.l 18-121.
Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, pp.205-6.
Camu, “La convertibilité”, p.22.
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Figure I.l: Gold and convertible currency reserves: 1952-1959
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Source: OEEC, Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics.
Germany's foreign exchange holdings rose consistently throughout the 1950s with the 
exception of the winter of 1957/8 and 1959. The exclusion of the net bilateral claims on 
other European countries arising from the liquidation of the EPU starting in 1959 probably 
accounts for this apparent fall in Bundesbank assets. In contrast, Britain’s gold and foreign 
exchange assets fluctuated in the same period between, roughly, two and three billion US 
dollars, without ever showing consistent signs of improvement. French reserves were 
similarly stagnant with the exception of a significant increase in 1955 and an improvement 
in reserves starting in 1959.^  ^ German reserves started out as the smallest of the three
Any attempt to interpret French reserve statistics must be prefaced with the cautionary note that French 
reserve data differ considerably according to source and their reliability in the 1950s was in general 
questionable according to the IMF; see IMF International Financial Statistics, foot- and endnotes in 
French sections on gold and foreign exchange.
In addition, the devaluations o f 1957 and 1958 further complicate cross-country comparisons.
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countries. But by early 1955 reserves had overtaken both British and French reserves and 
continued to grow strongly.
Table I.l: Gold and foreign exchange holdings (convertible currency) 
(million US dollars at end of period)^
Assets Liabilities Net (assets minus 
liabilities)
FRG UK France FRG UK France FRG UK France
1952 710 1845 86 9013 624 -7168
1953 1281 2518 829 13 9780 717 1268 -7262 112
1954 1997 2762 1261 34 10368 495 1963 -7606 766
1955 2404 2120 1912 33 10013 212 2371 -7893 1700
1956 3402 2237 1180 37 9582 300 3365 -7345 880
1957 4105 2273 645 170 9164 1121 3935 -6891 -476
1958 4604 3069 1050 89 9377 1681 4515 -6308 -631
1959 4532 2736 1720 98 9820 744 4434 -7084 976
1960 6737 3231 2070 102 10878 6635 -7647
a: gold and foreign exchange holdings o f Bundesbank for ERG and of
Exchange Equalization Account for UK 
Source: calculated from IMF Intemational Financial Statistics.
For France: Banque de France annual reports.
A superficial glance at the relationship between gold and foreign exchange assets and 
liabilities, as displayed in table I.l, produces again a much more favorable picture for 
Germany than for France or Britain. The overall absence of a clear upward trend in the 
UK’s reserves, especially when compared with Germany’s performance, certainly did not 
increase confidence in the ability of Britain to maintain the exchange rate of the pound, 
especially if the pound became convertible. Matters were made worse by the large sterling 
liabilities which exceeded by far the gold and foreign exchange assets of the Exchange 
Equalization Account (EEA) and which failed to drop significantly throughout the 
1950s.^  ^Germany’s foreign liabilities, on the other hand, were reduced to insignificance
56 These liabilities were thought to be easily liquifiable and therefore volatile. However, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter, the majority o f  sterling liabilities were not very volatile and, therefore, not the threat to 
the reserves that they were made out to be.
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by the its gold and foreign exchange assets, serving further to bolster confidence in the 
DM especially when compared to the pound.
Table 1.2: Convertible gold and foreign exchange holdings 
divided by average monthly commodity imports
FRG UK France
1952 2.4 2.6 n.a.
1953 4.3 3.7 3.8
1954 5.6 4.0 5.6
1955 5.4 2.7 6.9
1956 6.8 2.9 3.6
1957 7.3 2.8 1.8
1958 7.9 3.9 3.5
1959 6.9 3.2 5.9
1960 8.6 3.4 5.4
Source: calculated from OECD Balance o f  Payments Statistics 1950-61
and IMF International Financial Statistics.
The comparison of the growth in gold and foreign exchange reserves to the 
development of imports, as shown in table 1.2, relates a country’s reserves to its potential 
foreign exchange needs to pay for imports.^^ For Germany, this indicator shows again a 
steady increase, as the ratio of reserves to average monthly imports rises from 2.4 in 1952 
to 8.6 in 1960, while in the British case, the ratio actually dropped between 1953 and
1960. Germany’s reserve holdings thus grew quicker than its already rapid import groAVth, 
even after the removal of most import controls after 1954, while Britain's reserves failed to 
keep pace even with the sluggish growth of its imports in the same period. Just as the 
dynamic upward trend in Germany’s foreign reserves made convertibility look easy for 
Germany, the stagnant, and therefore continued precarious, situation of Britain's foreign
The central bank assessed the level o f gold and foreign exchange holdings in relation to the country's 
needs for foreign reserves by dividing them by the average monthly import value. See, for example. Bank 
deutscher Lander Geschaftsbericht fiir das Jahr 1954, 1955, p.30.
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exchange reserves ensured that convertibility remained a daunting task for the British 
government and financial institutions. France’s ratio statistic is characterized by the most 
extreme vacillations of all three countries, indicating, if anything, the absence of a stable 
upv^ard trend in the development of foreign exchange reserves with regard to imports. 
Moreover, a closer inspection of French reserves will show later that the levels indicated 
in the above table were frequently only maintained through massive foreign credits. In 
general, it is difficult to obtain reliable statistics on French reserves in the 1950s.^^
The above measures of reserve performance, - reserve growth, reserve-liability 
comparison, and reserve-import ratios -, indicate a significantly more favorable 
development for Germany than for Britain or France. From this brief overview of reserve 
sufficiency one would therefore conclude that Germany should have been more 
predisposed to convertibility than Britain or France. However, for several reasons reserve 
sufficiency is a misleading or unreliable indication of a country’s ability or willingness to 
move to convertibility. A country’s reserves statistics, as they are generally published, are 
made up of many different components, the weight and development of which are often 
very difficult to distill. The trade balance, - with a trade surplus earning a country reserves, 
and a trade deficit costing reserves -, is only one of the economic variables affecting a 
country's level of reserves. Government intervention in the foreign exchange market, - that 
is, the sale, or purchase, of domestic currency for, or with, foreign currency with the 
purpose of affecting the exchange rate -, can also significantly increase or decrease a 
country’s reserves. However, data on the magnitude of foreign exchange market 
intervention are very difficult to obtain. In addition, reserve levels differ significantly
See IMF International Financial Statistics, footnotes and endnotes in French section on gold and 
foreign exchange reserves.
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according to whether the data include actual credits and available credit lines, such as IMF 
drawing facilities. Also, after World War II European reserves were generally 
‘subsidized’, although to varying degrees, by US aid or military expenditure. The different 
components that combine to determine a country’s foreign exchange reserves make it very 
difficult not only to assess its actual reserve-earning potential but also to identify and 
assign changes in reserves to a specific factor.^  ^A decrease in reserves need not indicate a 
deterioration in the current account or a period of speculation against a currency if the 
decline is caused, for example, by the repayment of a foreign loan. The repayment might 
actually be an indication of an otherwise strengthening reserve earning capacity, as a result 
of which the government sees itself able to repay a loan or debt ahead of time, assuming 
that the government can choose the timing of the repayment. In 1957, Germany, in light of 
the strength of its trade balance and its reserves offered to repay in advance £60 million 
pounds, purchased with US dollars, of its debt for post-war economic assistance. The 
repayment increased British gold and dollar reserves and reduced Britain’s EPU debt 
while at the same time reducing German gold and dollar reserves and its EPU credit, both 
of which, according to Rootham from the Bank of England, was “one of the objects of the 
exercise”.^  ^ Finally, leads and lags in the payment of trade can significantly affect 
reserves. An importer’s decision to accelerate payment of goods or an exporter’s decision 
to delay payment are determined by the trader’s confidence in the stability of the exchange 
rate. For example, if an importer expects a devaluation of his or her currency in the near 
future, he or she will want to accelerate payments.^  ^ Thus, a country’s reserve level is the
See also B. Eichengreen, A. K. Rose, and C. Wyplosz, Speculative Attacks on Pegged Exchange Rates: 
An Empirical Exploration with Special Reference to the European Monetary System, NBER working 
paper No.4898, 1994, p.l8.
BoE OV34/42, Memo by Rootham, January 30, 1957 and P. Vinter to Copleston, “Germany: 
Accelerated Debt Repayment”, January 23, 1957.
* 'lt is  very difficult to estimate the size o f leads and lags in times o f speculation for or against the pound.
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outcome of a host of factors that combine to determine a country’s reserve level. When all 
factors pull in the same direction to indicate a strong general trend, then the complexity of 
reserve data does not prevent the observer from being able to draw fairly clear, and 
correct, conclusions. This was the case in Germany in the 1950s. Reserves ceased to be an 
issue early in the 1950s. Their rapid and continued growth ensured that reserve sufficiency 
was no obstacle to convertibility. However, for France and Britain, there is no such 
general trend. As a result, the ability to assess the strength or weakness of a country’s 
currency according to its foreign exchange reserves, can be misleading. Like British 
reserves, French reserves refused to grow in the 1950s. However, the sterling overhang, - 
the accumulation of sizable sterling liabilities in excess of reserves -, made UK reserves a 
more popular topic of discussion in Europe than French reserves, particularly in 
connection with convertibility. As opposed to Britain, in France, convertibility was not a 
controversial and topical issue in the 1950s, mostly because the return to convertibility 
was not the government’s pet issue that it was in the UK. The following sections examine 
reserves in relation to, first, trade and competitiveness, second, liabilities, and, third, 
confidence. They concentrate on the link between reserves and convertibility in the UK, 
with France and Germany mainly serving as standards of comparison.
Reserves and the current account
A country’s ability to run current account surpluses is one determinant of the size
Similar to other short term capital flows they are often grouped under “errors and omissions” in balance of  
payments statements, making their movements difficult to trace. The Economist claimed in late 1956 that 
“[i]t has been authoritatively estimated that the total swing o f the pendulum o f ‘leads and lags’ in sterling 
payments throughout the world can affect the gold and dollar reserve by no less than £400 million”. The 
Radcliffe report estimated that they could amount to hundreds o f millions o f pounds and that in the third 
quarter o f 1957 they might have cost the UK reserves as much as £90 to 100 million, which would have 
amounted to nearly half o f the fall in reserves during the crisis. The important point here is that leads and 
lags o f  payments are nearly impossible to control, yet they can have a significant impact on the trade 
balance and foreign exchange earnings. The Economist, “How vulnerable is sterling?”, November 17, 
1956, p.5.. The Banker, “The Report analysed”, September 1959, pp.523-4, J. Spraos, “Speculation, 
arbitrage and sterling”, in The Economic Journal, March 1959, pp.7-8.
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of its foreign exchange reserves. The balance for visible trade offers a better indication of a 
country’s reserve-earning capacity as linked to trade movements than the current account 
balance. The latter includes official transfers, which, especially in the case of West 
Germany, were quite significant in this period, thus distorting the picture of market trends 
since official transfers did not respond to comparative advantage or other market forces. 
The trade balance, and the ability of a country to earn reserves through trade surpluses, 
however, is one indication of a country’s competitiveness.
Figure 1.2: Trade balance 1950-1961 (million US dollars)
InFRG
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961
Source: OECD Statistics o f Balance o f Payments 1950-61.
Figure 1.2 compares the trade balances of the FRO, Britain and France between 1950 and
1961. Germany’s trade balance record clearly separates it from Britain and France. After 
1950, the trade balance never went back into deficit, and instead showed a continuous 
upward trend, with the exceptions of 1955, when the trade surplus fell, and 1958, when it 
remained the same as the previous year. Britain’s trade balance reveals almost the opposite
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trend. The trade balance displayed a deficit throughout the period with the exceptions of 
1955 and 1958, when Britain registered small surpluses. The French trade surplus showed 
consistent deficits until 1959 after which the trade balance became and stayed positive. 
The German trade balance thus provided a solid footing for a continuous and growing 
inflow of foreign exchange earnings. The prospects of continuous rising foreign exchange 
reserves in turn contributed significantly to confidence in the DM, whereas in Britain the 
trade balance certainly did not increase confidence in the pound and it probably even hurt 
the pound since it offered no prospects of grooving foreign exchange earnings and thus did 
nothing to alleviate fears of insufficient foreign reserves to back the pound in case of a 
move to convertibility.
Britain’s inability to accumulate foreign exchange reserves was a symptom of 
what can be identified as a structural balance of payments problem. Up until 1929, 
Britain’s invisible earnings kept its current account in healthy surplus.^  ^Thus, dividend, 
interest and profit earnings firom UK investment abroad combined with a surplus in the 
balance for services and transfers to more than offset Britain’s traditional trade deficits. 
The resulting net surplus on current account allowed Britain to accumulate gold and 
foreign exchange reserves and to create its overseas capital investments. After World War 
II, Britain’s earnings from investments abroad and from the provision of financial services 
fell, the former being partially due to the significant liquidation of capital investments 
outside the UK in the course of the war.^  ^ In general, the surplus on the current account 
was considered unsatisfactory, particularly since a large section of the surplus was due to 
US defense aid to the UK. In 1952, Chancellor of the Exchequer Richard Butler stated that
See, for example, C. Feinstein, “Success and Failure: British Economic Growth since 1948”, in Floud 
and McCloskey (eds.). The Economic History, pp. 103-4, and Scammell, The International Economy, 
pp.111-3.
See also. The Banker, “Britain’s Invisible Earnings”, May 1958, pp.327-331.
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Britain needed an annual current account surplus of £300 to £350 million, to be achieved 
through an increase in exports, to ensure the necessary stability in the external balances 
and allow Britain to increase its reserves. "^^  This goal still held in 1957.^  ^ Since the UK 
was a net exporter of capital and consistently ran a deficit in its visible trade balance, the 
surplus had to come from invisible eamings.^^ However, invisible earnings failed to meet 
these demands.
All sterling area countries pooled their reserves in London. Thus, if sterling area 
countries outside Britain earned gold and dollars from their balance of payments they sold 
them to the UK. Alternatively, when they needed gold and dollars they were entitled to 
purchase them from the UK gold and dollar reserves. The rest of the sterling area (RSA) 
was a “net contributor to the central gold and dollar reserves throughout the 1950s, even 
including the deterioration of the RSA balance of payments vrith the EPU after 1955”.^  ^
This can also be seen in table 1.3 below. According to Schenk, between 1950 and 1958, 
the overseas sterling area contributed on average £7.4 million per quarter to the central 
reserves.^^ The UK inability to accumulate gold and foreign exchange reserves can 
therefore not be attributed to the rest of the sterling area, on the contrary, their consistent 
reserve earnings provided an element of stability for the UK's otherwise troubled reserves. 
The table shows the make up of the UK's gold and dollar reserves between 1952 and 1957. 
The net increase in gold and dollar reserves from UK transactions with the dollar area in 
the second half of 1957 is largely explained by a credit of £90 million from the US
^  Federal Reserve Bank o f  New York, Monthly Review, January 1954, p.8.
PRO T236-3945, “The Sterling Area”, T.L. Rowan to Makins and Chancellor o f Exchequer, November 
4, 1957. See also F. W. Paish, The Position o f  the United Kingdom as an Exporter o f  Capital, University 
o f  Queensland Press, 1958 pp.4-6.
Harrod, The Pound Sterling 195I-I958, p .l5  and Scammell, The International Economy, p .l l2 .
C. R. Schenk, British Management o f  the Sterling Area 1950-1958, Ph.D. Dissertation, LSE, University 
o f  London, 1991, p.292.
Schenk, Britain, p.29.
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Export-Import bank granted to the UK. In addition, US defense aid, which is included in 
the current balance, increased UK gold and dollar reserves by £120 million in 1952, £102 
million in 1953, £50 million in 1954, £46 million in 1955, £26 million in 1956, and £21 
million in 1957. The table shows that without the sales of gold and dollars from the 
surpluses earned by the RSA with the non-sterling world, and without US defense aid, the 
UK balance of payments lacked a reliable source for accumulating gold and dollar 
reserves. This analysis would thus indicate a structural inability of the UK to earn gold and 
dollar reserves.
France’s trade performance indicated even greater difficulty in accumulating foreign exchange reserves 
than Britain's. According to contemporary observers, French balance of payments problems were explained 
by domestic expansionary policies which led to a deterioration o f the trade balance. Throughout the 1950s, 
exports refused to grow despite subsidies and other encouragements, while imports could only be restrained 
with extensive restrictions. The Banker, “The Economics o f  de Gaulle”, July 1958, pp.432-438, and 
OEEC, Economic Conditions in Member and Associated Countries o f  the OEEC, France - 1958, 1958, 
p.5. See also chapter IV.
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Table 1.3: UK gold and dollar reserves, 1952-7 (million £)
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Jan. - 
June
July - 
Dec.
Jan. - 
June
July - 
Dec.
Jan. - 
June
July - 
Dec.
Jan. - 
June
July - 
Dec.
Jan. - 
June
July - 
Dec.
Jan. - 
June
July-
Dee.
reserves at beg. o f period 834 602 659 845 899 1078 986 957 757 852 799 850
UK transactions with $ area
- current balance -139 -27 +42 -34 +39 -99 “68 -116 +74 -76 -24 -65
- long-term and misc. capital +31 -3 +4 -19 +20 -10 +16 +2 -18 -36 +20 +107
(net)
- overseas sterling holdings -19 +15 +7 +21 -1 +36 -11 -28 -20 -1 +13 -15
(decrease - )
Total -127 -15 +53 -32 +58 -73 -63 -142 +36 -113 +9 +27
gold and dollar transfers in
respect o f transactions with:
(ijrest o f sterling area
- RSA sales o f gold in UK (net) +51 +20 +31 +47 +66 +72 +82 +94 +97 +123 +105 +118
- other -31 +81 +54 +39 +29 +8 +11 +24 +43 -31 +78 -14
Total +20 +101 +85 +86 +95 +80 +93 +118 +140 +92 +183 +104
(ii)non-dollar, non-sterling
countries
- other western hemisphere +9 +13 -1 +10 +1 +20 — -9 +6 +2 — +11
countries
- OEEC countries:
EPU -129 +30 +49 -8 +24 -31 +14 -84 -5 -83 +5 -124
settlements
other -3 -78 -19 -19 -20 -48 -73 -64 -77 -139 -120 -44
- other non-sterling countries — +8 +20 +19 +21 -4 -3 -12 -11 -7 -18 -14
Total -123 -27 +49 +2 +26 -63 -62 -169 -87 -227 -133 -171
(iii)non-territorial orgs. -2 -2 -1 -2 — -36 +3 -7 +6 +195 -8 +2
Total (= change in reserves) -232 +57 +186 +54 +179 -92 -29 -200 +95 -53 +51 -38
Source: HMSO, UK balance o f  payments 1946-57,1959, Table 10, p.39.
A loss of competitiveness, due to relatively high inflation, partially explains 
Britain’s inability to accumulate reserves/® In particular, the decline in export price 
competitiveness in manufacturing, played an important role in preventing Britain from 
achieving a more favorable trade balance/^ E. Bernstein identified three causes for 
balance of payments deficits, “current inflation, price and cost disparity, and structural
70 See, for example, J. Llewellyn and S. Potter, “Competitiveness and the Current Account", in A. Boltho 
(ed.), The European Economy: Growth and Crisis, Oxford University Press, 1982, pp. 138-9.
M. Surrey, “United Kingdom”, in Boltho (ed.). The European Economy, p.538.
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maladjustments”.^  ^According to Max Corden, in an “inflation-prone” country, monetary 
expansion will stimulate domestic demand.^  ^ As a result, domestic consumption will 
increase partially through an increase in imports and partially through an increase in the 
consumption of domestic goods that would otherwise be exported. Both are to the 
detriment of the trade balance. In addition, inflation feeds through to higher export prices. 
Consequently, domestic exports become less competitive while imports become more 
competitive because, at fixed exchange rates, they will become relatively cheaper 
compared to domestic goods.^ "^  Thus, higher than average inflation tends to lead to a 
current account deficit.
Michael Bordo and Lars Jonung calculated the means and standard deviations of 
national inflation rates of the G-11 countries^  ^ for what they call the “preconvertible 
Bretton Woods period”, from 1946 until 1958.
E. M. Bernstein, “Strategic Factors in Balance of Payments Adjustment", in The Review o f  Economics 
and Statistics, February 1958, p.l33.
For an in-depth discussion o f  the effect o f inflation on the balance o f  payments, see W. M. Corden, 
Inflation, Exchange Rates and the World Economy: Lectures on International Monetary Economics, third 
edition. University o f Chicago Press, 1986, in particular pp.56-70.
This analysis is simplified in that it assumes price elasticities o f  demand for imports and exports and it 
assumes that a monetary expansion will increase demand rather than simply resulting in an equivalent 
increase in prices without any real effects on the economy.
United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Switzerland.
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Table 1.4: Average national inflation rates 1946-1958 (per cent)
mean standard
deviation
Switzerland 1.8 1.9
Germany 2.1 6.2
Belgium 2.4 4.4
United States 2.8 3.5
Canada 3.9 3.9
Sweden 4.1 5.4
Netherlands 4.5 3.2
United Kingdom 4.6 2.5
Japan 4.7 7.3
France 5.6 5.1
Italy 5.8 16.0
mean 3.8 5.4
convergence 1.1 2.2
Source: M. D. Borde and L. Jonung, Monetary Regimes, Inflation and Monetary Reform: 
An Essay in Honor o f  Axel Leijonhufvud, Working Paper No. 16, 
Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance, 
Stockholm School o f Economics, May, 1994, data appendix.
The calculations by Bordo and Jonung show that whereas Germany had the second lowest 
average inflation rate, the UK’s average inflation rate was only exceeded by Japan, France 
and Italy (table 1.4). Germany’s average inflation rate was less than half that of the UK, 
placing Germany far below the G-11 average and the UK nearly one percent above. The 
high stan<^ ard deviation in the case of Germany is explained by relatively high inflation 
during the Korean war contrasting with periods of extremely low inflation before and after 
the Korean War. Germany’s average inflation rate, and its standard deviation, would be 
even smaller if the Korean War years of 1950/1 were excluded, whereas the removal of 
those high inflation years on countries with higher average inflation, and small standard 
deviation, would have a smaller effect. The price stability data is compatible with the 
relative strength of the DM compared to the pound sterling in the 1950s as exhibited in the 
bank note rates for both shown in figure III.2. Similarly, in accordance with a currency
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which was even more volatile and vulnerable than sterling, France’s average inflation rate 
between 1946 and 1958 was only exceeded by Italy/^
Britain’s and France’s above average inflation rates explain these countries’ poor 
reserves record/^ According to Eichengreen’s calculations, Britain’s unit labor cost 
increased by 43 per cent between 1950 and 1958, whereas Germany’s only grew by 27 per 
cent in the same period/^ In addition, British labor productivity performed poorly 
compared to Germany In France, the unit labor cost was only 27 per cent higher in 1958 
than in 1950, but this does not take into account a 20 per cent devaluation of the franc in 
1957, which temporarily offset wage pressures.^^ The unit labor cost indices indicate a 
significant difference in wage inflation in France, Britain and Germany. Relatively high 
inflation increased domestic demand and undermined UK and French competitiveness 
through rising input costs, which in turn resulted in a trade balance deficit and an inability 
to accumulate foreign reserves.
Some contemporary observers in the 1950s attributed sterling’s weakness to 
growing productivity differences and overexpansion at home.** Britain’s and France’s 
stagnant foreign exchange reserves were first and foremost the symptom of their balance 
of payments problems which centered around their trade balance. Contrary to 
Eichengreen’s assertions, it is questionable whether wage discipline was adequate in
For a discussion o f France's inflationary problems and their effects on the balance o f payments, see G. 
Saint-Paul, “Economic Reconstruction in France: 1945-1958”, in R. Dombusch, W. Nolling and R. 
Layard (eds.). Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Lessons fo r the East Today, MIT Press, 1993, 
pp.83-114, G. Saint-Paul, “France: Real and Monetary Aspects o f French Exchange Rate Policy under 
the Fourth Republic”, in Eichengreen, Europe's Post-War Recovery, pp.292-319, and C. Sautter, 
“France”, in Boltho (ed.). The European Economy, pp.449-471. 
for France, see, Saint-Paul, “Economic Reconstruction”.
Eichengreen, Reconstructing, p.63.
Milward, The European Rescue, p. 151.
Eichengreen, Reconstructing, p.63. In Eichengreen’s measurement o f  unit labor cost a depreciation 
reduces unit labor costs.
Kenen, British Monetary Policy, p. 109.
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France and Britain, particularly in comparison with Germany.
Reserves vs, liabilities
Large foreign exchange liabilities carried over from previous economic eras or
wartime expenditure can present an exogenous threat to a country’s reserves. In this case,
reserves can be insufficient even for a country with a healthy trade balance. Throughout
the 1950s, the large sterling balances held by non-residents appeared to present a constant
threat to UK reserves, and sterling’s stability, referred to as the sterling overhang. British
policymakers argued in the 1950s that UK reserves were insufficient with regard to the
huge sterling liabilities incurred during World War II. Regarding convertibility, many
expressed the fear that if and as soon as non-resident holders of sterling became free to
exchange them into any other currency, in particular into the dollar, they might rush to do
so, especially if confidence in sterling was low.^  ^This fear was not unfounded, since that
was exactly what had happened in the 1947 attempt at convertibility. The size of the
sterling overhang meant that the run on the pound thus unleashed would exceed Britain's
reserve capacity by far. The sterling overhang was blamed for the weakness of sterling as
can be seen in Judd Polk’s “rebirth theory”, coined in 1956, which expressed a widespread
belief that “there is nothing wrong with sterling apart from the heavy volume of
obligations that a country gets into in the course of two closely spaced all-out wars”.*^
Similarly, more recently, John Fforde identified the sterling overhang, the volatility of
untied balances combined with the ratio of UK reserves to external monetary liabilities,
and the risk that sterling area countries would choose to accumulate US dollars as reserves
PRO T236-5403, “Exchange Rate Policy (Note o f a Meeting held in the Chancellor o f  the Exchequer's 
room at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 24th April)”, April 24, 1956.
Polk, Sterling, p.251.
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instead of sterling as the three dangers that threatened sterling in the 1940s and 1950s.^^
Contrary to these views, Catherine Schenk claimed in a recent book that observers 
in the 1950s overestimated the danger and the volatility of the sterling balances.^  ^
Between 1950 and 1958 the geographical distribution and monetary composition of the 
sterling balances changed significantly, with an increase in the share of sterling balances 
held by the colonies while the balances of the independent sterling area declined. Thus, 
colonial sterling balances more than doubled from £673 million in 1950 to £1.45 billion in 
1958, accounting for about one half of the total sterling area balances by the beginning of 
1958, while sterling balances of the independent sterling area declined from £1.9 billion in 
1950 to £1.4 billion in 1958.^  ^ According to Schenk, the increase of colonial sterling 
balances relative to the sterling balances held by the independent sterling area reduced the 
overall volatility of the sterling balances. The largest part of the colonial balances was 
"earmarked for a variety of specific purposes which restricted their l iq u id ity T h e  run­
down in the sterling balances held by the independent sterling area meant that after the 
mid-1950s, most of the countries in the independent sterling area “held only minimal 
working balances so the image of large ‘excess’ reserves floating around the sterling area 
ready to be ‘cashed in’ is misleading”.^ *
The sterling balances of the non-sterling area were the most volatile of the three 
categories. They were also different from the other two - colonial balances and 
independent sterling area balances - since:
Most NSA [non-sterling area] balances were held privately as working balances. 
Britain excercised no control over these assets and so they were linked closely to
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.275.
Schenk, Britain, p.48.
ibid., pp.20 & 25.
ibid., p.22.
ibid., p.25.
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the volume of trade in sterling and to confidence in the pound.^^
Schenk estimated these NSA holdings at about £1.6 billion in early 1950 and about £1.4 
billion in September 1958.^  ^However, a large part of the non-sterling area balances were 
held by non-territorial organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, which 
meant that they were not very volatile. If sterling holdings of non-territorial organizations 
are excluded, the total non-sterling area balances, and thus the share which is considered 
the most volatile, becomes much smaller than it is often presented to be. As can be seen 
from the table below, sterling balances of non-sterling countries excluding holdings of 
non-territorial organizations only exceeded the UK's gold and dollar reserves in 1951 and 
1952. These non-sterling balances dropped from £934 million to £727 million between 
1950 and 1958, although the decline was not continuous.
ibid., p.26.
^  figures given are estimated from top chart in Schenk, Britain, p.21.
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Table 1.5: Sterling balances of the non-sterling countries compared to
UK gold and dollar reserves 1950-7 (million £)
total sterling balances of 
non-sterling countries, 
excluding holdings of 
non-territorial 
organizations
holdings of non- 
territorial 
organizations
UK gold and 
dollar 
reserves
December 31,1950 934 577 1178
December 31,1951 941 566 834
December 31,1952 677 567 659
December 31,1953 695 511 899
December 31,1954 779 476 986
December 31,1955 697 469 757
December 31,1956 565 669 799
December 31,1957 570 645 812
December 31,1958 727 631* 1096
a: June 30,1958.
Source: HMSO, UK Balance o f  Payments 1946-57, 
BIS, 29th Annual Report, April I, 1958 to March 31, 1959, 
p. 141, and IMF International Financial Statistics.
These figures show that the threat presented by these sterling balances to British reservers 
was not as big as often portrayed.
To what extent did the foreign-held sterling balances affect UK policy on 
convertibility? Although the Bank of England and the Treasury disagreed on many issues 
regarding convertibility, as will be shown later, they agreed that convertibility would be 
limited to non-residents of the sterling area.^  ^ Consequently, the sterling balances held by 
residents of the sterling area did not immediately influence UK officials’ stance on 
convertibility. An examination of the impact of the sterling overhang on progress towards 
convertibility must focus therefore primarily on the non-resident sterling balances, that is 
the balances held by non-residents of the sterling area, since only they were to become 
convertible upon the establishment of convertibility. In 1954 the sterling balances that
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p. 161.
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were held neither by dollar area residents nor by sterling area residents became 
transferable sterling balances. Thus after March 1954, non-resident sterling balances fell 
largely into two categories: American account sterling, and transferable sterling.^  ^ By 
1950, American account sterling, that is sterling belonging to residents of the dollar area, 
could already be converted into US dollars at the official rate. In addition, the size of these 
balances was negligible in relation to the total non-resident sterling holdings and small in 
relation to Britain’s gold and foreign exchange reserves (see tables I.l and 1.3). 
Consequently, the monetary authorities' main concern when it came to convertibility 
centered on transferable sterling.
Table 1.6: Sterling balances of non-sterling area residents (million £)
end of total non- 
sterling area
dollar area transferable 
sterling area
gold and 
dollar 
reserves
1951 941 38 n.a. 834
1952 677 34 n.a. 659
1953 695 62 n.a. 899
1954 779 97 682 986
1955 697 58 639 757
1956 565 37 528 799
1957 570 35 535 812
1958 727 48 679 1096
Source: Bank for International Settlements, 29th Annual Report, April 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959, p. 141.
reserves from previous table.
Only the transferable sterling balances would have played a direct role in influencing UK 
policy choices regarding convertibility. After 1952, UK gold and dollar reserves always 
exceeded the size of these transferable sterling balances, although not by a comfortable 
margin. Certainly, the ratio of reserves to transferable sterling balances looked even
92 See also section on path to convertibility in this chapter.
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smaller when it was compared to the ratio of Germany’s reserves to Bekomark holdings.^  ^
The development and characteristics of transferable sterling mirrored very closely the 
development of the German Bekomark. Transferable sterling and Bekomark obtained a 
very similar status in the spring of 1954. Both became transferable among non-residents 
throughout the non-dollar area. Both were traded unofficially at discounts in foreign 
exchange markets outside the currency-issuing country. Table 1.7 compares the size of 
transferable sterling holdings of non-residents to Bekomark holdings of German non­
residents. Germany’s Bekomark holdings look irrelevant compared to the size of 
transferable sterling balances that the UK would have to be prepared to convert when 
convertibility was established. "^  ^The table shows that Bekomark holdings were too small 
to have ever been a serious concern for German monetary authorities when contemplating 
convertibility. Non-resident Bekomark balances definitely presented no threat to currency 
stability if presented for conversion, when measured against the amount of foreign 
exchange reserves available in Germany.
Bekomark referred to DM accounts with limited convertibility (‘beschrankt konvertierbare DM’). They 
were the German equivalent o f the transferable sterling accounts in that they were the DM accounts of 
those non-residents who were residents o f the non-dollar area countries. Similar to transferable sterling 
Bekomark could be used for payment o f goods and services to all countries with which the FRO had 
payments agreements, that is with the non-dollar area. Bekomark holdings were also transferable among 
non-residents. For a more detailed discussion see the German chapter.
DM and sterling holdings of dollar area residents need not be considered here since they were already 
convertible.
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Table 1.7: Holdings of transferable sterling and Bekomark compared
to gold and convertible currency reserves (million US dollars at end of period/
UK" PRO"
holdings o f gold 
and convertible 
currency
transferable
sterling
holdings
ratio of reserves 
to transferable 
sterling
holdings of gold 
and convertible 
currency
Bekomark
holdings
ratio of reserves 
to Bekomark
1953
2518 1772 1.42 1281 12 106.75
1954 2762 1907 1.45 1997 52 38.40
1955 2120 1789 1.19 2404 70 34.34
1956 2237 1478 1.51 3402 120 28.35
1957 2273 1498 1.52 4105 123 33.37
1958 3069 1901 1.61 4604 189' 24.36
a: converted at £1.00 = US $2.80. 
b: converted at DM1.00 = US $0.238.
c: at the end o f November, 
gold and foreign exchange holdings o f  Bundesbank for FRG and of 
Exchange Equalization Account for UK. 
Source: transferable sterling holdings from BIS, 
27th Annual Report, April 11956 to March 21, 1957, p. 182 and BIS, 
29th Annual Report, April I, 1958 to March 31, 1959, p. 177; Bekomark holdings 
from Deutsche Bundesbank, MonatsberichtfiirJanuar 1958, p.98 and 
Monatsbericht ju r Januar 1959, p. 124; reserves calculated from IMF International Financial Statistics.
While the UK could not rely on a reserve to liabilities ratio as comfortable as 
Germany, the volume of sterling balances to which convertibility applied was not nearly 
as formidable as often presented. In discussions between the Treasury and the Bank on 
when to establish convertibility. Treasury officials often pointed to the non-sterling area 
sterling balances as an argument against the Bank’s pressures to establish convertibility as 
quickly as possible.^  ^The sterling balances were an excuse for the Treasury to postpone 
action and they allowed the Government to mask the real reasons for its reluctance to 
establish convertibility. Firstly, American account sterling was already convertible, and 
secondly, as Leslie Rowan firom the Treasury wrote to Maude in February 1958, “[a] large 
part of this [transferable account sterling balances] represents the working balances of
95 PRO T236-5403, “Exchange Rate Policy (Note o f a Meeting held in the Chancellor o f the Exchequer’s 
Room at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 24th April 1956)”, April 24,1956.
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foreign banks operating in London”.^  ^ Thus a large part of the transferable sterling 
balances were not very volatile and did not present a threat to the pound’s stability 
Thirdly, and perhaps even more importantly, holders of transferable sterling balances 
could already convert these into dollars at only a small discount, and after the declaration 
by the Bank of England in the spring 1955 they could rest assured that the discount would 
not exceed one per cent. When the Treasury attempted to justify the postponement of 
convertibility by arguing that the transferable sterling balances would flood the exchange 
markets upon the establishment of convertibility, the Bank retorted that countries were not 
deterred by the discount on transferable sterling from converting it into dollars “if they so 
desire”.^  ^Thus, there was no reason to believe that convertibility would release a flood of 
sterling balances to be presented for conversion as the Treasury claimed, since these were 
already de facto convertible and even central banks were converting their transferable 
sterling in the unofficial market.^^
The sterling liabilities in themselves might have affected policy on convertibility 
in the sense that they were a powerful obstacle to devaluation of the pound, which, 
according to Eichengreen would have been necessary for establishing viable convertibility. 
The argument was that devaluation was an option not open to the British since it would 
reduce the value of sterling holdings which in turn would damage Britain's relations with 
the rest of the sterling area.*®® However, the following chapter on UK policy on
PRO T236-3945, Rowan to Maude, February 13, 1958.
In contrast to the large part o f the literature on the issue in the 1950s and 1960s, A. Hazelwood claimed 
in 1959 that, “[a] substantial, though not clearly definable, component o f the sterling balances is not o f a 
volatile character, but is held for long-term purposes, and changes in it could reasonably be considered as 
long-term investment or disinvestment in the United Kingdom”. A. Hazelwood, “The Export and Import 
of Capital”, in G.D.N. Worswick and P H. Ady (eds.). The British Economy in the Nineteen-Fifties, 
Clarendon Press, 1962, pp. 186-7.
PRO T236-5403, Parsons (BoE) to Rowan, May, 16, 1956.
^  ibid.
see, fore example. Strange, Sterling, pp.336-7.
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convertibility will show that the sterling balances did not stop UK governments from 
contemplating letting the pound float downwards. Therefore, the sterling balances do not 
explain why Britain refrained from devaluation, which according to Eichengreen, would 
have allowed it to establish convertibility way before 1958.
The sterling balances certainly increased the exposure of sterling and the costs for
the UK of international fluctuations in exchange rate confidence, but they were neither the
threat to the reserves often presented nor were they the cause of sterling’s instability or
‘weakness’.S im ila rly , the mere existence of the sterling balances does not provide a
satisfactory explanation for the pound’s proneness to speculative attacks throughout the
1950s. Therefore, the sterling overhang alone provides no satisfactory explanation for the
reluctance with which the UK approached convertibility.
Under the era of the gold standard, which lasted roughly from 1880 until 1914,
Britain was able to run an international financial system of "international capital transfers
of a magnitude that remains unrivaled” with a comparatively low level of gold reserves.
During the gold standard, sterling was a widely used reserve currency. Similarly, after
the war, many countries, albeit mainly from the sterling area, held sterling balances as
reserve currency. However, during the gold standard UK reserves were much smaller.
Thus Roy Harrod wrote in 1952:
[t]he free gold in the Bank of England was usually of the order of £20 million. It is 
instructive to compare this with the present reserve (September 30th 1951) of 
£1,167 million, which is deemed to be so low as to spell perdition. Even after 
allowing for the change in the value of gold, this present-day reserve is gigantic by 
nineteenth century standards.
Eichengreen argues that “Britain’s overseas liabilities ... constituted less o f a threat to convertibility
after 1947, and especially after 1951, than before”. Eichengreen, Reconstructing, p.78.
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Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, p.212.
Bordo, The Gold Standard, p.23, and Eichengreen, Elusive Stability, p .l 18.
R. Harrod, The Pound Sterling, Essays in International Finance, No. 13, Princeton University Press,
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The principal difference between the large amount of sterling balances held as reserve 
currency under the gold standard and the sterling balances held by countries after World 
War II is the degree of international confidence in the pound and the credibility of Britain's 
commitment to the stability of the pound. Thus, a considerable excess of liabilities over 
reserves does not explain the weakness of a currency. The causes for the ‘weakness’ of the 
pound in the 1950s must be found elsewhere.
Reserves and confidence
Throughout the post-war era, concern for the stability of the pound has
continuously played a decisive role in British economic policymaking, beginning with
the speculative attack on the pound that followed the first convertibility attempt in 1947
and continuing in the present with the severe speculative attacks on the pound in the
spring of 1995. Many attempts have been made to explain sterling’s instability and
‘weakness’, especially when compared to the DM. In general, the abundance of books on
the problem of the pound, reflects both the importance attributed to the pound as
international currency and to the concern about its health. Many authors have explained
a large share of the pound’s fragility by the insufficiency of reserves. Thus, one criterion
applied to reserve sufficiency was whether national reserves were large enough to be able
to withstand a loss of confidence in the national currency. According to this measure, the
level of reserves sufficiency varies according to the level of confidence in the currency.
The lower the confidence, the higher the amount of reserves necessary to inspire
1952, p.3.
see, for example, J. Tomlinson, “British Economic Policy since 1945", in Floud and McCloskey (eds.). 
The Economic History, p.266.
see, for example, Caimcross and Eichengreen, Sterling in Decline, B. Cohen, The Future o f  Sterling as 
an International Currency, Macmillan, 1971, Day, The Future, Harrod, The Pound Sterling, 1951-1958, 
Hawtrey, The Pound, Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, and Strange, Sterling.
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confidence. Thus, L. Camu argued that the sufficiency level of reserves depended “tant de 
la confiance qu'inspire la monnaie que de l'état de la balance des paiements”. Moreover, 
a low level of reserves in itself could erode confidence in a cunency.
M. FG. Scott argued in 1962 that the main cause for sterling’s proneness to
speculative attacks lay in the insufficiency of the UK’s gold and dollar reserves. He agreed
with the findings of the Radcliffe Committee^^  ^on this issue when he stated that,
[i]t was this [inadequacy of gold and dollar reserves] which encouraged 
speculation against the pound, thus exaggerating our weakness, and it was this 
which compelled the Government to take countermeasures in a hurry. Had the 
reserves been larger, the measures could have been gentler, and some dislocation 
of the economy could have been avoided.
Similarly, Camu claimed that “les autorités doivent détenir une masse de manoeuvre
suffisante pour persuader l'opinion de la solidité de leur monnaie et pour se défendre
contre des mouvements spéculatifs”. ^ Thus, on the one hand, it was argued that low
reserves led to a loss of confidence, and consequent weakening of the pound, while, on the
Camu, “La convertibilité”, p.22.
‘as much on confidence which the currency inspires as on the state o f the balance o f payments’.
'°*In May 1957, a Committee under the chairmanship o f Lord Radcliffe was appointed to examine the 
monetary and credit system o f the UK and m particular the role o f monetary policy for the British 
economy. The Committtee reported two years later with the Radcliffe Report which was published in 
1959, that is, after the establishment o f  convertibility. HMSO, Report o f  the Committee on the Working o f  
the Monetary System, Cmnd.827, 1959. According to Caimcross, “[t]he main consequences o f the Report 
lay less in the adoption o f specific recommendations for policy than in a major improvement in financial 
statistics and information, closer working relations between the Bank and the Treasury, and a continuing 
debate over the role o f monetary policy in which ideas very different from those o f the Radcliffe Report 
received increasing attention”. A. Caimcross “Economic Policy and Performance, 1945-1964", in Floud 
and McCloskey (eds.). The Economic History, p.59. The decision to appoint a Committee to examine the 
effectiveness o f monetary policy was partially motivated by the experience and fhistration with the 
instability o f sterling. For a brief analysis o f the report see N. Kaldor, “The Radcliffe Report”, in Review 
o f  Economics and Statistics, Feb. 1960, pp. 14-19 or The Banker, “The Report analysed”, September 
1959, p.497ff.
M. FG. Scott, “The Balance o f  Payments Crises”, Chapter 7 in Worswick and Ady, The British 
Economy, pp.224-5.
' Camu, “La convertibilité”.
‘the authorities must retain a quantity which allows sufficient room for maneouver to persuade the 
opinion o f  the solidity o f their curreny and to defend themselves against shot term speculative 
movements’.
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other hand, low confidence in the pound made reserves insufficient. This is a circuitous or 
spiral argument, with one element reinforcing the other.
As a result of both the 1947 experience of convertibility and the recurring sterling 
crises throughout the 1950s, policymakers questioned the sufficiency of UK reserves to 
withstand speculation. Some even attributed sterling's weakness to the level of reserves.  ^
However, the level of reserves on its own fails to explain the weakness of the pound in the 
1950s. Periods of sterling weakness were not preceded by adverse developments in UK 
reserves. Thus, in spite of continuously growing reserves throughout 1953 and 1954, 
sterling was subject to two weak periods.
While the trade balance, and underlying competitiveness problems, explain the 
lack of growth in Britain’s and France’s reserves in the 1950s, as compared to Germany, 
trade balance problems do not explain the occurrence of the speculative crises that plagued 
sterling in the 1950s. At least the later crises started at times when the trade balance was 
clearly improving and often doing better than usual. The speculative crisis in the third 
quarter of 1957 occurred at a time when Britain's trade balance was strengthening, leading 
observers to attribute the considerable reserve losses, $531 million or £190 million, 
between July and September to speculative pressures.^ Similarly, the speculative crisis of 
the fourth quarter of 1956 occurred at a time when Britain’s trade balance was 
im proving .T he speculation against sterling that occurred between August 1954 and
’ ‘ ' In an emphatic appeal to the Treasury to float the pound, the academic William Rees-Mogg claimed 
that “[sjpeculation against the pound, ..., is greatly encouraged by the knowledge that the reserves are o f  
inadequate size”. PRO T236-4364, William Rees-Mogg, “British Currency Policy”, April 1957 (no exact 
date).
Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, Monthly Review, January 1958, p.9.
Similarly, J.C.R. Dow pointed out that when the run on the pound occurred the UK current account was 
actually in “comfortable balance”. Dow, The Management, p.96.
Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, Monthly Review, May 1957, p.59.
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February 1955 was attributed more to disappointment after the realization that Britain 
would not make the pound convertible in 1955 as had been expected than to problems in 
the balance of payments/Finally, the weakness of sterling in the second half of 1955 
was caused by the belief that the government would let the pound float downward.
All the above sterling crises were accompanied by a loss of reserves. Samual Katz 
identified four sterling crises between 1955 and 1958. He estimated that during each of 
these periods of sterling weakness, the largest portion of the reserve drain could be 
attributed to speculation against sterling. The effect of speculation against sterling was 
proxied by the EPU non-trade residual which was calculated as the difference between 
Britain’s monthly trade balance with the EPU and the payments results.
Table 1.8; United Kingdom: selected official reserve changes, 1955-1957
(million US dollars)
Period Number o f  months Reserve losses EPU non-trade residual
Actual Adjusted^
1.1955: July to Sept. 3 -355 -345 -412
II. 1956: May to July 3 +77 +63 -384
III. 1956: Aug. to Dec. 5 -272 -690 -397
IV. 1957: July to Sept. 3 -531 -628 -422
a: Actual reserves adjusted for known government capital transactions. 
Source: reproduced from S. Katz, Sterling Speculation and European Convertibility: 
1955-1958, Essays in International Finance, No.37, Princeton University Press, 1961, p.l5.
Katz’s calculations show that a large extent of reserve loss during sterling crises was 
explained by speculative short-term capital flows, rather than by trade deficits. To a large 
extent, the speculation against sterling in the 1950s took the form of leads and lags in the 
payment of trade,^*  ^with the conversion of foreign sterling holdings, that is, the sterling
114 BIS, 25th Annual Report, April 1,1954 to March 31, 1955, pp.110-1, and The Economist, “Astringent 
for the Pound”, January 29, 1955, p.384.
According to Katz, exchange rate speculation in the 1950s differed from exchange rate speculation 
before World War II in that it was carried out by merchants, through leads and lags in the payment o f  
trade. For these merchants leads and lags was a way to reduce their exchange risks rather than incur risks 
if they anticipated a change in exchange rates in the near future. S. Katz, Sterling Speculation and
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overhang, playing a subordinate role in these crises. Leads and lags of payments were 
generally linked to an expectation of exchange rate c h a n g e s /In  the case of Britain, 
reserve losses due to leads and lags were triggered by expectations of a depreciation or a 
devaluation of the pound/Deterioration of confidence in the pound seems, therefore, to 
have played a greater role in triggering pound weakness than the level of reserves, the 
trade balance or the sterling overhang. If the size of reserves or the trade balance were the 
determining factor of sterling strength in the 1950s, then the strengthening of sterling after 
each of the above-mentioned crises should be explainable by an improvement in these 
factors. However, none of the recoveries of sterling can be attributed to an increase in UK 
reserves or to an improvement in the trade balance, confirming the conclusion that these 
factors were not the catalysts in the sterling crises.
For the UK, the 1950s were characterized by recurring sterling crises. Similarly, 
the French franc was one of the weakest currencies in Europe in the 1950s. The inability 
of both countries to accumulate foreign exchange reserves can be attributed to problems of 
international competitiveness, due to rising costs, which prevented them from running the 
current account surpluses necessary for accumulating reserves. Similarly, Germany’s 
rapidly rising reserves were the result of growing trade surpluses. The argument that 
reserves were too low to allow Britain to move to convertibility must be rejected as 
simplistic and misleading in that it failed to recognize the root of the problem which was
European Convertibility: 1955-1958, Essays in International Finance, No. 37, Princeton University Press, 
1961, p.3.
Analyses o f arbitrage and speculation in sterling are also provided in A. J. Bloomfield, Speculative 
and Flight Movements o f  Capital in Postwar International Finance, Princeton Studies in International 
Finance, February 1954, Spraos, “Speculation”, pp.3-2I, and B. Reading, “The Forward Pound 1951- 
1959”, in The Economic Journal, Vol. 70, No.278, June 1960, pp.304-3I9.
Katz, Sterling Speculation, pp.4-5.
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lack of confidence in the pound caused by economic fundamentals and economic policy 
decisions. As Roy Harrod wrote to the Prime Minister in 1957: “The British throughout 
the heyday of sterling never did work on a large reserve. The idea that we must have one 
can be dismissed.”  ^ Similarly, the Bank for International Settlements pointed out in 1956 
that, “[a]s regards the adequacy of monetary reserves, no single criterion is decisive, since 
ultimately the value of a currency depends not so much on the magnitude of the 
accumulated reserves as on the determination with which it is upheld in a period of 
strain”.^
The professed aim of the UK government to return to convertibility sooner rather 
than later conflicted with the volatility of the pound and its proneness to speculative 
attacks. This section has argued that the weakness of the pound seems to have been the 
result of a lack of confidence, rather than insufficient reserves, as was often claimed. The 
bouts of sterling speculation generally were not triggered by a drop in reserves, an increase 
in liabilities, or a deterioration in the current account balance. Instead, the weakness of the 
sterling exchange rate for bank notes indicated a lack of confidence in the pound 
throughout the 1950s. The fact that reserve losses occurred mainly as a result of leads and 
lags, which were motivated by the expectation of an imminent sterling devaluation, and 
the forward rate for the pound confirm the claim that the pound suffered from a lack of 
confidence. The weakness of the pound in the 1950s presented a powerful obstacle to 
establishing convertibility in the 1950s. If reserves and liabilities do not explain the 
weakness of the pound, what were the causes of the lack of confidence in the pound? The
PRO PREMl 1-2973, Roy Harrod to PM “Extract from letter o f  21.9.1957”, September 21,1957. 
BIS, Annual Report, April 1,1955 to March 31, 1956, p. 163.
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chapter on UK convertibility suggests one explanation for the weakness of the pound. 
Conclusion
In the 1950s, UK officials identified the level of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves as a crucial, if not the most important, measure of the strength or stability of 
sterling. Thus, the UK explained its policy on convertibility as a policy of waiting for the 
reserves to reach a level “at which it was thought safe to establish convertibility”. The 
UK often treated the reserves as an exogenous variable which determined currency 
stability. However, a country’s level of reserves are only the reflection, or symptom, of a 
country’s balance of payments. Sterling’s weakness seems to have been the greater 
obstacle to UK convertibility in the 1950s.
In the 1950s, the pound was prone to weakness, as reflected by the recurring large 
drops in the bank note rate for the pound. In contrast to the pound, the DM went from 
strength to strength once it had overcome its balance of payments crisis in 1951. The 
documented inability to accumulate foreign exchange reserves is one indication of the 
weakness of pound. While Germany’s current account ensured a continued increase in 
dollar and foreign exchange reserves, Britain’s current account shows a constant trade 
deficit which invisible earnings failed to offset.
Part of sterling’s weakness can be explained by the fact that in an adjustable peg 
exchange rate system speculators can only 'win.^ ^^  If they detect downward pressure on a 
currency, speculators will seek to get out of that currency, because of the chance that it 
might be devalued. By selling the currency they increase downward pressure on the 
currency. Speculators will have an incentive to get out of a currency experiencing
Milward, “Motives”, pp.260-1. 
Tew, The Evolution, pp.84-5.
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downward pressure or suffering from loss of confidence, because if the currency is 
devalued they will have hedged against that whereas if it is not devalued they do not lose 
anything, - assuming that they can freely buy and sell the currency and disregarding 
transactions costs -, by switching back into the original currency, since the currency will 
not be revalued in the near future. This one-way option for speculators undoubtedly 
increased sterling’s vulnerability to speculation. However, unless speculation is assumed 
to be irrational or random, the one-way option for speculators does not explain what 
triggers the loss of confidence in the first place.
The factors undermining sterling in the 1950s consolidated the strength of the DM. 
Germany’s trade ensured a continuously rising level of gold and foreign exchange 
reserves. Again, however, the importance for currency stability lies not so much in the 
actual size of the reserves but rather in the confidence in the DM created by the prospects 
of continued large reserve inflows due to large current account surpluses. Contrary to the 
widespread belief at the time, the fact that British gold and convertible currency reserves 
were small when compared with the sterling liabilities does not explain the recurring 
speculation against sterling in the 1950s. In addition to the fact that the UK had 'hidden 
reserves’ which were not included in statements on Britain's reserves, in times of trouble 
the UK could back up its reserves with credit lines from both the IMF and the Export- 
Import Bank.^^  ^The inability to accumulate foreign exchange reserves is a reflection of a 
structural balance of payments problem rather than self sufficient cause of the weakness of 
sterling.
While trade considerations made convertibility desirable, the strength of
The Economist, “To Defend the Pound”, December 8, 1956, p.851; and Schenk, British Management, 
pp.298-9.
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Germany’s currency as documented in this chapter provided the necessary conditions for 
making the DM convertible. However, while trade considerations made a move to 
convertibility only attractive if it was collective, there were also currency considerations 
that prevented Germany from moving to convertibility before the rest of Europe, and, 
above all, before Britain. The German chapter will discuss the connection between 
German monetary policy and policy on convertibility.
The French franc was even more prone to downward pressure than the pound 
sterling. However, the situation of the franc differed significantly from that of both the 
DM and the pound sterling. France’s external economic links were much more limited 
than Germany’s or Britain's. Both trade and capital flows were strongly controlled, 
resulting in a much more closed economy. French policy on convertibility up until 1958 
was consistent with both trade and currency considerations in that up until 1958, France 
showed very little interest in opening up the economy or freeing its currency from 
exchange control. France had neither the motivation, through trade, nor the satisfactory 
condition, from currency stability, to do so. The chapter on French convertibility policy 
will show the dramatic change that took place in French economic policy in 1958 and why 
France suddenly shot ahead to take the lead in the establishment of convertibility. Whereas 
the move to convertibility in 1958 represents a continuation of Britain’s and Germany’s 
monetary policy in the 1950s, for France the move was part of a break of continuity in 
French monetary and economic policy after World War II.
The fact that neither trade deficits nor changes in the sterling overhang triggered 
the speculative crises against sterling in the 1950s and the fact that announcements of 
increases in reserves did not stop speculation once it had started indicate that other factors 
were responsible for the weakness of the pound. The UK chapter will propose an
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alternative or complementary explanation for the weakness of the pound. It will show that 
there was a profound lack of confidence in the pound in the 1950s. It will also show that 
the lack of confidence was not irrational but that it can be attributed to UK government 
policy as well as economic fundamentals. British policy was tom between the conflicting 
goals of establishing the pound as international key currency and pursuing an independent 
monetary policy. British policy on convertibility played a cmcial role in this dilemma. For 
the UK, policy on convertibility embodied the dilemma of the necessity to liberalize its 
currency for international transactions if it wanted to maintain its claim to international 
status on the one hand, and the fear of letting the external constraint curtail autonomy over 
domestic economic policy by removing exchange, and trade and capital, controls, on the 
other. This dilemma created a fundamental crisis of UK commitment to the tenets of the 
Bretton Woods system and this is what weakened the pound, not the other factors 
firequently listed.
PROGRESS TOWARD CONVERTIBILITY
This section briefly retraces Britain, France and Germany’s technical progress 
towards convertibility after World War II. In addition to providing a historical overview, 
the aim is to show similarities and differences in the approach to exchange control 
removal in the three countries.
Like most other Western European countries, Britain emerged fi’om World War II 
with an inconvertible currency, a huge dollar deficit, and a shortage of gold and dollar
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reserves/^^ After World War II most foreign currency earned by UK residents from 
exports, invisibles and capital investment had to be surrendered to authorized dealers. 
Exchange control generally governed all transactions between residents and non-residents 
except for those with other parts of the sterling area. A large portion of the sterling earned 
by non-dollar area countries during World War II was held in so-called ‘special accounts’ 
which were effectively blocked, that is, they could not be used for the payment of trade or 
investment, or converted. In 1952, this blocked sterling made up a little less than one third 
of all sterling balances - £1 billion out of £3.4 billion - held outside the UK and the dollar 
area.^ "^^
Under the pressure of the United States - in connection with the loan agreement 
negotiated in 1946 -, Britain undertook the first European attempt to restore currency 
convertibility in 1947.^ ^^  Convertibility was limited to newly acquired sterling, thus 
excluding outstanding sterling balances held by countries outside the United Kingdom and 
accumulated before the convertibility date. These were estimated at the equivalent of 
$14.9 billion at the end of 1946, an amount far exceeding the unspent balance of US and 
Canadian loans, $2.2 billion in mid-1947, and British gold and dollar reserves, $2.4 billion 
in mid-1947, combined. In spite of these efforts to limit the quantity available for 
conversion into dollars, as soon as sterling was freed the UK started losing US dollars at a 
dramatic and accelerating rate, forcing the suspension of convertibility only six weeks
For a brief historical overview over the development o f the system o f exchange controls and o f the 
path towards convertibility o f the pound sterling, see Hinshaw, “Toward European Convertibility” and 
Bank o f  England Quarterly Bulletin, “The U.K. exchange control: a short history”, Vol.7, No.3, 
September 1967, pp.245-260. For a history o f the pound sterling see, for example A. Feaveryear, The 
Pound Sterling: A History o f  English Money, 2nd edition. Clarendon Press, 1963.
B. Tew, International Monetary Co-operation 1945-60, fifth (revised) edition, Hutchinson & Co., 
1960, p .l34.
For an account and analysis o f the convertibility crisis, see, for example, Dow, The Management, 
Hinshaw, “Toward European Convertibility”, Fforde, The Bank o f  England, Hirsch The Pound Sterling, 
Pressnell, External Economic Policy.
Hinshaw, “Toward European Convertibility”, p. 10.
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after it had been established. Hinshaw blamed the imcompetitiveness of the sterling area 
goods when compared with dollar area exports for the failure of convertibility. The 
memory of the disaster of 1947 lingered with decisionmakers throughout the 1950s, up 
until the second official and successful attempt at the establishment of non-resident current 
account convertibility in December 1958.^ ^^
After 1947, Britain divided the world into four areas, according to the nature of the 
exchange control that it applied: the sterling area, the American account area, the 
transferable account area and a group of countries with which the UK maintained bilateral 
relationships. Table 1 shows the breakdown of countries according to the four sterling 
account types as of April 1952.
Hinshaw, “Toward European Convertibility”, p. 11.
Polk, Sterling, pp.241-2.
See Germany chapter for a comparison of the UK and German historical experiences with convertibility or 
currency reform.
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Table 1.9: Sterling account system as of April 1952
Sterling area American transferable bilateral account
account account countries
countries countries
Australia Argentina
New Zealand USA Austria Brazil
South Africa Bolivia Chile China
India Central America Czechoslovakia Formosa
Pakistan Venezuela Denmark France
Ceylon Ecuador Egypt E. Germany
Burma Philippines Ethiopia Hungary
Iceland Cuba Finland Iran
Iraq Colombia W. Germany Israel
Jordan Dominica Greece Japan
Libya Italy Lebanon
Persian Gulf Netherlands Paraguay
territories Norway Peru
British Colonies Poland
Spain
Sweden
Thailand
USSR
Portugal
Romania
Svsdtzerland
Syria
Tangier
Turkey
Uruguay
Yugoslavia
Source: reproduced from Schenk, Britain, p.9.
Within the sterling area “unconditional transferability was the rule, qualified by certain 
local controls mainly on capital transactions”. However, while payments into the 
sterling area were largely unrestricted and could be made in sterling, out-payments 
required authorization. No exchange control restricted the use of sterling that had reached 
an American account, except regarding its transfer to bilateral countries, and the British 
authorities stood ready to convert any American account sterling into US dollars on 
demand.Officially, transferable account sterling could not be converted into US dollars 
or any other currency, but it could be transferred automatically for all payments to the
129
130
Tew, International Monetary Co-operation, p. 132. 
ibid.
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sterling area and for current payments to any country in the transferable account area.
Sterling held by residents of countries with bilateral agreements with the UK, finally,
could be used for all payments to the sterling area, but required authorization for transfers
to all other areas. The blocked sterling balances were excluded from all of these
arrangements. In March 1954,
the prescription of currency requirements for settlements with non-dollar countries 
other than Hungary, Iran, and Turkey were simplified by permitting receipts from 
and payments to those countries to be settled in sterling through any nonresident 
account (other than a Blocked Account) related to those countries. The facilities of 
transfer previously available only for Transferable Accounts in respect of current 
transactions were extended to all non-dollar countries (except Hungary, Iran, and 
Turkey) regardless of the nature of the transaction.^^*
In February 1955, the Exchange Equalization Account was authorized to intervene in
foreign exchange markets abroad to maintain transferable sterling within one per cent of
the official rate for sterling.
Britain exercised a restrictive policy regarding travel allowances and the import
and export of banknotes. Generally, most foreign exchange receipts had to be surrendered,
that is, residents had to offer foreign exchange receipts for sale to an authorized dealer.
From February 1955 onwards, transferable sterling was unofficially convertible into US
dollars at an exchange rate which remained roughly within one per cent of the official rate.
On December 1958, American account, transferable account and bilateral account were
unified into non-resident sterling and non-resident sterling became convertible officially
into the US dollar. However, capital account restrictions continued to restrict the
conversion of sterling for capital account purposes.
In Germany, ‘Devisenzwangswirtschafr’ - a system in which currency transactions
IMF, Sixth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, p.308.
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between residents and non-residents were governed largely by exchange controls - began 
in July 1931 with Chancellor Briining’s ‘Notverordnungsgesetze’ (emergency laws)/^^ 
After World War II, the occupying powers prohibited all financial and commercial 
transactions between the German zones and the rest of the world. The first significant 
steps to liberalize financial transactions between German residents and non-residents were 
taken in connection with the currency reform in 1948.^ ^  ^ As Germany gradually lifted 
exchange restrictions, several types of DM emerged, depending on the purpose for which 
the currency could be used and the country of residence of the holder of the currency.
Up until 1954, non-residents who resided in the free currency area - that is, the 
dollar area - were obliged to pay for German goods in convertible foreign currency. On 
April 1, 1954 the RunderlaB AuBenwirtschaft (decree on external economic relations) 
24/54 decreed that DM balances of residents of countries with freely convertible 
currencies, in particular the USA, Canada and Switzerland, could use their DM balances 
for all trade transactions which previously had required freely convertible currency. To 
this purpose, free currency area residents could set up so-called ‘frei konvertierbare DM- 
Konten’, freely convertible DM accounts in the FRG.*^  ^ Thus, they could use their DM 
balances to pay for German goods or for goods from third countries. DM balances of 
residents of convertible currency countries effectively became hard currency, at least for 
the payment of goods and services. Moreover, free currency area residents receiving 
payments could convert their holdings in these accounts into freely convertible currency.
Among other things, all foreign currency operations were centralized in the Reichsbank and all foreign 
exchange had to be turned in to the authorities. L. Kollner, Chronik der deutschen Wdhrungspolitik 1871- 
1991, second edition, Fritz Knapp Verlag, 1991, pp.82-83.
See German chapter for an account o f the currency reform.
BA B 102-55340, “Stationen auf dem Wege zur Konvertibilitat” (Abteilung VA), July 13, 1956. 
see also BA B 102-55340, “Auszugsweise Übersetzung aus Foreign Report vom 18.2.1954 - Die D-Mark 
geht in Fiihrung”, undated.
Bank deutscher Lander, Geschqftsbericht fiir  das Jahr 1953, p.98.
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regardless of whether the holdings were acquired from goods, services, or capital 
transactions/^^ However, capital investments by all non-residents in Germany still 
required permission/Simultaneously, in 1954, the government allowed the 
establishment of DM accounts with limited convertibility, Bekomark accounts, for those 
non-residents who were residents of the non-dollar area countries/^^ Non-resident holders 
of Bekomark accounts could use these for payment of goods and services to all countries 
with which the FRO had payments agreements, that is, with the non-dollar area/^^ 
Bekomark holdings were also transferable among non-residents and were comparable to 
the transferable sterling accounts. The measures taken in 1954 effectively joined countries 
in two separate currency areas for the FRO, namely the dollar area and the area containing 
those countries with which the FRO had payments agreem ents.The latter included the 
EPU countries but also those countries with which Germany still maintained bilateral 
trade agreem ents^with the exception of Brazil, Yugoslavia and Turkey which were 
excluded from this payments multilateralization. '^*  ^The Bekomark was a significant step 
forward towards the transferability and convertibility of the DM for non-residents. 
However, Bekomark accounts could not be used for capital investment in Germany. Table 
1.10 shows the development of Bekomark and freely convertible DM accounts between 
1953 and 1958.
ibid.
ibid.
Bank deutscher Lander, Geschaftsbericht fur das Jahr 1953, p.98.
BA B 102-55340, “Stationen auf dem Wege zur Konvertibilitat”, July 13, 1956.
This development mirrors the unification of transferable sterling in the UK in the same year.
As o f December 1953 these were Argentina, Chile Columbia, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay in 
Latin America, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary in Eastern Europe, and Iran, Japan 
and Spain. Bank deutscher Lander, Geschaftsbericht fiir  das Jahr 1953, p.92.
Bank for International Settlements, 25th Annual Report, 1.4.1954 to 31.3.1955, p .l 14.
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Table I.IO: Holdings of Bekomark and freely convertible DM at end of year
(million DM), 1952-1958
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958“
freely convertible DM accounts 3 22 50 74 180 668
Bekomark accounts 52 219 294 506 518 794
a: holdings the end of November 
Source: reproduced from Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichtfiir 
Januar 1958, p.98 and MonatsberichtfürJanuar 1959, p.l24.
In 1931, non-resident accounts of Reichsmark were frozen into so-called 
Sperrmark, or ‘blocked mark’ accounts. In 1950, the first steps were taken towards the 
liberalization of capital flows which had been prohibited under the military government 
after World War 11.^ "^  Money was still not allowed to flow into or out of Germany but, 
starting in 1951, Sperrmark balances could be transferred among non-residents. In 
addition, from August 1950 onwards, money in Sperrmark accounts could be used for 
investment in Germany. In 1953, after the London Debt Agreement, the Allied High 
Commission renounced its right to monitor the exchange control of the Federal Republic 
as it applied to capital flows. Germany was now free to liberalize capital flows which it 
began in late 1953 when the repatriation of interest, dividends and company profits earned 
from Sperrmark account investments was permitted for all non-residents, including dollar 
area residents. From April 1954, all holders of Sperrmark accounts could transfer 
abroad their balances, via clearing arrangements or payments agreements such as the
This meant that the balances in German currency held by non-residents could not be invested, transferred 
to other non-residents, used for payment o f trade, not to mention be repatriated by the foreign owners. The 
status o f these holdings was not changed when World War II ended, nor in the transition from Reichsmark to 
Deutsche Mark during the currency reform o f 1948. Bank deutscher Lander, Geschafisbericht fiir das Jahr 
1954, p.105.
Kôllner, Chronik, p. 136.
Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, p. 165.
Bank deutscher Lander, Geschafisbericht fiir das Jahr 1953, p.94.
Bank deutscher Lander, Geschafisbericht fiir das Jahr 1953, pp..96 and 99 and Bank deutscher 
Lander, Geschafisbericht fiir das Jahr 1954, p. 107.
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In September 1954, the RunderlaB AuBenwirtschafl (RA) 78/54 decreed that all 
revenue earned on investments in Germany by non-residents could be transferred abroad. 
In addition, foreigners could withdra^v limited of amounts money from Sperrmark 
accounts to be spent on travel expenses in the Federal Republic, and to be paid to residents 
of the FRG.^ "^  ^(In December 1953, total DM balances held by foreigners in blocked mark 
accounts totaled 774 million DM. Converted at DM4.20 for lUS dollar these holdings 
amounted to a mere 184.4 million US dollars, a very small amount compared to, 
especially, foreign-held sterling balances (see UK section). Moreover, contrary to the 
British case, these foreign-held balances made up only a little more than one tenth of 
Germany’s federal gold and foreign exchange holdings, which were 1281 million US 
dollars in 1953.^ ^® From September 1954, all Sperrmark holdings could be transferred into 
‘beschrankt konvertierbare DM-Konten’, also called Bekomark accounts.*^  ^ Jointly with 
the significant relaxation of restrictions Sperrmark holdings were renamed ‘liberalisierte 
Kapitalkonten’ (liberalized capital accounts) or Libkamark accounts. These Libkamark 
accounts could be used for investments in Germany, payments to Germany and limited 
repatriation of capital, that is, money invested in Germany could be exchanged back into 
non-dollar convertible currency. Libkamark could be transferred into Bekomark 
accounts, but not the other way around. Like their predecessors, they could be drawn on 
for travel expenses in Germany, or to make payments or gifts to German residents.
Until July 1958, when the Libkamark accounts were transformed into freely
ibid., p.97. 
ibid., p.99.
IMF, International Financial Statistics.
Bank deutscher Lânder, Geschafisbericht fiir  das Jahr 1954, p.105. 
ibid.
B 102-55340, “Stationen auf dem Wege zur Konvertibilitat”, (Abteilung VA), July 13, 1956. See also 
Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, p. 165.
Bank deutscher Lander, Geschqftsbericht fiir das Jahr 1954, p. 106.
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convertible DM accounts/L ibkam ark holdings were fed through capital gains, 
compensation payments, and the liquidation of capital investments, such as the sale of 
securities. They were run down through transferals to Bekomark accounts, investments, - 
such as the purchase of securities -, travel expenses, and transfer payments to residents.
Table 1.11: Formation and use of Libkamark accounts between
Se [)tember 1954 and February 1955 (million DM)
total on August 31,1954 629.6
increase
decrease
+969.2
-1136.0
total on February 28,1955 462.8
Source: reproduced from Bank deutscher Lander, Geschaftsbericht fiir das Jahr 1954, p. 106.
The cautious liberalization of Libkamark complemented Germany’s general 
reluctance to liberalize capital i n f l o w s / I n  contrast, Germany by far outpaced most 
Western European countries in freeing German investment abroad. Britain's, and most 
other Western European countries', monetary authorities took the reverse stance on capital 
flows. They welcomed foreign capital but tried to prevent domestic money from going 
abroad. New foreign investment in Germany was freed of most restrictions by mid- 
1958.^^  ^ However, interest could still not be paid on non-resident accounts held in 
Germany until May 1959, at which time the obligation to obtain permission for the sale of
German money market papers to foreigners was also abolished. 158
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht fiir  Januar 1959, p. 124.155
This issue is discussed in chapter III.
Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, pp. 161-166.
Kollner, Chronik, p. 160. However, according to Kollner, in June 1960, both liberalizations were 
revoked, ibid., p. 161.
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In France, exchange control was introduced in September 1939/^^ In 1958, 
looking back on France’s recent history of exchange control. La Vie Française 
commented:
La France, Fan prochain, pourra - si l’on ose dire - fêter le vingtième anniversaire 
de son contrôle des changes: depuis septembre 1939, elle ne s’en est pas évadée. 
Elle vit avec lui , par lui. L’ensemble des textes monétaires qu’elle a édités couvre 
des milliers de pages, et les spécialistes eux-mêmes hésitent à se prononcer avec 
certitude sur bien des points litigieux de cette étonnante réglementation.
Pourtant, il faut bien la connaître, peu ou prou, qu’on veuille exporter, importer, 
voyager...
Le Français qui désire souscrire à l’augmentation de capital d’une société 
hollandaise, doter sa fille qui se marie en Angleterre, recueillir une succession en 
Italie, est bien forcé de consulter ces textes touffus. Mais comment s’y recconaîtra- 
t-il? Aucun manuel, aucun vade-mecum ne s’offre à guider l’infortuné citoyen 
dans le labyrinthe du contrôle.
After World War II, non-resident franc accounts were divided into “comptes francs 
libres” or free franc accounts, “comptes étrangers en francs” or nonresident accounts, and 
“comptes «capital» [sic]” or capital accounts. The free franc accounts were held mainly 
by residents of the dollar area.^^  ^They could be credited with the franc proceeds from the 
sale of freely convertible currencies, mainly US and Canadian dollars. Balances in these 
accounts could be used to purchase any currencies dealt in on the Paris exchange market 
including the US dollar. They could also be used for payments in the French franc area
IMF Fourth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1953, p. 152.
La Vie Française, “ABC du Contrôle des Changes”, 14.3.1958, p.18.
‘Next year, France will be able to - if  one dare say so - celebrate the twentieth anniversary o f its exchange 
control: since September 1939, she has not escaped it. She lives with it, o ff it. The total o f monetary texts 
which it has produced covers thousands o f pages, and the experts themselves hesitate to comment with 
confidence on contentious points o f this astounding body o f regulations.
Nonetheless, anybody who wants to export, import, travel,..., has to know the rules, at least roughly.
The Frenchman who wants to invest in a Dutch company, provide his daughter who is getting married in 
England with a dowry, inherit in Italy, has to consult these abstruse texts. But how will he find his way 
around? No manual, no handbook offers to guide the unfortunate citizen through this maze of control.’
Free franc accounts were also held by residents o f  Djibouti. La Vie Française, “ABC du Contrôle des 
Changes”, March 14, 1958, p. 18. See also, L. B. Yeager, International Monetary Relations. Theory, History, 
and Policy, second edition. Harper & Row, 1976, footnote 3, p.475.
In 1958 this provision applied to the currencies o f the following countries or monetary areas: Austria, 
Belgian monetary area, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic o f Germany, Italy,
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or for transfers to other non-resident franc accounts/
Nonresident accounts (comptes étrangers en francs) referred to accounts held by 
residents of the non-dollar and non-franc area countries/^ Balances on these accounts 
could be transferred to other accounts within the same country. In addition, from July 
1954 onwards, franc balances held in non-resident accounts of residents of the EPU could 
be transferred freely with one another. By March 1957, this transferable franc area had 
grown to include Argentina, Brazil, Mainland China, China (Taiwan), Paraguay, Japan 
and, to a limited extent, Hungary. From January 21, 1956, EPU holders of nonresident 
franc accounts could exchange their balances into EPU currencies and vice versa. From 
July 1954 onwards, balances in capital accounts of dollar area residents could be 
transferred to other capital accounts within the dollar area. The same applied for capital 
account francs of EPU residents.
Generally, foreign exchange proceeds from exports had to be surrendered within 
one month of their receipt. However, exporters were allowed to retain a percentage of their 
export proceeds in so-called EFAC (Exportation-Frais accessoires) accounts. These 
accounts “were set up after the war and enable exporters to hold balances for use in 
developing their export businesses”.
Netherlands monetary area, Norway, Portuguese monetary area, sterling area, Sweden, Switzerland and 
Yugoslavia. IMF, Ninth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, p. 131.
IMF, Ninth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, p. 131.
Residents of the franc area could generally freely exchange their currencies. The exchange rates o f the franc 
area currencies were pegged to the French franc.
The French franc area comprised Continental France, Monaco, the Territory o f the Saar, theFrench 
Overseas Departments (DOM) - Algeria, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Guiana, and Reunion -, Morocco, 
Tunisia, the French Overseas Territories (TOM) - French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, the 
Trust Territories o f Cameroon and Togo, Madagascar and its dependencies, Comoro Islands, St. Pierre 
and Miquelon, New Caledonia and dependencies, the French Establishments in Oceania, and the 
Condominium o f New Hebrides), and Cambodia, Laos, and the Republic o f  Viet-Nam. IMF, Ninth 
Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, pp. 130-131.
IMF, Eighth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, p. 135.
BIS, 25th Annual Report, April 1, 1954 to March 31, 1955, p.l 17. La Vie Française, “ABC du 
Contrôle des Changes”, March 14,1958, p. 18.
167 BIS, 25th Annual Report, April I, 1954 to March 31, 1955, p .l 17.
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France adjusted control regarding bank notes, travel allowances and capital exports 
in response to changes in the strengths or weaknesses of France’s external financial 
situation. In periods of speculation against the fi-anc, the government reduced travel 
allowances and the supply of foreign exchange for foreign investment reduced. 
Alternatively, travel allowances were increased when the balance of payments situation 
was favorable and the respective currency seemed stable. Travel allowances for French 
residents were increased in July 1954, when the French balance of payments was strong, 
while they were reduced in February 1957, when the balance of payments was 
deteriorating and foreign exchange reserves were dwindling. In September 1956, in 
response to growing balance of payments problems, the Office des Changes reduced the 
availability of foreign exchange for the purchase of foreign securities.
In France, similar to Britain, in the mid-1950s, the government took measured 
steps to increase the transferability of firancs within the EPU area and the dollar area, while 
maintaining the wall of exchange control between the EPU and the dollar area, and, of 
course, between resident and non-resident holders of firancs. While steps were taken to 
liberalize and even encourage capital inflow, capital outflows remained strictly regulated 
by exchange control. In Britain, large steps were taken towards non-resident convertibility 
in 1954 and 1955. Capital inflow was also increasingly liberalized. In Germany, the period 
was characterized by the continuous dismantling of exchange control both for residents 
and non-residents, and for capital outflow, so that by 1958, the DM was virtually 
convertible for these three categories. In Germany, the only area where relatively little 
progress had been made towards the removal of exchange control was capital inflow.
BIS, 27th Annual Report, April I, 1956 to March 21, 1957, p .l91 .
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The comparison of the national paths to convertibility and of the steps taken in 
1958 reveal national differences in the type of convertibility pursued and in the 
approach to payments liberalization. For France and Britain, the return to convertibility 
focused on non-resident convertibility for current account purposes and on measured 
liberalization of convertibility regarding capital imports. Moreover, between 1952 and 
1958, France repeatedly revoked previous liberalizations of exchange control when the 
franc was under pressure. Thus, in France, exchange control served as a discretionary 
policy instrument aimed at manipulating supply and demand for the franc. After the 
initial suspension of trade and exchange liberalization in the balance of payments crisis 
in 1950/1951, Germany’s path to convertibility was characterized by a continuous and 
comparatively rapid removal of exchange control not only on non-resident current 
account convertibility, but also on resident and on capital account convertibility. The 
significant exception to this restoration of general convertibility was the import of 
capital. German authorities retained exchange control on capital imports as a means of 
preventing foreign capital from flooding in.
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CONCLUSION
Based on their evaluation of historical experience, the creators of the post-World 
War II international monetary system sought the establishment of non-resident current 
account convertibility at a pegged exchange rate. When the transitional period before the 
establishment of convertibility looked to last much longer than originally anticipated, 
the EPU was created in 1950 to provide a substitute mechanism for convertibility. Its 
aim was to increase the transferability of European currencies for intra-European trade. 
The establishment of convertibility was the natural termination point for the EPU. To 
understand Europe’s path to convertibility one must examine the national policies of 
France, Britain and Germany on the EPU and on trade in general.
This chapter has argued that the widespread view that Western European 
countries were joined in a consensus on the desirability of convertibility and that the 
timing of its establishment can be explained by the fulfillment of certain economic 
preconditions is simplistic and incorrect. The Eichengreen hypothesis fails to explain 
why convertibility was established jointly and why it took place when it did. Similarly, 
this chapter has shown that the reserve insufficiency argument fails to explain both the 
timing of convertibility or the weakness of the pound and the franc in the 1950s. To 
understand Europe’s path to convertibility one must examine convertibility within the 
context of national economic policymaking in France, Britain and Germany. National 
decisionmaking on trade, exchange rate, macroeconomic, and even foreign policy 
played important roles in both the establishment of convertibility, both the timing and 
the decision to move jointly. The following country chapters analyze national policy on 
convertibility within the context of the above-mentioned issues. A country-by country 
analysis reveals fundamental differences in national policy objectives between these
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three countries regarding convertibility. If the three leading countries pursued different, 
even incompatible, policies then this raises the question 'what motives prompted the 
three leading countries to cooperate on a joint return to currency convertibility.
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II: BRITISH POLICY ON CONVERTIBILITY 
INTRODUCTION
In the UK, convertibility was publicly reinstated as a top economic priority, after
the five year moratorium that had reigned since the convertibility disaster in 1947, at the
Commonwealth conference in January 1952/ 1952 was also the year when UK officials
publicly proposed, in the ‘Collective Approach’ the type of convertibility that would be
realized six years later, namely non-resident current account convertibility/ According to
Kaplan and Schleiminger,
Early in 1952, well before economic stability was firmly rooted in Britain or on the 
Continent, the UK government was again considering convertibility. By mid-1954, 
its subsequent initiatives had established convertibility as a serious and pressing 
issue.^
The UK Treasury liked to portray British path to convertibility in the 1950s as a case of
consistent policy and continuous progress towards the proclaimed policy objective of
sterling convertibility. Thus, when non-resident convertibility was officially established in
December 1958, the Treasury proposed to announce the step to the press as a logical
continuation of the steady progress made in the previous years by stating:
It is the policy of the Government, a policy endorsed at various Commonwealth 
Conferences, to move forward in the fireeing of trade and payments as and when 
such moves can be made safely and with advantage. This policy is to further the 
objective of sterling which has been the aim of Governments of both parties since 
the war.^
On the surface, UK policy might be viewed as a straightforward matter. As a large trading 
nation and co-founder of the Bretton Woods system, Britain could be expected to be an
* Dow, The Management, p.80.
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p. 168.
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p. 160.
PRO T236-4822, UNICORN Draft Press Announcement, December 22,1958.
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ardent supporter of convertibility. The British government had set out three preconditions, 
that had to be fulfilled before convertibility could be established, namely a sound internal 
economy, sufficient financial support and a good creditor policy. Thus, the timing of 
convertibility should be explained by the fulfillment of these conditions.
A closer look reveals, however, that in the UK convertibility was in fact a very 
controversial issue the desirability of which was seriously and continuously questioned 
by policymakers throughout the 1950s. Policymakers questioned not only when and 
how convertibility should be established but also whether it should be established at all. 
Conflicting policy goals made convertibility an issue which was anything but a 
technical economic event the establishment of which depended merely on the 
fulfillment of certain economic preconditions.
TRADE CONSIDERATIONS
In the early post-war period H.M.G. announced as a policy objective the return to 
convertibility for sterling and did not allow the 1947 debacle to deflect them from 
this as their continuing objective. Given our dependence on exports and foreign 
trade, H.M.G. decided that it is a major interest of the U.K. to promote a system 
which will give the best chance of expanding world trade and ourselves the best 
chance of getting a share in it. This was conceived to be a multilateral system with 
the greatest freedom of trade and payments and the restoration of convertibility of 
sterling as an integral part of any effective multilateral system....This step has 
therefore to be looked at as a further move in the series of steps which have been 
taken along the road to freer trade and payments and its advantages to be judged 
by the benefits to be derived as we attain what both parties have agreed upon as 
our objective.^
The above paragraph is taken from a brief which was prepared for presentation to the 
public upon the official establishment of convertibility. As the world’s largest trader at the
 ^PRO T236-4819, “Brief: Why this step helps trade” (M.S.(S.G.)(58)13), October 29,1958.
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time, one would expect the UK to be a champion of currency convertibility, at least for 
current account transactions. Contrary to this expectation, however, in the 1950s, the 
facilitation of trade never figured significantly as an argument in favor of convertibility in 
the UK.^ Neither the Bank of England nor the Treasury looked to convertibility to open 
the British economy to world trade. Rather, if trade considerations affected policy on 
convertibility, then the prospect of liberalized and multilateral trade deterred the UK 
Treasury from pursuing convertibility. Thus, one of the arguments presented by the 
Treasury throughout the 1950s against establishing sterling convertibility was that the 
move might increase pressure on the UK to end its discrimination against dollar imports.
In a Treasury memo in March 1958, Under Secretary A. W. France warned of “the 
additional pressure which bringing the rates together might bring on us and others to 
dismantle discrimination against the dollar and the strains which this might put on 
sterling”.^  In a report on exchange policy in April 1956, Third Secretary Rickett asked 
how the government would be able to justify to the financial press, the IMF, and the 
opposition party the continuation of “a system under which 85% to 90% of our imports 
fi"om Europe are liberalised while only 50% of our imports from the dollar area are 
liberalised” once the rates had been unified since the move would certainly be widely 
regarded as constituting convertibility.^ He disagreed with the Governor of the Bank of 
England on the overall desirability of the progress towards convertibility for the following 
reason:
* Milward, The European Rescue, p.356. According to Scammell, after World War II “trade policy appeared 
to many to be a secondary issue - second to the major problem of providing full employment in Britain after 
the war and insulating her economy from deflationary influences coming from abroad”. Scammell, 
International Monetary Policy, p. 120.
 ^ T236-3946, A. W. France, “Bringing the Rates together - Arguments against action in the immediate 
future”, March 20,1958.
* PRO T236-3940, D. Rickett to T. L. Rowan, “Exchange Policy”, April 19,1956.
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It is true that whether or not a further step is taken towards convertibility, other 
countries, whatever we do, will continue to move towards greater freedom in their 
imports from the dollar area. There is surely little doubt however that a further step 
towards convertibility (followed as we have seen by similar action in Europe) 
would greatly accentuate this process... How could we justify buying motorcars 
from the French, Germans and Italians but not from the United States if the pound 
we paid to the Europeans can be freely turned into dollars?^
Rickett concluded that “we wish to be the judges of the rate at which we should move and
not to have our hands forced as a result of steps taken in the exchange field”. Table II. 1
compares trade liberalization, in terms of quota removal, among OEEC countries. By
1958, Britain had reached 94 per cent of the OEEC Trade Liberalization Index regarding
its OEEC imports and was thus in line with the rest of Europe. However, at 62 per cent in
1958, British quota removal vis-à vis trade with the United States and Canada was well
below that of half of the OEEC countries. Only Austria, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Ireland, Portugal and Turkey exhibited a lower percentage of quota removal with trade
with the United State and Canada in 1958. Overall, therefore, British performance on trade
discrimination was mediocre.
’ ibid. The report was written in response to a memo from the Governor to the Chancellor o f the Exchequer 
urging the latter to finally go ahead with the establishment o f convertibility. PRO T236-3940, the Governor 
of the Bank o f England to the Chancellor o f Exchequer, April 12,1956.
According to the Bank for International Settlements, in 1959, “[t]he setback [in quota removal] in the case 
of Germany was due entirely to the réintroduction o f restrictions on coal imports”, and thus did not reflect a 
significant turnaround in trade policy. BIS, 29th Annual Report, April 1, 1958 to March 21, 1959, p. 160.
The restrictions were introduced to shelter Germany’s already traditionally protected energy sector from the 
drop in world coal prices due to the international 1958 recession.
' ^  The problem with the comparison o f quota removal is that the percentages refer only to private trade. 
However, in the 1950s, a large portion o f trade was not private but government-regulated, and the portion o f  
public to private trade varied considerably across countries. In the case of the UK, government trade made 
up a comparatively large portion o f total trade, with the effect that it allowed the UK to reach a higher 
liberalization index than other countries with a smaller share o f  government trade who undertook similar 
measures. In addition, the UK excluded a large number o f goods from the list based on which the 
liberalization index was calculated, which led to a further artificial improvement in its trade liberalization 
index. The general justification used by the British, as well as other OEEC members, was that the goods 
were strategic for national defense. In the British case, there is evidence that this justification was stretched 
particularly far to include a wide range of products. Overall, therefore, British trade liberalization was far 
less exhaustive than the OEEC Trade Liberalization Index would indicate. A. S. Milward and G. Brennan, 
Britain’s Place in the World. A Statistical Study o f  Import Controls, Routledge, 1996, chapter III. See 
also. The Economist, “Steps in convertibility”, British Banking supplement, June 12,1954, p.9.
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Table II I: OEEC countries: quota removal (percentage on January 1)
Intra-European trade Trade with the United 
States and Canada
1952^ 1953" 1954^ 1955^ 1956 1957 1958 1959 1956 1957 1958 1959
Austria 0 0 65 82 89 90 90 90 8 40 40 45
Benelux 75‘' 90" 87 88 96 96 96 96 86 86 86 86
Denmark 65 75 76 76 78 86 86 86 55 55 55 66
France 0 0 51 75 78 82 0 90 11 11 0 50
Germany 77 84 90 90 91 92 93 91 68 90 94 78
Greece 0 0 90"^ 97^ 95 95 95 96 99 99 99 99
Iceland 41 0 29 29 29 29 29 29 33 33 33 33
Ireland 75 75 77 77 90 90 90 90 15 15 15 15
Italy 77 99 100 100 99 99 99 98 24 39 68 68
Norway 75 75 75 75 75 78 81 81 0 84 87 91
Portugal 84 92 93 93 94 94 94 94 53 53 53 53
Sweden 75 91 91 91 93 93 93 93 64 68 68 68
Switzerland 75 91 92 92 93 91 91 91 98 99 99 93
Turkey 63 63 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UK 46 44 80 84 85 94 94 95 56 59 62 73
members
combined
n.a. n.a. 81 84 86 89 83 89 54 61 64 73
Note: For intra-European trade the percentages relate to base year 1948, except for Austria and Germany, 
where base years are 1952 and 1949, respectively. For trade with the dollar area the base period is 1953.
a: April; b: mid-March; 
c: does not include Netherlands; d: unofficial;
Source: BIS, annual reports.
In convertibility discussions. Treasury officials argued that while official 
convertibility did not directly increase pressure to remove dollar discrimination, it would 
weaken the UK’s ability to resist such pressures, thus increasing the net pressure.British 
defenses would be weakened by the fact that official currency convertibility removed the 
justification for discriminating against the exports of a country on the basis that its 
currency was scarce. Convertibility as a technical step would not increase the exposure of 
British industry to international competition. Moreover, since the UK did not plan to
PRO T236-3946, “The Arguments Against an Early Amalgamation o f the Official and Transferable 
Rates”, April 2,1958.
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declare its currency convertible according to Article VIII of the IMF Articles of
Agreement when it announced the unification of sterling rates, the move carried no legal
obligation to remove discrimination. Rather, the move would reduce the justification of
discrimination, putting pressure on Britain to liberalize US imports. In September 1955,
Peter Thomeycroft, then President of the Board of Trade, wrote:
It is inconvertibility, together with the European Payments Union and other 
payments agreements which are built upon it, that provides a basis of reason for 
the whole system of trade discrimination as we now have it in the Sterling Area 
and Western Europe.
...we should deploy all the ingenuity at our disposal, to avoid convertibility [sic] 
before we are ready for it [the removal of trade discrimination]
The general dollar scarcity in Europe after World War II had justified the
discrimination against goods for which the UK would have to pay with US dollars. As the
1950s progressed, the dollar gap, as it was called, began to close thus weakening the case
for continued discrimination against dollar imports. As a result, countries in Western
Europe began to liberalize their imports from the dollar area by removing quotas and
reducing tariffs. UK policymakers saw no necessary positive correlation between the
freeing of payments and the removal of dollar discrimination, as Hinshaw pointed out in
1958. While progressing towards convertibility, they
not only intended to retain discrimination themselves, but expressed the hope that 
continental Western European countries would continue for an indefinite 
transitional period to maintain their discriminatory restrictions against the Dollar 
Area.^^
In 1958 A. W. France even suggested expanding the use of quantitative restrictions when 
establishing convertibility. He proposed that in order to facilitate the unification of the 
non-resident sterling rates, the UK should “put on global quotas all the items remaining on
PRO T236-3943, Peter Thomeycroft to R.A. Butler, September 6, 1955. 
Hinshaw, “Toward European Convertibility”, p. 19.
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dollar quota, enlarging the quotas to take account of the existing non-dollar trade”/^ By 
deliberalizing trade with Europe to the level of that with the US, France argued, “[w]e 
could then unify the rates without the danger of an attack on discrimination”/^
Some might argue that the UK’s reluctance to remove discrimination against 
dollar imports is explained by consideration for members of the sterling area, many of 
which might feel threatened by dollar imports. However, Sir Alexander Caimcross 
rejected this argument, claiming that “[f]or all their talk on convertibility. Conservative 
ministers had no wish to abandon dollar discrimination but other members of the sterling 
area were less anxious to retain it”.^  ^Similarly, Schenk argued that the rest of the sterling 
area countries actually wanted a more rapid progress towards freer trade and payments.
The reason given for the unwillingness to increase pressure on the UK to remove 
discrimination against dollar imports was that the removal of the remaining restrictions 
would lead to “an increase in imports which we cannot afford”. In 1954, officials in the 
Treasury’s Economic Section and from the Board of Trade, - the latter of which 
consistently opposed convertibility -, produced several reports, such as the Dean report, 
which estimated the strain on the UK balance of payments of removing discrimination 
against dollar imports in the event that the establishment of convertibility in the near 
future should force the UK to remove dollar discrimination.^^ The lowest estimate came to 
£300 million, which Treasury officials regarded “quite a high price to pay for
PRO T236-3945, A. W. France to Rowan, “Liberalisation and the Rates”, February 27,1958. 
ibid.
A. Caimcross, The British Economy since 1945: Economic policy and Performance, Blackwell Publishers, 
1992, p.121.
Schenk, Britain, p. 123. 
ibid.
Caimcross and Watts, The Economic Section, p.310.
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convertibility, if, as the continentals argued, it spelt an end to discrimination against dollar 
goods''/^
While sterling convertibility was considered a necessary prerequisite for a global 
multilateral trading system, UK policymakers did not look to sterling convertibility as an 
impetus for liberalizing UK imports. Generally, trade considerations explain neither 
British policy on convertibility, nor the delay in the establishment of convertibility. The 
subsidiary role of trade considerations is reflected in Britain’s policy on the EPU. From 
the beginning, Britain was a very reluctant member of the EPU, eager to end it or at least 
remove itself, and thus the entire sterling area, from the EPU as soon as possible.^^ One of 
the reasons listed by the Treasury for wanting to end the EPU as soon as possible and to 
establish convertibility was that the EPU was discriminating against non-EPU countries 
because of the easier terms of payment among EPU members.^^ Although this was true, 
this is unlikely to have been a big concern of British policymakers, considering Britain’s 
view on trade discrimination as discussed in the previous section and given the fact that 
the sterling area was included in the EPU’s settlement mechanism.
According to Caimcross, the UK entered the EPU “with some hesitation, fearing 
that the new payments system would limit the use of sterling as an international 
currency”.^ '* The principal reason why the UK contemplated, on several occasions, 
“torpedoing the EPU by making a unilateral dash for full convertibility”,^  ^ was that 
sterling's membership in a preferential payments system, such as the EPU, conflicted with 
aspirations for a special role for sterling in the international monetary system. As long as
I' ibid.
for a discussion, see Milward, The European Rescue, pp.350-367. 
PRO T230-373, note by Rickett, March 7, 1958.
Caimcross, “Economic Policy”, p.42.
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Britain remained in the EPU, sterling differed little from the other currencies in the 
clearing union. As a regional clearing system, the EPU made all member currencies equal, 
removing an important incentive to do business in, and thus hold, sterling rather than any 
other European currency. The EPU prevented members from accumulating reserves in 
sterling, “since all changes in member currency balances held by member central banks 
had to be reported monthly to the Union and to be compensated according to the EPU 
rules (i.e., to be transformed into EPU credit and gold)”.^  ^ The latter component of the 
EPU agreement thus undermined sterling’s status as international reserve currency. The 
preoccupation with the effect of EPU membership on sterling’s status as international 
reserve currency is confirmed by Milward’s statement that “in London little thought was 
given to overall consequences for British trade of a disruption of the EPU”.^ ^
Britain’s strong dislike of the EPU and the pursuit of its dissolution stand in stark 
contrast with the fact that it was one of the principal beneficiaries of EPU's credit-granting 
facilities, as can be seen from Table 11.2.^  ^The pursuit of an early dissolution of the EPU 
in the mid-1950s can only be explained by Britain’s aspirations for the pound as 
international key currency which conflicted with the continuation of EPU. The expectation 
of US financial support partially explains what Milward called a “high-handed diplomatic 
attitude towards the EPU” in the first half of the 1950s, which, “contrasted starkly with 
Britain's financial weakness”.^ ^
Hinshaw, “Toward European convertibility”, p. 18. 
Milward, The European Rescue, p.356. 
see also Strange, Sterling, p.63.
Milward, The European Rescue, p.365.
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Table II.2: Credits granted to (+) or received from (-) EPU (million US dollars)
UK France FRG Bel.-Lux. Denmark Italy Netherl. Norway Switzerl.
1955 -339 -139 +547 +173 -108 -174 +178 -112 +109
1956 -350 -209 +688 +187 -92 -154 +113 -91 +76
1957 -382 -385 +1010 +137 -89 -111 +82 -77 +18
1958* -378 -485 +1027 +154 -66 +7 +121 -87 -12
a: as o f December 27,1958. 
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht jurJanuar 1 9 5 9 ,1959, p. 124;
BIS, 28th Annual Report, April 1, 1957 to March 31, 1958, p. 169.
In June 1955, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer, R. A. Butler, rejected one of several 
Bank requests to establish convertibility, he questioned whether convertibility was at all 
possible if it was allied to free trade.^ ® The attraction to a floating exchange rate in 
conjunction with convertibility among UK policymakers^ % and the absence of any 
expression of concern of its effects on trade, lend further proof to the dismissal of trade 
considerations in the convertibility discussions, particularly in the first half of the 1950s. 
Many continental European countries expressed a great dislike for the “additional and 
unnecessary uncertainty for the trading world that would be brought about by more freely 
moving exchange rates”, as they were propagated, in connection with convertibility, by 
the British.^^
For Britain, trade considerations, in particular the desire to promote multilateral 
non-discriminatory trade, did not provide a motive for establishing currency convertibility. 
British trade policy in the 1950s reveals a reluctance to remove controls on trade and 
payments and to end trade discrimination, all of which are in conflict with the 
commitment made to free and multilateral trade and payments by joining the Bretton
30
32
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.228. 
See following section.
Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, p. 108.
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Woods system. Trade was certainly not a sufficient motivation for Britain to champion 
convertibility. If, as G. John Ikenberry claimed, the British, in the Bretton Woods 
negotiations, joined the Americans in “a common belief in the desirability of currency 
stability and the convertibility of currencies”, then other motivations than a shared interest 
in the expansion of world trade must have determined the British attitude.^^
Ikenberry, “The Political Origins”, p. 162.
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KEEPING THE BACKDOOR OPEN
In t r o d u c t io n
UK policy on convertibility in the 1950s was characterized by dilemmas and
inconsistencies. Throughout that decade, periods in which government statements and
policy raised expectations of imminent convertibility alternated with periods where
convertibility seemed to be postponed indefinitely.^ "  ^At the Commonwealth Conference in
December 1952, Britain presented its Collective Approach for Freer Trade and
Payments.^^ In March, 1953, the Chancellor of the Exchequer announced to OEEC
officials in Paris that Commonwealth members had agreed that a rapid return to
convertibility would be in their countries’ best interest and that they intended to proceed
quickly towards convertibility.^^ However, the plans did not materialize, largely because
of the US’s refusal to provide the financial support to Britain or to the IMF which the
British considered necessary.By the third quarter of 1953 the public had realized that
convertibility plans were off:
The fairest judgment seems to be that a year ago Britain and the Commonwealth 
put convertibility first, and tried hopefully to insert liberalisation second; now, 
apparently, they put liberalisation first and convertibility nowhere (except in 
conditional perorations about the rather distant fiiture).^^
Mocking the government for its inconsistent policy. The Economist wrote that “...it would
see also Dow, Management, pp.87-8.
This was the first time convertibility plans were presented to the public since 1947; the preceding 
ROBOT plan for convertibility, which envisaged convertibility o f non-resident sterling for current 
account purposes at a freely floating rate, was kept secret and quashed by the British Cabinet.
Patterson, Discrimination, p. 101.
Continental European countries' hostility to the British plan which envisaged making plans for their 
currencies over their heads also played a role. For a discussion o f the Collective Approach to 
Convertibility, see Milward, The European Rescue, pp.360-2 and Fforde, The Bank o f  England, pp.477- 
492.
The Economist, “Britain against Convertibility”, November 7, 1953, p.438.
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be an act of decency towards the dead, between now and next March at any rate, to leave 
the word convertibility out of the politicians’ perorations as completely as it is now out of 
their programme”?^ In March 1954 bilateral account sterling was abolished and the 
transferable account area was enlarged to include practically all sterling outside the 
sterling and dollar areas. At the same time, the London gold market was reopened. Both 
measures raised expectations about a move to convertibility in the near future. By June 
1954 at the latest, government statements had rekindled expectations of the UK’s “definite 
intention” to make sterling convertible “by or before next spring”.^ ® However, the 
statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the annual IMF meeting in September 
1954 made it clear that convertibility would be put off yet again.^  ^ On February 24, 1955, 
the UK government allowed the Exchange Equalization Account (EEA) to intervene in the 
transferable sterling market to prevent the transferable rate from dropping too far below 
the official rate. Many contemporary observers judged this step to constitute the ‘de facto’ 
establishment of convertibility, raising expectations of an imminent move toward the 
official unification of the sterling rates."^  ^ However, the combination of an apparent 
moratorium on government statements regarding convertibility and the sterling crises 
occurring in the second halves of 1955, 1956 and 1957 resulted in a quieting down of 
speculation about convertibility until 1958/^ The apparent policy void on convertibility 
between February 1955 and 1958 was criticized in many circles, not least the Bank of 
England, as indicating Britain’s half-heartedness regarding sterling and convertibility. The
ibid.
The Economist, “Next Step for Sterling”, June 12, 1954, p.869.
BIS, 25th Annual Report, April 1,1954 to March 31. 1955, p. 110; see also The Economist, “Go-Slow 
for Sterling”, and “Mr Butler Regrets”, October 2, 1954, pp.23 & 60.
Harrod, The Pound Sterling, 1951-1958, p.27; Caimcross, “Economic Policy”, p.64. The Economist 
called the move “Backdoor Convertibility”, November 3, 1955, p.827.
Within the Bank o f En 
between 1955 and 1958.
gland and the Treasury, however, convertibility continued to be discussed heatedly
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feeling was that Britain was not finishing the business it had started, when it had
established de facto convertibility in 1955. The UK standstill on convertibility led The
Banker to observe in 1956:
While the signal for the formal move still rests with Britain, the continental 
countries, and notably Western Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, have in 
recent months been flexing their convertibility muscles somewhat ostentatiously ... 
The sterling clock has momentarily stopped; but the latest German measures bring 
the D-mark so near the objective that the policy of waiting for a lead from London 
appears little more than a formality.
...it can be said that of all currencies with pretensions to international importance, 
sterling is very nearly bottom of the list in the extent of convertibility for 
residents."^
The impression gained by Britain’s bumpy ride to convertibility in the 1950s is that 
British policy on convertibility in the 1950s must have been tom between the desire to 
move as quickly as possible, and ahead of everybody else, on the one hand, and a 
reluctance to take the plunge on the other. Overall, between 1952 and 1958, government 
statements and actions repeatedly fed rumors of imminent convertibility, leading The 
Economist to write in September 1958 that “[t]he light hearted economic historian of the 
‘fifties could have a fine time recalling the occasions through those years when 
convertibility was confidently expected and thought to be just around the comer”."^^
The apparent inconsistencies in British policy on convertibility are explained by a 
fundamental conflict between internal and external policy objectives. On the external side, 
British ambitions for international currency status for the pound sterling and for London as 
world financial center, rather than trade considerations, explain the keen interest in 
establishing convertibility sooner rather than later and the public statements to that 
effect."^  ^At the same time, however, British governments were reluctant to implement an
^  The Banker, “Sterling Now”, June 1956, pp.333-4.
The Economist, “Convertibility”, September 27,1958, p. 1043.
^  According to Day, convertibility was important “because o f the position o f sterling as an international
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external monetary policy which might require domestic economic adjustment, and, 
moreover, which would be very difficult and very costly to revoke. The official 
establishment of convertibility would have constituted such a policy.
C o n f l ic t in g  p o l ic y  g o a l s
The most ardent advocates of the rapid return to convertibility came from the 
financial sector of the UK economy and, in particular, from the Bank of England."^  ^From 
the early 1950s, the Bank of England was the driving force in the return to convertibility."*  ^
In its pursuit of a rapid return to currency convertibility, the Bank of England was 
motivated above all by the desire to “re-establish sterling as an international currency with 
unrestricted use”."*^ To be able to claim an international key currency role, both as trade 
and as reserve currency, sterling had be widely convertible, and, moreover, it should, 
ideally, become convertible before other European currencies. For these reasons, the Bank 
of England wanted official convertibility, that is, the unification of the two non-resident 
rates for sterling for current account purposes, as soon as possible.^^ The election victory
currency”. Day, The Future, p. 121. See also Hinshaw, “Toward European Convertibility”, p. 18 and S. 
Strange, “International Monetary Relations”, in Andrew Shonfield, (ed.). International Economic 
Relations o f  the Western World 1959-1971, Volume 2, Oxford University Press, 1976, p,71.
The Bank o f England's interest in the prestige o f sterling is explained by the positive correlation between 
the international prestige o f sterling and the influence and prestige, both nationally and internationally, o f the 
Bank o f England. Milward, The European Rescue, p.358. An assessment o f the benefits and costs o f  
sterling’s role as international currency in the 1960s can be found in B. J. Cohen, “The Benefits and Cost 
o f Sterling”, Reprints in International Finance, No. 15, Princeton University Press, 1970. In general, 
however it is extremely difficult to assess the financial or economic benefits o f sterling’s role as 
international currency. “What the real economic advantages, rather than the more general considerations 
o f political power and prestige, o f the international use o f sterling actually were is an involved question 
about which there is little hard information.” Milward, The European Rescue, p.353.
Dow, The Management, 1964, p.84, and Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area, p. 124.
Milward, The European Rescue, pp.352-3.
Cobbold, the Governor o f the Bank of England, and Bolton were instrumental in the draftuig o f ROBOT 
in 1952, the first plan put forward for sterling convertibility since the failed attempt in 1947. ROBOT 
envisaged making the pound convertible at an exchange rate which would be allowed to float between 
$2.40 and S3.20, while blocking 90 per cent o f  all foreign-held sterling balances and funding at least 80
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of the Conservatives in 1951 brought a party to power which was more receptive than the
previous government to advice from the financial sectors of the economy, namely the
Bank of England and the City. According to Susan Strange,
[wjhile the emphasis under the first Labour government had been on the 
exclusiveness of a defensive currency area, ringed by controls similar to, though 
less strict than, those round the Soviet East European monetary area in the 1960s, 
the emphasis from the end of 1951 onwards was on the re-establishment of sterling 
as general international currency and of London as an open financial market­
place.^^
This assessment is confirmed by the fact that in 1952, the Conservative government
publicly declared the speedy restoration of convertibility to be one of its top priorities.^^
According to Milward, many Conservative ministers shared the Bank view that
To restore Britain to its role as the chief decision-making power in the 
international financial system after the United States was ... the only international 
policy which guaranteed the nation’s survival in worthwhile form.^^
Thus, convertibility was seen as prerequisite for continued international financial power,
which in turn was the channel through which Britain sought to assert its national interest
in the international arena. In 1953, von Mangoldt, the German representative in the EPU
Managing Board, wrote that Britain’s policy on convertibility was determined by the
ambition to reclaim Britain’s key role in international trade and payments in order to
establish a more favorable balance of power vis-à-vis the United States. '^* In spite of the
per cent o f sterling area sterling balances. Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, 
pp. 164-5. For a discussion o f ROBOT, see also Fforde, The Bank o f  England, pp.434-440 and Milward, 
The European Rescue, pp.351-353.
Strange, Sterling, p.64.
Dow, The Management, p.72.
Milward, The European Rescue, p.354.
Hanrieder stated that “British political leaders and the Treasury were inclined to see sterling’s 
international role as an imperial legacy, as embodying solemn responsibilities to Commonwealth 
governments that held sterling as a reserve asset, and as one more measure o f Britain’s continued great- 
power status. Under Harold Wilson in the late sixties sterling became a symbol o f  Britain’s international 
virility and prestige, much like the independent nuclear deterrent”. W. F. Hanrieder, The Foreign Policies 
o f West Germany, France, and Britain, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980, p.219.
BA B 102-55345, report by von Mangoldt re. “Englische Konvertierbarkeitsplane; bisherige 
Entwicklung und gegenwartiger Stand der Diskussionen in der OEEC”, March 28, 1953.
108
combination of a Conservative government and the campaigning by the Bank of England, 
official convertibility was not established until 1958, raising the question what 
considerations held Britain back from moving more quickly towards its declared goal of 
restoring the pound to its pre-war glory.
The Treasury argued that if convertibility was to further the goal of increasing 
sterling’s prestige then it had to be undertaken at a time when sterling was strong. If not. 
Treasury officials feared, the move might lead to a run on the pound, as it had in 1947, 
which would defeat the purpose of establishing convertibility in the first place. Thus, it 
was argued, the weakness of sterling prevented the government from realizing its declared 
goal of rapid convertibility. In contradiction with the officially stated policy that 
convertibility was to be established when sterling was strong the move to de facto 
convertibility was actually ‘‘taken as an act of defence”, that is, at a time when sterling was 
under attack.^^
In direct response to adverse speculation against sterling, the government 
announced on February 24, 1955 that it had advised the Exchange Equalization Account 
(EEA) to intervene in the transferable sterling markets abroad to ensure that the 
transferable sterling rate did not fall below one per cent of the official rate. As a result, 
after February 1955, every non-resident of the sterling area could convert sterling into 
other currencies and vice versa for current account purposes at a rate which was
Chancellor Butler stated publicly in July 1955 that convertibility had to be undertaken from a position 
o f strength. The Banker, “Sterling under Strain”, August 1955, p.86.
The Banker, “No Backsliding on Sterling”, December 1957, p.765 and Fforde, The Bank o f  England, 
p.525.
Foreseeing the government’s decision to establish de fact convertibility as a means o f ending sterling 
speculation The £co/7om/jr remarked on the inconsistency of government statements and actions:
Having declared to the world that Britain cannot afford to embrace convertibihty while economic conditions 
seem to be set fair, it is going to look very peculiar if  it hurries to embrace it as soon as the barometer points 
to stormy. The Economist, “Go-Slow for Sterling”, October 2, 1954, p.23.
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guaranteed to remain within one per cent discount of the official rate/^ Therefore,
February 24, 1955 has rightly been identified as the date of the establishment of de facto
convertibility/^ Roy Harrod assessed the move according to the two characteristics which
he claimed defined convertibility:
First, the authorities responsible for the currency must be de facto willing to 
convert it. Secondly, there must be complete confidence that they will continue to 
be willing to convert it. If both these conditions are fulfilled, then the currency 
may be said to be ‘convertible’.
...It cannot be said that [after February 1955] there was absolute confidence that 
the British authorities would continue to maintain transferable sterling above the 
commodity shunting point, but it can be said that there was a sufficient amount of 
confidence to justify the use of the word ‘convertible’.^ ^
After the move toward de facto convertibility the official unification of sterling rates as it
finally took place on December 28, 1958, should have been a formality, since the step did
not increase the actual fireedom to exchange sterling. The question is, why it took the UK
government nearly four years between committing itself to keeping the transferable and
official rate for sterling within one percent of each other, and thus de facto convertible, and
officially unifying the two rates. Why did the UK government agree to de facto
convertibility while insisting on waiting with official convertibility?
The Bank was not satisfied with the ‘backdoor convertibility’ that was established 
in February 1955. The step effectively meant that the Bank of England stood ready to 
provide the dollars demanded in return for sterling that could not be found in the market.
Thus the commitment to maintain the transferable sterling rate within one per cent o f the official rate 
provided the guarantee o f the exchange value which was one o f  the defining characteristics o f  Bretton 
Woods convertibility (see chapter I).
E.N. Helleiner, American Hegemony and Global Economic Structure: From Closed to open Financial 
Relations in the Post War world, Ph.D. Dissertation, University o f  London, 1991, p. 119. Surrey, “United 
Kingdom”, p.533.
Harrod, The Pound Sterling, 1951-1958, p.28.
110
forcing the UK reserves to bear the burden of convertibility without enjoying its benefits. 
In order to maintain the transferable sterling rate within one per cent of the official rate, 
UK monetary authorities had to sell dollars for sterling every time the transferable sterling 
rate threatened to fall below the one per cent limit. Soon after the decision to intervene in 
the transferable market for sterling, in August 1955, the Bank renewed its pressure on the 
Treasury to unify non-resident sterling, thus establishing official non-resident 
convertibility. The Bank suggested the Istanbul conference in September of the same year 
as a suitable occasion for establishing and announcing official convertibilityThe main 
argument put forward by Bank officials for the official unification of non-resident sterling 
rates was that the move was necessary to restore confidence in the pound by removing 
uncertainty about the UK's intentions regarding exchange policy. They argued that “[t]he 
policy of bringing together the official and transferable rates was of the greatest 
importance in maintaining confidence abroad in sterling”.^  ^ The dual rate system for 
sterling was a ‘costly anomaly’ and it undermined confidence in sterling.^^ For reasons of 
prestige and practicality, a major international currency could not afford to be divided into 
an official and a cheap version, and be traded at different rates in different markets. In 
addition, the turnover for the market for transferable sterling into dollars frequently 
exceeded that for official sterling, and, more importantly, it was conducted outside the 
United Kingdom, in the foreign exchange markets of New York and Zurich.^  ^ The fact 
that the larger part of sterling/dollar transactions was carried out outside the UK
^  PRO T236-3943, “Note o f a meeting in Sir Edward Bridges’ room at the Treasury, at 3 p.m. on 
Monday, 8th August 1955”, August 8,1955. 
ibid.
“  see, for example, PRO T236-3946, ‘“ Pros’ for early amalgamation o f  official and transferable 
sterling”, report sent by the Bank o f England to Rowan, March 18, 1958.
PRO T236-3946, “The Arguments in Favour o f an Early Amalgamation o f  Official and Transferable 
Sterling - Views of the Bank o f England”, April 2 ,1958.
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constituted a loss of both face and money. ^  Britain lost income in terms of financial and 
transactions services of sterling to exchange centers outside the UK, which also 
undermined London’s position as an international exchange center.^  ^ Another important 
implication of the dual sterling/dollar rate system was that through the transferable sterling 
rate the other European currencies also became de facto convertible into the dollar but at a 
cheaper rate, which led to distortions in European payments arrangements. Among other 
things, it forced the UK to redeem at the official sterling rate through the EPU sterling 
which had been acquired at a discount.^^ The Bank argued that, as long as the two non­
resident rates were not officially united, people were not sure whether the government 
would not renege on its commitment to maintain the transferable sterling rate within one 
per cent of the official rate in times of strong speculation against sterling. This doubt 
exacerbated the downward tendency of the transferable rate when sterling was under 
pressure, as people sought to rid themselves of transferable sterling which they expected to 
depreciate, thus increasing the cost of maintaining a fixed exchange rate in general. The 
lack of complete segmentation between transferable and official sterling combined with 
the uncertainty over the future of the transferable rate forced British monetary authorities 
to intervene in the cheap sterling market just to preserve the official sterling rate, while, at 
the same time, making it very costly and difficult for them to do this effectively. In
^ ibid.
As stated above, the actual financial income loss is very difficult to assess. According to Clarke, in the 
second half o f the 1950s, that is, when the Bank o f England was already intervening in the transferable 
sterling markets in Zurich and New York, “[i]n some quarters an annual turnover of at least £1,000 million 
was estimated to be taking place outside the London market”. In a meeting between Bank and Treasury 
officials in 1956 an estimate was presented according to which towards the end o f each month when EPU 
settlement was approaching, “the daily turnover in transferable sterling was close on £5m”. W. M. Clarke, 
The City in the World Economy, 1965, p.51 and PRO T236-5403, “Exchange rate policy (note o f  a 
meeting held in the Chancellor o f the Exchequer's room at 4 p.m. on Tuesday, 24th April)”, April 24, 
1956.
^  PRO T230-373, note o f a meeting held in the Chancellor o f the Exchequer's room on exchange rate 
policy between Bank o f England and Treasury officials, March 5, 1958.
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addition, effective intervention in the transferable sterling rate was made even more 
difficult by the fact that the transferable market was outside the UK.
The Bank of England summed up its case by saying that sterling rate unification 
was vital for restoring confidence in the pound as an intemational key currency and 
London as intemational financial center: “The one thing we must not do is to imagine that 
other people will have confidence in our currency if we manifestly exhibit no confidence 
in it ourselves”.^  ^By hesitating to act on the long avowed policy of sterling convertibility 
that had been on the agenda for over ten years the government was constantly encouraging 
speculation against the pound.
Treasury officials shared by no means the Bank’s sense of urgency regarding the 
return to convertibility. They claimed that sterling rate unification represented far more 
than merely the removal of a costly anomaly. The overall Treasury attitude vis-à-vis the 
return to convertibility throughout most of the 1950s is best summed up in F. A. Bishop’s 
reaction to Bank pressure to unify sterling in March 1958, when he remarked “[t]he real 
question is - what is the huny?”^^
Had the British government viewed the step taken in February 1955 as the 
achievement of convertibility, then it would not have agreed to it. According to 
Caimcross, as a result of the decision to intervene in transferable sterling, the government 
“ended up with de facto [sic] convertibility, something it never planned to adopt”.^  ^For 
the government, intervention in transferable sterling was a technical step, and was
ibid.
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presented as such, which served two direct purposes/^ The first one was to end the dollar 
drain caused by commodity shunting/^ This term was used to describe a process whereby 
sterling area goods were purchased with transferable sterling, allegedly to be resold to a 
transferable account country, when in fact they were resold for dollars which would then 
not be surrendered to exchange control authorities. “In this roundabout way the holder of 
transferable sterling could obtain dollars, and the British Exchange Account would be 
deprived of dollars that it would normally have received from the sale of sterling-area 
goods in America.”^^  The larger the discount of transferable sterling relative to official 
sterling, the more worthwhile commodity shunting became. With a discount of the 
transferable rate on the official rate of one percent or less, transactions costs ensured that 
commodity shunting was no longer profitable.^^ The second motivation for allowing the 
EEA to intervene in the transferable market was to end speculation against sterling. In 
response to the continuous deterioration of transferable sterling in the previous months, 
the government decided that the best way to prevent the transferable rate from dragging 
down the official rate was to intervene in foreign exchange markets to support the 
transferable rate.^ "^  Measured according to its latter purpose, the success of the move was 
limited. Intervention combined with a raise in bank rate from 3.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent 
and the réintroduction of hire-purchase restrictions temporarily ended speculation in the 
spring of 1955. However, the policy of intervention in the transferable sterling market 
could not prevent adverse spéculation from flaring up again in the summer of 1955, in
Dow, The Management, p.86.
Hinshaw, Toward European Convertibility, p.25. A good description o f  commodity shunting and the 
decision to intervene in transferable sterling to end it is found in Harrod, The Pound Sterling, 1951-1958, 
pp.24-27.
Feaveryear, The Pound Sterling, p.421.
Dow, Management, p.86. The Economist, “Backdoor Convertibility”, March 5, 1955, pp.827-829. 
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, pp.524-527.
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1956 and in 1957. For the Treasury and for the government, the decision to intervene in
transferable sterling did not constitute convertibility. Rather it was a technical step which
had the benefit, so Treasury officials thought at the time, that it could be revoked without
too much difficulty. The UK government saw a big difference between the measures of
February 1955 and official convertibility. According to Treasury officials, the formal
unification of the two sterling rates would be an irrevocable and therefore major step, in
that it would lead to the loss of the transferable rate as a policy instrument.^^ They argued
that as long as the rates had not been officially unified the government could, in times ôf
crisis, untie the transferable rate firom the official rate and let the former float downward.
Once the rates had been officially unified, however, this option would no longer be
available, because it would be regarded at home and abroad as a major step.^  ^ The
Treasury insisted that the official move to convertibility had to be made from strength, that
is, when confidence in sterling was high, to assure that the event be confidence-boosting.
In view of the repeated sterling crises, officials pointed out that, if not undertaken at a
moment of strength, convertibility could unleash speculation against sterling, thus actually
weakening it.^  ^According to Scammell, official convertibility constituted
a step which could not easily be retraced and was a declaration of strength and 
confidence by governments that convertibility was not just a passing phase made 
possible by temporarily favourable circumstances but was the normal condition for 
a strong currency and could now be held indefinitely.^*
While policymakers were keen to convince the world that sterling was strong they feared
precisely the fact that the step was difficult to revoke once it had been taken.
PRO T236-3946, Rowan to Making, March 23, 1958.
PRO T236-3946, “The Arguments Against an Early Amalgamation o f the Official and Transferable 
Rates - Views o f the Treasury”, April 2, 1958.
PRO T236-3946, “The Arguments Against a Move Now”, Rowan to Rickett, March 24, 1958.
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Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.398
The government’s reluctance to establish official convertibility, thus sealing the de 
facto removal of exchange control, can be explained partially by a general reluctance to 
free the economy from controls and discriminatory practices after World War In the 
early post-war period, economic policy in the UK was characterized by a widespread 
belief that “the country would have to defend its balance of payments by frequent recourse 
to direct controls and discriminatory measures”.M a n y  economists and other observers 
of the UK economy frequently argued, both at the time of the events and afterwards 
looking back on the course of things, that controls provided a useful and entirely 
acceptable discretionary tool with which to manage the economy. It is widely accepted 
that the Labour government assigned an important role to controls as a means of 
containing inflation and solving balance of payments problems.*^ But, as Caimcross, who 
was part of the decisionmaking body, observed, although Conservative governments 
“attached more importance to market freedom” than Labour, even they were not reluctant 
to introduce controls when they thought it necessary.^^
In 1962, M. FG. Scott suggested as one possible way to improve the UK balance 
of payments the imposition of import restrictions or tariffs.^  ^ Scott’s view of the 
usefulness of controls is particularly interesting since he advised the government directly
N. F. R. Crafts, ‘“You’ve never had it so good?’ British economic policy and performance, 1945- 
1960”, in Eichengreen, Europe's Post-War Recovery, pp.246-270 and P. Minford, “Reconstruction and 
the U.K. Postwar Welfare State: False Start and New Beginning”, in Dombusch, Nolling and Layard 
(eds.). Postwar Economic Reconstruction, pp. 115-137.
Scammell, The International Economy, pp.45-6.
Howson, “Money”, p.231.
A. Caimcross, The British Economy, p.94. Patrick Minford claimed that the “new generation o f Tory 
leaders” which governed Britain in the 1950s, - Butler, Macmillan and even Churchill -, “was in 
economic matters uncommitted to free market ideas”. Minford, “Reconstruction”, p. 120.
M. FG. Scott, “The Balance o f Payments Crises”, in Worswick and Ady (eds.). The British Economy, 
p.229.
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on economic policy in 1953-4 as a member of the Economic Section, thus contributing to 
the formation of government policy, and then went on to comment on government policy 
and the UK economy from the outside as an academic observer.*"^  During his spell in the 
Economic Section he wrote a report on the costs of removing dollar discrimination in the 
case of a move to convertibility which indicated that the costs of removing dollar 
discrimination, and thus of establishing convertibility, were too high.^  ^ Scott’s view 
reflected the general stance taken by the Economic Section on convertibility, which, 
throughout most of the 1950s, “debated exchange rate policy without much wish to see an 
early introduction of convertibility”.^  ^After the return to convertibility Scott criticized the 
move, for having increased speculative capital flows.*^
Prime Minister and former Chancellor of the Exchequer Harold Macmillan 
exhibited a particular attraction to exchange control or, at least, a reluctance to renounce 
its use as policy instrument. During the speculative crisis in the fall of 1957 he wrote a 
personal note to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in which he questioned the general 
desirability of the progress towards convertibility which had already been achieved and 
asked him to look into the possibility of backtracking on the removal of exchange control. 
He wondered: “[H]ow far is it possible to revert to the position before we slopped into 
practical convertibility, and so to prevent these raids by the enemy upon our currency”, 
and argued that “[w]e might perfectly well consider reimposing some of the monetary
^ Another contribution by Scott to the literature on the balance o f payments o f the UK is M. FG. Scott, A 
Study o f  United Kingdom Imports, Cambridge University Press, 1963.
For a study on the role o f the Economic Section in UK economic policy formation see Caimcross and 
Watts, The Economic Section.
PRO T230-342, M. FG. Scott, “The effect o f  removing discrimination against dollar countries”,
EC(S)(54)9, April 21, 1954.
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Caimcross and Watts, The Economic Section, p.309. 
Scott, “The Balance o f  Payments Crises”, p.227.
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controls and exchange controls if it is practical to do so - again as a temporary measure”.^  ^
As the crisis worsened Macmillan's disenchantment with the removal of exchange control 
grew and his attacks on a policy of payments liberalization became bolder. In late 
September he asserted that “[t]o say that this second course [a reversal of the extent of 
convertibility so far achieved] would ‘represent a reversal of all that we have tried to 
achieve in the last ten years’ does not prove it is wrong”.^ ^
Making de facto convertibility official would have only made it harder to renege 
on a policy that the Prime Minister viewed with great skepticism. An official move would 
have sealed the removal of exchange control, finalizing the renouncement of 
inconvertibility as an instrument of monetary policy. The reluctance to establish official 
convertibility was reinforced by the fear of political repercussions of a move that might 
be interpreted as a governmental tendency to put intemational financial considerations 
before domestic economic growth.
In the UK, contrary to Germany and France, convertibility was a political issue, 
rather than just a technical monetary problem. In a meeting on exchange rate policy in 
October 1958, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Heathcoat Amory, remarked on the 
political importance of the return to non-resident current account convertibility in 
December 1958 since the move represented the achievement of a goal set out by the 
Conservative government in 1952.^ ® Conservative policymakers worried that 
convertibility would be criticized by the Opposition as indicating the Government's 
willingness to put sterling before the economy.^' In light of sterling’s persistent weakness
PRO T236-3945, Macmillan to Thomeycroft, September 18, 1957.
PRO T236-3945, Macmillan to Economic Secretary o f  Treasury, September 29, 1957.
^  PRO T236-4819, “Exchange Rate Policy: Note o f Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W .l, on 
Tuesday, 28th October 1958, at 12.15 p.m.”, October 28, 1958.
See, for example, PRO T236-3945, “Bringing the Rates together” to Makins and Rowan by Treasury
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in the 1950s, a move to convertibility might have triggered a sterling crisis, forcing the 
government to raise interest rates or introduce other contractionary measures to defend 
sterling. Labour argued that there 'was a conflict between domestic goals, full employment 
and economic expansion, and intemational ambitions, in particular sterling's intemational 
currency role and the dealings of the City of London, and that convertibility catered to the 
latter at the expense of the former. The Labour Party viewed exchange control as a way of 
protecting the domestic economy from intemational speculation against sterling. The 
removal of exchange control, through the establishment of convertibility, was attacked as 
sacrificing the domestic economy to the intemational status of sterling.^  ^ Convertibility 
was at the heart of a general debate over what should be Britain's economic goals. Thus, 
policymaking on convertibility was weighed down by a more general political 
controversy. In 1954, The Economist described the politics of convertibility as the 
following:
Next year is likely to be an election year. It is possible that convertibility might be 
achieved during it if Mr Gaitskell could be induced to meet the plan vrith passive 
acceptance; but it has always been clear that the project would not work if he was 
jostled by his own left wing into meeting it with implacable opposition. Now it 
seems likely that he is going to be jostled that way not only by the left wing of his 
party, but by its right wing as well. The latest economic report of the Trades Union 
Congress, in its search for some grounds for criticism of Tory financial policy, 
leaned heavily on the view that the removal of controls had already left Britain 
excessively vulnerable to fluctuations in world markets. It is important to 
recognise what this policy of Labour opposition to freer payments would mean if 
C-Day were, after all, allowed to dawn next spring. Foreigners would then in effect 
be told ‘Britain is giving you the opportunity to convert your sterling into dollars. 
In six months’ time there will probably be a general election, and the altemative 
government that may well be elected 'will probably take this opportunity away.’ 
There is little doubt what foreigners' reactions would be; they would hurry forward 
to utilise their rights of conversion at a fast enough press to wreck the whole 
venture.^^
official (unsigned), February 20, 1958.
“...Labour spokesmen have publicly stated that the recent strains could have been met by a tightening 
o f exchange control”. The Banker^ “No Backsliding on Sterling”, December 1957, p.763.
The Economist, “Patience for the Pound”, September 11, 1954, p.792.
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In October 1958, the Trades Union Congress (TUG) wrote to the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Heathcoat Amory, that it opposed any further moved to convertibility. This 
letter was also reported in the Times newspaper. The Treasury was concerned about the 
possible negative public reaction to convertibility as a result.^ "^  The convertibility issue 
was divided along party lines in the sense that the Conservative party had made it a top 
priority, while Labour was likely to oppose, and might attempt to revoke exchange control 
liberalization. Moreover, as Macmillan’s views revealed, even within the Conservative 
party, convertibility was a controversial issue. In Britain, convertibility was a much more 
prominent and debated issue than in France or Germany. The public controversy 
surrounding convertibility in Britain in the 1950s contradicts A.C.L. Day’s previously 
quoted comment from 1956 that “[w]ith the exception of the autarkists and imperialists of 
the extreme left and extreme right, the principle that we should move towards 
convertibility is remarkably generally accepted”
The conclusion from this section is that in the 1950s several factors held the 
Treasury back from making sterling officially convertible for non-residents for current 
account purposes. All were linked to the symbolical importance of the move. First, 
officials, including the Prime Minister, feared the effect on speculation of a move to 
convertibility if it were undertaken at a moment of sterling weakness. Growing concern 
with sterling’s weakness also explains why UK policy increasingly realized the necessity 
of a collective move to convertibility. Given sterling’s proneness to drop, a unilateral
PRO T236-4819, J. Downie to A. France and R. Hall, October 27, 1958. See also PRO PREMl 1-2671, 
October 28, 1958.
Day, The Future, p. 120.
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move to sterling convertibility seemed a precarious policy/^ Second, UK politicians were 
concerned, particularly before elections, about the message an official move to 
convertibility might send to the electorate. The step could be considered a threat to the 
government's commitment to full employment since official convertibility at a fixed rate 
implied the need for financial discipline for a country whose inflation was consistently 
higher than the European average. Although convertibility had already been established de 
facto, an official announcement of convertibility was likely to be a welcome bait for the 
Opposition. Third, there were strong reservations against giving up the transferable rate of 
sterling. Policymakers considered the dual exchange rate system an instrument of 
monetary policy which they were unwilling to give up. Moreover, they were reluctant to 
endorse a decision, and therefore make a reversal more difficult, which they thought 
limited their ability to pursue an independent economic policy. Thus, in the UK, 
policymaking on convertibility revolved around political, psychological and symbolical 
issues.
C o n v e r t ib il it y  a n d  t h e  e x t e r n a l  c o n s t r a in t
A floating exchange rate for the pound was viewed as a possible solution to the 
conflict between the establishment of convertibility and the maintenance of an 
independent monetary policy. Throughout the 1950s, both the Bank of England and the 
Treasury were very attracted to floating exchange rates or at least more flexible exchange 
rates, although for different reasons. Many of the supporters of a floating exchange rate in 
the Treasury opposed convertibility for the same reasons that they advocated floating
^ “Official reserves were never growing fast enough in 1952-4 to justify British attempts to make sterling 
convertible outside a common European framework.” Milward, The European Rescue, p.395.
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rates. Alternatively, many policymakers thought that the return to sterling convertibility 
could or should only be undertaken jointly with a move towards greater exchange rate 
flexibility. Both the resistance to convertibility and the attraction to a floating, or flexible, 
pound exchange rate are explained by the view that the exchange rate was an instrument of 
monetary policy which the Treasury refused to give up. This section focuses on the 
attraction of policymakers in the Treasury and the Conservative government to floating 
exchange rates. The situation in the Bank of England was very different, since the Bank 
was Britain’s most ardent advocate of the return to currency convertibility. A floating or 
more flexible exchange rate would have increased the importance of monetary policy, 
which in turn would have increased the role of the Bank of England.^^
Many policymakers in the UK were opposed to convertibility unless it was
accompanied by an increase in exchange rate flexibility. In his theory of system
overdetermination, Holtfrerich explained why policymakers might consider convertibility
and fixed exchange rates to be incompatible:
Some autonomy in domestic stabilisation policy could peacefully coexist with 
fixed (but adjustable) exchange rates in the Bretton Woods era, as long as currency 
convertibility and thus intemational capital movements were still restricted. But 
with convertibility fully restored, the system was overdetermined and - when 
finally forced to make a choice and to eliminate one of the three elements (fixed 
exchange rates, full external convertibility, and national autonomy in stabilisation 
policy) - the participating countries finally agreed to remove the fixity of exchange 
rates in 1973.^ *
“To return to convertibility at a floating rate would have not only established the external balance and 
foreign confidence in sterling as the first consideration in domestic policy formulation, but would have 
restored the Bank o f England itself to an important role in policy formulation.” Milward, The European 
Rescue, p.358.
C.-L. Holtfrerich, “Introduction: The Evolution o f  World Trade, 1720 to the Present”, in Carl-Ludwig 
Holtfrerich (ed.). Interactions in the World Economy: Perspectives from International Economic History, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989, p.21.
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A country can only pursue an independent monetary policy, especially an inflationary 
monetary policy, when the economy is closed or when exchange rates are flexible, and 
even then its room for manoeuvre is limited. In the 1950s British pohcymakers were 
confronted with conflicting policy aims of national policy autonomy, convertibility and 
fixed exchange rates. As a result, the discussion over the return to convertibility was 
inextricably linked to the debate over fixed versus flexible exchange rates. Policymaking 
in the UK was pervaded by a strong distrust in the ability of an open multilateral system of 
free trade and payments combined with a fixed exchange rate to ensure the level of 
employment which the UK considered adequate.
Throughout the 1950s, British policymakers were attracted to the idea of a floating 
pound, in particular in connection with a move to convertibility. Thus, the plan for 
operation ROBOT, devised in 1950/1, envisaged a move to a floating or semi-floating 
exchange rate conjointly with the establishment of convertibility. There seems to be a 
belief that UK governments abandoned “the idea of increasing the use of monetary policy 
as an economic regulator by the use of floating exchange rates” in 1955.^  ^But a host of 
Treasury and Bank memos show that as late as the spring of 1958, the idea of a floating 
exchange rate was far from dead. In the spring of 1958 there was an outpouring of Bank 
and Treasury memos exchanging views on the pros and cons of a floating rate for sterling 
or, more moderately, a widening of the margins of fluctuation.
^  Milward, The European Rescue, p.358.
Kaplan and Schleiminger claim that Bank officials abandoned the idea o f  a floating rate after 1954 because 
they realized that a floating pound damaged confidence in sterling and thus the sterling's prestige as 
intemational currency. But the Bank still sought wider margins o f  fluctuation for sterling. In the 
negotiations for the European Monetary Agreement (EMA) which was to replace the EPU upon the 
establishment of convertibility, the British lobbied for a wider band around an official parity o f three to 
four per cent on either side to which the continental countries were opposed. Kaplan and Schleiminger, 
The European Payments Union, p.221 and Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.537.
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In September 1955, Robert Hall, Director of the Economic Section questioned the 
general desirability of convertibility at a fixed exchange ratte, since it represented a policy 
which, he claimed, restricted the UK's autonomy over its (domestic economic policy. He 
criticized the abandonment of the idea of a floating exchamge rate stating that this meant 
that the UK had
...made a radical change in the Collective Approachi and removed firom it what had 
always seemed to me to be its central feature and thee one that was going to give us 
the latitude which is not present with convertibility aat a fixed rate with narrow gold 
points. There is, to my mind, no doubt that converrtibility at a fixed rate imposes 
rigid limitations on internal policy and especially wlhen import and export controls 
are abandoned, so that changes in the foreign balance have to be primarily brought 
about by changes in the levels of activity and emplo^yment.^®^
The view of the director of the Economic Section is representative of a general reluctance
of the Treasury to embark on any policy, including convertiibility, which would force UK
policymakers to respond to external pressures to combat infUation.
In 1956 Rowan wrote a memo which was then redrafted by Hall entitled “Why
Convertibility”.^ ®* This memo best summarized the UK dilemma with regard to the
advancement towards convertibility. It juxtaposed the desirability to maintain the
international currency status for sterling with the fear thatt convertibility, which formed
part of a multilateral system of fi-ee trade and payments, would expose the UK to a wide
area of trade which “increased the risk that individual counttries may have to face painful
economic adjustments”. It saw a potential conflict betweem the advantages derived fi’om
“the widest possible system of trade and payments” and countries’ need to “isolate
themselves firom a fully international system”. The latter desire could be explained by
countries’ desire for independence “for example because thtey wish to be in a position to
PRO T236-3943, Robert Hall, “Convertibility etc.”, September 9, 19955.
PRO T236-3940, R. Hall, suggested redraft o f Rowan’s memo “W hy Convertibility” from May 18, 
1956, June 8, 1956.
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pursue an inflationary policy with impunity”.*®^ In 1955, Robert Hall stated more clearly 
that, “[t]he reason for which (in the end) we have not moved to convertibility is that we 
are afraid of the internal adjustments that will be required”. T h e r e  was a general 
unwillingness in the Treasury to allow the rules of the game of a multilateral system of 
free trade and payments at a fixed exchange rates at convertible currencies to dictate the 
level of domestic economic expansion. Convertibility, particularly at fixed rates, was 
feared to increase the UK's exposure to the forces of adjustment, thus reducing the British 
government's freedom to manage its economy according to its priorities. In a memo to the 
Prime Minister, Burke Trend from the Treasury asked the revealing, and rhetorical, 
question: “Are we prepared to accept the psychological limitation on our foreign policy of 
the continuance of a tight internal economic policy which convertibility must entail”?^®"^
There were a few voices in the Treasury which strongly criticized the general
policy of refusing to take exchange rate problems as an indication of the need to adjust. In
a paper written in late 1956, W. M. Scammell accused the Treasury policy of ignoring the
danger signals sent out by the weakness of the pound. He criticized
the tacit assumption that this country is in the happy position of being able to 
direct policy primarily in the interests of the domestic economic situation and to 
regard the balance of payments as a dependent variable which, while it is 
important, and must be watched, still is dependent.
Scammell warned of the fallacy of viewing the balance of payments as something
“subordinate to the level of employment”. With the following passage he delivered an
eloquent condemnation of British economic policy in the 1950s which he claimed had
ibid.
PRO T236-3943, R. Hall to Edward Bridges, “Convertibility, etc.”, September 2,1955. 
PRO PREMl 1-2671, Memo by B. Trend to the Prime Minister, September 10, 1958. 
PRO T230-305, W. M. Scammell to Downie, December 21, 1956.
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been misguided by an erroneous assessment of the situation:
If we adopt the view that the balance of payments is determined rather than 
determining then we fly in the face of the facts presented by the experience of 
recent years. Our policies for domestic equilibrium and steady growth are likely to 
be frequently impeded by their external consequences which will quickly assert 
themselves in claimant fashion. This is what 1 think has happened in the past. We 
have paid some lip service to the importance of the external position (as expressed 
in reserve levels) but we have, in the main, formed our domestic policies with 
scant regard for our changing international position. That is one reason why our 
domestic economic situation has been subjected to crisis after crisis, - in 1947, in 
1952, and in 1955. As long as we assume the primacy of domestic planning that 
will go on: the sooner we recognise the primacy of the external forces the sooner it 
will be possible to move towards an integrated general economic policy.
Rather than interpreting exchange rate pressure as an indication for necessary 
internal action, the Treasury sought to isolate the economy from its effects. Some authors 
have implied that British policy erred in letting the international status of sterling 
dominate domestic economic policy. In fact, however, the problem lay with a British 
failure to recognize the inevitability of the external constraint on domestic policymaking. 
British policy towards fixed exchange rates and convertibility reveals a dismissal of the 
importance of the external constraint, which significantly contributed to sterling’s general 
weakness in the 1950s. The lack of commitment to the Bretton Woods system of 
convertible currencies at a fixed rate undermined the stability of sterling, thus forcing the 
UK to apply drastic brakes to economic activity which interrupted a continuous expansion 
of the economy.
W h y  a  f l o a t in g  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w a s  n o t  a d o p t e d
Conservative ministers believed that a floating exchange rate would allow the
ibid.
One example is Tomlinson, “British Economic Policy”, pp.266-7.
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government to pursue an independent monetary policy. The Prime Minister, Harold 
Macmillan, was very attracted to a floating exchange rate for sterling. He thought that 
floating would compensate for the perceived loss in monetary policy leeway caused by 
convertibility. In August 1957, France wrote that in a meeting the Prime Minister 
“himself raised the question of floating rates and seemed attracted”.^  On March 10,1958 
Macmillan asked the Treasury to prepare memoranda discussing the pros and cons of 
unification and the pros and cons of a floating rate.*^  ^ On March 21, 1958, he went even 
further, asking the Chancellor of the Exchequer to prepare a paper showing what 
constitutional and technical steps were required to be able to move to a floating rate: “1 do 
not want an argument as to whether we ought to do it, 1 want a presentation of how we do 
it if we decide to do it”.^ ^^  The Prime Minister was not thrilled about the idea of 
convertibility. He feared that exchange rate unification would reduce the flexibility of 
monetary policy as an economic instrument at his disposal, and impose greater monetary 
discipline. Macmillan was worried about ensuing attacks by the opposition on the grounds 
that by establishing convertibility he sacrificed economic growth and full employment to 
the external position of the pound. In particular, for political reasons, Macmillan wanted to 
introduce an expansionary budget in April 1958 and he did not want sterling weakness to 
hamper his ability to do so. He thought that a floating pound would solve the problem, 
allowing him to inflate the economy without suffering a sterling crisis.^H is plans led to 
a confrontation with Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter Thomeycroft, on these issues in
For a discussion o f Macmillan's involvement in British economic policy, see R. Lamb, The Macmillan 
Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth, John Murray, 1995 and A. Home, Macmillan: 1894-1956, 
Volume I, Macmillan, 1988, and A. Home, Macmillan: 1957-1986, Volume II, Macmillan, 1989.
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.589.
PRO T236-3944, France to Rowan, August 23, 1957.
PRO T230-373, note from Maude to Makins and Rowan, March 10,1958.
PRO T236-3946, March 21, 1958.
for a discussion see Lamb, The Macmillan Years, pp.47-52.
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the fall of 1957. Thomeycroft blamed inflationary pressures in the UK for the sterling 
crisis in 1957, and therefore advocated a disinflationary policy, to Macmillan’s strong 
dislike. In the end, Macmillan got his way, when Thomeycroft resigned and Heathcoat 
Amory, “a more malleable colleague” took his place allowing Macmillan “in presidential 
fashion ... to exercise his own control over the Treasury”.M acm illan 's  attraction to a 
floating exchange rate was shared by a number of Treasury and Bank officials.^France 
from the Treasury stated that “[i]n general I think that to widen the margins (and we might 
very well have to operate without limits to begin with) is a course which is not 
unjustifiable when our own underlying position is sound and when we are dealing with 
speculation”.^ H e  saw a floating or flexible exchange rate not as an emergency solution 
when a fixed exchange rate could no longer be maintained but as an acceptable policy that 
should be considered when sterling was strong.
After the Thomeycroft affair. Treasury and Bank officials became increasingly 
worried that Macmillan saw a rate which was free to float, downwards, as a way of 
allowing him to pursue an inflationary economic policy without having to worry about the 
exchange rate. In their memos they started to caution against thinking that with a floating 
exchange rate the UK would be free to inflate its economy. In a Bank of England report 
from March 1958, while acknowledging that floating offered some advantages, such as 
protecting sterling against pure speculation, the Bank wamed that “[i]t should not [sic] be 
thought, however, that among the advantages would be the acquisition by H.M.G. of
Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p.51.
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, pp.571-572.
PRO T236-3944, France to Rowan, August 23, 1957.
128
greater freedom of manoeuvre in domestic monetary and ecionomic policy”. In response 
to the Prime Minister’s request for a memo on the pros and cons of floating in March 
1958, Rickett produced a report discussing the desirabiHity of a floating rate. While 
admitting that floating could be a successful weapon for dealing with speculators, he 
strongly wamed against using a floating exchange rate as a subtle way of allowing 
depreciation in the face of domestic inflation, which is exactly vWhat both the Bank and the 
Treasury suspected to be reason for the Prime Minister’s attraction to it. Rickett stated that 
“wherever [...] exchange depreciation has been resorted to as an alternative to dealing with 
the causes of inflation, the relief gained has been at best temporary, while in many cases 
the effects can be positively harmful”.* H e  softened his strong stand against floating by 
making his argument partially dependent on world prices and international economic 
conditions. He claimed that to let the pound float in the present conditions of rising or 
even relatively stable world prices would be equivalent to letting it depreciate, which in 
turn would hurt confidence in the pound of the holders off sterling reserves whose real 
value would drop through a depreciation. A situation off falling world prices and/or 
recession, however, would change the scenario, potentially making floating an attractive 
policy option, as it had been for the United Kingdom in 1931. Thus, he stated, “[a]n 
exchange adjustment may be helpful to a country seeking to avoid the need for deflation in 
conditions of severe world depression and falling prices, and dangerous to a country 
persisting in an inflationary policy against a background of rising or even relatively stable 
world prices”.**^  Most likely, these cautionary statements were directed at Prime Minister 
Macmillan. Many in the Treasury and the Bank of Englland viewed a more flexible
PRO T236-3946, Bank o f England Report, “A Floating Rate Systenn”, March 18, 1958. 
PRO T236-3946, memo by Rickett on the pros and cons o f flexible rates, March 24, 1958. 
ibid.
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exchange rate as helpful in protecting the pound against pure speculative attacks, that is, 
attacks that were not linked to economic fundamentals. However, they were aware of the 
danger of thinking that a floating rate would allow a country to pursue an inflationary 
policy over an extended period of time. They feared that this was what Macmillan had in 
mind and archival evidence shows that their fears were justified. A joint Bank/Treasury 
paper in April 1958 wamed that “the advantages in relation to speculators would only be 
maintained if we were determined to deny ourselves any internal freedom gained by a 
more elastic system”. An inflationary policy would lead to a steady depreciation of the 
pound, due to rising import prices which would lead to rising wages, which in turn would 
lead to inflation and thus further currency depreciation.
In April 1958, the Bank of England and the Treasury issued a joint paper on 
flexible exchange rates, presumably in response to the Prime Minister's inquiry, which 
drew up a time table for the establishment of convertibility that was adjusted for the joint 
introduction of a floating exchange rate. The paper concluded that if one were to consider 
the UK alone as any other country in the international system a case could be made for 
either regime, that is, floating and fixed, but that “from the point of view of our 
international interests, the disadvantages [of floating] far outweigh the advantages”. I t  
expressed concern about the potentially damaging impact of a variable exchange rate for 
the credibility of the pound as a safe haven and reserve currency. In late March, Rowan 
stated that, “[ijndeed it would be very damaging if the action of bringing the rates together 
came to be regarded mainly as a prelude to action to widen the margins”, and - claiming
Lamb, The Macmillan Years.
PRO T236-3946, “Joint Bank/Treasury paper on flexible exchange rates”, April 2, 1958. 
ibid.
PRO T236-3946, joint Bank o f England and Treasury paper on flexible exchange rates, April 2, 1958. 
ibid.
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that such was the prevailing perception - used this concern as an argument against 
establishing convertibility immediately/^^ The concern was that such a move would be 
perceived as masking a devaluation and would thus lead to a speculative attack against the 
pound. By the spring of 1958, Treasury officials were moving closer to the Bank of 
England’s view on the disadvantages of the status quo, that is, two exchange rates and two 
markets for sterling, the larger of which was beyond their control. But the fear that under 
prevailing expectations the establishment of convertibility would be directly associated 
vdth the introduction of a floating exchange rate for sterling, which in turn might lead to 
speculation against the pound, prevented them from pressing for action.
Treasury officials increasingly realized that letting the pound float or even just 
widening the margins would inevitably be regarded as a move from weakness “and a 
confession that we did not expect our recent policy, with its increased emphasis on the 
stability of the £, to succeed”.M o reo v er, officials argued that even if the pound could 
be floated from a position of strength, it was still not advisable, since the IMF did not 
condone such a policy. Far from endorsing the IMF view on exchange rates, the concern 
was that the UK could not afford losing access to the IMF’s resources when it needed 
support for the pound. Rowan criticized the IMF system of fixed exchange rates with a 
narrow margin, remarking that “if the founders of I.M.F. had, in their wisdom decided 
upon somewhat wider margins it would now be helpful in that it would give us greater 
freedom of manoeuvre to deal with speculators”. His view was thus that, were it not for 
fear of IMF disapproval, a widening of the margins would be the suitable policy to adopt. 
The fear of being refused the financial support from the IMF which was considered
PRO T236-3946, Rowan to Rickett, “The Arguments Against a Move Now”, March 24,1958. 
126 pj^Q J236-3945, Rowan, “Margins for Sterling”, October 31, 1957. 
ibid.
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necessary for a move to convertibility played an important role in the Treasury’s decision 
not to float the pound when establishing convertibility. In addition, however, the 
realization that people equated floating the pound or widening the margins with a 
devaluation deterred policymakers from letting the pound float. The experience after 1955 
showed that this expectation alone could already lead to speculative pressure against the 
pound. Both frequent adverse speculation and the anticipation of a devaluation weakened 
the pound and endangered its role as reserve currency. Continental European resistance to 
more flexible rates meant that British insistence on floating in spite of the rejection of 
wider margins in the EMA negotiations was likely to be seen as anti-European. Once 
the British decided that sterling convertibility could only be established together with 
Europe, they were concerned not to jeopardize a collective European move to 
convertibility. Moreover, in 1958 concerns about the creation of European Economic 
Community (EEC) and the failure of a European free trade area added a new and decisive 
dimension to British policy on convertibility.
Even though most officials in the Bank and the Treasury accepted after 1955 that, 
on the whole, floating was not an advisable policy choice for the establishment of sterling 
convertibility, neither the Bank nor the Treasury were willing completely to renounce 
floating as a possible policy option. During the crisis of 1957, most Treasury officials saw 
floating as an emergency solution to the problem. In July 1957, H. A. Copeman from the 
Treasury prepared a paper presenting the official position adopted by the Treasury on the 
issue. The memorandum stated was that floating was not a desirable policy in the given 
circumstances. While acknowledging the need to denounce publicly any rumors that the
PRO T236-3946, joint Bank/Treasury paper on flexible exchange rates, April 2 ,1958. 
This will be discussed in Chapter V.
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Treasury might consider floating because of the damaging effects this had on the pound,
Copeman was anxious not to condemn floating categorically:
I have, I hope, stated the case against a floating rate strongly, but I have attempted 
to avoid prophesying irretrievable woe if we do float. If it is ever found that 
conditions are developing where floating is the right policy, we shall not wish to 
have burnt our boats. ^ ^
In the years leading up to the establishment of nonresident current account 
convertibility, the British government seriously considered making the pound convertible 
at a floating exchange rate.^ ^^  Throughout the 1950s and up until 1958, the internal 
discussions on how and when to achieve convertibility by unifying sterling exchange 
rates, were accompanied by parallel discussions on whether to go convertible with a 
unitary fluctuating exchange rate for sterling or not.*^  ^According to Joseph Gold in an 
official IMF pamphlet, the IMF's Articles of Agreement clearly conveyed that under 
Article VIII “[a]n exchange rate regime which the Fund cannot approve is one that 
consists of a unitary fluctuating exchange rate”.^ ^^  However, this is precisely what the 
British had in mind. The British considered a floating exchange for sterling at a time 
when, at least internationally and officially, floating was not even discussed as policy 
option, and when they thought they depended on an IMF loan for their return to 
convertibility. Under the “Collective Approach to Freer Trade and Currencies”, for 
example, suggested by the UK in 1953, the British proposed to let sterling float - or at 
least to widen the margins way beyond the one per cent permitted by the Fund - while at
PRO T236-4364, H. A. Copeman to Symons: “Mr. Rees-Mogg on the Floating Exchange Rate”, July 
18, 1957.
see, for example, Fforde, The Bank o f  England.
see, for example, “A Floating Rate System”, Bank o f  England Report, 18.3.1958, PRO T236-3946.
J. Gold, The Fund's Concept o f  Convertibility, Pamphlet Series No. 14, International Monetary Fund, 
1971, p .l9 .
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the same time seeking an IMF loan to finance the operat ion/In  other words, on several 
occasions the British considered making the pound convertible at a floating rate with the 
financial help of a loan from the organization that was designed among other things to 
prevent a fluctuating exchange rate system. The UK was at the forefront of the move for 
restoration of convertibility, at a time when “fluctuating exchange rates challenged the par 
value system enshrined in the IMF Articles of Agreement”, but it did not view a fixed 
exchange rate as a necessary condition of convertibility.
C o n c l u s io n
Compared to the other OEEC partners, “trade and industry had a lesser place in 
policy formulation than the status of the currency and the international financial 
considerations on which that was thought to depend”. “It is in no way surprising that in 
Britain the will to national reassertion should have gathered its forces behind the financial 
service sector. Relative to the rest of the economy it was far more important than in other 
European economies.”^^ ^
E.N. Helleiner claimed that the decisive leadership in shifting Europe towards 
convertibility in the 1950s came from the The careful examination of Britain’s
policy on convertibility throws doubts on this view. While Britain’s pursuit of 
international financial ambitions dictated that sterling lead Europe into convertibility, the 
government was not willing to commit to an external monetary policy which was a 
controversial issue in domestic policy and which would be difficult to reverse once
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, pp. 168-74. 
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p. 171. 
Milward, The European Rescue, p.390.
Helleiner, American Hegemony, p .l 18.
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convertibility had been officially established. The reluctance to establish official 
convertibility, even after de facto convertibility had already been established, and the 
attraction to a floating rate in connection vdth convertibility are explained by the need to 
keep the backdoor open for British domestic policy to escape the constraints which a 
system of multilateral trade, convertible currencies, and fixed exchange rates puts on the 
sovereignty of domestic economic policy.
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ECONOMIC POLICY AND STERLING’S WEAKNESS
In t r o d u c t io n
This section argues that British economic policy, in particular its monetary 
policy, undermined the credibility of Britain’s commitment to a stable pound. Many 
policymakers and authors argued that in the 1950s British reserves were insufficient to 
establish convertibility. The insufficiency of reserves was blamed for undermining the 
stability of the pound. According to this view the resulting weakness of the pound, 
particularly its proneness to speculative attacks, explained why convertibility had to be 
postponed repeatedly throughout the 1950s. Between 1952 and 1958, nearly every 
Treasury memo, and a large part of Bank of England memos, on convertibility linked any 
possible action or inaction on convertibility to its effect on the stability of the pound 
exchange rate. Thus, in 1953, L. A. Martin at the Bank of England stated that “the crux of 
full convertibility is, of course, confidence in the currency as reflected in the in- or out­
flow of capital”. Within the UK Treasury, the test for any proposal for progress towards 
convertibility, or any monetary policy suggestion, appears to have been whether it would 
increase or decrease confidence in the pound as expressed in adverse speculation. The 
concern with the weakness of the pound and the effect of convertibility on the pound was 
a persistent issue in UK policymaking throughout the 1950s, even after the establishment
BoE OV34/39, L. A. Martin to Tansley, “Germany and Convertibility”, October 6, 1953. For other 
Treasury or Bank views on the importance o f confidence in sterling as a prerequisite for a move to 
convertibility, see, for example, PRO T236-3943, “Note o f a meeting in Sir Edward Bridges' room at the 
Treasury, at 3 p.m. on Monday, 8th August, 1955”, August 8, 1955, PRO T236-3940, Hall’s suggested 
redraft o f Rowan’s memo “Why Convertibility”, June 8, 1956, PRO T236-3944, R. Makins to the 
Chancellor o f Exchequer, August 23, 1957, and A. France to T. L. Rowan, August 23, 1957, PRO T236- 
3946, Bank o f England Report by E. Parson sent to T. L . Rowan, “‘Pros’ for early amalgamation o f  
official and transferable sterling”, March 18, 1958, and T. L. Rowan to D. Rickett “The arguments 
against a move now”, March 24, 1958, PRO PREMl 1-2671, memo by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
“Exchange rate policy and related matters”, September 8, 1958.
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of de facto convertibility after 1955. The fear was that a move to official convertibility 
when sterling was weak would unleash a run on the pound.
In the UK, the inadequacy of foreign exchange reserves was blamed for 
undermining the confidence of the pound and making it prone to adverse speculation. 
The weakness of the pound, in turn, it was argued, made it impossible to consider the 
return to convertibility. UK policymakers maintained that an improvement in the reserve 
position and a strengthening of the pound were prerequisites for a move to convertibility. 
Fred Hirsch claimed that one of the causes of sterling's weakness lay in the insufficiency 
of British reserves that “have never been high enough to withstand any substantial loss 
of funds that starts either through Britain's own deficit or through finance of other 
countries' deficits through the sterling banking mechanism”. According to the 
supporters of the reserve-liability explanation of sterling’s weakness, the sterling 
balances presented a huge danger to the stability of the pound because of the constant 
threat of an onslaught of holders demanding their conversion/Such a run, by the non­
resident holders of sterling, could be triggered by the slightest adverse development in 
Britain's external situation or simply by an, apparently, irrational loss of confidence.
As chapter I has shown, Britain’s level of reserves only explain sterling’s 
weakness insofar as they reflect the inability of the UK economy to accumulate reserves, 
due to stmctural balance of payments problems. However, changes in UK reserves cannot
PRO T236-4363, “Exchange Flexibility for Sterling”, by Fleming, November 11, 1955. 
ibid.
A. P. Thirlwall claimed that “[b]ecause o f the large holding o f sterling by foreigners and the persistent 
threat of their removal from London, the exchange rate was ... continually under threat in the 1950s and 
1960s, notwithstanding surpluses earned on the current account. It was eventually weakness on the capital 
account (both short and long term), unrelated to any serious weakening on the current account, that 
precipitated devaluation in 1967, and which has led sterling to depreciate so dramatically and unfortunately 
since 1972.” A. P. Thirlwall, Balance-of-Payments Theory and the United Kingdom Experience, 
Macmillan, 1980, p. 143.
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explain the occurrence and the timing of the crises which sterling experienced in the 
1950s. Recurring speculative runs on a currency are one indicator of the 'weakness' or 
instability of a currency. In his book on the pound sterling written in 1965, Hirsch 
identified and compared eight sterling crises between 1947 and 1965 alone. In Hirsch’s 
table, reproduced below, he documented the magnitude of the crises in terms of the 
massive drain on the reserves they produced. Table 11.3 shows the extent of the gold and 
dollar drain and the lowest level of reserves in each crisis. According to Hirsch’s analysis, 
trade deficits of relatively small magnitude set off massive speculation against the pound. 
The frequency and magnitude of the speculation against the pound which was prompted 
by the slightest apparently adverse change in economic conditions - and sometimes even 
without any visible change - reflects the volatility of confidence in the pound and its 
general vulnerability and instability, or what Hirsch called its “long-run weakness”.
see my comment on the difficulty o f interpreting reserve data. 
Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, p.47.
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Table II.3; Sterling crises 1947-65
crisis period gold and dollar drain 
(million $)
net reserves a t lowest 
point (million $)
convertibility crisis 1947, 7 months 
(February to August)
-2500 2000
devaluation crisis 1949, 5Vz months 
(March 31 to September 18)
-1265 1330
Korean aftermath, 10 months (July 
1951 to April 1952)
-2284 1662
floating rates crisis, 3 months (July to 
September 1955)
-345 2345
Suez crisis 1956, 5 months (August to 
December)
-845 1572
1957 crisis, 2 months (August to 
September)
-700 1850
1961 crisis, 5 months (March to July) -1620 1560
crisis 1964-5, 8 months (September 
1964 to April 1965)
-2408 342
Source: reproduced from Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, pp.48-9.
In addition the crises identified by Hirsch, other bouts of sterling weakness occurred 
between August 1954 and February 1955. The last big sterling crisis before convertibility 
was established, the crisis of September 1957, must have been particularly traumatic for 
British monetary authorities. Speculation against the pound seemed to develop out of 
nowhere, since it occurred at a time when Britain was actually running a current account 
surplus that almost covered its capital outflow. According to Hirsch, the causes of the 
1957 sterling crisis were purely speculative, that is, there was no ‘real economic’ reason to 
doubt the stability of the p o u n d .T h e  run on the pound was stopped when Britain and 
Germany jointly and publicly assured sterling holders of their commitment to the existing 
exchange rates.
In each of the crises, Hirsch assigned a significant, and sometimes exclusive, role
Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, p.49.
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to speculation in triggering or aggravating the crisis. In this sense, he viewed speculation 
as the cause rather than the consequence of the weakness of the pound.Attributing 
weakness of a currency purely to speculation implies that without speculation the currency 
would be healthy since the underlying economy is healthy. In other words, the argument 
that speculation on its own causes currency weakness implies that speculation is random 
and speculators are either irrational or draw false conclusions &om the state of an 
economy.
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz examined speculative attacks on pegged 
exchange rates between 1967 and 1992. The question they sought to answer was “whether 
speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates are necessarily prompted by the inadequate 
convergence of national policies or whether such attacks can occur even in the absence of 
policy imbalances”. I n  addition, a growing body of literature has concerned itself with 
the importance of a government’s commitment to an exchange rate regime for currency 
stability. The literature on exchange rate speculation and the importance of credibility is 
fairly young. However, in the last couple of years, the body of work on this topic has been 
growing rapidly. Due to the relative youth of the topic in economic theory most
This is what is generally referred to as 'self-fulfilling speculation’: if  a large enough group of  
speculators believes that a currency will be devalued, their speculation against a currency, will eventually 
force it into devaluation. There need not have been any problems in the economy or any indications o f  
currency weakness to start the speculation, aside firom the speculation itself. See, for example, 
Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, Speculative Attacks, p.4. 
ibid., p.5.
See, for example, D. Backus and E. J. Driffill, “Inflation and Reputation”, in American Economic 
Review, June 1985, pp.530-538, D. Backus and E. J. Driffill, “Rational Expectations and Policy 
Credibility Following a Change in Regime”, in Review o f  Economic Studies, April 1985, pp.211-221, de 
Grauwe, International Money, H. Henrik and T. Persson, “Exchange Rate Policy, Wage Formation and 
Credibility”, in European Economic Review, October 1988, pp. 1621-36, P. R. Masson, The Credibility o f  
the United Kingdom's Commitment to the ERM: Intentions versus Actions, IMF Working Paper 94/147, 
December 1994, P. Knigman, “A Model o f Balance o f  Payments Crises”, in Journal o f  Money, Credit 
and Banking, 1979, pp.311-325, and A. K. Rose and L. E. Svensson, European Exchange Rate 
Credibility Before the Fall, Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No.852, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), November 1993. For a discussion and an overview over the literature 
on exchange rate speculation, see Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, Speculative Attacks.
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empirical research focuses largely on exchange rate speculation in the past two decades. 
No attempt has been made so far to apply the theory on confidence and credibility to the 
relative weakness of sterling and the strength of the DM in the 1950s. This is partially 
explained by the general belief that the reserve-liability explanation combined with ‘pure’ 
speculation explain the troubles of the pound in this period. This section argues that, 
contrary to the random speculation theory for the weakness of the pound, in the 1950s 
there were clear indications, so called ‘policy imbalances’, in the British economy, and, 
particularly, in British monetary policy that led rational decisionmakers to expect a 
sterling devaluation and consequently to speculate against sterling.
In f l a t io n  a n d  f u l l  e m p l o y m e n t
The previous chapter showed that Britain's average inflation between 1946 and 
1958 was one of the highest in Western Europe compared to Germany where average 
inflation was one of the lowest. According to the theory of purchasing power parity (PPP), 
all other things equal, different rates of inflation in two countries, which are connected 
through trade and/or capital flows, should result in corresponding changes in the exchange 
rate.^ °^ If one country’s price level grows faster than another country’s, then, according to 
the theory that purchasing power parity holds, the currency of the country vrith the higher 
rate of inflation should experience pressure to depreciate relative to the currency of the 
country with the lower rate of inflation. Britain’s higher than average inflation after World 
War II eroded the value of the pound. Thus, economic fundamentals go a long way in
One exception to this is Bordo, The Gold Standard.
A. Stevenson, V. Muscatelli and M. Gregory, Macroeconomic Theory and Stabilisation Policy, Philip 
Alien, 1988, p.266 and de Grauwe, International Money, pp.61-72.
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explaining sterling’s weakness in the 1950s. Moreover, in the 1950s while inflation was 
higher than in countries with higher growth rates, such as the US and Germany, 
unemployment in the UK was l o w e r . T h e  combination of lower than average 
unemployment and higher than average inflation indicated and signaled to people a strong 
UK commitment to full employment.
Table II.4: Inflation and standardized unemployment rates (per cent), 1950-64
Unemployment Inflation
Japan 1.8 4.2
France 1.9 6.0
UK 2.5 4.0
Germany 3.6 3.2
US 4.8 2.2
Source: N. F. R. Crafts and N. W. C. Woodward, “Introduction and Overview”, in 
Crafts and Woodward (eds.). The British Economy, p.6.
J. Tomlinson noted that “[i]n comparative perspective the strength of this commitment to 
full employment seems to mark Britain out” and that “[cjertainly in other European 
countries there was not the same emphasis”. The apparent choice of full employment 
over price stability hurt confidence in the pound. Thus, according to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, the speculative pressures on sterling between July and September 
1957, “reflected the doubts, in Britain as well as elsewhere, about the likelihood of 
maintaining the existing value of sterling in view of the greater rise in prices and wages in
151 In late 1958, A. J. Brown reflected on “the astonishing absence o f unemployment” in the British economy 
over the past decade. A. J. Brown, “Inflation and the British Economy”, in The Economic Journal, 
September 1958, p.449.
Tomlinson, “British economic policy since 1945”, p.259. Bernstein most likely had Britain in mind, 
when he categorically stated, in 1958, that, “...with full employment the existence o f a payments deficit is 
a clear indication o f current inflation”. Bernstein, “Strategic Factors”, p. 135. See also S. Broadberry, 
“Employment and Unemployment”, in Floud and McCloskey (eds.). The Economic History, pp.211-212.
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Britain than in other industrial nations"People  form expectations about a government’s 
willingness and ability to resist devaluation. In Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz’s research 
on speculative attacks on pegged exchange rates, governments which are perceived to 
attribute a high priority to price stability are considered strong governments as opposed to 
weak governments which place a relatively lower value on price stability. The ‘stronger’ 
the government appears to be the smaller the probability, and thus the greater the 
expectations, that it will devalue its currency even under pressure. The weaker a 
government is considered to be the greater the belief that it will devalue and therefore the 
greater the speculative pressure on the currency to devalue. Widespread doubts about a 
government’s commitment to a given exchange rate and price stability increase the 
likelihood and extent of speculation against a currency, especially if low unemployment is 
assumed to be a high priority for the government. In the 1950s, the British government 
was perceived to accept inflationary wage settlements and, consequently, “was accused by 
the press of having ‘given up the fight against inflation’’’.^ ^^  Dow spoke of the 
institutionalization of annual wage increases and Keith Middlemas claimed that the 
“reluctance of Conservative governments of the 1950s to upset industrial harmony” was 
partially responsible for the fact that between 1945 and 1957 wages increases exceeded 
productivity g ro w th .T h e  government’s commitment to full employment curtailed its 
bargaining power with the trade unions. Judging the British economic policy as an
Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, Monthly Review, January 1958, p.9.
According to P. Masson “a ‘credibility crisis’, in which, for instance, investors doubt that the 
government is committed to a particular parity or gives as much weight to inflation as it says that it does, 
may make the costs o f maintaining the parity very high, if  the government also cares about 
unemployment, as is assumed. This circumstance may then trigger a devaluation”. Masson, The 
Credibility, p.iii. See also Tomlinson, “British Economic Policy”, p.263.
Caimcross, “Economic Policy”, p.57.
Dow, The Management, pp.98-9, and K. Middlemas, Politics in Industrial Society: The Experience o f  
the British System Since 1911, André Deutsch, 1979, p.397. For a discussion o f Britain’s commitment to 
full employment after World War II see, for example, Minford, “Reconstruction”.
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outsider, von Herwarth, from the German embassy in London wrote in August 1955:
Das Hauptproblem der britischen Wirtschaftschaftspolitik liegt nach wie vor bei 
der Frage, ob der britische Arbeiter gewillt ist, der Situation Rechnung zu tragen, 
und ob es der Gewerkschaftsfuhrung in Zusammenarbeit mit der Regierung doch 
noch gelingt, der unsinnigen Lohnforderungen und Wünsche auf 
Arbeitszeitverkürzung in den unteren Instanzen der Gewerkschaftshierarchie Herr 
zu werden/^^
According to Dow, the rapid expansion of demand and output in the years 1952-1955 and 
1958-1960 were both due to the influence of government policy: “As far as internal 
conditions are concerned ... budgetary and monetary policy failed to be stabilizing.”^^* 
Looking back in the 1990s on the UK’s economic problems of the 1950s, W. M. Kirby 
claimed that:
It was inflationary pressure, itself the product of the full employment commitment, 
which was the prime cause of the successive balance of payments and exchange 
rate crises which underpinned the stop-go cycle, while the UK's failure to match 
the growth performance of its principal overseas competitors had serious 
implications for relative living standards and also for the long-term stability of the 
external account.
C r isis  m a n a g e m e n t
The handling of exchange rate crises contributed to the weakening of sterling. 
Particularly the inflationary boom of 1955-1956 and the government’s inability or 
unwillingness to contain it in time undermined the credibility of the British government’s 
commitment to exchange rate stability. Dow claimed that although the signs of the 
economy overheating were clear, government action “proved neither consistent nor
BA B 102-6106, “Die britische Wirtschaftslage”, von Herwarth, August 12,1955.
‘The main problem o f British economic policy continues to be centered around the question, 
whether the British worker is willing to adapt to the circumstances, and whether the trade union 
leaders, together with the government, can withstand the unreasonable wage demands and calls 
for reduction o f working hours coming from the lower echalons o f  the trade union hierarchy.’ 
Dow, The Management, p.384.
M. W. Kirby “Supply-Side Management”, in Crafts and Woodward (eds.). The British Economy, 
p.243.
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timely”. B a n k  rate was raised from three per cent to 4.5 per cent in February 1955 and 
hire purchase restrictions were introduced. As soon as these measures, together with the 
intervention in transferable sterling, had halted adverse speculation the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer took the opportunity to present an expansionary budget in April, that is, a mere 
two months after the imposition of restrictive measures and right in time before the 
elections in May 1955. In June, sterling weakened again, forcing the government to 
introduce a supplementary contractionary budget in October. The expansionary budget 
before the elections followed by the contractionary budget shortly after the elections, 
created the strong impression that the government was pursuing political aims at the 
expense of economic and monetary stabil i ty .Dow criticized government policy during 
the 1955-1956 boom, arguing that “Mr. Butler appears to have relied on monetary control, 
exercised with his right hand, to balance the budget concessions given by his left”.^ ^^  
Warren Smith and Raymond Mikesell examined British monetary policy in the 1950s and 
concluded that a greater reliance on contractionary fiscal policy, in the 1955 inflationary 
boom but also thereafter, would have produced better results than resorting to monetary 
policy only.^^  ^The reluctance to resort to contractionary fiscal policy can be explained by 
the fear of UK governments of political repercussions of unpopular tax raises and cuts in 
government expenditure which were more difficult to reverse than Bank rate raises.
ibid., p.78.
ibid., p.79 and Surrey, “United Kingdom”, p.532.
Dow, The Management, p.79.
W. L. Smith and R. F. Mikesell, “The Effectiveness o f Monetary Policy: Recent British Experience”, 
in The Journal o f  Political Economy, February 1957, pp. 18-39.
The determining influence o f political issues on fiscal policy decisions in Britain in the 1950s is 
illustrated in Macmillan's efforts to push through an expansionary budget for 1958. “Through all the 
Prime Minister’s minutes runs the theme that the 1958 Budget must be designed to make possible a soft 
vote-winning Budget in 1959, and he was worried that if  the brakes were not taken off in 1958 there 
would be insufficient time to get Britain out o f slump before the votes were counted.” Lamb, The 
Macmillan Years, p. 53. See also pp.54-7 and p.93 for Macmillan’s often successful efforts to push 
through expansionary budgets for political reasons.
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Monetary policy was a more flexible instrument than fiscal policy in that interest rates and 
credit availability could be changed more quickly, in both directions, and with less public 
scrutiny than changes in taxes or government spending. According to Jim Tomlinson, in 
the UK,
the whole history of policy on inflation [since 1945] is one of episodic scares and 
hurried policy initiatives, unsustained once the immediate scare is passed.... [F]or 
the period up to the early 1970s much of the concern with inflation flowed from its 
impact on international competitiveness, given a fixed exchange rate under the 
Bretton Woods system. Thus attempts to control aggregate demand to contain 
inflation were usually triggered not by the level of an inflation index but by a run 
on the pound which threatened to drive it from the fixed level.
One reason why the government was reluctant to undertake far-reaching economic 
adjustment in response to sterling’s weakness was that many Treasury officials viewed the 
speculative crises as triggered by pure speculation, and thus refused to undertake painful 
economic adjustment in response to the exchange crises. Most Treasury officials did not 
interpret the pound’s weakness as a reflection of an underlying economic disequilibrium 
requiring an adjustment of the internal economy. Instead, they viewed speculation against 
sterling as unrelated to economic fundamentals. The government only took action when 
speculative pressure against the pound threatened to get out of hand and wipe out the 
reserves. UK governments saw speculation against the pound as an isolated, exogenous 
problem, like a natural disaster, which they tackled with measures aimed directly at 
stopping speculation. Thus, in every exchange crisis the measures taken aimed only at 
producing the immediate effect of ending the flight from the poimd, rather than at tackling 
the problem which caused the flight from the pound.
The Treasury justified its unwillingness to let external pressure dictate policy to
Tomlinson, “British Economic Policy”, pp.262-3.
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restrain the domestic economy by arguing that external factors, or other countries, were 
responsible for the weakness of the pound. In the second half of the 1950s, when sterling 
was plagued by frequent adverse speculative pressure, the Treasury argued that the cause 
of the problem lay not with an excessively expansionary UK domestic policy. Rather, 
“overcautious budgetary and monetary policies pursued by the German authorities” were 
to blame for the destabilization of European exchange r a t e s . I n  1957, Treasury officials 
produced a whole string of papers comparing certain aspects of the UK and the German 
economy. They concluded that the Germans were responsible for exchange rate 
instability in Europe and that they should and could therefore restore exchange rate 
equilibrium, either by adjusting through inflation or by revaluing their currency vis-à-vis 
the US dollar. In a paper in September 1957, P. E. Watts from the Economic Section 
claimed that the proof that the DM was undervalued lay in the fact that “the U.K. has 
failed to maintain its share of international trade in manufactures whereas Germany has 
increased hers”.^ ^^  In the same memo. Watts listed as further evidence of the 
undervaluation of the DM the fact that Germany enjoyed the highest percentage increase 
in gold and foreign exchange holdings between 1954 and 1956 of all Western European 
countries and of Canada and the US. The paper failed to mention that the UK came last in 
the table which suggests that while Germany might be creating problems on the one end of 
the spectrum, the UK was creating problems on the other end. The trouble with the UK’s 
attempt to blame Germany for exchange rate instability, which Watts acknowledged in his 
paper, was that any argument produced to prove that the DM was undervalued could
166 pj^Q T236-3944, “Memorandum by the Bank o f  England: Germany”, September 5, 1957.
see, for example, PRO T236-3944, R. Hall to T. L. Rowan, “Floating Rates”, September 9, 1957, and 
PRO 7236-3944, joint Bank/Treasury document, “Sterling”, September 10, 1957,
168 pp
1957.
168 ppQ 7236-3945, P. E. Watts (Economic Section), “Second Draft: Exchange Rates”, September 17,
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equally be used to prove that the disequilibrium was caused by the UK’s inability or 
unwillingness to fight higher than average inflation. Overall, Watts failed to make a 
convincing case that the responsibility for action lay with Germany and not with the UK.
In Anglo-American talks in 1958 the Treasury sought IMF assistance to support 
the pound. The Treasury justified its request for support by arguing that sterling’s 
weakness was not caused by excessive domestic inflation and that therefore there was no 
reason for measures to restrict domestic expansion, which would have been unpopular. 
Instead, the US recession was partially responsible for the pound’s problems and, 
consequently, the responsibility for action lay with the Americans, not vrith the UK. The 
US delegation rejected the argument, attacking instead the UK’s refusal to tackle domestic 
inflation. The Americans hardly concealed their criticism of UK policy by claiming that 
those who argued that a US recession would hurt the world were probably seeking to 
“continue to inflate and to live permanently beyond their means - the sofi: way”.^ °^ In their 
view, “any country should be able, by adopting the right policies to increase their reserves 
within a short period; failure to do so for whatever reason, is regarded as a lack of 
dependability”, and they suggested that UK economic policy should aim at establishing 
long-term confidence in the pound, “[ijnstead of thinking of new ways of borrowing to 
add to reserves”. T h e  UK response to the criticism reflects policymakers” conviction 
that the weakness of the pound was no reflection of an underlying problem in the UK 
economy:
P]t is clear that although the Americans are aware that sterling is in a special
position, they are far firom grasping the full significance of that position. ... It is
PRO T236-3945, P. E. Watts (Economic Section), “Second Draft: Exchange Rates”, September 17, 
1957.
PRO T236-3945, “Anglo-U.S. Economic Talks: Report by Sir Leslie Rowan and Sir Robert Hall on 
visit to Washington, 15th-21st February, 1958”, February 24, 1958. 
ibid.
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important to note that the U.S. pay much more regard to the building up of 
reserves than to the external monetary position as a whole - i.e. the ratio of 
reserves to liabilities.
Placing the blame for sterling’s weakness on other countries justified British governments’ 
policy of tackling speculation rather than looking further, to the domestic economy and 
economic policy, for causes of sterling weakness.
The drastic short-term and short-sighted measures introduced by the Treasury 
when pressure against sterling mounted prove the resistance to implement policies which 
would have assured a stable fixed exchange rate. In addition to rises in bank rate and the 
introduction of hire-purchase regulations, both of which were rescinded as soon as 
pressure had abated, UK governments relied heavily on public statements which reiterated 
their commitment to the existing rate and announced their determination to act as means to 
tackling exchange crises in the 1950s. Thus, the government ended the run on the pound 
during the Suez crisis in 1956 “by statements of determination to maintain sterling’s $2.80 
parity and by recourse to international assistance”. T h e  lack of any internal adjustment 
measures to restore exchange rate stability was justified by the claim that the flight firom 
the pound was caused by speculation alone, that is, that the problem lay not with the 
internal state of the economy. Similarly, the 1957 exchange crisis was considered to be 
caused purely by adverse speculation.Thus, in August 1957, A. W. France fi-om the 
Treasury claimed that the UK’s underlying position was fine and that, “[o]ur present 
problems are entirely due to speculation”. In the same paper, however, he
ibid.
Yeager, International Monetary Relations, p.450.
Hirsch, The Pound Sterling, p.49.
PRO T236-3944, A. W. France to Makins, August 21,1957.
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acknowledged that “there are fears about our rate in the longer term due to the doubts 
about whether the Government will contain inflation and whether repeated wage increases 
will make us uncompetitive”.*^  ^In response to the speculative crisis in the fall of 1957, the 
Treasury tried to persuade Germany to revalue the DM in 1957, while admitting that a 
DM revaluation would only be effective if accompanied by internal measures, both in 
Germany and the UK towards economic adjustment if the revaluation was to have a 
lasting effect. The fundamental aim was to stop speculation not to correct the 
underlying disequilibrium. A DM revaluation would have removed the pressure to 
implement corrective internal measures, both on the German and on the British side, albeit 
only temporarily. In the end, the government tackled the 1957 crisis by raising bank rate to 
seven per cent, obtaining an IMF standby loan, and joining Germany in publicly 
announcing its commitment to defend the existing exchange rate parities. Thus, the 
1957 crisis “led to explicit official pronouncements (though little action) on the latterly 
central issues of inflation and monetary control”.P o licym akers attributed greater 
importance to public statements pronouncing German and British intentions to act than to 
actions themselves.**** In fact, the UK saw currency realignments as a substitute for 
measures to correct the economic imbalance. Both the Treasury and the Bank of England 
preferred DM revaluation to pound devaluation because they thought the latter more likely 
to reduce further confidence in the pound and thus jeopardize its position as international 
transactions and reserve currency. A devaluation would have been in direct conflict with
ibid.
PRO T236-3944, “Memorandum by the Bank o f England: Germany”, September 5, 1957, and PRO 
T236-3944, D. F. Hubback, “Germany”, September 6, 1957.
Yeager, International Monetary Relations, p.452.
Surrey, “United Kingdom”, p.534.
180 pp^Q 7236-3944, “Memorandum by the Bank o f  England: Germany”, September 5, 1957.
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the aim pursued by the establishment of convertibility, which was to strengthen sterling’s 
prestige as a strong international currency. While policymakers, in particular the Prime 
Minister, could well envisage a floating rate to camouflage a depreciation, in the policy 
discussions devaluation was never even mentioned as an o>ption. According to Wolfram 
Hanrieder, “British leaders...feared that devaluation womld irremediably undermine 
sterling’s role as an international reserve currency, a role that for political and economic 
reasons - prestige and an ability to run up long-term paym»ents deficits - they wanted to 
preserve”.^ *^
The decision to change an exchange parity is ultimately political. Necessary 
changes in parities have often been delayed because of the political costs. One 
hangover from the gold standard era was the nottion that there is something 
sacrosanct about a parity and that devaluation is an admission that domestic 
financial policies have failed.
The monetary authorities always hoped that events would somehow save them 
from the need to devalue - that next month’s trade data would show a healthy rise 
in exports, or that other countries would revalue theiir currencies so that their own 
devaluation would be unnecessary.^*^
In any case, devaluation alone would not have solved Biritain’s balance of payments
problems. A successful devaluation would have requiredl additional domestic policy
measures aimed at a lasting reduction in inflationary pressures.
Throughout the 1950s, repeated runs on the pound depleted reserves at an alarming 
rate. For a while, the UK successfully combated speculation with temporary solutions, 
such as IMF standby loans and public statements, which required no lasting change in 
domestic policy. But these policies only had limited viability, and there was a limit to the
Hanrieder, The Foreign Policies, p.219.
R. Z. Aliber, The International Money Game, second and expanded edition, Basic Books, 1976, p.55. 
Schenk, British Management, pp.319-321. Milivoje Panic showed that exchange rate realignment 
alone is insufficient in correcting fundamental disequilibria. Panic, N atm nal Management, pp. 105-110.
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amount of times they could be successful in stopping speculation. As long as there were 
two rates for sterling, the official and the transferable rate, the government thought it could 
resist pressure for adjustment by letting the transferable rate drop. A floating or more 
flexible rate adopted together with the establishment of convertibility would have also 
reduced the direct pressure to adjust. It would not, however, have removed the economic 
problems.
E x c h a n g e  r a t e  p o l ic y  a n d  c o n f id e n c e
Advocates of fixed exchange rate regimes consider the exchange value guarantee
provided by pegging or fixing one’s currency as a necessary “confidence building
scheme” to induce people to hold a domestic currency when they are free to convert
domestic currency into other currencies. The exchange value guarantee closely
resembles one of Paul de Grauwe’s four characteristics of money, according to which
“[t]he willingness to hold money balances is based on the confidence of the holder that
these assets will not lose their value”. One way of convincing people to hold money is
“to guarantee that the money can be converted at a fixed price into another asset over
whose value the supplier has no control”. This is precisely the guarantee that existed
during the gold standard. The exchange value guarantee combined with the
exchangeability guarantee become a “confidence building device”, with the aim of
inducing people to hold the domestic currency. According to de Grauwe,
The convertibility of the domestic currency into foreign currency at a fixed price 
was the main confidence building device used by countries to have their currency
De Grauwe, International Money, p.2.
ibid.
ibid.
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accepted in international transactions/^^
If people lack confidence in the stability of the value of a currency then they will not be 
willing to hold that currency or accept it in international transactions if they can avoid it. 
When the UK made sterling convertible in 1947, holders of sterling used the opportunity 
to rid themselves of a currency in which they had little confidence, expecting it to be 
devalued or be made inconvertible again soon, and converting their holdings into a 
currency in which they had more confidence, that is, the US dollar. Lack of confidence in 
sterling led to a run on the pound and forced the consequent suspension of convertibility. 
Like devaluation, the suspension of convertibility is likely to lead to a loss of value of a 
currency, because the shadow price of a currency is most likely to be higher under 
convertibility, when people can use it for current international transactions than when they 
cannot. When a currency can be freely exchanged for other currencies, then a country 
competes - to a certain extent - with other countries’ currencies for people who will be 
willing to hold its currency and to use and accept it in international payments. Rather than 
accept a currency with a highly volatile exchange rate, people will prefer a currency whose 
value is stable, thus minimizing the risk of loss of value of their currency holdings. The 
attraction of the British government to a floating pound was widely known. Particularly
ibid., p.3.
*** The current international monetary system defies the theory that a currency must have a fixed exchange 
rate as a confidence building scheme to convince people o f its stability and thus of the desirability o f holding 
that currency. In a world o f floating rates, holders cannot rely upon a fixed exchange rate as a measure of 
currency stability. Rather, currency holders might look to the stability of a currency - for example, what is 
the spread o f its average fluctuation - and/or to the trend o f its exchange rate path - that is, does the exchange 
rate seem to be on its way up or down. Consequently, perhaps the definition o f convertibility that calls for a 
fixed exchange rate should be updated to require stability, rather than fixity o f  exchange value. De Grauwe 
has modified the previous definition o f convertibility by requiring stability of purchasing power as a 
confidence building measure, rather than fixity o f the exchange rate, stating that “a national currency can 
graduate as an international currency if  there is confidence that it will maintain a stable purchasing power”. 
De Grauwe, International Money, p.9.
see for example The Banker, “Sterling Fixed or Flexible?”, July 1955, pp.7-14, and “Sterling after 
Istanbul”, October 1955, pp.211-216. As late as the fall o f 1957, the public knew o f government
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in times of speculation against the pound, the discussion flamed up in the press and within 
the government. Letting the pound float was seriously contemplated as a policy response 
to adverse speculation. Public knowledge of this played a considerable role in weakening 
the pound and exposing it to more pressure than it might have otherwise had to endure.
By the second half of the 1950s, policymakers began to realize that the mere consideration 
of a floating rate especially at times when sterling was already vulnerable, increased 
speculative pressure against sterling. In September 1957, the Prime Minister sent a note to 
the Treasury in which he warned officials not to question publicly the desirability of the 
current fixed exchange rate regime and the parity of the pound since these doubts alone 
might trigger speculation against the pound .S ince  rumors about letting the pound float 
tended to spark up in periods of speculative pressure against the pound, letting the pound 
float had come to be regarded as equivalent to a depreciation of sterling. Floating was 
envisaged together with convertibility, as a policy to take the strain of the establishment of 
convertibility off the reserves and putting it instead on the exchange rate, that is, to let the 
pound depreciate with the hope of thus preventing a drain of reserves .A s  a result, any 
discussion about the possibility of floating was frequently interpreted as indicating a 
‘weakness’ of the pound and the possibility of a future devaluation, consequently 
triggering or intensifying speculative pressure against sterling.
considerations to float the pound. Lamb, The Macmillan Years, p.46.
The Economist, “Sterling’s Strength through Tribulation”, in “British Banking”, Special Supplement, 
June 14,1958, p.8.
PRO T236-3945, “Economic Situation: Note by the Prime Minister”, September 26, 1957.
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C o n c l u s io n
Throughout the 1950s, but increasingly so after 1955, fear of sterling’s weakness 
played an important role in British policy on convertibility. A growing loss of confidence 
in the pound sterling throughout the 1950s, due to both economic fundamentals and 
government policy, played an important role in sterling’s weakness in the 1950s. Chapter I 
showed that reserves in themselves cannot be blamed for sterling’s weakness. Rather, 
inflationary pressures, which the government was unwilling to contain, and public 
awareness of the priority given to unemployment over inflation, of the government's 
serious consideration to let the pound float in times of adverse speculation, and of the 
unwillingness to open the economy to foreign competition undermined the credibility of 
the government’s commitment to a strong pound. UK policy on convertibility was an 
important part of a monetary policy that gradually undermined the confidence in the 
stability of sterling.
...[I]n order for ...commitments to have credibility, they must be ‘time consistent’. 
That is, it must be in the interest of the authorities to continue to honour them in 
the future. If a commitment is made which economic agents expect to go counter 
to the interests of the authorities in some future period, they will realize today that 
the commitment will not be held.
Doubts over the government’s commitment to a fixed stable exchange rate 
undermined sterling in the 1950s. Complacency about inflationary pressures, particularly 
obvious in 1955, and the priority given by the government to full employment conflicted 
with a stable exchange rate for the pound. The attraction to floating and the apparent 
ambivalence regarding convertibility conveyed a lack of determination to maintain a
De Grauwe, International Money, p. 194.
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strong pound. All factors combined to erode confidence in the British currency making it 
prone to speculative attacks. UK external monetary policy exhibited unwillingness to 
accept the commitment anchors which would have been necessary to build lastirxg 
confidence in the pound, namely a fixed exchange rate combined with currency 
convertibility. Even when restricted by capital and exchange controls, economic agents 
could and did incorporate their expectations into their economic transactions to affect 
sterling and the UK r e s e r v e s . I n  1957 Triffin observed that “the obstacles to the 
restoration of currency convertibility in Europe no longer lie in the weakness of its 
economy, in its persistent inflationary proclivities or in its shortage of dollars, but in fears 
and uncertainties regarding the future harmonization of nationalistic trade and monetary 
policies in an interdependent world”. T h e  lack of commitment to the tenets of the 
Bretton Woods system had far-reaching consequences. De Grauwe argued that “[t]he 
Bretton Woods system collapsed because the commitments towards convertibility (at a 
fixed price) were not credible”. T h e  lack of credibility was already evident to economic 
agents in the 1950s.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the 1950s British policy on convertibility was characterized by 
inconsistencies and indecisiveness. The lack of a clear and determined policy on sterling
Besides leads and lags which account for the bulk o f  speculative movements against the pound there 
were other significant channels through which speculators sold sterling in times o f uncertainty. These 
channels, most importantly the Kuweit and the Hong Kong Gap were inofficial markets in which sterling 
area residents sold sterling for dollar securities. The Hong Kong Gap, is discussed in detail in C. Schenk, 
“Closing the Hong Kong Gap: Hong Kong and the Free Dollar Market in the 1950s”, in The Economic 
History Review, May 1994, pp.335-353.
R. Triffin, Europe and the Money Muddle, New Haven, 1957, p.86.
De Grauwe, International Money, p.54.
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and on convertibility reflected the dilemma between external and internal policy goals in 
Britain's monetary policy in the 1950s which undermined long-term confidence in the 
pound, thus contributing significantly to its weakness throughout and beyond the decade 
in question. The dilemma can be expressed as the conflict between the pursuit of full 
employment on the one hand, and the need for external stability and usability of sterling 
and Britain's international political ambitions, on the other hand/^^ The desire to pursue 
an independent domestic economic policy, aimed at economic growth and full 
employment was incompatible with a currency which was convertible and fixed or 
pegged.^ ®® In 1956, A. C. L. Day argued that convertibility would facilitate capital 
movements even if convertibility were only applied to current transactions since the 
removal of exchange control would make all flows more difficult to control. He warned 
that “[t]he result would be that the strain on sterling and the British economy might be 
quite intolerable" and concluded that "complete convertibility would impose a quite 
impossible strain”.^ ®^ Some Treasury officials, and particularly Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan, considered the duality of sterling rates an important instrument of monetary 
policy, since it theoretically enabled them to let the transferable rate drop in times of 
adverse speculation, thus letting the exchange rate take the pressure instead of the 
domestic economyHowever,  if sterling was to continue to be the world's trading
A. C. L. Day summarized the dilemma as the tradeoff between the costs and advantages of 
convertibility which revolved around “first, the arguments for and against a more liberal international 
trading and payments system; and secondly, the arguments for an against the extension o f London's 
importance as an international banker (and, to a lesser extent, as an international trading centre)”. Day, 
The Future, p.l36. For discussion o f the problems and benefits o f convertibility see also Polk, Sterling.
This argument refers to Holtfferich’s theory o f overdetermination o f the system, explained earlier in 
this chapter.
see also Milward, The European Rescue, p.355.
Day, The Future, p. 132.
°^^The Bank o f England rejected the idea that letting the transferable rate float was an instrument o f  
monetary policy at the disposal o f the government mainly because o f the danger o f such a policy to 
sterling credibility.
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currency, a reserve currency, and if London was to remain an international capital market, 
sterling had to become convertible sooner rather than later. An international reserve status 
for sterling was important both for the continuation of the sterling area and for Britain’s 
international power ambitions.
Without the protection of exchange control, UK policymakers believed that a 
floating exchange rate would let the exchange rate take the strain resulting from Britain’s 
pursuit of a full employment policy. In this sense, the exchange rate was viewed as an 
instrument of monetary policy which policymakers were unwilling to give up. Sterling 
convertibility at a fixed rate would have reduced the exchange rate to a dependent 
variable, which would be determined by inflation differentials, between Britain and the 
world average, and by Britain’s balance of payments. With a fixed convertible currency, 
Britain’s domestic economic policy would be determined by its external balance. For a 
government committed to full employment, even at the expense of price stability, an 
external constraint which limited domestic policy choices was not an attractive option.
The commitment of UK governments to full employment and their reluctance to 
do anything about inflation unless they were forced to act in order to stem speculation 
against the pound seriously undermined confidence in the pound. Public awareness of the 
policy priorities of UK governments repeatedly led speculators and traders to expect a 
devaluation of the pound whereas a revaluation was never a realistic possibility. UK 
policymakers' attraction to a floating exchange rate for the pound, especially in times 
where the pound was already under speculative attack, confirmed widespread anticipation 
that the pound exchange rate would be allowed to drop in times of crisis. International
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comparisons of purchasing power parity or competitiveness further reinforced the belief 
that the pound would fall sooner or later. Anybody speculating on the future value of the 
pound had nothing, or next to nothing, to lose by selling the pound in the present, since all 
the above factors indicated that the only way for the pound to move was down.^°  ^ In the 
second half of the 1950s, the frequent sterling crises increased policymakers’ concern that 
convertibility would lead to a repeat of 1947.
The way in which UK governments tackled, and temporarily ended, speculation 
against the pound in the later 1950s, undermined the government’s credibility and its 
ability to deal with crises in the future. The Government stopped pound speculation 
largely through public announcements without backing the words up with any real lasting 
corrective action. The rises in bank rate and controls on hire-purchase did nothing to 
address the underlying inflationary tendency of the economy which reappeared every time 
as soon as the temporary restrictive measures had been lifted. UK governments refused to 
fight the longer-term inflationary trend because they saw inflation as an acceptable price to 
pay for full employment.
Britain was the first country publicly to make the return to convertibility a 
government priority after 1947.^ °"^  Moreover, the Treasury and Conservative governments 
were very concerned with appearing to be the leader in the return to currency 
convertibility of the European currencies. By leading Europe into convertibility they 
hoped to inject confidence into holders of sterling that the pound was worth holding.
Foreman-Peck, “Trade”, p. 173.
“Dans les années 50, la pression exercée en vue de restaurer la convertibilité en dollar de devises 
européennes ne vint pas des États-Unis mais de Londres.” Milward, “La livre sterling”, p.408.
Tn the 1950s, the pressure exerted to restore the dollar convertibility o f the European currencies did not 
come from the US but from London.’
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However, domestic policy considerations and doubts about the strength of the pound, and 
the effect of convertibility on confidence in the pound, presented powerful obstacles to a 
return to convertibility, particularly to an official announcement thereof. By 1958, the 
dilemmas facing UK policymakers with regard to convertibility had not disappeared, on 
the contrary. Moreover, by 1958 other factors came into play which further complicated 
the decision making process in Britain. These new factors, European integration, presented 
an additional dilemma for policy on convertibility, which is discussed in the chapter on 
monetary cooperation and European integration.
While the size of sterling balances held by non-residents put the British currency 
in a category of its own, this alone need not have caused the severe problems for currency 
management that Britain encountered, if domestic monetary policy had shown a greater 
commitment to currency stability. According to Dow, irresolution and vacillation when it 
came to monetary policy in general and the establishment of convertibility in particular, 
contributed significantly to the fluctuations in the confidence in sterling.^ ®^  Thus, sterling's 
weakness cannot be blamed exclusively on the international nature and exposure of the 
currency that distinguished it from other Western European currencies. The Economist 
pointed out in 1958:
One striking aspect of the whole experience of 1958, indeed, is that, when 
confidence in Britain's domestic policy is strong, sterling’s relative status is not 
always and necessarily affected adversely by an international political crisis.^^^
Significant responsibility for sterling weakness goes to the lack of domestic policy
commitment to currency stability. Britain's monetary policy throughout the 1950s
constantly reminded sterling holders of this lack of commitment, thus seriously
Dow, The Management, p. 87.
The Economist, “Assessment for Sterling”, November 29, 1958, p .812.
160
undermining confidence in sterling, both in Britain and abroad. Overall, the issues linked 
with convertibility presented the British with many dilemmas, due to the conflicting 
policy goals pursued. This was not the case in Germany, where, for reasons of historical 
and economic necessity, the economic situation and the political issues forged a strong 
and nearly all-encompassing consensus on convertibility that embraced political parties 
and economic factions alike.
In Britain, external policy objectives dictated a return to convertibility as soon as 
possible, while the freedom to pursue domestic policy aims was believed to be threatened 
by the establishment of convertibility, particularly by convertibility at a fixed exchange 
rate. This dilemma, unique to Britain, paralyzed decision making on convertibility in the 
UK. Whereas in Britain convertibility was a highly divisive, and very political, issue, in 
Germany and France, policy on convertibility was never encumbered by conflicts of the 
nature that was troubling the UK. The dilemma which convertibility posed explains the 
indecisiveness of British exchange rate policy in the 1950s.
One widespread interpretation of the problems of the UK economy in the 1950s 
and 1960s is that the stop-go cycle was caused by the conflicting commitment to both a 
high level of employment and a fixed exchange rate. °^  ^J. Foreman-Peck claimed that the 
UK commitment to a fixed exchange rate “proved to be a constraint upon policy from the 
beginning”.^ ^^  While the UK was strongly committed to high employment in the 1950s, 
the commitment to fixed exchange rates is questionable. The discussions between the 
Treasury, the Bank and the Prime Minister reveal the fragility of the UK commitment to
Foreman-Peck, “Trade”, p. 165.
ibid., p. 167, and Yeager, International Monetary Relations, p.471.
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fixed exchange rates. Even when it became clear that the lack of public commitment to a 
fixed exchange rate destabilized the pound, policymakers continued to discuss the 
possibility. Moreover, economic agents strongly doubted Britain's commitment to a stable 
pound. They expected a devaluation of the pound and, as rational decisionmakers, acted 
accordingly, in turn further weakening the pound.
A possible solution to the credibility problem would have been an independent 
central bank. According to Bordo, an independent conservative central bank “may avoid 
the perceived disadvantage of sacrificing national sovereignty to the supemational dictates 
of a fixed exchange rate”.^ ®^ Thus, a more independent and powerful Bank of England 
might have provided the credible commitment mechanism necessary for exchange rate 
stability.^As this chapter has shown, had the Bank of England had a greater say in 
monetary policy in Britain, convertibility would have been established earlier. The next 
chapter looks at a country with a, relatively, independent conservative central bank.
Bordo, The Gold Standard, p.4. 
ibid.
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n: GERMAN POLICY ON CONVERTIBILITY 
INTRODUCTION
In terms of both economic and political considerations, the return to convertibility 
presented an entirely different issue for the Federal Republic of Germany than for the 
United Kingdom. An analysis of the approach to convertibility in Germany reveals 
fundamental disparities between the UK and Germany in economic conditions, but also in 
the importance and the meaning attributed to, and in the goals pursued by, convertibility. 
One indication of the striking disparity between Germany and the UK can be found in the 
fact that after 1955 convertibility was no longer an issue, whereas the convertibility debate 
in Britain lasted until the day of the establishment of convertibility in December 1958, if 
not longer.* By 1955, at the very latest, all the major factions of the German economy had 
accepted that convertibility was a necessary and desirable prerequisite for securing 
Germany’s position in the international arena, both economically and politically. The 
country should therefore seek its establishment the sooner the better.
This chapter argues that a fortunate combination of historical experience, 
institutional setting, economic and political conditions unique to the Federal Republic 
made rapid progress towards convertibility uncontroversial, desirable and feasible. By 
1954, at the latest, Germany could have already ‘gone convertible’, on its own, at a time 
when in Britain it was highly controversial and in France unthinkable. This chapter 
explains why, when it could have established convertibility much earlier than anybody 
else, Germany waited for the rest of Western Europe to ensure that the move to
* PRO T230-400, A memo by Watts on the current status o f the international trading system, suggested 
that it might be advisable to return to bilateralism were it not for the reaction that might provoke in the 
IMF. March 11, 1959.
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convertibility would be a collective one, and that Germany would not be seen as the leader 
in such a move.
TRADE
Contrary to Britain, in Germany policy on convertibility was determined by the 
desire to promote trade. In Germany trade dependence provided the principal common 
denominator which united economic and political factions in a consensus on the 
desirability of convertibility and the necessity of a collective move. An overview over the 
development of trade in the 1950s illustrates the difference in the role of trade in the 
German economy, and, consequently, in economic policy compared to Britain and France 
(see table III.l). The development of German trade is characterized by an outstanding 
growth of exports and imports, both in absolute figures and as a percentage of national 
output.
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Table III.l: Development of trade, 1950-1961*
Year exports , annual % change
(exports as % of GDP in 
brackets)
FRG UK France
imports^, annual % change
(imports as % of GDP in 
brackets)
FRG UK France
Trade (imports plus 
exports) as a 
percentage of GDP
FRG UK France
1950 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 28.5 59.0 28.0
(14.8) (31.0) (14.2) (13.7) (27.9) (13.9)
1951 34.1 -4.9 13.9 6.0 7.5 13.0 31.1 57.6 30.0
(17.9) (28.6) (15.2) (13.2) (29.0) (14.8)
1952 15.1 -2.7 -2.7 24.1 -6.9 4.9 34.2 55.0 29.5
(19.1) (27.9) (14.4) (15.1) (27.1) (15.1)
1953 17.4 4.9 1.4 17.5 83 -0.9 37.4 56.2 28.8
(20.9) (28.1) (14.2) (16.6) (28.2) (14.5)
1954 22.6 6.4 173 28.7 3.8 5.2 43.5 56.8 30.5
(23.7) (28.7) (15.9) (19.8) (28.1) (14.6)
1955 16.9 4.4 63 23.0 10.1 4.7 46.8 59.1 30.4
C49) (29.1) (16.0) (21.9) (30.0) (14.5)
1956 16.1 4.9 -7.9 12.4 -03 16.1 50.2 58.9 30.0
(27.1) (29.7) (14.0) (23.0) (29.2) (16.0)
1957 4.5 2.4 5.2 15.0 1.6 6.0 55.0 59.1 29.9
(29.9) (30.0) (13.9) (25.1) (29.2) (16.0)
1958 13.7 1.7 3.4 103 1.2 -3.9 57.2 60.1 29.3
(30.3) (30.6) (14.2) (26.9) (29.6) (15.1)
1959 13.7 2.8 13.4 18.6 6.9 0.5 62.2 61.2 30.3
(32.3) (30.5) (15.6) (29.9) (30.7) (14.8)
1960 13.5 5.0 153 16.8 123 16.8 65.9 63.8 33.3
(33.7) (30.7) (17.0) (323) (33.1) (16.3)
1961 3.8 3.2 173 9.5 03 6.8 65.5 63.7 33.9
(32.7) (31.1) (17.2) (32.9) (32.6) (16.7)
a: all 1954 prices 
b; goods and services 
GDP at factor cost
Source: calculated from OEEC, Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics 1962. 
Between 1950 and 1958, exports of the FRG grew by 266 per cent. In comparison, in both 
the UK and the US, exports in 1958 were only 18 per cent more than in 1950, while in 
France exports grew by 40 per cent.  ^Between 1950 and 1961, Germany’s exports grew at 
an annual compounded rate of 15.5 per cent, compared to a mere 2.5 per cent in the UK 
and 6.2 per cent in France. In the same period, the annual compounded growth rate for real 
GDP was 7.5 per cent for the FRG, compared to 2.5 per cent for the UK and 4.3 per cent
The growth in German exports was largely due to growth in manufactured exports, whereas Britain 
witnessed a shrinkage o f the proportion o f exports made up o f manufactured goods. See, for example, R. 
Millward, “Industrial and commercial performance since 1950”, in Floud and McCloskey, (eds.). The 
Economic History, pp. 123-167.
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for France, respectively. Thus German exports grew at a rate that was twice as fast as its 
GDP growth, which, in turn, was much higher than in Britain or France. By comparison, 
Britain’s exports grew just as sluggishly as GDP, while France fared slightly better with 
both higher GDP growth and exports rising faster than its GDP but neither rate came even 
close to Germany’s. Between 1950 and 1958, Germany’s exports as a percentage of GDP 
grew from 14.8 per cent to 29.9 per cent. This represents a rise in export dependence - 
defined here as exports as a percentage of GDP - of 15.1 per cent. By comparison, British 
and French export dependence hardly changed between 1950 and 1950, hovering around 
30 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. While Britain’s export dependence was more 
than double that of Germany in 1950 - 31 per cent compared to 14 per cent -, by 1958, 
exports made up the same proportion of GDP in both countries, with Germany’s export 
dependence having shot up to the level of Britain’s which had remained roughly stagnant. 
As important as Germany’s rapid rise in both exports and export dependence is the 
continuity of the growth in the two figures for West Germany. Germany’s continuity 
stands in stark contrast to the development of exports and export dependence in Britain 
and France.
Table IIL2: Real GDP growth (per cent)®
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 average”
FRG 10.4 8.1 7.5 7.7 11.4 6.7 5.3 3.1 6.8 8.5 7.2 7.5
UK 3.4 -0.3 4.2 4.0 3.2 2.7 1.5 -0.4 3.1 4.2 1.9 2.5
France 6.0 2.5 3.0 4.9 5.6 4.9 6.0 1.8 2.9 5.8 4.4 4.3
a: GDP at factor cost at 1954 prices 
b: annual compounded growth rate 
Source: OECD Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics 1962.
The results for import dependence mirror fairly closely those for export 
dependence. Germany's import dependence, - defined here as imports as a percentage of 
GDP -, more than doubled between 1950 and 1958, implying again that imports grew at a
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considerably quicker pace than GDP. In contrast, imports as a percentage of GDP 
increased by a meager 1.2 per cent for the UK and 1.3 per cent for France.^ The continuity 
of the rapid growth of the FRG’s trade dependence, or, what Bergsten has called its 
“economic openness”, between 1950 and 1958 stands in stark contrast with the 
development of the UK and France in the same time period."^
Much of the speed of Germany’s export growth reflects the return of exports to 
their prewar levels.  ^ In this sense, it is not surprising that the German growth of exports 
should have exceeded that of Britain in the early post-war period, since Britain’s export 
levels had not been similarly reduced by autarky, war and destruction. This observation 
does not, however, take away from the fact that the actual rapidity of the export growth, 
combined with a concurrent general rapid economic expansion and increase in economic 
welfare created an important self-reinforcing dynamic which, in turn, affected economic 
policy decisions and confirmed the desirability of Germany’s outward orientation. 
Germany’s rapid export growth combined with strong economic growth lends support to 
the theory of export-led growth as an explanation for the FRG’s ‘economic miracle’. ^
Throughout the 1950s, the growth of German exports and imports outstripped by 
far the growth of its national output in this period, thus continuously increasing Germany’s 
dependence on international transactions, or its openness. Germany’s dependence on 
international transactions, as measured by trade as a proportion of GDP, doubled between
For an in-depth discussion o f the pivotal importance of the size and growth of Germany's imports, as a 
motor for the growth o f the European economies see Milward, The European Rescue, pp. 134-167. For a 
definition o f ‘openness’, see also Panic, National Management, pp.3-5.
 ^C. F. Bergsten. The Dilemmas o f  the Dollar, New York University Press, 1975, pp.20-23.
 ^W. Abelshauser, Wirtschqftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Suhrkamp, 1983, pp. 147-148.
 ^According to Milward, in Germany “attributing the country’s economic and political success to exports 
became a political cult”. Milward, The European Rescue, p. 126.
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1950 and 1958 from 28.5 per cent in 1950 to 57.2 per cent in 1958, having increased 
steadily throughout the period. In contrast, Britain's trade as percentage of GDP was little 
more than one per cent higher in 1958 than it was in 1950. France’s trade dependence 
fluctuated around 29 per cent in the same period. Neither France nor the UK experienced a 
similar continuous upward trend in trade dependence. As a country whose prosperity 
depended to a large and increasing extent on trade, the FRG required a currency that was 
widely usable, as an international means of payment for current account transactions.^ 
However, for a country as dependent on access to international markets, both for imports 
and exports, currency convertibility only made sense if its establishment did not 
jeopardize this access. In Germany, in line with the economic theory discussed in chapter 
I, the primary purpose of convertibility was to promote trade. Thus, contrary to Britain, in 
Germany the advantages associated with convertibility were inextricably linked to trade 
considerations. A unilateral convertibility would have turned the DM into a hard and 
therefore scarce currency in Europe. This might have prompted Germany’s European 
trading partners to discriminate against German goods. In 1953, the Economics Ministry 
warned that a German move to convertibility before its OEEC trading partners would only 
be advantageous if the countries whose currencies remained inconvertible would commit 
themselves to renouncing discrimination against the countries whose currencies had 
become convertible.* The Economics Ministry asserted that what was important for 
Germany was “commercial convertibility”: “Wenn in Deutschland von Konvertibilitat 
gesprochen werde, so werde dabei an einen freien Zahlungsverkehr und [sic] einen freien
’ see, for example, E. Owen Smith, The German Economy, Routledge, 1994, pp.499-504.
® BA B 102-55345, “Allgemeine Auffassungen der deutschen Bundesregienmg (BR) zur Frage der 
Konvertibilitat”, April 27, 1953 and “Beitrâge zur Diskussion iiber die Herstellimg eines freieren 
Handels-und Zahlungsverkehrs (Konvertibilitat)”, June 5, 1953.
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Handel gedacht.”  ^ Contrary to German motivations for convertibility, the Economics 
Ministry pointed out, Britain was more concerned with “financial convertibility”, 
explaining why in Britain convertibility was compatible with trade restrictions. 
Convertibility combined with trade discrimination was not an acceptable policy to 
Germany, since it contained the risk of discrimination against German exports.
In light of Germany’s interest in maintaining access to export markets, the 
Advisory Council to the Economics Ministry wrote in 1952 that the only way for 
Germany to establish convertibility was jointly with the other OEEC countries.^^ This 
view was conveyed to the British government in May 1953. In an Anglo-German meeting 
on convertibility in London the German representatives declared that Germany advocated 
a collective return to convertibility by all EPU countries. Similarly, representatives of 
business and industry favored convertibility on one important condition: the simultaneous 
establishment of convertibility "with as many countries as possible to prevent 
discrimination against its exports by soft currency countries. While convertibility was 
judged to be beneficial for German business since it helped exports by establishing the 
DM as an internationally acceptable means of exchange and payment, business sectors 
were not keen on convertibility if Germany were to establish it before most of its trading 
partners. The Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) - the German equivalent of
 ^ BA HI02-56894, “Entwurf: Ergebnisse der deutschen-britischen Besprechimgen iiber einen freieren 
Handels- und Zahlungsverkehr (Konvertibilitat)”, May 19, 1953.
‘When convertibility is discussed in Germany, one is thinking o f a system o f  free payments and [sic] free 
trade.’
BA B 102-55345, “Grundsatze, iiber die zwischen dem Bundeswirtschaftsminister Erhard, dem 
belgischen Aussenminister van Zeeland und dem Aussenhandelsminister Meurice in der Aussprache am 
4. Mai 1953, nachmittags, Übereinstimmung festgestellt wurde”, draft. May 26, 1953.
Der Wissenschaftliche Beirat beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, “31. Gutachten vom 16. November 
1952: Konvertierbarkeit der Wahrungen”, in Sammelband der Gutachten von 1948-1966, 2. Band: 
Gutachten vom Juni 1950 bis November 1952, Otto Schwarz & Co., 1967, pp.95-97.
BA B 102-55340, “Entwurf: Ergebnisse der deutsch-britischen Besprechungen iiber einen freieren 
Handels- und Zahlungsverkehr (Konvertibilitat) am 12. und 13. Mai 1953 in London”, by Stedtfeldt, May 
19, 1953.
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the Federation of British Industries -, sent a memo to the Economics Ministry on this 
matter in 1955, in which it warned against the discrimination against German exports that 
might result if only the pound, the US dollar and the DM were convertible/^ 
Discrimination could only be avoided, the BDI pointed out, if as many trading nations as 
possible established convertibility simultaneously. Similarly, in a statement made in 1954, 
the committee for international economic issues of the Deutsche Industrie- und Handelstag 
(DIHT) - the German Trade and Industry Association -, emphasized the necessity of re­
establishing convertibility as soon as possible, and it assured the government of its support 
in the matter. However, a collective move to convertibility by as large a group of 
countries as possible was considered urgently necessary (“dringend erforderlich”) to avoid 
any damage to German exports through discrimination. Since, in 1955, some of 
Germany’s most important trading partners were not yet prepared to take this step, the 
DIHT wanted Germany to wait for these partners rather than establish convertibility by 
itself or only with Britain. German industry advocated the rapid liberalization of German 
payments, but only on the condition that Germany would not risk discrirnination against 
its exports by establishing convertibility unilaterailly before most of its trading partners.
While most German economic factions were in favor of rapid convertibility, 
decisionmakers had no interest in pressuring Britain to establish official convertibility 
before it was ready, since that might have only resulted in a British retreat on trade 
liberalization.^^ In particular, German policymakers were concerned about the breakup of
BA B 102-55345, Memo by the BDI to the Economics Ministry: “Die Handelspolitik in der 
Übergangsphase zur Konvertibilitaf’, June 7,1955.
BA B102-12145, statement by the DIHT: “Stellungnahme des Aussenwirtschaflsausschusses des 
Deutschen Industrie- und Handelstages zur Frage der Konvertierbarkeif’, September 29,1954. 
ibid.
BA B 102-55345, “Grundsàtze, iiber die zwischen dem Bundeswirtschaftsminister Erhard, dem 
belgischen Aussenminister van Zeeland und dem Aussenhandelsminister Meurice m der Aussprache am 
4. Mai 1953, nachmittags, Übereinstimmung festgestellt wurde", draft. May 26,1953.
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the EPU as a result of a unilateral British move to convertibility. The EPU bound 
Germany’s principal trading partners together in a mutual commitment to intra-OEEC 
trade liberalization. As Germany’s biggest export and import market the EPU provided the 
ideal forum for the expansion of German trade. In the 1950s nearly three quarters of 
German exports went to the EPU area while two thirds of German imports came from the 
EPU (see table III.3). Even if a unilateral British move to convertibility had not ended the 
EPU, a British withdrawal from the EPU would have reduced significantly the benefits of 
the EPU for Germany. Britain’s membership and the consequent incorporation of the 
sterling area in the EPU settlement mechanism was a particularly important advantage for 
Germany throughout the 1950s, although for changing reasons. In the first half of the 
1950s, the settlement area allowed Germany to offset its trade deficits with the sterling 
area with its overall surpluses with the EPU (see tables 111.3 and 111.4).^  ^In the second half 
of the 1950s, when Germany ran a surplus with the sterling area, the EPU guaranteed 
access to the sterling area for German exports, which made up around 12 per cent of total 
German exports.
BA 3102-55340, Vocke, president of the German central bank to Erhard, February 23, 1954.
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Table III.3: German trade with EPU area (million US dollars)
imports^ exports trade balance
EPU area % of total world EPU area % of total world EPU area world
1950 1802 67 2697 1479 75 1976 -323 -720
1951 2027 58 3492 2477 72 3463 450 -28
1952 2373 62 3814 2879 72 4002 506 188
1953 2474 66 3771 3132 71 4389 659 618
1954 2886 63 4571 3753 72 5248 867 677
1955 3644 63 5793 4417 72 6135 772 341
1956 3946 60 6617 5231 71 7358 1285 741
1957 4358 58 7499 6011 70 8575 1654 1076
1958 4458 61 7361 6044 69 8807 1586 1446
a: c.i.f.; b: f.o.b. 
Source: OEEC Statistical Bulletins, Series IV.
The principle advantage of the EPU for Germany was that it committed its 
members to a code of liberalization of intra-OEEC trade, which ensured continued 
German access to its most important export market. If convertibility was not collective, 
then German policymakers and industry feared that a division of the OEEC into 
convertible and inconvertible currencies would lead to discrimination against countries 
whose currencies had become convertible. Moreover, it would endanger intra-OEEC trade 
liberalization and the EPU settlement mechanism. To prevent a reversal of intra-OEEC 
trade liberalization, Germany policymakers wanted, first, a collective move to 
convertibility and, secondly, some forum for cooperation which would safeguard intra- 
European trade liberalization after the introduction of convertibility.^* This forum could be 
either a modified EPU or a new organization. German trade interests were against a 
dissolution of the EPU unless the commitment to reciprocal trade liberalization in a post- 
EPU Europe could be guaranteed.
' BA B 102-55340, “Entwurf: Ergebnisse der deutsch-britischen Besprechungen iiber einen freieren 
Handels- und Zahlungsverkehr (Konvertibilitat) am 12. und 13. Mai 1953 in London”, May 19, 1953, 
and memo from the Economics Minister re. Anglo-German consultations on convertibility, “Vorlaufige 
Liste der Besprechungspunkte”, May 22,1953.
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Table 1II.4: German trade with the sterling area (million US dollars)
imports  ^(in brackets percentage 
of total imports)
exports” (in brackets percentage 
of total exports)
trade balance
1953 590(15.6) 533 (12.1) -57
1954 721(15.8) 635 (12.1) -86
1955 876(15.1) 791 (12.9) -85
1956 954 (14.4) 943 (12.8) -11
1957 1025 (13.7) 1141 (13.3) 116
1958 1022(13.9) 1215(13.8) 193
a: b: f.o.b.
Source: OEEC Statistical Bulletins, Series IV.
The EPU was a suitable forum for ensuring collective progress towards 
convertibility. While waiting for the rest of Europe to be ready to establish convertibility 
without reneging on trade liberalization, Germany lobbied for a hardening of the EPU’s 
settlement mechanism. From 1951 onwards, while Germany ran large and growing 
surpluses with the EPU area as a whole, it ran continuous, though not as large, deficits 
with the dollar area (see table III.5). In contrast, both Britain and France ran deficits with 
the EPU as well as the dollar area throughout most of the period. Through the EPU 
settlement mechanism, Germany received gold and hard currency only for a portion of this 
surplus. The rest constituted an automatic credit to the EPU and thus to those member 
countries that ran deficits with the Union. At the same time, Germany had to pay hard 
currency for its deficits with the dollar area. With convertibility of European currencies 
into the dollar, Germany would have easily been able to offset its dollar deficits with 
currency earnings fi*om its EPU suipluses. A hardening of the EPU, that is, an increase in 
the portion of credits and debts to be settled in dollars or gold, increased the share of 
Germany’s EPU surpluses for which Germany received hard currency. In this sense.
19 The settlement mechanism was gradually raised from a goldicredit ratio o f  40:60, to 50:50 in 1954, and 
fmally to 75:25 in 1955; for a detailed discussion o f the EPU, see Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European 
Payments Union.
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hardening increased the convertibility of Germany’s EPU surpluses. In 1954, the Bank
deutscher Lander emphasized the importance of increasing the convertibility of
Germany’s EPU surpluses, so that they could be used to offset the deficits with the
currently limited dollar area. It argued that this was necessary if progress towards
liberalization of imports from the dollar area was to continue.^® In fact, however,
Germany’s gold foreign exchange reserves allowed Germany to cover easily the trade
deficits with the dollar area. However, Germany preferred to make its surpluses from the
EPU convertible, to be able to use them to offset dollar area deficits, rather than having to
dig into its foreign exchange reserves.
In addition to increasing the convertibility of Germany’s EPU surpluses, a more
important advantage of the gradual hardening of the settlements mechanism was that it
progressively brought all EPU currencies, not just the DM, closer to convertibility without
dismantling the OEEC forum for intra-European trade liberalization. From a trade
perspective, for Germany, the convertibility of other currencies was at least as important
as the convertibility of the DM.
If trade liberalization within OEEC could be combined with a parallel gradual 
hardening of the settlements within EPU, until all settlements were made in hard 
currency the EPU and its non-retaliatory trade rules could be preserved, at the 
same time as convertibility was achieved generally.^^
Thus, with regard to the EPU the best policy option for Germany was a gradual hardening
of the EPU until the large portion of the OEEC countries were ready to move to
convertibility jointly.
Bank deutscher Lander, Geschc^sberichtfur das Jahr 1954, p.32.
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Milward, The European Rescue, p.379.
Table III.5: Trade balance according to area (monthly average)
UK (million pounds) FRG (million DM) France (billion francs)
EPU area $ area EPU area $ area EPU area $ area
1950 -5.64 -15.15 -127 -114 1.8 -8.7
1951 -29.32 -35.78 148 -156 -14.7 -10.3
1952 -12.54 -29.14 171 -159 -17.8 -12.1
1953 -0.92 -19.91 222 -58 -11.2 -5.7
1954 -3.12 -20.37 296 -77 -5 -5.7
1955 -11.15 -35.42 258 -158 -3.8 -7.2
1956 -4.55 -25.89 436 -203 -18 -13.3
1957 -2.86 -32.68 592 -300 -19.4 -19
1958 -12.77 -18.94 544 -190 -19.6 -9.4
Source: OEEC Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics.
From the beginning, trade considerations were a determining factor in Germany’s 
policy on convertibility, and, in particular, in its advocacy of a collective move to currency 
convertibility. Overall, trade dependence created a strong consensus for convertibility, 
provided it was undertaken collectively. Germany’s economic situation and its trade 
dependence ensured general domestic support for economic cooperation with its main 
trading partners, - the OEEC -, and particularly for any policy that benefited the country’s 
exports. The collective return to currency convertibility at fixed exchange rates combined 
both. Thus, contrary to Britain and France, growing trade dependence created an 
environment conducive to the establishment and the maintenance of convertibility.
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CONVERTIBILITY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF GERMAN ECONOMIC
POLICY ORIENTATION
In addition to trade dependence, political circumstances and the general economic 
policy orientation created an environment which was conducive to a widespread 
consensus on the desirability of convertibility. Thus, as this section will show, contrary to 
Britain, the delay in establishing convertibility in Germany cannot be explained by a 
general skepticism about the desirability of convertibility at a fixed exchange rate and the 
domestic economic policy constraints associated with it.
For Germany, 1945 marked the beginning of a new era. The country was defeated, 
divided and occupied, and the economy lay in shambles. Germany had to be recreated 
along new geographical, political and economic lines.^  ^The occupation powers regulated 
Germany’s economy and particularly the external relations between the German occupied 
zones and other countries in the early post-war years. As a result, the Allied powers played 
an important role in shaping the economic policy of the nascent Federal Republic. 
Independent of the Allied powers, a heated debate on economic policy orientation took 
place within Germany itself in the first years after World War 11. According to Anthony 
Nicholls, the struggle over economic policy in Germany “was not between laissez-faire 
[sic] free enterprise and a totalitarian command-economy, but between a free-price 
mechanism operating within a set of rules laid down by the state, and a mixed economy in 
which private business produced according to a global plan and operated within a state- 
regulated system of rationing”.^  ^Thus, “[t]he real conflict of opinion was between those
For a an account o f Germany post war reconstruction see, for example, Abelshauser, 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, Milward, The Reconstruction, Nicholls, 
Freedom with Responsibility.
^  Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p. 193.
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who felt that the price mechanism must be reintroduced into Germany as quickly as 
possible as a means of distribution, and those who thought it must be severely limited in 
its applications so as to fulfill social and economic priorities which the market could not 
be expected to accomplish by itself’?^ The unique post war situation in Germany at the 
same time necessitated and made possible a profound reshuffle of economic policy 
orientation. The immediate post war years witnessed a fierce but constructive debate over 
Germany's economic policy orientation among politicians, economists and administrators, 
the outcome of which was by no means a foregone conclusion with particularly members 
of the Social Democratic Party advocating a more dirigiste economic policy than the one 
eventually adopted?^ The outcome of this debate was the creation of the so-called social 
market economy along the lines advocated by its intellectual creator, Alfi*ed Müller- 
Armack.^^ The concept developed by Müller-Armack between 1946 and 1948 combined 
“a legally protected system of competition” on the one hand and government intervention 
to overcome “unhealthy inequalities of wealth” and to ensure social security on the 
other.^^
By 1948 the battle was decided in favor of a market economy with a strong 
element of social responsibility and after 1951 the economic success made it difficult for 
any economic or political faction to object to the path chosen. The victory of the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) in the first federal elections of 1949 “implied a rejection of the 
SPD’s critique of the Christian Democratic social market economy” and an endorsement
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p. 180. Nicholls provides an extensive account o f the debate in 
Germany over the future course o f Germany's economic policy. In addition to Nicholls, see also Giersch, 
Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, pp.28-38.
^  see Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, chapter 12, “The SPD and the Social Market Economy”, 
pp.248-269 and W. E. Paterson, The SPD and European Integration, Saxon House, 1974.
 ^ Alfred Müller-Armack was economics professor and later become secretary o f state in the Economics 
Ministry and one o f Erhard’s closest associates.
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p. 143. For a discussion o f  Müller-Armack and the concept o f  
social market economy see pp. 136-144.
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of Economies Minister Erhard’s liberal economic policyGermany differed significantly 
firom France or Britain in that fi-om the early 1950s there was a fairly widespread 
consensus, among policymakers, academics and citizens alike that the key to economic 
success lay in an open economy, a stable currency, and “a rejection of policies designed to 
push output and employment at the cost of rising prices or controls”/^ Compared to 
Britain in the 1950s, where economic policies, especially policies aimed at stabilizing 
prices, implemented by the ruling Conservative Party could nearly always be expected to 
be attacked by the Labour Party, in Germany, there was a much greater consensus on the 
general aims and means of economic policy. The success of the social market economy, 
reflected in high growth rates and a rapid improvement in living standards, undermined 
any criticism fi*om the SPD of the economic model chosen or its implementation by the 
ruling CDU.^  ^ The historical experience with the special combination of war, inflation, 
unemployment and economic collapse forged a consensus on the social market 
economy.^ ^ To German citizens full employment policies “carr[ied] the threat of inflation 
and controls and thus touch[ed] the two most sensitive spots in German economic 
experience”.^  ^ Throughout the 1950s, the Federal Republic was concerned with 
“Wahrungsstabilitat” (currency stability) as a necessary condition for trade and thus 
economic growth.^^
Paterson, The SPD, p.43.
Wallich, Mainsprings o f  the German Revival, Yale University Press, 1955, p. 107. See also H. Giersch, 
K.-H. Paqué and H. Schmieding, “Openness, Wage Restraint and Macroeconomic Stability: West 
Germany’s Road to Prosperity 1948-1958”, in Dombusch, Nolling and Layard (eds.). Postwar Economic 
Reconstruction, pp. 1-27 and K. H. Hennings, “West Germany” in Boltho (ed.). The European Economy, 
p.479.
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, chapter 14, “The SPD and the Struggle for Reform”, pp.300- 
321, Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, and Hennings, “West Germany”.
W. Abelshauser, “Die ordnungspolitische Epochenbedeutung der Weltwirtschaftskrise in Deutschland: 
Bin Beitrag zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft”, in D. Petzina (ed.), 
Ordnungspolitische Weichenstellungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Duncker und Humblot, 1991, 
pp. 12-99.
Wallich, Mainsprings, p.l 12.
H.-P. Schwarz, Die Ara Adenauer: Griinderjahre der Republik 1949-1957, Geschichte der
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For Germany, the economic trauma carried over from the interwar period was the 
hyperinflation of the early 1920s, whereas, in contrast, the corresponding trauma in Britain 
was unemployment. In Germany, the traumatic experience with hyperinflation in the 
1920s created a widespread consensus, even grassroots support for price stabilityW hen 
the poimd sterling was devalued in 1949 by 30 per cent and most Western European 
countries followed suit, Germany decided to devalue its currency only by 20 per cent. This 
meant effectively a revaluation of the DM vis-à-vis most Western European currencies. 
The revaluation was intentional in that the authorities saw the DM appreciation as a means 
of imposing price stability on the German economy. Thus, according to Nicholls, “[t]he 
Bank deutscher Lander and Erhard were happier with a smaller devaluation since it would 
cheapen imports and force price discipline on exporters” Revaluation would reduce the 
import prices of raw materials which would benefit Germany's manufacturing industry. 
Unemployment and an initial loss of competitiveness were the cost of price stability and 
an expected eventual rise in competitiveness which the authorities were conscious of and 
willing to accept. The German policy response to the UK devaluation shows that, contrary 
to the UK, German policymakers’ commitment was to price stability rather than full
Bimdesrepublik Band 2, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1981, p.SO. For a very good analysis o f the 
Federal Republic’s early monetary policy, see R. E. Emmer, “West German Monetary Policy, 1948-54”, in 
The Journal o f Political Economy, Vol.63, N o.l, February-December, 1955, pp.52-69.
Dickhaus points to a collection o f  letters from German citizens in which they express their concern to 
the government amount price stability. Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, p.44. Giersch, Paqué 
and Schmieding claimed that “the trauma o f inflation remained severe, particularly among low- and 
middle-income workers who had lost most o f their savings in the currency reform. Clearly, an aggressive 
stance in wage policy which would have run the risk o f spurring a wage-price spiral was not very popular 
among the rank-and-file, and union leaders could not simply by-pass this mood”, and they pointed to 
“repeated warnings o f  the liberal press not to rekindle inflation”. Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The 
Fading Miracle, p.78 and “Openness”, p. 13. Bergsten claimed that Germany tended to fear inflation, that 
is, financing, more than unemployment, that is, adjustment. Bergsten, The Dilemmas, p. 23. See also, H.-P. 
Schwarz (1981), Die Àra Adenauer: Epochenwechsel 1957-1963, Geschichte der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Band 2, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1981, p.80, E. Thiel, “Macroeconomic Policy 
Preference and Co-ordination: A View from Germany”, in Guerrieri and Padoan, (eds.). The Political 
Economy, pp.202-230, and Wallich, Mainsprings, pp.l 11-2.
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p.275; see also, Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, 
pp.77-8.
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employment/^
The way to ensure price stability, aside from an independent central bank, was an 
open, economy in which free competition kept prices low and export-led growth prevented 
the economy from overheating. The creators of the German economic model believed that 
“free market entry for new firms and for products from abroad” would force German 
producers to become more competitive and ensured price stability.^  ^The way to establish 
an open economy was through the removal of controls both on the domestic economy and 
on external transactions. On the domestic side, the currency reform and the accompanying 
internal reforms of 1948 marked the decisive step in Germany’s transition to a market 
econom yAm ong other things, the reforms eliminated the monetary overhang, removed 
price controls on a wide range of goods, and instated a German central bank as an 
independent institution whose main purpose was the safeguarding of the value of the 
domestic currency. Trade and payments liberalization were the external counterpart to the 
decontrol of the internal economy.
The liberalization of trade and payments, including the rapid establishment of 
currency convertibility, belonged to the set of predetermined policy orientations which had 
been ‘assigned’ to the Federal Republic before it was allowed to formulate its own foreign
According to Carlin, “until 1968 the government steadfastly refused to undertake a commitment to 
maintain domestic demand”. W. Carlin “West German Growth and Institutions, 1945-90”, Centre fo r  
Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper Series, No.896, January 1994, p. 17.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, p-30.
Analyses and accounts o f the internal reforms in 1948 are provided in Abelshauser, 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp.46-54, J. Dingwort-Nusseck, “Economic Growth, Economic Policy, and 
Foreign Affairs”, in W. F. Hanrieder (ed.). West German Foreign Policy, 1949-1979, Westview Press, 
1980. p.213, Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, pp.2-10 and p. 15, W. F. Hanrieder, West 
German Foreign Policy 1949-1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response, Stanford University 
Press, 1967, pp.21-22, O. Pfleiderer, “Two Types o f  Inflation, Two Types o f Currency Reform: The 
German Currency Miracles o f 1923 and 1948”, in Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschqft, 
Vol. 135, No.3, 1979, pp.352-364, and H. C. Wallich and J. F. Wilson, “Economic Orientations in 
Postwar Germany: Critical Choices on the Road Toward Currency Convertibility”, in Zeitschrift fur die 
gesamte Staatswissenschqft, Yo\. 137, No.3, 1981, pp.390-406.
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p o lic y S o m e  observers claimed that Allied economic policy played a decisive role in 
creating Germany’s orientation towards trade liberalization and free markets."^ ® Others 
argued that Germany made its fundamental economic policy choices, - choosing the free 
market over planning and trade liberalization over protectionism -, independently of Allied 
policy and influence/^ The former view generally brushes over the fact that the Allied 
powers were far from united in their beliefs regarding economic policy in general and 
economic policy for Germany in particular.^^ Whereas Britain and France endorsed 
economic controls and macroeconomic planning, the United States wanted an economy in 
which market forces were allowed to operate as freely as possible/^ Although the 
Western Allies, in particular the United States, initially put Germany on the road of trade 
liberalization - with the aim of creating a model economy -, domestic policymakers and 
Germany industry agreed that trade liberalization was the way to export-led growth and 
price stability and they continued on this course after the Federal Republic had obtained 
sovereignty over its economic policy. Thus, Wolf argued that “[f]ollowing the free trade 
tenet of the ordo-liberal approach, the German government had opted to pursue unilateral 
liberalization and was committed to early convertibility”.^ Moreover, public support of 
trade liberalization was much stronger than in Britain. According to Giersch, Paqué and
see, for example, W. Biihrer, “Erzwungene oder freiwillige Liberalisienmg? Die USA, die OEEC und 
die westdeutsche AuBenhandelspolitik 1949-1952”, in L. Herbst, W. Biihrer and H. Sowade (eds.), Vom 
Marshallplan zur EWG: die Eingliederung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland in die westliche Welt, R. 
Oldenbourg Verlag, 1990, pp.139-163.
^  "In addition to initiating tiie currency reform and channeling counterpart funds into critical sectors o f  
the economy. Allied economic policy made a most important and lasting impact on the West German 
economy by stressing the need to free markets and liberalize trade." Hanrieder, West German Foreign 
Policy 1949-1963, p.21-2. see also Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 147.
Biihrer, “Erzwungene oder freiwillige Liberalisienmg?”, pp. 161-2.
for a discussion o f Allied economic goals and policies regarding Germany, see Nicholls, Freedom with 
Responsibility, chapters 5 to 9.
The US wanted Germany to become the model o f trade liberalization in the OEEC. Abelshauser, 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p. 152, Biihrer, “Erzwungene oder freiwillige Liberalisienmg?”, and Hanrieder, 
West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, p.22.
^  H. Wolf, “Post-war Germany in the European context: domestic and external determinants o f growth” 
in Eichengreen (ed.), Europe’s Post-War Recovery, p.342.
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Schmieding, “protectionist pressures arising from sectoral lobbies were effectively 
dampened by the umbrella organizations of capital and labor”. In particular, the 
Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund, the German trade union council (DGB), actively 
supported the removal of import restrictions which it saw as a way of reducing 
consumer prices.^^ Bergsten argued that, due to its economic openness, Germany favored 
and promoted the setting up of conditions conducive to free trade and capital 
movements."^  ^There were important exceptions to Germany’s general endorsement of free 
trade and capital movements. Agriculture, energy and textiles were some of the sectors in 
which powerful protectionist lobbies worked against trade liberalization. However, aside 
from these important exceptions, Germany’s general policy orientation was towards the 
removal of barriers to trade. Currency convertibility was one of the instruments with 
which economic policymakers hoped to achieve an open, competitive economy and thus 
price stability
Wallich and Wilson pointed out that particularly Germany’s export dependence 
and its corresponding large creditor position provided an important stimulus to “the rapid 
liberalization of other external transactions besides merchandise trade” Thus, Germany 
removed quotas faster (see table 1 in chapter II) and reduced tariffs earlier than Britain and 
France."*^  The pursuit of trade liberalization was a rational policy choice given Germany’s 
conscious decision in favor of export-led growth and the resulting increasing trade 
dependence. According to Milward, “[a]ccess to European markets was a matter of life 
and death for the German economy and it was understandable that there should be no
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, p. 19. See also Hennings, “West Germany”, pp.476 & 
479.
^  Bergsten, The Dilemmas, p.23.
M. Dickhaus. Zwischen Europa und der Welt, p.46.
Wallich and Wilson, “Economic Orientations”, p.402.
Milward, The European Rescue, p. 145.
182
firmer advocate of trade liberalization than the Federal Republic''/^ Germany’s successful
economic performance in the 1950s was inextricably tied to the growth of trade,
explaining the fact that “the Federal Republic not merely passively acquiesced in the
liberalization of trade and invisible transactions within the OEEC, but that it actively
supported this policy in several instances”/^ In 1949, Germany liberalized its imports
from OEEC countries, that is, it removed quantitative restrictions, to a much greater extent
than its OEEC partners/^ When Germany was hit by a severe balance of payments crisis,
partially as a result of its rapid and higher than average rate of trade liberalization, the
government was reluctant to impose import controls to reduce the current account deficits,
and it rapidly reliberalized as soon as the worst was over/^ In general, Germany’s
economic policy, compared to France’s and Britain’s can be explained by the different
reconstruction model chosen by the former after World War II:
The British and French model sought salvation in a greater role of the state in 
organizing and shepherding economic life. In this model, the government centrally 
coordinated investment - helped by the nationalization of key industries - used 
demand management to guarantee full employment, employed trade restrictions to 
insulate the domestic economy from external shocks, and used price controls to 
check the inflationary consequences of demand stimulation.
The alternative, the German model, de-emphasized the role of the government as a 
macroeconomic agent. Instead, the intellectual leaders of the ordo-liberal school 
around Eucken, Müller-Armack and - on the political side - Ludwig Erhard, 
dominated early post-war economic thinking in Germany and envisaged a return to 
the competitive ideal of the nineteenth century, though tempered by the provision 
of social support for those less favored by the market processes. To prevent a 
repeat of interwar disasters attributed to the erosion of competition, the 
government was to assume a new function as guarantor of competitive market 
structures. Yet it would shun demand stabilization and direct investment planning, 
limiting its activities to the provision of a stable environment facilitating private 
long-term decisionmaking. ... The ordo-liberals welcomed free trade as an
50 Milward, The Reconstruction, p.426.
H. Moller, “The Reconstruction o f the International Economic Order After the Second World War and the 
Integration o f the Federal Republic o f Germany into the World Economy”, in Zeitschrift fur die gesamte 
Staatswissenschqft, 1981, p.361.
Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, p. 123.
Biihrer, “Erzwungene oder freiwillige Liberalisienmg?”, pp. 156-162 and Kaplan and Schleiminger, 
The European Payments Union, chapter 6.
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additional source of competitive pressures for domestic producers and for the same 
reasons rejected restrictions on current account convertibility/^
Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard played a crucial role in the adoption and
maintenance of a liberal economic policy after World War II/^ While most economic
factions in Germany soon agreed that the only way to economic prosperity was free
competition and trade, it was Erhard’s zeal that drove forward Germany’s rapid progress
towards that state. When the German balance of payments crisis of 1950/1 was at its
worst, Erhard still stubbornly resisted pressure exerted by Chancellor Adenauer, Finance
Minister Schaffer and even the Allies to restore price controls: “as a notorious optimist,
Erhard stuck to his predictions that the adjustment flexibility of the market economy was
great enough to cope with the problem in due course”.^  ^Erhard was instrumental in the
passing of an anti-cartel law which was an important signal to German business and to the
rest of the world that Germany would not fall back into the price-distorting and inefficient
prewar system of monopolies, price controls and protectionism.^^ The liberalization of
imports was one of Erhard’s instruments with which he sought to achieve price stability
and force German producers to become more competitive.^^ It was under Erhard’s
Wolf, “Post-War Germany”, p.329. Similarly, Carlin claimed that the German model o f the social 
market economy “stood in sharp contrast to the ‘post-war settlement’ in the UK. The UK’s post-war 
settlement is often taken to include interventionist macroeconomic policy associated with a commitment 
to full employment; the build-up o f the welfare state; the use o f 'non-market techniques' such as 
nationalization to deal with market failures and government agreement with the trade unions to secure 
wage restraint in exchange for the continuation o f trade union ‘privileges’ on the shop floor regarding the 
organization of work”. W. Carlin, West German Growth and Institutions, 1945-1990, Centre for 
Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper Series No. 896, January 1994, p.31.
Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p.52, Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, pp.328-366, Giersch, 
Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, D. Koerfer. Kam pf ums Kanzleramt - Erhard und Adenauer, 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1987, and D. Koerfer, “Wirtschaftspolitische Kontroversen zwischen 
Konrad Adenauer und Ludwig Erhard (1956-1963)”, in Hans Pohl (ed.), Adenauers Verhaltnis zu 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschqft, Rhondorfer Gesprache Band 12, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, 
Bouvier Verlag, 1992, and U. Lappenkiiper, “‘Ich bin wirklich ein guter Europaer’ - Ludwig Erhards 
Europapolitik 1949-1966”, in Francia, Vol. 18, N o .3 ,1991.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, p. 17.
For an account o f the discussions surrounding Erhard’s role in the passing o f  an anti-cartel law, see 
"Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, pp.326-338.
58 Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, p.XV.
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economic reign that Germany unilaterally reduced tariffs to cut the level of effective tariff- 
protection from 19.6 per cent to 10.6 per cent.^^
The external economic policy of the first Economics Minister of the Federal 
Republic focused on the restoration of the liberal global economic order as it existed 
before World War Convertibility formed an integral part of this plan. Thus, Erhard 
wrote:
The spirit of liberalization and the sterility of currency control are like fire and 
water. Currency control of any kind symbolizes everything that is bad for man....In 
my view only the free convertibility of currencies can form a sane basis for a truly 
functioning free world market...The all-embracing function of convertible 
currencies can never be replaced in as complete a fashion by other measures.^ ^
Already in June 1953 Der Spiegel stated that, “Er [Erhard] würde mit der D-Mark den
Kopfsprung in die Konvertierbarkeit lieber heute als morgen wagen”.^  ^Erhard’s sense of
urgency with regard to DM convertibility contrasted sharply with the cautious stance of
the Finance Ministry on payments liberalization.^^ Comparing the enthusiasm of the
German Economics Minister for rapid convertibility with his counterparts in other
European countries the German news magazine wrote that “[wjahrend Ludwig Erhard
schon in der Badehose auf dem Spnmgterm seine Muskeln spielen laBt, stehen die anderen
hochzittemd um den groBen Wahrungsteich herum”.^
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, p .l 11 and Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p.355.
^  H. J. Kiisters, “Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik 1949-1958”, in 
Herbst, Biihrer and Sowade (eds.), Vom Marshallplan, p.350.
L. Erhard, Prosperity through Competition: The Economics o f  the German Miracle, third and revised 
edition, Thames and Hudson, 1962, pp.239 & 241.
Der Spiegel, “Goldwahrung: In einer andem Welt wieder”, No.24, June 10, 1953, p.20.
‘For him the plunge o f  the DM into convertibility cannot happen soon enough’.
After Germany had regained sovereignty over its international monetary policy, the Finance Ministry, 
the Economics Ministry and the German central bank, battled for the authority over Germany’s payments 
liberalization. This battle is discussed in Appendix A.
^  ibid., p.21
‘while Ludwig Erhard is already on the springboard in his swimming trunks flexing his muscles, the others 
are standing around the currency pool shivering’.
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The rapid progress in Germany towards de facto convertibility and towards 
resident convertibility proves the positive stance on convertibility. In Germany, contrary to 
Britain, progress towards non-resident convertibility was continuously matched by 
progress towards resident convertibility.^^ By 1954, it was clear that when the Germans 
spoke of establishing convertibility, they meant “a great deal more than Mr. Butler aims at 
for sterling”.^  ^From 1953 onwards, Germany rapidly increased travel allowances so that 
by mid-1954 the allowance was “so high that it is beyond the means of any but the richest 
man to spend it on pleasure”.^  ^From October 15, 1956, German travelers could exchange 
and take into or out of Germany any amount of German or foreign means of payment.^^ In 
contrast, France and Britain restricted travel allowances and the import and export of 
banknotes and coins beyond the officiai establishment of convertibility. In May and June 
1956, the German government undertook a number of steps to relax exchange control for 
residents. Among other things, exporters were freed from the obligation to surrender 
foreign exchange receipts. They were allowed to keep the proceeds of their sales 
indefinitely in accounts abroad. In addition, residents were allowed to purchase foreign 
securities dealt in on foreign stock exchanges and the import of gold was liberalized.^^ The 
Banker commented that “[t]he combined effect of these measures will be to grant virtually 
complete convertibility to the German resident.”^^  In contrast, in Britain, as in most other 
European countries, resident convertibility was nothing but “a distant and hazy
BA B102-55340, “Auszugsweise Übersetzung aus Foreign Report vom 18.2.1954 - Die D-Mark geht in 
Fiihnmg”, February 18,1954.
^  The Economist, “Five Minutes After Britain”, June 19, 1954, p.962.
The Economist, “German Travel Shows the Way”, June 5, 1954, p.790. See also the IMF’s Annual 
Reports on Exchange Restrictions and BIS annual reports.
IMF, Eighth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, p. 148.
IMF, Eighth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, p. 145 and Bank Deutscher Lander, 
Geschafisbericht fur das Jahr 1956, pp. 110-111.
The Banker, “Sterling Now”, Vol.CVI, June 56, pp.331-336. For a similar comment see also The 
Economist, “Convertible D-Mark”, May 19, 1956, p.717.
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prospect"/^ Overall, The Economist remarked that Germany began to remove exchange 
control long before their EPU surpluses made it safe for it to do so and concluded that 
“[t]he spirit of ‘convertibility’ and free trade in a new Europe has been shown by the 
Germans in a number of ways that might well be copied by the British”/^
The strong export orientation of the German economy, which was consolidated but 
not created by the Allies, nipped in the bud any latent opposition to convertibility that 
might have existed/^ The unique ‘conditioning’ by the Allies combined with West 
Germany’s export orientation - the two of which cannot be easily separated - and the 
FRG’s decision in favor of the market economy forged a strong consensus on the pursuit 
of a rapid establishment of currency convertibility. Convertibility, as a principle, was not 
questioned as it was in Britain. In the press, in 1953, Der Spiegel condemned exchange 
control as a serious impediment to the expansion of trade and thus economic welfare and 
argued for the quickest possible re-establishment of currency convertibilitySimilarly, 
the national weekly German magazine, Der Volkswirt wrote in January 1959, in response 
to the collective establishment of currency convertibility, that exchange control violated 
the principles of a market economy. Exchange restrictions could therefore only exist as 
emergency laws which by definition could be no more than temporary aberrations of the 
norm, with the establishment of currency convertibility simply represented a return to the 
norm. The paper described the gradual establishment of convertibility as the path from the 
general prohibition to the normal state of things (“...[der] Weg vom allgemeinen Verbot
The Economist, “How Convertible is Sterling?”, July 17, 1954, p.211.
The Economist, “German Travel shows the Way”, June 5, 1954, p.790.
Germany was traditionally a very trade-dependent country. Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, p.27. 
Der Spiegel, “Goldwahrung; In einer andem Welt wieder”, No.24, June 10, 1953, pp. 15-19.
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zum Normalzustand”)7^ Indicative of the general tone of the article, the title, “Trotz 
Konvertibilitat noch Devisenbewirtschaftungs-Reste”, rather than praise the events of 
December 1958 as an extraordinary achievement, criticized the Bundesbank and the 
Economics Ministry for still hesitating to take the final steps in removing all exchange 
control and fully restoring the German currency to the ‘normal state of affairs’
The widespread consensus in Germany on price stability and export-led growth as 
the keys to German recovery and prosperity produced economic conditions which were 
highly favorable to the establishment of convertibility. A widespread concern with 
inflation found its expression in an independent central bank whose principal function was 
to maintain price stability and in wage restraint.^^ The statutory independence of the 
German central bank and its clear commitment to price stability assured the credibility of 
continued DM strength. According to Bordo and Jonung, the establishment of an 
independent central bank whose sole responsibility is to maintain price stability is one way 
to anchor inflationary expectations: “One method to create strong credibility for the 
purchasing power of the currency is to take the money supply out of the control of the 
political system”.^ * Several studies on the link between central bank independence and 
price inflation find that “lower average inflation is associated with higher central bank 
independence”.^  ^The German case seems to fit this rule. The primary policy goal of the
Der Volkswirt, “Trotz Konvertibilitat noch Devisenbewirtschaftungs-Reste”, No.7, February 14, 1959, 
p.273.
ibid.
The German press repeatedly appealed to the unions to exercise wage restraint by warning that high 
wage claims would set o ff an inflationary spiral. Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, p. 12.
Bordo and Jonung, Monetary Regimes, p. 10.
M. D. Bordo and B. Eschweiler, Rules, Discretion, and Central Bank Independence: The German 
Experience 1880-1989, Working Paper No. 4547, Working Paper Series, National Bureau o f Economic 
Research, Cambridge, MA, November 1993, p.30. For a comparative anlysis o f the importance o f central 
bank independence, see J. B. Goodman, “Monetary Policies in France, Italy, and Germany: 1973-1985”, 
in Guerrieri and Padoan, (eds.). The Political Economy, pp. 171-201.
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German central bank was, and still is, the safeguarding of the value of the DM. In order to 
achieve this goal the Bank deutscher Lander and later the Bundesbank “can and has 
pursued its own policies, at times against the wishes of Bonn”.^  ^Contrary to Britain and 
France, where the independence of the central banks was severely restricted after World 
War II, the statutory independence of the German central bank guaranteed price stability in 
the present and in the foreseeable future, thus affecting people’s price expectations and 
their own pricing decisions. Wages which increased at a markedly slower pace than 
productivity, reinforced price stability and ensured continued competitive advantages vis- 
à-vis other countries where the wage-productivity ratio was not as favorable. Due to the 
vivid memory of Germany’s devastating experiences with inflation, “an aggressive stance 
in wage policy, which would have run the risk of spurring a wage-price spiral, was not 
very popular among the rank and file, and union leaders could not simply disregard this 
mood”.*'
Wage increases which were offset by productivity increases, high private savings 
and, firom 1957 onwards, falling raw material costs and compression of profits reinforced 
price stability and were conducive to Germany’s international competitiveness.*^ 
According to Wolf, between 1948 and 1960, German producer wages increased by 53 per 
cent whereas productivity increased by 88 per cent. For Britain the corresponding figures 
are 22 per cent and 30 per cent.*  ^The price competitiveness of German goods is illustrated
Hennings, “West Germany”, p.475.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, p. 13.
OEEC, Economic Conditions in the Federal Republic o f  Germany 1958, p.5. According to Carlin, the 
combination o f "very long periods o f fixed exchange rates" and wage restraint maintained the German 
competitiveness which in turn secured export growth until 1969. Strong export growth made it 
unnecessary for German policy makers to stimulate the economy since it enabled the continued 
maintenance o f high capacity utilization when domestic demand flagged. Carlin, “West German 
Growth”, p. 17.
Wolf, “Post-War Germany”, p.333. Scammell wrote in 1961 that, “[t]he real strength o f the German 
surplus is the very strong competitive position the Germans have secured for themselves in export 
markets, - a position based upon the importance conceded to the export drive in the past by German
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in the development of export prices which, between 1953 and 1957, grew at a slower rate 
than those of France, Britain or the US and than the OEEC average (table III.6).
Table III.6: Development of export prices
Area Export prices in 1957
1950=100 1953 = 100
AU OEEC 127 105
United Kingdom 131 110
West Germany 127 103
United States 122 107
France 131 107
Source: reproduced from Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.362, footnote.
Liberalization of imports kept prices down. Cheaper imports forced domestic producers to 
become more competitive, while cheaper raw material imports kept production costs 
down, further enhancing the competitiveness of German manufacturing exports. Both of 
these effects were an important motivation for trade liberalization. Similarly, the decontrol 
of large sectors of the economy was conducive to efficiency and competitiveness. While 
the currency reform of 1948 had led to the elimination of the monetary overhang, 
economic policy and industrial organization ensured a strong currency and kept German 
goods competitive. "^* Table 2 in chapter I showed that Germany’s inflation was 
consistently below the European average. The 1950s marked a decade of continuous and 
growing German trade surpluses, with the exception of the 1955 trade surplus which 
remained below that of the previous year.^  ^ In fact, since 1951 Germany’s trade balance 
has remained positive until the present day.^  ^ Similarly, Germany’s current account 
balance exhibited continuous, albeit stagnant, surpluses between 1951 and 1960.^  ^ With
industrialists, the competitive prices at which goods have been offered, the short and well-honoured 
delivery dates for capital goods and the attention given to selling and marketing techniques.” Scammell, 
International Monetary Policy, pp.361-362.
^  For a comparison of wage inflation and price stability see chapter II.
OECD, Statistics o f the Balance o f  Payments, 1950-1961.
Owen Smith, The German Economy, p.501.
OECD, Statistics o f the Balance o f  Payments, 1950-I96I. According to Scammell, since the invisible
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the exception of 1959, deficits on the capital account never even came close to offsetting 
the current account surplus. As a result, between 1951 and 1960 Germany amassed a 
considerable amount of gold and foreign exchange.
In addition to economic policy, fortunate circumstances reinforced the strength of 
the DM. According to Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, wage restraint can partially be 
attributed to the fact that “most professional observers underestimated quite considerably 
the potential for productivity growth”.^  ^ Moreover, the huge and constant inflow of 
refugees from Eastern Europe, constituted a constant supply shock to the labor market, 
preventing wages fi*om rising more rapidly.Second, dollar earnings firom US troops 
stationed in Germany provided a guaranteed source of reserves earnings. These dollar 
earnings contributed significantly to the consolidation of Germany’s foreign exchange 
reserves: “Jeder Soldat, der ein deutsches Auto kaufte oder in Berchtesgaden seinen 
Urlaub verbrachte, starkte die deutschen Wahrungsreserven.” ®^ These earnings were 
certain and largely independent of economic fluctuations. Already in 1953, a Bank of 
England official identified dollar payments by US troops in Germany as an “artificial” 
boost for the confidence of the DM, hinting perhaps at what he considered an unfair 
advantage of the DM over sterling in the fight for currency stability Between 1954 and 
1958, these dollar earnings made up roughly between 10 per cent and 12 per cent of the
balance was relatively small, the merchandise trade surpluses were the determinating item in Germany’s 
current account surpluses. Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.361.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, “Openness”, pp. 13 & 21.
An analysis o f the effect o f the constant inflow o f  refugees on the German economy can be found in 
Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp.95-98.
G. Stolper, K. Hauser and K. Borchardt, Deutsche Wirtschaft seit 1870, J. C. B. Mohr, 1964, p.281. 
'Every soldier who bought a German car or spent his vacation in Berchtesgaden strengthened German 
foreign exchange reserves.'
BoE OV 34/39, L. A. Martin (Overseas and Foreign Office) to Tansley, “Germany and Convertibility”, 
October 6, 1953.
Similarly, in April 1954, a Bank official listed the expenditure o f  US armed forces in Germany as a 
significant contributor to the large increases in German gold and dollar holdings. BoE OV 34/39, 
“Germany: Visit to Frankfurt, Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf and Hamburg 10th-20th March 1954”, April 7, 
1954.
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FRG’s annual total gold and convertible foreign exchange assets.^  ^They were more than 
sufficient to offset Germany's trade deficit vis-à-vis the dollar area. The guarantee of a 
certain inflow of US dollars into Germany, independent of cyclical fluctuations and 
economic conditions, contributed to the continued strength of the DM.
A third fortunate circumstance consolidating the strength of the DM related to 
Germany’s external liabilities. The debts owed by Germany after the war presented the 
only potential threat to Germany’s otherwise solid currency. The generous terms of the 
London Debt Agreement, ratified in 1953, which cut external indebtedness by 50 per cerit, 
and the obstacles to a renegotiation of this settlement, however, ensured that the 
repayment of the outstanding debts never endangered the stability of the DM.^  ^ In 
addition, by clarifying the size and status of Germany’s external liabilities and by 
presenting a schedule for their repayment, the Agreement removed uncertainty regarding 
Germany's debts, that is, when how much would have to be repaid, which in itself 
increased confidence in the DM.^  ^ The settlement of Germany’s external debts was a 
fortunate circumstance which was exogenous to German policymaking. One might argue, 
however, that the favorable settlement of German debts was partially the result of the 
German economic policy. Germany’s demonstration of its willingness to be a good citizen 
of Europe, by cooperating with the USA and the EPU Managing Board during the balance 
of payments crisis and by liberalizing trade at a faster rate than demanded, persuaded the 
Allies to be lenient in the debt negotiations. In any case, the Agreement ensured a steady, 
and thus predictable, manageable annual repayment of Germany’s external debts and
^  The percentage is obtained by dividing dollar earnings listed in monthly reports o f the Bundesbank, 
converted into US dollars at DM4.20 = 1.00 US$, by reserve figures from IMF International Financial 
Statistics.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, p .l 13.
G. Gutmann, H.-J. Hochstrate and R. Schliiter, Die Wirtschafisverfassung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland: Entwicklung und ordnungspolitische Grundlagen, Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1964, p.256.
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compensation payments. In contrast, Britain’s significant extemal debts, the sterling 
overhang accumulated during World War II, were not settled in a similar way, posing a 
relatively greater instability risk to Britain's reserves and its currency through the danger 
of large, sudden, conversion demands by foreign creditors.
The fortunate circumstances consolidated a favorable extemal economic situation 
and solidified an economic policy which allowed Germany to move rapidly and safely 
towards de facto convertibility. Germany’s policy on convertibility was characterized by 
the rapid removal of exchange control on current as well as most capital account 
transactions and on non-resident as well as resident convertibility, on the one hand, and 
the public commitment not to establish official convertibility before the rest of Europe on 
the other hand. The decision to wait for Britain, and the rest of Europe to undertake the 
official move is not explained by lack of soundness of German economic position or by an 
aversion to convertibility. Instead, the decision to postpone official convertibility even 
when it was a mere formality for the DM can be ascribed to several factors. A unilateral 
German move to convertibility would have fundamentally dismpted the functioning of the 
EPU. As has been shown in the first section of this chapter, Germany did not want to 
undermine the cohesion of a regional payments mechanism which ensured the access to 
Germany’s largest export, and import, market. As far as German trade interests were 
concerned, the convertibility of other currencies was at least as important as DM 
convertibility. The risk with officially making the DM a hard currency was that this might 
allow other countries to justify the reimposition of trade discrimination against German 
goods. If DM convertibility had been established unilaterally and at the expense of other 
countries’ trade and payments liberalization, it would have defeated its fundamental 
purpose. By giving the UK the promise to move only upon British lead, Germany sought
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to prevent Britain rushing into convertibility simply to pre-empt German action. Such a 
defensive move to convertibility might be accompanied by the reimposition of 
discrimination against German goods not only in Britain but throughout the sterling area. 
Contrary to Britain, a unilateral move to official convertibility ahead of the rest of Europe 
offered no advantage to Germany.
This thesis does not claim that the first post-war decade in Germany was 
characterized by total harmony and consensus on economic policy. The important point 
made here is that, contrary to Britain, there was a general agreement that the interwar 
experience with hyperinflation should be avoided. This agreement, combined with a 
strong support for the liberalization of trade and payments and export-led growth as the 
way to reconstruction and prosperity, ensured that convertibility was not the 
controversial issue in Germany that it was in Britain.
In addition to the general economic policy orientation which was conducive to 
the establishment of convertibility, the Komai preconditions for viable convertibility 
were fulfilled by the early 1950s.^  ^Monetary overhangs were removed by the currency 
reform as early as 1948, foreign reserves were abundant in relation to foreign debts and 
import needs, the exchange rate did not threaten balance of payments surpluses and wage 
increases, both monetary and in relation to productivity, were very moderate. German 
goods were highly competitive, and the currency was strong, especially compared to the 
pound.
In spite of these favorable conditions, German policymakers never seriously 
considered a unilateral move to convertibility or taking the official lead in convertibility
See chapter I.
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in Europe. In addition to trade dependence and the fear of discrimination, several other 
factors ensured that in Germany DM convertibility was only envisaged as a collective
move.
THE CONSENSUS ON A COLLECTIVE MOVE
S o v e r e ig n t y  a n d  n o r m a l it y
The Allies’ occupation of Germany after World War II clearly distinguishes 
Germany’s path to convertibility fi*om that of France and Britain, at least in the early 
stages. The laws No.52 and No.53 decreed by the military government categorically 
prohibited all commercial and financial transaction between German residents and non­
residents, except for specifically permitted transactions. The power of the Allied High 
Command to devolve economic sovereignty gradually to Germany when it saw fit, 
implied an important leverage of the Allied powers over Germany’s economic policy. Had 
German economic policy conflicted with what the Allies had in mind for Germany’s 
economy, it is possible that Germany would have had to wait longer to obtain sovereignty. 
For example, a decision in favor of an economic policy orientation which was 
protectionist and strongly based on economic planning, as was suggested by many Social 
Democrats after 1945 when the foundation for Germany’s economic model was 
hammered out, might have caused the Western Allies to wait. If anything, the liberal 
economic policy orientation of the first Economics Minister of the Federal Republic, 
Ludwig Erhard, and his reputation as “opponent of socialization, planning and cheap 
money” persuaded the Allies to hand over sovereignty relatively early
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p. 157. See also p. 151,
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Although the FRG officially gained sovereignty over its currency 
(‘Devisenhoheit’) in 1952 and sovereignty in most other respects by 1955, the FRG was 
still a young state burdened with a very difficult national past. Even after the restoration 
of sovereignty, Germany struggled for acceptance and for its full reintegration as an 
equal state in the international community. For Germany, the establishment of 
convertibility signified above all the removal of an abnormal and therefore undesirable 
condition. On the one hand, convertibility enabled the restoration of normality of 
payments in the international economic system. But on the other hand, Germany saw 
convertibility as an event that would bring it closer to political normalization and 
reintegration into the international system of nation-states. Thus, Germany’s push for 
currency equality and normality was simultaneously a reflection of and an instrument 
for its quest for political normalization and re-establishment as a sovereign and equal 
nation-state. Joint leadership in convertibility with the UK and France must be analyzed 
in this light.
The relevance attributed to convertibility by the FRG exceeded the monetary or 
even economic realm. In restoring the DM to a ‘normal’ state (‘Normalzustand’), 
convertibility was also expected to contribute to the restoration of the German state to 
normality. At the top of the political agenda of the emerging Federal Republic of Germany 
stood the integration into the international community of nation states as an equal, 
‘normal’ state Germany’s desire for and pursuit of political normality through 
economic policy is reflected in its early trade policy. As Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding 
point out that “[t]he most remarkable features of West Germany’s trade policy in the first
see Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, p.50.
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years after the country had come into being in late 1949 was that it tried to behave almost
exactly like everybody else”.^  ^Economic cooperation offered an important opportunity for
Germany to demonstrate to Western Europe a sense of collectivity, responsibility and
goodwill. At the same time, other countries allowing or even inviting Germany to
participate in collective international actions or institutions proved to Germany that its
efforts were paying off, and that it was on its way to what Hanrieder calls “political
recovery”, that is, “the right to have a foreign policy and the return of a democratic
Germany to the society of free nations” The closer Germany moved towards currency
convertibility the further it distanced itself from the era of exchange control, a period
which coincided roughly with Hitler’s reign in Germany, and which the new Republic was
anxious to put behind it. The creation of the DM itself in 1948, together with the currency
reform, symbolized a new beginning, a departure from the old misguided ways and the
birth of a new era. For many the reform marked a new beginning for the German state and
a step towards normality.
Für die meisten Zeitgenossen stand weder der Tag der Verkundung des 
Grundgesetzes am 23. Mai 1949 noch die Konstituierung des Bonner Parlaments 
am 7. September 1949 fur den entscheidenden Neubeginn in Staat und Wirtschaft, 
sondem eben der 20. Juni 1948 [the date of the currency reform]...
Jede Reform, die das überkommene Erbe der Kriegswirtschaft iiberwinden wollte, 
muBte mit einer Reform der Wahrung beginnen. Für die neoliberale 
Wirtschaftsrerform Erhards gait dies besonders, vertraute er doch weitgehend auf 
den Wettbewerbsmechanismus des Marktes, der dem Geld eine wichtige Funktion 
bei der Steuerung der wirtschaftlichen Prozesse zumiBt.*°®
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, p. 108.
^  Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, p.50.
Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte, pp.51&52.
‘Any reform that wanted to overcome the legacy o f the war economy had to start with the 
reform o f the currency. This was especially the case for Erhard’s neoliberal economic reform, 
since he relied mainly on the competition mechanism o f the market, which attributes to money 
an important role in the steering o f the economic processes...
For most contemporaries the decisive new beginning in state and economy was embodied 
neither in the day o f the proclamation o f the basic law on May 23, 1949 nor in the establishment 
o f parliament in Bonn on September 7, 1949, but rather in the events o f June 20, 1948.’
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As the economic miracle unfolded, the DM became inextricably associated with 
Germany’s new prosperity but also with the new image the Republic sought to convey. 
The celebrations of the DM’s tenth birthday, in 1958, were fit for a king.^ ^  ^The DM was 
venerated as the symbol of a new and prosperous beginning and a break with the past. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that policymakers saw in monetary cooperation and in the 
‘normalization’ of the DM a side entrance to political ‘normalization’. An earlier example 
of the pursuit of political ‘normalization’ through economic ‘normalization’ is the 
admission of the FRG to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). 
This was regarded as the “first step towards the rehabilitation of the country on an 
international l e v e l " .T h e  first international act of the government of the Federal 
Republic, the Treaty for the European Recovery Program (ERF) signed with the United 
States in 1949 was an economic act. °^  ^Buchheim asserted that the establishment of non­
resident current account convertibility marks the completion of the process of the FRG’s 
reintegration into the world economy, since the FRG belonged to the leading group of 
countries involved in the move.^^ Through participation in the collective return to 
currency convertibility West Germany thus worked towards its goal of normalization and 
reintegration into Europe and the world. The desire for reintegration into the world 
economy and for a normalization of its economic and political international status, 
together with the recognition that convertibility represented a crucial step in that direction, 
united the major West German economic and political institutions in this common goal. 
The faith in the DM and the desire to leave behind exchange control and the regime that
The occasion was even “considered worthy o f commemoration by postage stamp”. The Economist, “The 
D-Mark's Tenth Birthday”, June 21, 1958, pp. 1090-1091.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, p.96.
Gutmann, Hochstrate and Schliiter, Die Wirtschafisverfassung, p.244.
Buchheim, Die Wiedereingliederung, p. 170.
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was associated with it, made convertibility an uncontroversial policy.
C o n v e r t ib il it y  a n d  e c o n o m ic  in t e g r a t io n
Among German economic and political factions, trade was largely regarded as one 
of the foundation stones of Germany’s economic success. Currency convertibility was 
generally accepted as a necessary pre-condition for the flourishing of German trade. Thus, 
policy on convertibility was not encumbered by the policy dilemmas that affected UK 
policy. However, there was room for debate on the direction of trade to be envisaged for 
Germany and convertibility played a role in determining this fundamental policy choice 
for Germany’s trade.
The controversy within the FRG on trade direction revolved around the question of 
European economic integration and Germany’s role in it. As in France and Britain, 
German economic and political factions were divided over what was the appropriate 
geographic and economic forum for integration. In all three countries, European economic 
integration raised political issues that were at least as important and contentious as the 
economic issues, and both influenced the choice of timing and cooperation in the return to 
currency convertibility in December 1958.
Starting with the plans for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) a strong 
opposition to Germany’s membership in a European customs union developed that 
transcended party lines and posed a serious challenge to party cohesion. The most 
prominent, and the most vehement, opposition to the EEC within the CDU came from 
Ludwig Erhard, the first Economics Minister of the Federal Republic and later Chancellor.
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, pp.341-349.
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A ‘weltoffene Handelspolitik’ formed one of the pillars of Erhard's economic policy/ 
The trade order he envisaged did not include tying West Germany into a framework of 
economic discrimination by a small group of countries against the rest of the world. On 
the contrary, Erhard feared that as a member of the EEC, the FRG might not be able to 
trade as freely with other parts of the world as it could otherwise.
Erhard was convinced that a supranational Common Market, especially in its then 
envisaged limited geographic form, threatened to cut off Germany’s trade with countries 
outside the Common Market. The European Economic Community (EEC) of the Six 
excluded such important trading partners as the Scandinavian countries, Austria, 
Switzerland and the UK. Table III.7 compares Germany’s exports to what would later 
become the EEC countries with its exports to its most important other European trading 
partners which would be excluded by the EEC. Together the latter countries made up 
between 26 per cent and 29 per cent of Germany’s total exports between 1950 and 1958. 
Throughout the period, the volume of exports to the UK, Scandinavia, Austria and 
Switzerland roughly equaled the exports to Germany’s EEC trading partners.
R. Neebe, “Optionen westdeutscher Aufienwirtschaftspolitik 1949-1953”, in Herbst, Biihrer, and 
Sowade, (eds.), Vom Marshallplan, pp. 192-193. For an in-depth analysis o f Erhard’s views on European 
integration and the conflict between Erhard and Adenauer see Lappenküper, “Tch bin wirklich ein guter 
Europâer’”.
‘world open trade policy’.
Küsters, “Der Streit”, p.350.
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Table III.7; Trade direction: German exports to EEC and selected non-EEC
European trading partners
Belgium 
Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands France, 
Italy
UK, Scandinavia*, 
Austria, Switzerland
1950 732 512
1951 1024 960
1952 1139 1155
1953 1314 1188
1954 1533 1470
1955 1768 1712
1956 2169 1990
1957 2503 2252
1958 2406 2336
million US dollars)
a: excludes Finland.
Source: calculated from OEEC Statistical Bulletins IV Series.
Erhard rejected a supranational organization that would divert trade from other
areas and, which he felt, threatened to drag the FRG into France’s web of protectionism.
He believed that a supranational institutional integration would expose Germany to French
‘contagious’ dirigisme which he despised. The European free trade area, proposed by the
British, presented, in Erhard’s eyes, the ideal solution. It envisaged not only an increase in
the geographical extent of trade liberalization, but also limited integration to trade
liberalization rather than extending it to institutional integration. As a free trade area it
would not shut out other trade areas since there would be no common external tariff. For
Erhard, the free trade area offered
eine Chance, den Gemeinsamen Markt einer supranationalen Sechser- 
Gemeinschafr in ein multilatérales Wirtschaftsabkommen überzuleiten, 
wegzukommen von der Frankreichorientierung und die Briten starker ins Spiel zu 
bringen.^ ®^
108 Küsters, “Der Streit”, p.360.
‘a chance to transform the Common Market o f a supranational community o f six into a 
multilateral economic agreement, to get away from the France orientation and to bring the 
British more into play’.
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Erhard warned against the politically and economically exclusive nature of the EEC, 
advocating that, if it had to happen, then at least “Britain be given membership in the 
EEC, and that her accession be made as easy and inviting as possible”.
Many important officials in the Economics Ministry prefenred a European free 
trade area to a Europe of the Six. The Advisory Council to the Economics Ministry shared 
Erhard’s skepticism of a Tittle Europe’. In 1953, the Advisory Council warned that the 
geographically limited European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) should be no more 
than an intermediate goal on the way to worldwide economic integration.*In March 
1958, Hans Gocht, an official from the Economics Ministry emphasized the urgency of 
Germany’s coming up with a proposal for a free trade area which was palatable both to 
France and the other OEEC members. He warned that a breakdown of the free trade area 
negotiations would end OEEC-wide European cooperation, leaving only cooperation 
within the EEC.*** In November 1958, Alfred Müller-Armack, also from the Economics 
Ministry, expressed disappointment at the failure of the Maudling negotiations for a free 
trade area, especially in light of the compatibility of British desires for a free trade area 
with the Germany Economics Ministry’s ideas of European integration.**  ^The Economics 
Minister and his Advisory Council were not alone in their opposition to the EEC. The 
SPD did not oppose integration on principle. However, it was not at all thrilled by “the 
prospect of a European union with strong Catholic conservative tendencies” which would 
exclude those countries whose social, political and economic leanings were closer to those
Hanrieder, fVest German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, Stanford, 1967, p.l65.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, “Vorbemerkungen zu den Gutachten 
des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium”, in Sammelband der Gutachten \on  
1948-1966, 3. Band: Gutachten vom Dezember 1952 bis November 1954, p.24.
BA B 102-12624, Gocht, “Versuch einer Wertung des franzosischen Memorandums über die 
Freihandelszone”, March 5, 1958.
BA B 102-11160, Müller-Armack to Erhard regarding FTA, the meeting o f the Maudling Committee 
October 22 to October 30, 1958, March 3 or 4,1958.
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of the SPD, that is. Great Britain and Scandinavia/ In 70 Jahre Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, a special commemorative edition on the tenth birthday of the Federal 
Republic, the press and information office of the government took particular care to stress 
the importance of the close partnership between Britain and Germany. It went on to state 
clearly that the founding of the EEC did not deflect from the plan to substitute it for a free 
trade area, which contained all eleven member states of the OEEC.*^  ^A European free 
trade area would avert the danger of the EEC’s, and thus Germany’s, isolation from the 
rest of the world. Regarding business and labor, Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding claim 
that, “...neither trade unions nor industry in general favored the ‘little Europe’ which 
finally materialized”.^ E rh a rd  kept calling for a less restrictive European economic 
association, and, according to Hanrieder, “there is considerable evidence that he was right 
when he said German economic interests were solidly behind him”.^ ^^
Among the important political and economic factions in West Germany, the only 
continuous and fervent support for European integration along the lines of the EEC came 
from Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG, and his close followers. Within the CDU, 
many were at least skeptical of the benefits of the geographical limitations and the 
supranational character of the integration pursued by Adenauer in his preoccupation with 
Franco-German cooperation. Noack claimed that, from the German side, the Common 
Market of the Six was only accepted because the Chancellor was willing and able to push 
through a solution that sacrificed economic interests to his political goals.'
Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, p. 100. See also Paterson, The SPD, p.52.
* Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 10 Jahre Bundesrepublik, Wiesbaden, 1959, p. 182. 
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, p. 121.
Hanrieder, West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963, p. 220.
P. Noack, Deutsche Aufienpolitik seit 1945, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1972, p.64,
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Opposition to a 'little Europe’ provided one of the motivations for Erhard to assure 
cooperation with Britain in the move to convertibility. The collective establishment of 
convertibility in cooperation with an important non-EEC member was a way of, 
symbolically, keeping a back door open to what he considered a truly 'weltoffene 
Handelspolitik’, that is, a liberal trade order that was not limited to the EEC. According to 
Nicholls, Erhard and his supporters “wanted the economic integration of the Western 
world as a whole, including Britain and the USA, and they wanted this to be achieved by 
lowering tariffs, establishing convertible currencies and breaking down other commercial 
barriers”.^
Erhard hoped to counter-balance the France-oriented penchant of Adenauer’s 
foreign policy with Anglo-German cooperation on convertibility. The frequent talks and 
negotiations between the British Treasury and the German Economics Ministry on 
convertibility and on the free trade area talks throughout the 1950s contrast with the 
striking dearth of records of any communication between officials from the German 
Economics Ministry and their French counterpart.^The meetings that did take place 
between France and Germany on the free trade negotiations tended to be between 
Adenauer and de Gaulle, and convertibility is unlikely to have been a major topic of 
conversation. In contrast, Erhard and his officials met frequently with British Treasury 
officials to discuss convertibility and European integration. The different preferences in 
the choice of negotiation partners between Adenauer and Erhard, reflect fundamental 
differences in the policy stance on European integration taken by the Chancellor as 
opposed to his Economics Mnister.*^® Erhard strongly criticized, as bluntly as politically
Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility, p.343.
See, for example, BA B102-11161 and BA B 102-12624, which contain records o f talks between the 
German Economics Ministry and Britain.
For a discussion o f the rift between Ludwig Erhard and Konrad Adenauer over European integration
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possible, Adenauer’s attachment to France, and the resulting Common Market of the Six. 
But aside from occasional vocal outbursts^ in  his opposition to the EEC and his 
propagation of a free trade area, Erhard’s hands were tied by the political undesirability of 
splitting the governing coalition over the issue and thus threatening its hold on power. The 
archives reveal frequent communications between the German Economics Ministry and 
the British Treasury in which the Germans voice their disagreement over French 
opposition to the free trade area and express their approval of British plans for wider 
European economic integration. Beyond these, in the end, empty promises of solidarity, 
and, given the political constraints of the time, Anglo-German cooperation on 
convertibility and the pursuit of an OEEC-wide establishment of convertibility, which 
transcended the EEC boundaries, presented a subtle, or perhaps helpless, way of 
undermining Adenauer’s European policy. The policy was subtle in that Adenauer is 
unlikely to have concerned himself with an issue which he must have considered merely 
technical and of a ‘low politics’ type. Throughout the 1950s, Adenauer and Erhard clashed 
over European integration, with Adenauer trying to assert his power in the realm of 
economic affairs. On several occasions, the power struggle led to near escalation and all 
out public confrontation. Similarly, Adenauer attempted to impose his will on the Bank 
deutscher Lander in the debate on the financing of Germany's rearmament in 1955/56.^^  ^
This conflict culminated in a statement by the BdL president Vocke in which he
and the EEC, see, for example, Koeifer, Kampf, and Koerfer, “Wirtschaftspolitische Kontroversen”, 
pp.33-45.
On one occasion, he went so far as to declare in front o f  members o f the press that the EEC in the form 
which it had been decided upon, might be necessary politically, but that it remained “ein 
volkswirtschaftlicher Unsinn” (‘an economic nonsense’). Quoted from Schwarz Die Àra Adenauer: 
Griinderjahre p.346.
see, for example, BA B102-11161, Werkmeister reports on Anglo-German and Franco-German 
negotiations. May 16,1957.
T. Horstmann, “Die Entstehung der Bank deutscher Lander als geldpolitische Lenkungsinstanz in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland”, in H. Riese and H.-P. Spahn (eds.), Geldpolitik und okonomische 
Entwicklung: ein Symposium, Transfer Verlag GmbH, 1990, p.217.
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questioned publicly Adenauer’s competence in the realm of economics, finance and 
currency matters. Regarding policy on exchange control and convertibility, however, 
Adenauer never seems to have tried actively to influence policy with the BMW or the 
BdL. Monthly reports to the Chancellor from the Economics Ministry prove that he was 
kept informed about the state of the progress towards convertibility. However, the archival 
fries on the move to convertibility in the Economics Ministry contain no evidence that he 
tried to affect policy decision regarding policy regarding convertibility. If Vocke’s 
assessment of Adenauer’s competence in currency matters is correct, then Adenauér 
simply did not realize the potential economic relevance of the seemingly technical and 
minor move to convertibility for European cooperation. He generally was uninterested in 
currency matters. According to a official who worked with him, he hardly knew the 
difference between devaluation and revaluation.
When the chances for a European free trade area dwindled in late 1958, the OEEC- 
wide establishment of convertibility offered one way of resisting the looming EEC 
strait)acket, as Erhard perceived it. In a book on Germany’s economic constitution written 
in 1964, Hans-Joachim Hochstrate, one of the authors, cautioned against the dangers of the 
co-existence of two separate trade organizations for European cooperation. He argued that 
the divisive potential of the co-existence of EEC and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), which was created in 1959 after the breakdown of the free trade area 
negotiations, was mitigated by currency convertibility and the general liberalization of 
trade, services and capital flows. Currency convertibility promoted pan-European
ibid.
See BA B 102-37571, “Monatliche Berichte der Referate V zur Unterrichtung des Kanzlers”, 1957-9. 
Comment by W. Langer in Pohl (ed.) Adenauers Verhaltnis, pp. 54-5.
A good history o f  the creation o f the EFTA is provided in Camps, Britain and the European
206
economic interdependence, which allowed for greater cooperation between all countries in 
Europe, but also between Western Europe and North America. Thus, currency 
convertibility came to have the extra advantage, and even became an imperative for, 
counterbalancing the centrifugal tendencies embodied in the rival existences of EEC and 
EFTA.
Like Erhard, the Advisory Council to the Economics Ministry saw convertibility 
as a means of preventing Germany from being trapped in the geographically limited 
ECSC, and later EEC and instead of furthering a more extensive economic integration. 
The Council expressed its belief that collective convertibility could pave the way to 
include all EPU members in a process of integration and trade liberalization.It 
emphasized the desirability and the importance of establishing convertibility jointly Avith 
all EPU members, as opposed to within the limited ECSC context.
By 1958, Germany’s currency was already largely de facto convertible, 
particularly within Europe. Thus, the events of December 1958 did not increase 
Germany’s openness and interdependence vis-à-vis the rest of Europe. However, the 
establishment of currency convertibility in 1958 increased the exchangeability of other 
European currencies. In doing so, it weakened the ability of the members of the EEC to 
isolate their economies from the rest of Europe. The collective establishment of 
convertibility by nearly all of Western Europe opened the economies of ‘Little Europe’ to 
the rest of Europe via foreign exchange markets.
Community, chapter VII.
Gutmann, Hochstrate and Schliiter, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung, p.272.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Beim Bundeswirtschaftsministerium, “Gutachten vom 11. Oktober 1953: 
Thema: Fragen des Gemeinsamen Marktes” in Sammelband der Gutachten von 1948-1966, 3. Band: 
Gutachten vom Dezember 1952 bis November 1954, pp.75-77.
See also Milward, The European Rescue, p.201.
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The strength of the DM would have allowed Germany to establish convertibility 
long before December 1958 without having to wait for other countries, including the UK, 
to join in a collective move. Instead, Erhard whose ministry decided on the issue for 
Germany chose to wait until the UK and the rest of Europe were ready to move to 
convertibility. Erhard was happy with the UK’s choice of timing in the move, among other 
things because the cooperation with the UK and the timing were both compatible with his 
vision for European integration. The economic and political factions within the FRG that 
opposed the restrictive EEC policy of Konrad Adenauer wanted to wait until the pound 
was ready to lead the collective move to convertibility. A collective move that extended 
beyond the EEC, and, in particular, included the UK was hoped to offset, at least partially, 
the EEC bias of the FRG, especially when it became clear that a free trade area was going 
to be boycotted by the French. Opposition also explains Germany’s approval of the timing 
of the move to coincide with the beginning of the EEC.
G e r m a n  s u r p l u s e s  a n d  e c o n o m ic  a d j u s t m e n t
In addition to political and trade considerations, monetary considerations mitigated 
against a unilateral official move to convertibility before the rest of Europe, and, in 
particular, Britain. An international key currency status for the DM was not one of 
Germany’s economic priorities in the 1950. In contrast to Britain, Germany had no desire 
to strengthen the DM through leadership in the European return to currency convertibility. 
On the contrary, as pressure on the DM progressively increased in the 1950s, 
policymakers sought to downplay the strength of its currency. A unilateral move would 
have only increased the international focus on the strength of the DM, further increasing
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the pressure to revalue.
Under a fixed exchange rate system, exchange rates are not free to move according 
to demand and supply conditions. Therefore, changes in currency strength are difficult 
to measure. The problem is exacerbated when foreign exchange markets are restrained by 
extensive exchange control regulations, preventing people from buying and selling 
currencies freely. The existence of parallel or unofficial markets for foreign exchange, 
emerging due to the limited convertibility of the official currency, might provide greater 
insight into market conditions, especially where these markets are removed from the reach 
of government or central bank intervention. The free exchange market for banknotes in 
Zurich quoted an exchange rate for German DM, pound sterling and French firanc, among 
others. Although some intervention in the market for banknotes is also likely to have taken 
place, the extent and the effectiveness with which UK, German and other monetary 
authorities controlled movements in the rate for banknotes remained much smaller than for 
any of the other types of sterling, DM, etc.^ ^^  According to the IMF and the Bank for 
International Settlements, the exchange rate for banknotes was a good indicator for
According to orthodox balance o f payments theory, under a fixed exchange rate regime, internal 
economic adjustments, through changes in prices and consumption, ensure that demand and supply are in 
equilibrium at the fixed currency price.
In the case of sterling, for example, the Exchange Equalization Account (EEA) intervened in the foreign 
exchange markets in New York and Zurich to ensure that the official rate for sterling remained within 0.75 
per cent either side o f the parity o f sterling. From 1955 onwards, the EEA also intervened in the market for 
transferable sterling to ensure that the transferable rate stayed within one per cent either side o f the official 
exchange rate. Thus, official intervention prevented both the official, and, from 1955, the transferable rate 
for sterling from reflecting changes in demand and supply conditions for sterling. Security sterling 
comprised non-resident sterling accounts for capital transactions in the UK. The rate for security sterling 
reflected movements in a type o f sterling which remained very limited in its use and volume. In addition, the 
demand for security sterling was strongly affected by changes in regulations o f  capital flows and in 
investment climate in the UK. UK authorities could control relatively effectively both the use and volume of  
security sterling. All of these characteristics o f security sterling render it inappropriate for an assessment o f  
sterling’s relative strength or weakness. Of all the different exchange rates for sterling, the exchange rate for 
sterling bank notes offers the best indication o f changes in sterling's position in foreign exchange markets.
In a public statement in November 1953, in connection with a court trial, the BdL declared that it had 
not intervened in the foreign exchange market in Zurich to support the exchange rate for DM banknotes. 
BBA B330-02050, Dr. von der Lippe (BdL) to F. O. Weber, chief editor o f the Mannheimer Morgen, 
November, 26, 1953.
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strength, or weakness, of an otherwise not freely traded currency in the 1950s, since 
fluctuations in the rates for banknotes reflected changes in confidence in currencies/The 
market in Zurich for banknotes consisted largely of notes which “have been smuggled out 
of their countries of origin and must be smuggled in again”/^^ The principal actors in the 
banknote market were banks that bought and sold currencies, which were largely obtained 
through tourist conversions. In addition, depending on national restrictions on the import 
and export of banknotes, individuals, other than tourists, bought and sold banknotes 
through Zurich.
Figure III.l shows the discounts of banknote rates of European currencies on their 
parities which were traded in Zurich. It compares the French jfranc, the DM and the 
pound with the Belgian franc, the Dutch florint, the Swedish krona and the Italian lira. The 
banknote rates for French firanc and pound sterling consistently exhibit both the largest 
discounts and the largest fluctuations in the discount on parity for both currencies. The 
performance of the banknote rate for French fianc, together with the two devaluations, 
reveal the franc as by far the weakest and most unstable of the European currencies 
examined here. Moreover, the graph fails to reflect the two devaluations of the official 
franc rate in August 1957 and December 1958. The DM exchange rate experienced a very 
different development in the same period. Starting from a very large discount on its 
official rate in December 1951, the DM rate exhibited a strong upward trend, implying a 
rapid reduction in the discount of the banknote rate on parity. From late 1953 onwards, the
IMF, Ninth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1958, p.8 and BIS, 23rd Annual Report April I, 
1952 to March 31, 1953, p.6. According to the Bank for International Settlements, in the 1950s, confidence 
in a currency could be measured “by the closeness o f ...free-market quotations to the official rates for bank­
notes”.
Bloomfield, Speculative, p.30.
The Austrian schilling and the Portuguese escudor were not included although bank notes in these 
currencies were traded, since there was no official rate (no consistent parity) for these listed in Zurich.
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discount never dropped below five per cent, with the DM rate for banknotes thus 
consistently remaining in the group of European currencies with the smallest discounts of 
banknote rates on their parities.
Figure III.l: Banknote rates in Zurich December 1951 - June 1959 (discount on parity)
12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 12 03 06 09 
51 52 52 52 52 53 53 53 53 54 54 54 54 55 55 55 55 56 56 56 56 57 57 57 57 58 58 58 58 59 59 59
0.0%
-5 .0% pound
DM-10.0%
-15.0%
FF
-20.0% skr
-25.0%
Source: calculated from Schweizerische Nationalbank, Monatsberichte.
Figure III.2 compares the discount of the exchange rates for banknotes in Swiss 
francs per pound sterling and DM, respectively, on the official exchange rate in the foreign 
exchange market in Zurich. The rate for German banknotes shows a continuous 
strengthening of the DM rate for banknotes vis-à-vis the official exchange rate. The lack 
of sharp fluctuations in the curve for DM banknotes after the fall of 1954 mirrors the 
absence of any serious exchange crises in Germany. In addition, from September 1953 
onwards the discount of the rate for German banknotes on the official rate was always 
smaller than the discount for UK banknotes, with the exception of a period between March
137 The banknote rates are depicted in terms o f their discount on official rates, so as to eliminate 
fluctuations in bank note rates due to fluctuations in the official rate, the latter of which was strongly 
influenced by central bank intervention, and to facilitate comparison between different currencies.
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and July 1958. As early as 1953, the Bank for International Settlements noted that “[t]he 
strength of the Deutsche Mark note reflects the improvement in the economic and 
financial position of western Germany”.
Roughly speaking, the exchange rates for DM and pound sterling moved in 
symmetry, with a strong movement in one direction in the UK pound matched by a very 
subdued movement in the same direction by the DM. The symmetry in the direction of the 
movements of the two exchange rates might indicate that both were affected similarly by 
events and economic conditions, or that they responded to the same events or conditions. 
At the same time, however, the elasticity of response of the factors determining the swings 
in both rates was much greater in the case of the UK pound than in the case of the DM. 
Compared to the DM rate, the rate for UK banknotes is characterized by large swings. 
Moreover, the UK exchange rate was particularly prone to rapid large downward 
movements. With the exception of the 1954/5 crisis, the leftward bias of the troughs in the 
pound exchange rate in the chart indicate that pound banknotes depreciated faster than it 
took them to regain their previous value. This proneness to depreciate faster than to 
appreciate is absent in the case of the DM. Thus, contrary to the DM, the pound banknote 
exhibited a certain ‘tendency to drop’. The pound’s proneness to drop more in value than 
the DM and to drop quickly indicates a certain weakness of the pound. A more thorough 
analysis of the causes for the behavior of the pound exchange rate observed in the chart 
will be undertaken in the following sections.
The relative ‘weakness’ of the pound compared to the DM in this period thus 
manifested itself in two ways. Both, the large fluctuations of the rate for UK banknotes 
contrasted with Germany’s smooth upwards trend, and the fact that after September 1953
23rd Annual Report, April 1, 1952 to March 31, 1953, p. 135.
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the discount of the UK banknote rate relative to the official exchange rate generally 
exceeded the discount for German banknotes, reflect the greater stability or strength of the 
German DM vis-à-vis the British pound. Moreover, the pound’s ‘tendency to drop’ 
supports the idea that it was unstable and weak. One of the problems with using banknote 
rates as a basis for comparing strengths and weaknesses of different currencies in the 
1950s is that national differences in exchange control might have affected banknote rates. 
Thus, the UK was much slower to remove controls both on the trade and on the import 
and export of banknotes into and out of the UK and the sterling area than Germany. The 
resulting limitations on the trade and use of sterling banknotes might account for a portion 
of the greater discount of the banknote rate for pound sterling than for the DM. However, 
it would not explain the greater variations of the pound compared to the DM. In general, 
the share of sterling’s weakness explained by the fact that it was harder to import and 
export banknotes is believed to be fairly small and, above all, fairly constant.
See IMF annual reports on exchange restrictions.
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Figure III.2: Discount of banknote rates on officiai rates in Switzerland, 1953-9
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Source: calculated from Schweizerische Nationalbank, Monatsberichte.
To most foreign observers the strength of the German currency indicated that the 
DM was “clearly undervalued”. T h i s  view was strengthened by Germany’s persistent 
balance of payments surpluses. An examination of Germany’s balance of payments 
reveals that trade surpluses, with a few exceptions, showed a constant upward trend in the 
1950s. Correspondingly, gold and foreign exchange reserves increased continuously and 
rapidly in the same period (see figure 1 and table 2 in chapter I).
Fforde, The Bank o f England, p.569.
It should be pointed out that subsequent experiences showed that a DM revaluation failed to bring about a 
lasting change in Germany's balance of payments. The DM revaluation in 1961 only temporarily 
alleviated the situation. The ensuing brief period of current account deficit and short-term capital outflow 
was quickly replaced by the previous trend of growing balance of payments surpluses and speculative 
capital inflow. See Owen Smith, The German Economy, p. 172.
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Table III.8: Germany’s external balance 1950-1960 (million DM)
year current account overall
balance^
current
account
trade balance compensation
payments
1950 -427 -2492 0 -564
1951 2301 772 0 2038
1952 2478 2318 0 2900
1953 3873 4324 268 3646
1954 3669 4143 508 2971
1955 2235 3069 617 1851
1956 4459 5680 924 5010
1957 5901 7783 1396 5122
1958 5998 7998 1505 3444
1959 4152 7431 1738 -1692
1960 4783 8271 2259 8019
a: current account minus capital account. 
Source; compiled from Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen 1875-1974,
pp.339 and 342, tables 1.01 and 1.04.
Table IIL8 shows that only large and rising official government transfers, mainly in the 
form of compensation payments, prevented the current account surpluses from growing at 
the same rate as the trade surpluses.*'*  ^ Between 1953 and 1958, Germany paid DM5,218 
million in compensation paym ents/T he repayment of Germany’s war debts consistently 
constituted the largest negative item on the capital account. Both compensation payments 
and debt repayments were independent of the market. Between 1953 and 1958, the public 
and the private sector of the Federal Republic together repaid DM5,377 million of 
outstanding debts to foreigners. The London Debt Agreement committed Germany to 
predetermined annual payments. However, Germany was free to negotiate accelerated 
debt payments, an option which it used increasingly after 1955 to offset rapidly rising
OECD, Statistics o f the Balance o f  Payments, 1950-61 and Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- 
undBankwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, Fritz Knapp Verlag, 1976. pp.339-342.
142 Deutsche Bundesbank, 40 Jahre Deutsche Mark: Monetare Statistiken 1948-1987, Fritz Knapp 
Verlag, 1988, pp.263-4. Table 1.40.
Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen, p.344, table 1.05 d).
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trade surpluses.
Table IIL9: Capital account balance, 1950-1959 (million DM)
Balance on goods 
and services
Capital account 
balance
o f which balance 
on private capital 
flows
1950 -2492 +637 +30
1951 +772 -543 +70
1952 +2318 +6 +75
1953 +4324 -698 -41
1954 +4143 -106 -184
1955 +3069 -640 0
1956 +5680 -162 +224
1957 +7783 -2655 +372
1958 +7998 -2329 -487
1959 +7431 -6398 -1255
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, p.339.
Had private capital been free to flow, it is more likely that it would have flown in
than out, due to the favorable investment climate in Germany. A large portion of private 
capital exports was made up of special credits, in particular in connection with the large 
credit made by German banks to the Indian government in 1957, and credits to facilitate 
the payment for German exports.Regarding private portfolio investment, purchases by 
foreigners of German securities exceeded purchases of foreign securities by Germans 
between 1955, when capital outflows were considerably liberalized, and 1958.^ ^  ^
Consequently, the largest counterweights to Germany’s trade surplus were settled by 
politicians and international agreements, and occasional special credits, instead of being 
determined by demand and supply conditions in the capital or goods markets. Table III.9
144
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Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschaftsberichtfiir das Jahr 1957, p.55
Private portfolio investment, 1954-1958 (million D M
net German portfolio 
investment abroad
net foreign portfolio 
investment in Germany
1954 0 1
1955 0 90
1956 17 289
1957 81 772
1958 292 592
Source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Deutsches Geld- und Bankenwesen in Zahlen 1876-1975, p.343. 
See also E. Diirr, Konjunkturpolitik bei Konvertibilitat, Universitat Kôln, 1961, p. 17.
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shows that private capital flows were no reliable or significant counterweight to the trade
surpluses. The Bundesbank conceded in 1957 that
die gegenwartige - und wohl auch in nachster Zukunft zu erwartende - deutsche 
Kapitalausfuhr weder in ihrem Umfange noch in ihrer Richtung einen Faktor 
darstellt, der einen ins Gewicht fallenden Beitrag zum Ausgleich der deutschen 
Zahlungsbilanzüberschüsse, insbesondere in der EZU, leisten, noch auch den zu 
hoch geschraubten Erwartungen zahlreicher Handelspartner der Bundesrepublik 
gerecht werden konnte.^ "^ ^
Within and beyond the period in question, therefore, Germany’s balance of payments was
dominated by large trade surpluses, which were only slightly mitigated by discretionary
and predictable government transfers and debt repayments. This balance of payments
record indicated a structural disequilibrium in Germany’s balance of payments since
private, that is market-determined, trade or capital flows, proved consistently incapable of
counterbalancing Germany’s export surpluses.
The impression gained by the persistent German surpluses was that they were
structural, implying that there was no tendency towards equilibrium. The apparent
structural nature of the balance of payments surpluses combined with the persistent
strength of the DM led trading partners to exert increasing pressure on Germany to
undertake some form of economic adjustment to correct what they considered a
fundamental disequilibrium. '^*  ^Britain was at the head of the group of countries that put
increasing pressure on Germany to appreciate what it considered to be a “clearly
undervalued” currency.M any identified the ‘undervaluation’ of the DM as the root of
Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschaftsbericht fiir das Jahr 1957, p.55.
‘neither the volume nor the direction o f the present - and most likely the future - German capital 
exports will constitute a factor that could make a significant contribution to offsetting the 
German balance o f payments exports, particularly in the EPU, nor will they be able to meet the 
albeit excessive expectations o f many o f Germany’s trading partners.’
Scammell, International Monetary Policy, chapter 12 “The problem o f the German surplus”.
Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.355.
Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschaftsbericht fiir das Jahr 1957, p.50.
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.569 and Scammell, International Monetary Policy, pp.363-370.
It should be pointed out that subsequent experiences showed that a DM revaluation failed to bring about a
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the European trade imbalances.Similarly, Dingwort-Nusseck claimed in 1980 that in
the 1950s, the German export surpluses were “especially supported by the undervaluation
of the deutsche mark”.*^  ^Germany was reproached for impeding the automatic adjustment
mechanism of a fixed exchange rate system according to which the balance of payments
surpluses, through rising foreign exchange earnings, should have stimulated domestic
consumption, thus raising prices and imports, which in turn would have restored external
balance and removed upwards pressure on the DM. Instead, critics claimed that Germany
was sterilizing surpluses and pursuing a policy of tight money, while, at the same time,
refusing to revalue, thus further exacerbating international trade imbalances and exchange
rate instability. The Banker remarked that
In a country that has been gaining gold and foreign exchange at the rate recently 
experienced by Germany - ... - it is paradoxical, to say the least, that the rates for 
commercial borrowing should range between 8 and 12 per cent. It is difficult to 
reconcile the German complaints of a capital famine with the massive and largely 
sterilized exchange reserve accumulated by the central bank. It should be possible 
to ease credit and capital without incurring the risk of runaway inflation.
But most German policymakers rejected the argument that German economic
policy was responsible for the European imbalances. Consequently, the FRG was equally
persistent in its refusal to be coaxed or pressured into appreciation of the DM as it was in
its resistance to respond to international demands to stimulate domestic demand. In
response to international criticism, German observers argued first, that the surpluses were
only temporary, and, second, that the trade deficits with the dollar area proved that the DM
lasting change in Germany's balance o f payments. The DM revaluation in 1961 only temporarily 
alleviated the situation. The ensuing brief period o f current account deficit and short-term capital outflow 
was quickly replaced by the previous trend o f growing balance o f payments surpluses and speculative 
capital inflow. See Owen Smith, The German Economy, p. 172.
See, for example. The Banker, “Europe’s Problem Currencies”, July 1954, p.425, Owen Smith, The 
German Economy, pp. 187 and 504-5, and Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, pp.93 
and 116. See also chapter II.
Dingwort-Nusseck, “Economic Growth”, p.213.
The Banker, “Europe’s Problem Currencies”, July 1954, p.427.
The Banker, “Europe’s Problem Currencies”, July 1954, pp.426-427.
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was not generally undervalued. However, even if surpluses were structural, the Economics
Ministry, as well as the Bundesbank, and many academics argued that it was not up to
Germany to correct them. Rather, the surpluses were the direct result of an international
inflationary epidemic that was raging outside of Germany and that was overheating
demand worldwide, except in the Federal Republic. Worldwide inflationary pressure
bullied Germany to appreciate while - at the same time - threatening to drag it into the
inflationary spiral which, for historic reasons, it feared so much. The German solution to
the problem was neither DM appreciation nor inflationary monetary policy in Germany,
but to stem world inflation. A lecture by Professor Dr. Otto Veit at the Industrie- und
Handelskammer Frankfurt in 1957 summed up the German view:
Heute darf ein Land wie Deutschland, das heiflt ein Land mit intemationaler 
Glaubigerposition, keine Geldausweitung zulassen, wenn die inflatorische 
Bewegung in der AuBenwelt, aus der diese Glaubigerposition erwachst, mit 
mangelnder Kontraktion in den Schuldnerlandem zusammenhangt.^^^
Rather than succumb to outside pressure, Veit considered it Germany’s duty to erect a
dam to stem the worldwide inflationary flood by resisting both appreciation and inflation:
Kâme es in einer Période steigender Weltmarktspreise und sinkender Geldwerte in 
der Welt dahin, daB die am wenigsten betroffenen Glaubigerlander über den 
Wechselkurs vor der Weltinflationstendenz ausweichen - also dasselbe mit 
umgekehrter Zielrichtung tun wie 1931 England -, so fiele ein wesentlicher 
Hemmschuh und Gegenhalt der intemationalen Expansionsbewegung fort.^^^
Veit’s views were representative of German policymakers in the 1950s who believed that
BA B 102-12654, “Wahrungspolitik auf dem richtigen Kurs” - Professor Dr. Otto Veit (erweiterte 
Fassung eines Vortrages in der IHK Frankfurt), April 1, 1957.
‘Today a country such as Germany, that is to say a country with an international creditor 
position, must not permit a monetary expansion, if the inflationary trend o f  the outside world, 
from which the creditor position results, is linked to insufficient contraction in the debtor 
countries.’
ibid.
‘If, in a period of rising world prices and falling money values in the world, the least affected 
creditor countries evaded the world inflationary trend through the exchange rate - i.e. if  they did 
the same as England did in 1931 but with the opposite sign -, then an essential brake and 
counterforce to the international expansionary movement would be removed.’
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it was not up to Germany to solve the other countries’ balance of payments problems by 
inflating to their level/^^
As the 1950s progressed, Germany increasingly came under attack for its apparent 
unwillingness to do anything about the persistent surpluses/In  particular, Germany was 
reproached of sterilizing the expansionary impact of its balance of payments surpluses and 
resulting inflow of gold and foreign exchange. In 1956, the Bank of England issued a 
veiled threat of retaliation should Germany not act to reduce its surpluses either through 
inflation or revaluation, thus underlining the accusation that Germany was boycotting the 
working of the fixed exchange rate system. The criticism from trading partners and the 
growing strength of the DM led to increasing concern in the Economics Ministry that 
other countries might discriminate against German exports on the basis that the DM was 
de facto a hard currency. To avert this danger and to resolve the problem in Europe, 
Erhard and many officials in the Economics Ministry suggested a multilateral exchange 
rate adjustment. The Economics Ministry was thinking primarily about a devaluation of 
those currencies where inflation was above average.However,  if these countries 
resisted devaluation, then Gocht from the Economics Ministry argued, Germany should 
revalue. Erhard shared that view but the Bundesbank categorically rejected a DM 
revaluation. In a stinging attack, the Economics Ministry accused the Bundesbank of
Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.365.
BA B 102-25878/9, “Ergebnisbericht über die Sitzung der Ministerstellvertreter (Arbeitsgmppe 19 
‘Finananzielle Stabilitât’ der OEEC) am 17. und 18. Juni 1957 in Paris”, June 24,1957.
BoE OV34/42, Rootham to Stevens and Parsons: “Note o f Conversations in Basle: 1st - 3rd June”, 
June 6, 1956.
BA B 102-12654, “Drohende Diskriminierung des deutschen Exports”, article in Wirtschafts- und 
Sozialpolitik, June 24, 1957 and BA B 102-12654, “Notwendigkeit einer Bereinigung der 
Wahrungsrelationen”, Gocht, August 19, 1957.
BA B 102-12654, “Notwendigkeit einer Bereinigung der Wahrungsrelationen”, Gocht, August 19, 
1957.
O. Emminger, “Deutsche Geld- und Wahrungspolitik im Spannungsfeld zwischen innerem un 
ausserem Gleichgweicht 1948-1975”, in Deutsche Bundesbank, Wahrung und Wirtschaft in Deutschland 
1876-1975, Fritz Knapp Verlag, 1976, p.495 and Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, p.217.
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sacrificing free trade and price stability to the maintenance of the exchange rate/^^ 
However, the Bundesbank was not alone in its unyielding resistance to revaluation. The 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the German OEEC delegation, the majority of the German 
export industry, and, influenced by their advisors, Adenauer and Vice-Chancellor Blücher 
also opposed revaluation.^^ As a result, instead of giving in to foreign pressure to relax 
monetary policy or revalue the DM, several policies were employed to prevent growing 
surpluses from having an inflationary effect on the German economy, while, 
simultaneously, reducing pressure on the DM to revalue.
The Juliusturm that was created by Fnance Mnister Schaffer in 1954 was one 
instrument for sterilizing balance of payments surpluses, although the monetary authorities 
denied this. Foreign exchange earnings were stored away and thus withdrawn from 
circulation, supposedly to save money for future defense expenses. The acceleration of 
German debt payments and of payments for defense imports was another tool employed 
by the German government to reduce exorbitant external surpluses. In 1956, 1957 and 
1958, when Germany’s trade surpluses shot up, foreign reserves rose dramatically and 
capital inflows increased in response to high real interest rates and in anticipation of a 
revaluation. In response, the government made large advance payments abroad for 
armament. These advance payments were classified as short term capital outflows since, 
until the arms were actually imported, they were in effect a credit to the arms supplying 
countries.Advance payments for defense imports made up 56 per cent of total short
BA B102-12654, “Vermerk - Reaktion auf Vockes Schreiben und den Artikel von Dr Steffe”, October 
24, 1957.
Emminger, “Deutsche”, p.495 and Dickhaus Zwischen, p.219.
H. Schlesinger,”Geldpolitik in der Phase des Wiederaufbaus (1950-1958)”, pp. 592-4, in Deutsche 
Bundesbank, Wahrung, 1976, pp. 555-607.
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht fur Marz 1959, pp.14-15.
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term capital exports in 1956, 76 per cent in 1957, and 59 per cent in 1958/^^ In addition, 
the acceleration of debt repayments starting in 1957 reduced Germany’s external 
surpluses. Thus, the German central bank advanced £75 million to the UK in the form of a 
special account at the Bank of England from which Germany was to pay its annual 
installments for its debt repayment between 1957 and 1966.^^^  This measure fulfilled a 
double function: as a capital export it reduced Germany’s extemal surplus in 1957 while at 
the same time providing a credit to the UK to increase its liquidity in times of adverse 
speculation.
Overall, German economic policy was aimed at sterilizing the expansionary effect
of its balance of payments surpluses and thus prevented them from having the
expansionary effect that was necessary to restore equilibrium. Herring and Marston
analyzed national monetary policies in the 1960s and showed that the Bundesbank
deliberately and successfully sterilized the expansionary impact of balance of payments
surpluses. They examined the period between 1960 and 1971 and concluded that the
Bundesbank “did in fact [sic] sterilize most of the impact of foreign exchange flows on the
reserve base”.*^® They went on to state that:
Our estimates of the reaction function imply that the Bundesbank varied its 
monetary policy instruments systematically in an attempt to achieve price stability 
and finance the needs of expanding internal trade. The Bundesbank’s success in 
pursuing these domestic objectives was such that toward the end of the decade the 
German trade balance was registering increasingly larger surpluses.^^*
According to Yeager, the German central bank “sought, in its domestic operations, to
counteract rather than reinforce the expansionary effect of its foreign-exchange
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht fiir  Marz 1959, p. 17.
Deutsche Bundesbank, Geschaftsbericht fiir das Jahr 1957, p.52.
Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, p.22I.
R. J. Herring and R. C. Marston, National Monetary Policies and International Financial Markets, 
North Holland Publishing Company, 1977, p. 161. 
ibid.
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acquisitions”. This point is illustrated in table III. 10. In all three periods shown in the 
table, foreign exchange transfers would have increased liquidity, all other things equal. 
However, the government and the central bank employed a range of discretionary tools to 
offset the expansionary impact of the foreign exchange inflow. In addition to the 
Juliusturm and accelerated debt repayment, the central bank resorted to open market sales 
of government securities, the reduction of bank liquidity through rises in minimum reserve 
requirements and raises in discount rates whenever it deemed that inflationary pressures 
were rising, such as, for example, in mid-1956.^^  ^ Higher interest rates were likely to 
increase capital inflow into Germany while dampening domestic consumption demand, 
and, consequently, imports. The result was an increase in already rising extemal surpluses. 
Monika Dickhaus argued that the German central bank’s monetary policy between 1955 
and 1958 was determined by the aim to preserve price stability and that bank officials 
were not concerned about the consequences of restrictive policy on the balance of
payments 174
Table III.IO: Changes in commercial bank liquidity (million DM)
1956 
1st half
1956 
2nd half
1957 
1st half
Foreign exchange transfers +2,325 +3,547 +3,981
Transfers from the public sector -1,472 -323 -950
Change in note circulation -550 -398 -937
Central bank operations -737 +7 -2,202
Commercial bank borrowing
from the central bank -440 -1,067 +4
Other factors +74 -260 +147
Total -800 +1,506 +43
Source: reproduced from OEEC, Economic Conditions in the Federal Republic o f Germany 1957, p.9 
The desire to maintain price stability even in the presence of growing foreign
exchange inflows played a crucial role in the German central bank’s policy on
Yeager, International Monetary Relations, p.489.
OEEC, Economic Conditions in the Federal Republic o f  Germany 1957, pp. 8-9.
174 Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, p.226.
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convertibility. The central bank condoned resident convertibility since it was considered 
compatible with, even conducive to, price stability. Regarding the relaxations of exchange 
and capital restrictions for German residents. The Economist recognized that the measures 
were also
part of the anti-inflation campaign that is being waged in Germany. It is hoped 
that if exporters take advantage of the right to leave some of their exports 
proceeds abroad, the Bank Deutscher Lander will not be called to buy dollars or 
other foreign currencies and to issue marks against them. Similarly, any German 
demand for foreign securities would reduce the inflationary pressure at home.^^^
Conversely, the central bank opposed the liberalization of capital imports. While capital
outflows were largely liberalized before the establishment of currency convertibility,
controls on capital inflows provided German monetary authorities with a tool to regulate,
at least to a certain extent, the amount of foreign money flowing into German. Large,
and particularly uncontrollable, capital inflows were considered undesirable for two
reasons. Firstly, they were feared to have an inflationary effect, especially when Germany
was trying to regulate the money supply by raising interest r a te s .T h u s ,  controls on
capital inflows allowed Germany to preserve a degree of monetary autonomy, in particular
in its pursuit of relatively tight monetary policy when compared with the rest of Europe.
Secondly, Germany’s currency stability and its commitment to low inflation repeatedly
triggered speculative flows into Germany as people anticipated a DM revaluation.*^^ The
central bank was supported in its resistance by the prominent economics professor Dr.
Otto Veit who claimed that the control of capital imports was vital for Germany in its
struggle against revaluation and imported inflation.
The Economist, “Convertible D-Mark”, May 19,1956, pp.717-718.
Capital inflow was discouraged through high reserve requirements on foreign deposits and the 
prohibition o f  interest payments to foreigners, among other things.
Gutmann, Hochstrate and Schliiter, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung, p.283.
One example o f such a speculative inflow was the currency crisis in September 1957.
BA B 102-12654, Professor Dr. Otto Veit, “Wahrungspolitik auf dem richtigen Kurs?”, April, 1, 1957.
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The BdL’s, and later the Bundesbank’s, reluctance to liberalize capital imports met 
with strong criticism from the Economics Ministry, which wrote in 1958: “Die 
Bundesbank hat sich trotz unserer Bemühungen nicht entschlieBen konnen, einer volligen 
Freigabe der Kapitaleinfuhr zuzustimmen”.^ ^^  After the collective return to currency 
convertibility in 1958, the Economics Ministry reiterated its disapproval of the 
Bundesbank’s continued unwillingness to free capital imports of all restrictions, claiming 
that the Bundesbank’s motivation was to restrict the free functioning of the money 
m ark e ts /T h e  central bank, in contrast to the Economics Ministry, shied away from 
expanding convertibility to include non-resident capital inflows, since restrictions on 
capital imports provided the central bank with an effective means of intervening in the 
capital market to regulate capital flows. Moreover, the central bank was not reluctant to 
reintroduce restrictions when it was deemed appropriate. During the speculative crisis in 
August and September 1957, the Bundesbank and the Economics Ministry clashed over 
the former’s suggestion to reimpose restrictions on the use of Libkamark accounts, that is, 
the accounts through which foreigners could invest in Germany. In May and September 
1957, the central bank raised the reserve requirements for non-resident accounts to levels 
that were three times as high as for resident accounts. The main function of this action was 
to reduce the liquidity effect of the surpluses. The difference between reserve requirements 
for non-resident and resident accounts was removed in April 1959, but in 1960, when the 
DM experiencing renewed speculative pressure to revalue, the Bundesbank quickly
BA B 102-57661, “Niederschrifl iiber die Besprechung am 5. Marz 1958 über die Lockerung der 
Beschrankimgen fxir die Kapitaleinfuhr, Abschaffimg der liberalisierten Kapitalmark”, March 5, 1958. 
For a detailed account o f the German central bank’s views and policy on convertibility, see Dickhaus, 
Zwischen Europa und der Welt.
‘In spite o f our efforts, the Bundesbank has not agreed to a complete liberalization of capital imports.’
BA B 102-57689, “Beabsichtigte Einschrankung der Deutschen Bundesbank fur die Kapitaleinfuhr”, 
attached to a letter by Sperl (Economics Ministry), January 5, 1959.
BA B 102-57708, Westrick, Economics Ministry, to Bundesbank re. “Einschrankung der Zufliisse auf 
liberalisierte Kapitalguthaben”, September 3, 1957.
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reimposed higher reserve requirements for foreign accounts. In addition, it reintroduced 
the prohibition to pay interest on foreign accounts and to sell German securities and shares 
to non-residents. The German central bank feared that capital imports would curtail its 
control over the money supply and make Germany more vulnerable through increasing 
foreign indeb tedness . In  general, in contrast to Erhard’s policy orientation, 
convertibility was not one of the central bank’s top priorities. The central bank put 
regionalism, in particular the EPU, before convertibility. The use of capital controls to 
regulate the capital inflow provides further evidence of the central bank’s refusal to adjust 
even in the presence of growing market pressure to do so.^ *^  Capital controls allowed 
Germany to “postpone for long periods the choice between domestic inflation and 
revaluation”.
Throughout the 1950s upward pressure on the DM was generally matched by 
downward pressure on the pound sterling. Both countries shared the desire to keep the 
sterling-DM exchange rate where it was. Britain wanted to avoid devaluation while 
Germany wanted to avoid revaluation, although the reasons for wanting to maintain the 
existing sterling-DM exchange rate differed significantly. A unilateral move to official 
convertibility, even when it was technically no more than a formality, would have 
reinforced confidence in the DM thus further increasing speculative capital inflows. Given 
the strong opposition to revaluation and the concern about imported inflation, there cannot
Diirr, Konjunkturpolitik, pp.30-33.
Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, p. 150.
Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa, pp. 126,134-40, 166-7 & 252.
According to Eschweiler and Bordo, the central bank used capital controls to isolate “the capital 
account from the effects o f higher real interest rates”. Eschweiler and Bordo, Rules, p.23.
Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, p.221.
See chapter II for a discussion o f the weakness o f sterling.
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have been many supporters of such a move, particularly not in the Bundesbank. Similarly, 
obvious German leadership in the move to convertibility would have probably also 
increased speculation and thus pressure for a DM revaluation, and it would have almost 
certainly weakened the position of the pound, especially since it had been established 
since the early 1950s that Britain was to lead Europe into convertibility. International 
policy coordination resulting in a collective official move under British leadership was 
hoped to reinforce confidence in the pound, and thus, indirectly, ease speculative pressures 
for a DM revaluation.
In the fall of 1957, the German government had already resorted to international 
policy coordination to reduce the speculative pressure on the DM. In the late summer of 
1957, funds started to shift from sterling into DM as a result of spreading rumors of an 
impending DM revaluation. The flows were successfully halted and partially reversed 
in September 1957, when a joint statement by German and British representatives at the 
annual IMF meeting and vrith the support of IMF director Per Jacobsson reiterated that 
neither would the DM be appreciated nor would the pound be devalued. In connection 
with the joint public statement, the Bundesbank lowered the discount rate from five to 4.5 
per cent while the Bank of England simultaneously raised Bank rate from five to seven per 
cent. The strong speculative inflow into Germany in the fall of 1957, when rumors of a 
DM revaluation were rife and the subsequent sharp drop of foreign reserve inflow in 
response to the joint Anglo-German public statement are clearly illustrated in figure III.3. 
The figure also shows that between 1952 and 1957 there was never a net quarterly outflow 
of foreign exchange reserves.
BIS, 28th Annual Report April I, 1957 to March 31, 1958, p. 171.
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Figure III.3: Quarterly changes in German foreign reserve holdings,
1952-1957 (million DM)
Source; Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht der Deutschen Bundesbank, September 1958, p.51.
Similarly, the collective move to currency convertibility under official British 
leadership took pressure off the DM to revalue, albeit only temporarily. Participation in 
the collective move thus allowed Germany to avoid, or at least postpone, the unpleasant 
choice between letting the surpluses inflate the economy or revaluing the DM, neither of 
which appealed to the German policymakers.'^^ Germany’s participation in the collective 
move to currency convertibility, undertaken at the right time, and led by anybody but 
Germany, presented an opportunity to reduce market pressure on the DM to revalue, while 
at the same time avoiding other equally undesirable forms of economic adjustment.
As Obstfeld pointed out, such displays of central bank solidarity only postponed 
speculative attacks, because they did nothing to correct the underlying causes for
191 Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, p.207.
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speculation in the first place and thus they could only temporarily discourage speculations 
about a DM revaluation/^^ The DM revaluation of 1961 proves that the Bundesbank’s 
success in averting exchange rate readjustment was short-lived. The central bank’s 
attempts to maintain the stability of the DM led to the currency being “increasingly 
threatened by international speculative short-term capital flows attracted by the 
Bundesbank's Council's strict adherence to its monetary code”/^^
Today, many economists and historians today agree that “Germany resisted 
adjustment during the Bretton Woods system”. Capital controls, the Juliusturm, official 
capital exports in the form of accelerated debt repayments and advance payments on 
defense imports either served to reduce existing surpluses or to prevent them from having 
an inflationary effect on the German economy. While German economic policymakers 
were concerned with reducing the immediate effects of growing surpluses, they refused to 
correct what their trading partners claimed were structural surpluses, either because they 
questioned the ‘structural’ nature of the persistent balance of payments surpluses or 
because they were quite happy to maintain them. As one official from the Bank of 
England correctly recognized in 1954, the acceleration of the debt repayment did nothing 
to change the trade pattern, which he asserted should be the main object of any policy to 
reduce surpluses. He warned that, “[i]t may be worth mentioning, therefore, that anything 
done to accelerate debt collection would help the Germans to delay other action which 
could be of a more pemianent and beneficial nature”. S c a m m e l l  evaluated German
ibid., p.220.
Owen Smith, The German Economy, p. 143.
Bordo, “The Bretton Woods International Monetary System: A Historical Overview", p.55.
BoE OV34/39, Macdonald to Thompson-McCausland, “Germany: Acceleration o f payments of 
Germany's external debts”, March 25, 1954. According to the Bank o f England the German suggestions for 
advance repayments of German debt were motivated by the aim to reduce Germany's extreme creditor
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economic policy vis-à-vis the structural surpluses in 1961 :
To their credit the German government has shown itself ready in OEEC and 
elsewhere to recognise the existence of a surplus problem and to take some 
measures for its alleviation. It has liberalised import policies, lent abroad in modest 
amount and is anxious to widen its foreign lending through the establishment of a 
capital market in Germany. Critics argue, however, that such measures are 
peripheral and, while they may alleviate, they do nothing to end the surplus and 
that, on the fundamental issues of the problem, i.e., the DM exchange rate, 
domestic monetary policy and the demand structure within the economy, the 
Germans are unco-operative.
Similar to Britain, Germany’s exchange rate and monetary policy reveals an unwillingness
to adjust. Contrary to Britain, however, convertibility was not a threat to German
economic policy since, as a persistent surpluses country, the disequilibrium presented no
immediate danger to its economic stability. Thus, “Germany’s example illustrates the
absence of forces pushing surplus countries towards balance-of-payments equilibrium”.^ ^^
Similar to Britain, policies were aimed at fighting the symptoms, currency instability,
rather than tackling the causes of the fundamental disequilibrium.
C o n c l u s io n
This section has shown that, in addition to trade dependence, several other factors 
explain why in Germany the official establishment of convertibility was only envisioned 
within a collective move incorporating as many countries as possible. First, the unique 
international political situation of the Federal Republic after World War II mitigated 
against a unilateral move to convertibility. The second reason for the insistence on 
collectivity can be found in the rather widespread opposition within Germany to the EEC.
position in the EPU. BoE OV34/39, L. A. Martin to Macdonald, Watson, O'Brien, Niemeyer: 
“Acceleration o f the repayment o f German external debt in order to relieve Germany's extreme creditor 
position in the European Payments Union”, March 18,1954.
Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.363.
Obstfeld, “The Adjustment Mechanism”, p. 220. See also Eschweiler and Bordo, Rules, pp.23-24.
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The economic and political factions within the FRG that opposed the restrictive EEC 
policy of Konrad Adenauer wanted to wait until the pound was ready to lead a collective 
move to convertibility which was hoped to provide a counterweight to the Common 
Market. Third, Germany’s postponement of official convertibility until the other countries, 
above all the UK, were ready to move, and its conspicuously low-key role in the move, 
were motivated by the desire to make the DM look weaker, and the pound stronger, than it 
was. This, in turn, allowed Germany to avoid a revaluation or any other form of economic 
adjustment in spite of persistent and growing external payments surpluses. Overall, while 
its economic conditions would have permitted a unilateral move to convertibility before 
the rest of Europe, Germany had nothing to gain from such a move.
CONCLUSION
It is hardly necessary to point out that a country will be more willing to accept a 
greater degree of economic dependence on the rest of the world if it expects the 
existing international economic order to promote rather than hinder the 
achievement of its major policy objectives.
This observation by Milivoje Panic can be applied perfectly to explain the motivations
for Germany’s economic openness and its cooperative stance on convertibility in the
1950s.
For the major parties and interest groups in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
rapid establishment of convertibility was not contestable, provided it was undertaken 
jointly with as many OEEC countries as possible. Contrary to Britain, convertibility, 
especially a collective move, did not infringe on Germany’s ability to pursue its own 
economic and monetary policy objectives. In fact, economically, there was no reason to
Panic, National Management, p. 161.
231
oppose convertibility. Large and growing current account surpluses, and, more 
importantly, the prospect of a continuation of this trend in the future, provided an assured 
large influx of foreign exchange reserves which in turn guaranteed confidence in the DM, 
even after the DM became convertible. Simultaneously, Germany’s large and growing 
trade dependence furnished a convincing motivation for liberalizing payments.
The limitations on Germany’s ‘sovereignty’, legally, but more importantly, 
politically and economically, predetermined Germany’s foreign policy, including its 
international economic policy. In terms of trade policy this meant integration, in terms of 
monetary policy it implied cooperation in the return to currency convertibility. It also 
implied letting somebody else take the official lead in the move, even though Germany 
had been the pacemaker of the process leading up to the achievement of convertibility. 
There was no sufficient political platform for opposing convertibility in principle nor 
European cooperation in the establishment of convertibility. Currency convertibility 
formed a vital part of the international economic system of liberalized trade and payments, 
as envisaged and laid out by the United States after World War II, into which the Federal 
Republic was bom.
Germany’s smooth road to the establishment of currency convertibility in 
December 1958 thus differs drastically from Britain’s or France’s route to convertibility. 
The fortunate compatibility of the overriding political and economic goals in West 
Germany at the time accounts for the speedy progress towards payments liberalization and 
the consensus on a collective move. Moreover, however, a collective move was 
compatible with German ambitions for the development of trade and with its monetary 
policy.
As the strength of the German DM increased rapidly, unwelcome speculative
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capital started to flow into Germany at the same time as countries were putting pressures 
on Germany to revalue the DM or to inflate its economy, both of which monetary 
authorities wanted to avoid. A unilateral move to convertibility would have only 
underlined the strength of the DM, in addition to undermining the OEEC forum for 
European economic cooperation, which many policymakers preferred to the EEC. The 
implication of this conclusion is that convertibility did not force Germany to subordinate 
its monetary policy to the rules of the games of a fixed exchange rate system. As a 
persistent surplus country, Germany could sterilize its domestic economy from its growing 
balance of payments surpluses at the expense of international monetary stability.
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IV: FRENCH POLICY ON CONVERTIBILITY 
INTRODUCTION
Between 1945 and 1958, the French economy was characterized by balance of 
payments crises, currency instability and high inflation. The franc was officially 
devalued five times between 1945 and 1959, evidencing a long term erosion of the 
franc. French exports remained largely stagnant at a time when world trade was 
expanding rapidly, forcing the French government to use high barriers against imports, 
export subsidies, and multiple exchange rates to prevent large trade deficits. Exchange 
control was pervasive, and few steps were taken to increase franc convertibility before 
1958. The French scenario thus appeared strongly adverse to the establishment of 
convertibility, making it all the more surprising that France participated in the collective 
return to currency convertibility in December 1958. Considering both French general 
economic policy and economic and financial conditions up until mid-1958, few would 
have predicted that France would be able or willing to participate in the establishment of 
non-resident currency convertibility. This chapter examines the conditions and policy 
considerations that explain the change from a protected, highly regulated economy with 
an unstable currency to currency convertibility.
TRADE
France began the 1950s as a promoter of trade liberalization within the OEEC. In 
1950 it campaigned for automatic tariff reductions in Western Europe, and, by 1951, 
France had removed quotas on 75 per cent of its 1948 list of private imports, far more than 
most other OEEC countries. However, in 1952 France’s balance of payments surpluses
234
with the EPU turned into substantial deficits, forcing it to suspend its liberalization. As a 
result, between 1952 and 1955, France was one of the most protected countries, if not the 
most, in Western Europe, with import barriers covering the whole scale firom prohibitive 
tariffs to quotas to import surcharges to exchange control (see table 1 in chapter 11).^
As can be seen in table 1 on export growth in chapter III, France’s main balance of 
payments problem in the 1950s was the stagnation of its exports. Throughout the 1950s, 
there was great concern about the competitiveness of French goods.^ Lower productivity 
levels and higher wages were blamed for the lack of competitiveness. Years of inflation 
rate which was continuously higher than that of France’s major trading partners had led to 
an overvalued franc, which, in turn, made French goods unattractive abroad. It was 
believed that the fact that a large portion of France’s exports went to the fi*anc area was a 
fundamental problem.^ Between 1950 and 1956, on average, 36 per cent of exports, in 
value terms, went to the firanc area. In 1957 and 1958, the share dropped slightly but was 
still around 30 per cent.
‘ Lynch, “Restoring France”, p.65.
 ^For an in-depth analysis o f France’s trade performance, see P. Arnaud-Ameller, La France à Vépreuve 
de la concurrence internationale 1951-1966, Armand Colin, 1970.
' For a detailed contemporary perspective of the economic and financial relations between France and the 
franc area see F. Bloch-Lainé et. al.. La Zone Franc, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956 and G. Perret, 
“Le Sous-développement des pays d’outre-mer et la politique française actuelle”, in Revue d ’économie 
politique, July-October 1960, pp.613-633.
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Table IV. 1: France; distribution of foreign trade by currency areas: 1951-6 (billion francs)
Areas Imports Exports Balance
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956
franc area 281 336 360 366 412 415 462 388 547 598 520 547 559 522 +107 +211 +238 +154 +135 +144 +60
rest o f world 
continental
OEEC® 261 402 391 347 373 473 583 353 420 418 466 518 622 616 +92 +18 +27 +119 +145 +149 +33
sterling 247 449 435 416 393 421 449 141 209 152 142 153 207 179 -106 -240 -283 -274 -240 -214 -270
area
dollar area 163 227 215 168 166 197 280 58 110 77 97 95 113 121 -105 -117 -138 -71 -71 -84 -159
others 121 201 191 161 178 168 202 138 198 171 181 196 235 185 +17 -3 -20 +20 +18 +67 -17
total for rest o f 792 1279 1232 1092 1110 1259 1514 690 937 818 886 962 1177 1101 -102 -342 -414 -206 -148 -82 -413
the world
grand total 1073 1615 1592 1458 1522 1674 1976 1078 1484 1416 1406 1509 1736 1623 +5 -131 -176 -52 -13 +62 -353
a: including their overseas territories. 
Source: BIS, annual reports.
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The franc area was sheltered fi'om international competition through a nearly impenetrable
protectionist wall, allowing French producers to sell their goods at uncompetitive prices/
Protégées contre la concurrence étrangère, les exportations françaises vers les pays 
d'outre-mer s'effectuaient à prix élevés, au détriment d'ailleurs des exportations des 
mêmes produits vers le monde extérieur, moins rémunératrices, plus difficiles à 
réaliser, mais qui eussent davantage contribué à améliorer l'état de nos réserves en 
devises/
The sluggish growth of the franc area economies, compared to Western European 
economies and the USA, explained the stagnation of the growth of French exports at a 
time when, for example, Germany, which exported to high growth countries, witnessed 
unprecedented export growth.
While exports refused to grow only protectionism prevented imports frrom 
exploding. The combination of export stagnation, in spite of substantial export promotion, 
and stifling protection to prevent imports fr*om skyrocketing meant that trade dependence 
remained low, in comparison with most other Westem European economies, throughout 
the 1950s (see table 1 in chapter III). The widespread concern over France’s apparently 
structural trade problems generated a heated controversy over what policies should be 
implemented to help France solve its external problems.^ Industry, agriculture, trade 
unions, and some sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared a strong dislike for 
opening up the obviously ‘vulnerable’ French market to international competition.^ The 
trade performance seemed to indicate that France would not be able to stand foreign 
competition, at least not from other OEEC members, above all Germany.
* J.-M. Jeanneney, Forces et faiblesses de l ’économie française 1945-1959, Librarie Armand Colin, 1959, 
p. 145. See also Lynch, “Restoring France”, p.62.
 ^A. de Lattre, Politique économique de la France depuis 1945, Editions Sirey, 1966, p.407.
‘Protected against foreign competition, French exports to the franc area were sold at elevated prices, to the 
detriment o f exports of the same products to the rest o f the world, which would have been less profitable and 
more difficult to realize, but which would have contributed more to improving the level o f our reserves and 
currencies.’
 ^for a discussion, see Lynch, “Restoring France”.
 ^ibid.
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Although there were proponents of trade and payments liberalization, - particularly 
in the Ministry of Finance -, who argued that only the opening up of the French economy 
to international pressures could cure inflation and make French goods competitive, there 
was an over-riding fear and reluctance to remove controls over trade and exchange.^ 
Looking back on the 1950s, Maurice Couve de Murville, - Foreign Minister between 1958 
and 1968, Economics and Finance Minister in 1968 and Prime Minister between 1968 and 
1969 -, criticized what he called “l’ignorance extraordinaire et le poids de préjugés 
séculaires, qu’on appelle en France le colbertisme, qui imprégnait alors les milieux 
dirigeants et leur rendaient inconcevable qu’on puisse ouvrir le marché français à la 
concurrence internationale”/  In general, there seems to have been a strong belief that free 
trade was an unobtainable illusion and that in the future controls over trade and payments 
would continue to be necessary and acceptable policy instruments at the disposal of nation 
states to regulate their external balances. Thus, Jean Weiller stated in 1958 that “il semble 
bien qu'après des années de discussion, l'idée d'une simple consécration des libres 
mécanismes du marché grâce au renoncement aux dirigismes nationaux ne soit 
généralement plus retenue, du moins dans sa simplicité première”. He saw nothing 
wrong with a system in which “[d]es ‘libérations d'échange’, dans certains secteurs, à 
l'intérieur de certaines zones ou régions, au cours de phases plus ou moins longues.
® Pierre Mendès-France, Radical and former Prime Minister, was at the forefront o f the critics of French 
protectionism which he believed was suffocating the French economy. M. Camps, Britain and the European 
Community 1955-1963, Princeton University Press, 1964, p.80.
 ^M. Couve de Murville comment in Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.), 1958 - la faillite ou le miracle: Le plan 
de Gaulle-Rueff, Economica, 1986, p.57.
‘the extraordinary ignorance and the weight of century-old prejudices, which in France one terms colbertism, 
which at the time pervaded the dirgiste circles and made it impossible for them to conceive that one could 
open the French market to foreign competition’.
J. Weiller, “De la protection rigide aux contrôles souples”, in Revue économique, No.3, May 1958, 
pp.341-2 & p.346. Kaplan and Schleiminger stated that “As applied to foreign trade, the system reinforced 
traditionally high tariff levels.” Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.267.
‘it seems that after years o f discussion, the idea o f the establishment o f free market mechanismes due to the 
renouncement o f national dirigismes has generally been abandoned, at least in its initial simplicity'...'trade 
liberalization, in certain sectors, within certain zones or regions, for longer or shorter periods, can coincide or 
alternate with a reinforcement o f protection or controls for other sectors, zones or regions’.
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pourrant fort bien coïncider ou alterner avec un renforcement des ‘protections’ ou de 
‘contrôles’ pour d’autres secteurs, zones ou régions”. In the years immediately following 
the end of World War II, politicians of all denominations were very attracted by the idea 
of autarky for the French economy. Similarly, although for other reasons, industry saw 
great advantages in “une autarcie relative qui permettrait une reconstruction à l’abri des 
offensives des concurrents”.^  ^ Fear of French inability to compete internationally, 
combined with politically motivated aims for autarky, created an environment where free 
trade and payments were viewed with great skepticism. As the 1950s progressed, the 
political arguments for autarky began to wane. However the fear that French producers 
would not be able to withstand international competition lingered throughout the decade, 
thus constituting an important argument against dismantling exchange control and trade 
discrimination, particularly since it would be difficult to reintroduce them once they had 
been removed.
Moreover, there was a strong desire in France to ensure the continuation of strong 
trading links between France and the franc area countries. Since imports from the franc 
area were consistently lower than exports to it, France’s trade balance with the franc area 
was in constant surplus (see table IV. 1). A large share of the trade flows between France 
and the associated franc area, both from France to the franc area and vice versa, was only 
maintained through preferential trading arrangements and import barriers preventing the 
inflow of goods from countries outside the franc area. Without trade discrimination and 
with general convertibility, French exporters stood to lose sheltered markets, while French
H. Bonin, Histoire économique de la France depuis 1880, Masson, 1988, p. 167. 
ibid.
One o f the obstacles was that under the IMF Articles o f Agreement the reduction o f restrictions led to an 
attrition o f the privileges o f Article XIV, since Art. XIV allowed a country, during the transitional phase, to 
maintain and adapt but not to introduce restrictions on payments and transfers. Gold, The Fund’s Concept, 
p.23.
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importers would look for cheaper goods outside the franc area. The result would be an 
erosion of the cohesion of the franc area.^ "^  According to Lynch, “the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs saw the trade and payments arrangements within the French Union as offering a 
more stable and secure basis for restoring French independence than the closer association 
with westem Europe advocated by the United States and supported by the Ministry of 
Finance". The political ambitions of keeping together the French union favored trade 
discrimination and exchange control and were therefore unconducive to convertibility.
In addition to rejecting convertibility for fear of international competition, up until 
1958, French policymakers wanted to prevent the rest of Europe from moving to 
convertibility. In particular, they did not want a breakup of the EPU and a division of 
Europe into convertible and inconvertible currencies. France benefited from the EPU in 
two ways. First, as an overall debtor since 1951, France received large automatic credits 
from the EPU. Second, the settlements mechanism allowed France to offset, at least 
partially, large deficits with the sterling area, on which it relied for certain key raw 
materials, with surpluses with the metropolitan OEEC (see table IV. 1). Throughout the 
1950s, France ran trade deficits with the sterling area and the dollar area, whereas its trade 
balance was generally in surplus with the metropolitan OEEC and the finnc area.^  ^ A 
breakup of the EPU, initiated most likely by the UK, would dismpt the settlement 
mechanism between the sterling area, France and the OEEC, and it would force France to 
settle its sizable EPU debts "with its trading partners. Table IV.2 shows net annual credits 
or surpluses within the EPU during the course of the existence of the EPU. By the end of
see, de Lattre, Politique économique, pp.407-9; Lynch, “Restoring France”, p.62; Camps, Britain, p.83; 
Patterson, Discrimination, pp.234-5.
*^Lynch, “Restoring France”, p.70.
Milward, The European Rescue, p.369.
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1958, France had accumulated a total debt of just below $3 billion. As a result, France 
would be deprived of the chance of recovering the gold and foreign exchange paid to the 
surplus countries during the existence of the EPU and would instead be forced to settle on 
the spot its substantial debts with its EPU creditors. The fact that Germany was the biggest 
creditor in the EPU and that France would have to negotiate its debts with the loser of 
World War II was a particularly humiliating prospect. France had not given up the hope of 
becoming an EPU creditor and thus being able to recover, upon dissolution of the EPU, a 
portion of the gold and dollars it had paid out as EPU debtor.
Table IV.2: Net annual surpluses (+) or deficits within EPU 1951-8 (1 July - 30 June)
(million US dollars)
1950-1 1951-2 1952-3 1953-4 1954-5 1955-6 1956-7 1957-8 1958^
Austria -104 -38 +42 +106 -103 -6 +23 -4 +24
Bel.-Lux. +236 +509 -33 -55 +80 +222 +14 +153 +66
Denmark -68 +46 -17 -92 -94 +4 -43 +10 -1
France +194 -602 -417 -149 +115 -180 -969 -576 -317
FRG -281 +584 +260 +518 +296 584 +1336 +826 +350
Greece -140 -83 -28 -40 -27 +40 +5 +7 -49
Iceland -7 -6 -4 -5 -2 -4 -3 -3 -9
Italy -30 +194 -223 -210 -225 -125 -94 +219 +73
Netherlands -270 +477 +139 -42 +84 -62 -36 +86 +181
Norway -80 +21 -59 -61 -70 -27 +41 -78 -30
Portugal +59 +28 -23 -19 -59 -27 +41 -78 -30
Sweden -59 +284 -44 -37 -104 +6 +111 -30 +11
Switzerland +11 +158 +85 +73 +10 -66 -83 -189 +20
Turkey -64 -96 -50 -94 -38 -27 -36 -50 -14
UK +604 -1476 +371 +107 +136 -327 -225 -317 -267
a: 1 July to 27 December 
Source: reproduced from Milward, The European Rescue, p.364.
In early 1954, the French government feared that the British were preparing to 
establish sterling convertibility some time after July 1, 1954 and at the latest by 30 June,
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1955^^ French policymakers also anticipated that such a move would be followed by
Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. Aside from the disadvantages associated with the
breakup of the EPU, a move by the UK, Germany and perhaps other EPU members would
leave France with the unpleasant choice of “retaining a non-convertible currency or being
forced into a more competitive multilateral system at a time not of its own choosing”.
If the franc did not become convertible this would obstruct the workings of the 
ECSC through which the French steel industry was exporting increasing amounts 
of steel to the German Federal Republic. It would also undermine the 
modernization of French industry which was being stimulated with imports of 
German machines, machine tools and parts - the demand for which far exceeded 
the capacity of France itself to supply. But if the franc did become convertible then 
French industry would lose most of the protection which it enjoyed in the French 
overseas territories.^^
If the franc remained inconvertible then sterling convertibility meant that France would no
longer be able to offset its deficits with the sterling area with its surpluses with other
countries which might not have gone convertible, such as Turkey, Greece, Italy, etc.^ ®
Thus, France’s deficits with convertible currency countries would increase. But if the firanc
became convertible, France would lose an important import barrier, and there would be
pressure to remove discrimination against imports from the dollar area.^  ^ In a note for the
President of the French Republic, the Economic and Financial affairs in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs claimed:
On peut légitimement se demander si l'Europe Occidentale est mûre pour la 
convertibilité. Le redressement spectaculaire de l’économie européenne depuis 
1945 ne s’explique-t-il pas, dans une large mesure par les mécanismes de 
paiements créés dans le cadre de l’O.E.C.E. d’une part, et par la politique de 
discrimination commerciale à l’égard de la zone dollar d’autre part?^^
AEF B44744, “Les conséquences de la convertibilité”, May 24,1954.
Lynch, “Restoring France”, p.67. 
ibid.
AEF B44744, “Les conséquences de la convertibilité”, May 24,1955. 
ibid.
MAE DE CE 203, “Note pour le Président”, “a.s. Convertibilité des monnaies” from the Director of 
Economic and Financial affairs. May 24,1955.
‘One can legitimately ask one self whether Westem Europe is ready for convertibility. Cannot the 
spectacular recovery o f the European economy since 1945 be explained, to a large extent, by the
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Throughout most of the 1950s, trade considerations led France to reject the establishment 
of convertibility not only for themselves, but also for the other European currencies, and 
thus to do everything in their power to prevent Britain, and other countries, from 
establishing convertibility?^ French efforts to prevent other countries from establishing 
convertibility correspond to simultaneous French initiatives to prevent other European 
countries, for example, Belgium, from abolishing trade discrimination?^ The aim was to 
delay Europe’s return to convertibility until France’s internal economy was stable and 
competitive so as to allow it to liberalize its trade and payments?^
In addition to trade considerations, a British or German move to convertibility 
without French participation was likely to be interpreted as a sign of weakness, 
undermining further the international position of the franc. According to the above 
mentioned report, the political consequences would be a weakening of European political 
cooperation, and a weakening of France’s international political power in favor of a 
“direction anglo-américaine”.^  ^A French decision to follow the pound into convertibility, 
however, would expose the French economy to precisely those risks and incur precisely 
those costs which policymakers had sought to avoid by postponing convertibility in the 
first place.^  ^ In order to avoid these dilemmas, France not only put off establishing 
convertibility for the franc but also pursued a policy aimed at ensuring that Britain and
payments mechanisms created within the framework o f the OEEC on the one hand, and by the 
policy o f commercial discrimination of the dollar zone on the other?’
AEF B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10,1954.
For an account of French efforts to stop other countries from adopting universal non-discrimination, see, 
Patterson, Discrimination, pp.96 and 106-7.
^  AEF B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10,1954.
AEF B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10,1954.
Among other things, convertibility would have forced France to abandon its policy o f multiple exchange 
rates. Starting in early 1952, France subsidized exports up to 15 per cent, while imports were taxed up to 20 
per cent, with the aim of stimulating exports while curbing import demand. The result was an effective 
devaluation, with importer having to pay more francs per foreign currency unit, whereas exporters received 
more more francs per foreign currency unit. J.-P. Patat and M. Lutfalla. Histoire monétaire de la France 
auX)C siècle, Economica, 1986, pp. 146 & 157,
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Germany did not establish convertibility. Policymakers wanted to ensure that Britain 
stayed in the EPU and out of convertibility.
In France, trade considerations, if anything, influenced policy against the 
establishment of convertibility. France’s trade performance was not conducive to rapid 
progress towards convertibility since convertibility would only make it more difficult to 
contain import growth while not helping exports. On the contrary, the initial effect of 
convertibility was likely to be a reduction in exports as franc area countries shifted their 
purchases away from France and towards cheaper producers of industrial goods. Many 
countries of the ftiunc area did not have tariffs. This meant that exchange control was the 
principal means of ensuring “privileged access for French exports” The fear was that, 
“[n]ot only would convertibility open up these markets to foreign competitors but it would 
reveal the full extent of French privilege at a particularly sensitive time politically”.^  ^
Moreover, a move to non-resident convertibility would have increased French dollar 
payments, since France was in overall deficit with the non-franc area (see table IV. 1).^ ® It 
is not surprising, therefore, that French governments were very reluctant about 
convertibility, especially when they were keenly aware of the fact that “[l]es sondages 
effectués en France ont confirmé,..., que les milieux économiques français appréhendaient 
très vivement le retour à la convertibilité et qu'ils en différeraient volontier l'échéance 
pendant des années”.^  ^
Trade considerations, that is trade dependence and distribution as well as trade
Lynch, “Restoring France”, p.67. 
ibid.
In contrast Germany stood to increase its dollar earnings as a result o f convertibility (see chapter III). 
MAE DE CE 198, French Ambassador to the FRG (A. François-Poncet) to Pinay “a.s. du rétablissement 
de la convertibilité”, June 24,1955.
‘Opion polls carried out in France have confirmed,..., that French economic factions dreaded the return to 
convertibility and that they would gladly defer its occurrence for several years’.
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policy, played an important role in explaining France’s unwillingness to establish 
convertibility, or allowing other countries in Europe to establish convertibility, at least up 
until 1956. France’s insistence that social charges had to be harmonized among European 
countries before trade, and, implicitly, payments, could be freed seemed to indicate that 
trade and payments liberalization were part of a distant and uncertain future.^^
POLICY ON CONVERTIBILITY
B e f o r e  1958: t h e  p r im a c y  of  t h e  ‘r e l a n c e ’^^
French economic policy after World War II was defined by the aim of restoring 
and modernizing France’s productive capacity and the pursuit of economic expansion to 
raise average living standards. '^* Already during the German occupation period, 
politicians and academics in the French resistance movement drafted detailed plans and 
proposals for sweeping economic reforms, which should be implemented when France 
was liberated. The common theme in these proposals and reports was the desire to 
restore France’s position as a great power. This was to be achieved by an interventionist 
and dirigiste economic policy aimed at increasing production and expanding the
Camps, Britain and the European Community, pp.36-7, 65, 71-2 & 79.
The term is generally used to describe the policy o f getting France back on its feet economically by 
restoring the productive apparatus.
For a discussion o f French post-war economic policy orientations, see, for example, Bonin, Histoire 
économique, F. Braudel and E. Labrousse (eds.). Histoire économique et sociale de la France: Tome IV: 
L ’ère industrielle et la société d ’aujourd’hui (siècle 1880-1980), Presses Universitaires de France, 1982, 
F. Caron, An economic history o f  modem  France, translated by Barbara Bray, Columbia University Press 
1979, H. Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France et de la Monnaie sous la IV République, Dunod, 1983, 
De Lattre, Politique économique, pp.446-486, Jeanneney, Forces et faiblesses, 1959, S. Nordengren, 
Economie and Social Targets fo r  Postwar France; Studies o f  Freeh Economie Planning, Social 
Development and Industrial Structure 1940-1962, Lund University, 1972, P. Petit, “Expansionary 
Policies in a Restrictive World: The Case o f France”, in Guerrieri and Padoan (eds.), The Political 
Economy, pp.231-263, Saint-Paul, “Economie Reconstruction”, and Sautter, “France”.
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economy to ensure that France could revive its economic power and independence.^^ 
The reports generally advocated a nationalization of important sectors of industry and 
protection from international competition while France was in its expansionist phase, 
combined with medium-term plans and targets for expansion, production, prices and 
wages. These proposals set the tone for the economic policy orientation after the 
liberation.
The first post-war government under de Gaulle undertook a series of 
nationalizations, which included the coal mines, the central bank, the main car 
manufacturer Renault, the four major deposit banks, the insurance system and public 
utilities. In addition, prices and wages were heavily controlled. “As a result”, Gilles Saint- 
Paul wrote, “the French economy was organized on a basis quite different from that which 
prevailed in the prewar period, when free-market principles were more influential: 25 
percent of the workforce was employed in the public sector - about twice the prewar 
figure” Thus, in the late 1940s and throughout most of the 1950s the French economy 
was characterized by a high degree of state intervention, planning and regulation. The 
makers of French economic policy generally believed that the way to restore France’s 
economic prowess was through planning and policies aimed at promoting production. 
Contrary to the policies pursued before World War I, after World War II, the 
liberalization of the economy was not a top priority. Rather controls on prices, 
domestically, and trade and payments, externally, were seen as instruments which were 
used to achieve the goals of reconstruction and full employment. Many economic and 
political factions in France questioned the desirability of opening up France to foreign
See, for example, the “Rapport sur la politique économique d’après-guerre”, written by the Comité 
Général d’Études (C.G.E.), a research organ made up o f academics and politicians, and the writings by 
socialist Léon Blum and by Maxime Blocq-Marcart, one o f the leading figures in the French resistance 
movement, all o f which are discussed in Nordengren, Economic and Social Targets, pp.32-65.
Saint-Paul, “Economic reconstruction”, p.85.
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influences through the liberalization of trade, payments and capital flows. Contrary to in 
Britain and Germany, some form of autarky was considered the best policy choice for 
France economically and politically.^^ Once France had become competitive and the 
economy expanded sufficiently, trade, exchange and price controls could be lifted. 
Thus, analogously to the infant industry argument, in the early postwar period, French 
governments argued that economic reconstruction and the restoration of productive 
capacity had to come before liberalization. Attributing this policy orientation to 
historically proven tendencies, Thierry de Montbrial claimed that “[sjuivant 
F inclination traditionnelle des Français, les gouvemments de F après-guerre avaient 
choisi de reconstituer F appareil productif du pays en le préservant de la concurrence 
étrangère”.^  ^As the trade section has shown, the poor performance of France’s exports 
and the high demand for imports made French governments very reluctant towards 
convertibility, leading them instead to pursue a protectionist trade policy combined with 
tight exchange controls.^  ^In general, convertibility conflicted with the dirigisme which 
characterized French economic policy after World War II and with the desire to isolate 
the economy from foreign influence and competition until it had regained its economic 
prowess.
According to Bonin, after World War II France faced the conscious choice between imperial and 
protectionist autarky and 'T ouverture à la «comparaison» des forces et faiblesses”. He claimed that 
“[djans les années 1945-1950, la majorité des hommes politiques - en particulier- et des patrons français 
sont partisans d’une autarcie relative qui permettrait une reconstruction à l’abri des offesnsives des 
concurrents”. Bonin, Histoire économique, pp. 165 & 167.
T. de Montbrial, “L’Économie française en 1958”, in Institut Charles de Gaulle (éd.), 1958, p.9. 
‘Following the traditional French inclination, the post-war governments had chosen to reconstruct the 
productive apparatus o f the country by protecting it against foreign competition.’
According to René Girault, France’s participation in the European Common Market might be interpreted 
as a continuation o f  France’s protectionist trade policies, since the Common Market’s external tariff, on 
which France insisted adamantly, sheltered the French economy within a slightly increased internal market 
from the competitive pressures o f  the global market. R. Girault, “Les relations économiques avec 
l’extérieur (1945-1975): mutations et permanences”. Chapter VI in Braudel and Labrousse (eds.). 
Histoire économique, p. 1381.
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The primacy of the relance in French economic policy after World War II also 
implied that governments ignored the financial constraint or considered it of secondary 
importance. Similar to Germany, France emerged from World War II carrying the burden 
of à history of inflation and currency instability. Contrary to Germany, however, the 
French franc did not benefit from a substantial currency reform, an independent central 
bank or a general consensus on the importance of price stability, all of which contributed 
to restoring monetary stability and credibility in the German currency.
Table IV.3: France: annual inflation rates,
1946-1959 (per cent)
1946 28.0
1947 26.5
1948 4.8
1949 4.8
1950 8.6
1951 23.0
1952 3.1
1953 -0.6
1954 1.1
1955 2.5
1956 5.0
1957 7.9
1958 9.1
1959 5.9
Source: Saint-Paul, “Economic Reconstruction”, p.86.
With the benefit of hindsight, most observers today blame fiscal and monetary 
policy for France’s inflationary problems in the 1940s and 1950s. Between 1950 and 
1958, France’s average inflation rate was 5.7 per cent (see table IV.3). In this time period, 
France’s inflation rates varied widely from year to year, between 23.0 per cent in 1950 and 
-0.6 per cent in 1953. Germany experienced much lower inflation and much less 
variability in inflation than France in the same time period."*® Measured by the large 
swings in inflation, France experienced much more drastic stop-go cycles than Britain. In
40 See table 4 in chapter I for an international comparison o f  means and standard deviations o f inflation 
rates between 1946 and 1958.
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France, periods of rampant inflation and strong economic growth, encouraged by lax fiscal
and monetary policy, were abruptly replaced by periods of price stability, resulting from
drastic government measures aimed at halting inflation."*^
The erosion of the franc can be attributed to a conscious policy choice in favor of
expansion and against monetary stability. Thus, René Girault claimed that, after World
War II, the French government made a conscious choice in favor of growth and against
currency stability. He stated that:
malgré de traditionnelles déclarations officielles sur la défense de notre monnaie, 
un choix relativement aisé est fait en 1945-1946: mieux vaut relancer et 
reconstituer les forces productives plutôt que donner la priorité au maintien de la 
valeur du frunc; au demeurant F austérité dont font preuve au même moment les 
Britanniques était-elle possible dans une France économiquement bouleversée, 
politiquement agitée, socialement changeante? On peut en douter..."*^
Whereas in Germany, price and currency stability were goals of top priority, and whereas
in Britain, concern for the external value and the key currency status of the pound at least
confined expansionary monetary policy to certain limits, in France the stability of the
franc came a long way after the goal of economic growth on the list of policy priorities.
Henri Koch claimed that, in the post-war period and at least up until 1958, “le franc
semble avoir été sacrifié à F expansion, le monétaire à l’économique”.^  ^Koch blamed lax
and misguided fiscal and monetary policy for France’s inflationary problems:
Une fausse interprétation de la pensée de lord Keynes, selon laquelle le déficit des 
finances publiques peut être un stimulant pour une économie faiblissante, a 
conduit à appliquer ce stimulant, même en période de plein-emploi des moyens de 
production. Une politique trop laxiste en matière de prix agricoles, et partant de
Sautter daims that the inflation swings “were largely the result o f changing economic behaviour and 
eocnomic policies”. Sautter, “France”, p.450. see also Caron, An economic history, pp.319-323.
Girault, “Les relations”, p. 1388.
‘in spite o f traditional official declarations on the defense o f our currency, a relatively easy decision 
was made in 1945-1946: better to relaunch and restore the productive forces rather than give 
priority to the preservation o f the value o f the franc; incidentally the austerity which the British are 
currently displaying would it be possible in France which is economically shaken, politically 
agitated, socially changing? One might question this...’
H. Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France, p.370.
‘the franc seems to have been sacrificed to expansion, the monetary [realm] to the economic’.
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salaires, a poussé de son côté à T inflation."^
Similarly, Patat and Lutfalla claimed that the priority accorded to expansion over 
monetary stability constituted “une des grandes faiblesses du premier plan de 
modernisation et d’équipement, dans lequel les orientations financières et monétaires 
tiennent une place très modeste”/^
The period of relative price stability, between 1953 and 1955, can be explained by 
a fortunate combination of large inflows of US aid to cover military expenditure in 
Indochina, favorable international economic conditions, - in particular, low international 
raw material prices -, and a temporary improvement in consumer confidence, rather than 
by the abandonment of inflationary financial policies/^ The persistence of inflationary 
pressures even in the years when inflation remained moderate is reflected in the liquidity 
ratio which compares the money supply (M2) to GDP (see table IV.4). This ratio increased 
in fi"om 28.9 per cent to 34.9 per cent between 1952 and 1955.
Table IV.4: Liquidity ratio in France (M2/GDP), 1950 to 1958 (per cent)
1950 31.1
1951 29.2
1952 28.9
1953 30.8
1954 33.1
1955 34.9
1956 34.8
1957 33.8
1958 31.6
Source: M2: Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France, table IV, p.410; GDP at market prices:
ibid, p.371.
‘A misinterpretation o f Lord Keynes’s theories, according to which government expenditure can 
serve to stimulate a sluggish economy, has led to the application o f this stimulus, even in periods 
o f full employment o f the means o f production. A too lax policy regarding agricultural prices, 
and, consequently, vis-à-vis salaries, in turn boosted inflation.’
Patat and Lutfalla. Histoire monétaire, p. 121.
^  Thus, according to Patat and Lutfalla, “la politique financière menée entre 1953 et 1955 était lourde de 
potentialités inflationnistes, potentialités qui ne se sont pas manifestées durant cette période car, et c ’est là le 
plus grand mérite des responsables de l’époque, un climat de confiance avait été instauré”. Patat and 
Lutfalla, Histoire Monétaire, p. 139.
‘the financial policy pursued between 1953 and 1955 was laden with inflationary potential, a potential 
which did not manifest itself during this period because, and this is the biggest achievement o f the 
policymakers at the time, a climate o f confidence had been established.’
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OECD Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics, 1962. 
Moreover, budget deficits remained high, especially when compared to British and
German figures (see table IV.5). A highly regulated and therefore rigid labor market, wage
indexation, and the lack of competition in many sectors due to nationalization, regulations,
cartelization and protectionism made inflation a structural phenomenon in the 1950s/^ In
addition, a policy of easy credit and the generous financing of budget deficits, contributed
significantly to growing inflationary pressures.
Table IV.5: Government deficit or surplus (per cent of GNP): 1950-1958
France Germany UK
1950 -5.9 -0.7 2.9
1951 -4.2 -0.6 -1.3
1952 -6.2 0.6 -3.6
1953 -5.6 1.0 -1.6
1954 -5.0 0.9 -0.2
1955 -4.6 1.1 -0.9
1956 -5.8 0.6 -0.6
1957 -5.0 -1.1 -1.1
1958 -2.7 -0.1 -0.9
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics.
The nationalization of the French central bank confirmed the priority attributed to 
the economic expansion at the expense of monetary stability. Deprived of its 
independence after World War II, the Banque de France had to provide generous credits to 
finance government deficits, and was severely restricted in its ability to defend the stability 
of the currency. “Newly nationalized at the end of 1945, it had become an instrument of 
the Finance Ministry. Lacking a fixed term of office, its Governor served at the pleasure of 
the government and could readily be replaced. His power rested wholly on his ability to
F. Caron and J. Bouvier, “Indices majeurs” in Braudel and Labrousse (eds.), Histoire économique, 
p. 1019. For a contemporary assessment o f  the French economy, see the annual reviews “La France 
économique en ...” in the July-October issues o f Revue d ’économie politique. See also J.-M. Jeanneney, 
“Les recessions françaises d’après guerre” in Revue économique. No. 6, November 1957, pp.939-978.
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persuade the Finance Minister to accept his advice.”^^
In addition to fiscal policy and the loss of central bank independence, the political
situation after World War II was not conducive to a policy of stable money:
The two main characteristics of the French economy during the 1945-1959 period 
are, first, the persistent climate of political and economic instability: governments 
were rotating at a dizzying pace, budgetary and balance of payments crises were 
recurrent, inflation was rarely controlled, and so forth; and second - this was a 
novelty compared to the prewar period - the major involvement of the state in all 
sectors of the economy, in particular in the financial sector and heavy industry
Whereas in Germany the trio Adenauer, Erhard and Vocke ensured consistency in
economic policymaking throughout the 1950s, in France, the frequent changes in top-level
figures and political parties resulted in a zigzag path in economic policy, further
complicating the already difficult task of reconstructing the French economy while
maintaining monetary stability. The large electoral support of the Communist party
deterred French governments from implementing unpopular expenditure cuts or stricter
monetary policy. Kaplan and Schleiminger wrote:
A quarter to a third of the electorate voted regularly for a Communist party that 
promised all sorts of material beneficence. The other political parties of the Fourth 
Republic had to combine in an endless succession of short-lived cabinets, each 
unwilling to emphasize anti-inflationary policies. Entitlement programmes and 
housing subsidies soon became exceedingly generous, and concessions were made 
repeatedly to the unremitting demands for higher wages.^^
The history of franc instability combined with the clear post-war government 
commitment to growth and the lack of competition both in labor and product markets 
eroded confidence in the franc, inducing people to hold their wealth in gold or abroad and 
in foreign currencies, rather than at home in francs. As Bloomfield observed in 1954:
No major country has, over the years, suffered more from wars and from
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.268.
Saint-Paul, “Economic reconstruction”, pp.83-4. See also Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France, 
p.371.
° Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, pp.267-268.
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continuous internal and external depreciation in the value of its money. As a result, 
the French people have long since become exceedingly conscious of and sensitive 
to these developments and rumors of such; and the tradition has been firmly 
established of keeping substantial funds abroad, and of hoarding gold, to ensure 
against such contingencies. In such a psychological atmosphere, every little 
development that would seem to presage inflation, exchange depreciation, or war 
is sufficient to provoke a flight of capital.
The major financial and political disturbances that have occurred in France during 
the postwar years, including inflation, exchange depreciation, internal political 
instability, and war scares, have perpetuated and indeed intensified this capital 
flight sensitivity on the part of the French people.^ ^
Bloomfield referred to “unofficial estimates, of uncertain value”, which, “generally place 
the total of French postwar capital flight into hard currencies and gold at between 400 
million and 600 million dollars a year”.^ ^
In light of the weakness of the French firanc, convertibility was certain to unleash a 
run on the firanc, not by foreign holders, as in Britain, but by French residents anxious to 
move their wealth into more stable currencies.^^ Thus, in contrast to the British situation, 
policymakers worried more about resident conversions of the firanc than about non­
resident holdings of French firanc, that is, firancs held by non-residents of the firanc zone, 
which were very limited. '^*
In 1952, a committee of economists, members of the central bank and some 
politicians, convened to discuss convertibility as a possible solution to France’s
Bloomfield, Speculative, p.42.
ibid., p.43.
The weakness o f the French franc is clearly reflected in the bank note rate shown in figure 1 in chapter 
III.
The French tendency to hoard gold, due to the lack o f credibility o f the government’s ability to check 
inflation, is mentioned in a report from a Bank o f England official in BoE OV45/91, “Paris: Sundry 
points o f interest, supplementary to Mr. Bridge’s memorandum o f  the 21st November 1952”, by E.M.H., 
March 12, 1953.
It is very difficult to obtain figures o f non-resident holdings. In 1955, the Director o f Finance and 
Economics in the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs noted that “les avoirs en francs des non residents de la zone 
franc sont très peu élevés”. MAE DE CE 203, “Note pour le président” “a.s. Convertibilité des monnaies”, 
from the Director for economic and financial affairs. May 24, 1955. Similarly, the Bank for International 
Settlements stated in its 24th annual report in 1954 that “there are no great amounts o f  French francs in the 
hands of residents o f other countries”. BIS, 24th Annual Report April 1, 1953 to March 31,1954, p. 129.
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monetary problems/^ The three principal questions addressed were, first, whether gold 
convertibility could restore monetary stability, second, whether, and under which 
conditions, convertibility could be maintained, and, third, whether, once monetary 
stability was reestablished, convertibility would become superfluous. Among the 
committee of experts, there were several fervent advocates of currency convertibility, 
among them Wilfried Baumgartner, the governor of the Banque de France who spoke of 
“ce paradis terrestre où toutes les monnaies seraient convertibles”.^  ^ The advocates 
argued that gold convertibility assured monetary stability by imposing monetary 
discipline on the government and by securing confidence in the currency in addition to 
facilitating trade. They claimed that the problem with the existing system of 
inconvertible currencies was that budgetary discipline was viewed not as an 
unconditional impossibility but as one of several policy choices.
The opponents of convertibility argued, in contrast, that convertibility severely 
hampered the government’s ability to manage the economy. They contended that full 
employment combined with a satisfactory standard of living could not be assured when 
the franc was convertible. Moreover, they argued that convertibility was not a wonder 
drug against inflation. In spite of the differences in opinion, the experts generally agreed 
that convertibility could not be established unilaterally by France alone. The general 
conclusion reached by the group of experts was that financial discipline and the 
restoration of monetary stability should become a top government priority since a sound 
currency was crucial for a stable and favorable economic development and for an 
improved trade performance.^^ Contrary to British policymakers and some economists
Conseil économique, Étude sur la remise en vigueur d ’une monnaie librement convertible en or. 
Études et travaux No.24, Presses Universitaires de France, 1952.
Conseil économique. Études sur la remise en vigueur, p. 11.
‘this earthly paradise where all the currencies would be convertible’, 
ibid., p .l6 .
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who argued that insufficient international liquidity and other exogenous factors 
undermined the pound, the expert committee pointed out that external causes could not 
be blamed for France’s problems, and it rejected devaluation as a single-handed remedy 
for France’s inflationary and trade problems. Contrary to Britain, in France aspirations 
for international key currency status do not appear to have played a crucial role in France’s 
policy on convertibility. Comparing the franc to sterling in 1956, the Director of External 
Finance in the Finance Ministry observed that in the case of France, “les considerations de 
prestige monétaire sont relativement secondaires en raison du rôle très limité que remplit 
le franc en tant que monnaie internationale”.^  ^ For this reason, among other things, the 
director argued, the creation of a transferable franc identical to transferable sterling was 
not considered. Domestic economic concerns, thus, played a greater role in determining 
French policy on convertibility than considerations regarding a potential international key 
currency status for the franc.
In the postwar period, US aid was a controversial issue in France which also 
surfaced in connection with convertibility. US aid alleviated significantly France’s balance 
of payments problems in the 1950s, turning deficits into surpluses in 1950 and 1953 (see 
tables IV.5 and IV.6).^  ^In 1955 and 1956, a large part of the US aid was in the form of 
military aid for the war in Indochina. Overall, France relied on US assistance to finance its 
budget deficits, to increase its foreign exchange reserves and to offset external deficits. 
While foreign aid was viewed as necessary to stabilize the balance of payments, it
AEF B44242, Memo by the Directeur des Finances extérieures: “Note pour le Ministre - Objet: Évolution 
du régime des paiements internationaux - convertibilité et ‘transférabilité’ des monnaies européennes.” 
February 20,1956.
‘considerations o f monetary prestige are relatively secondary due to the very limited role which the franc 
plays as international currency’.
Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France, pp. 195-199.
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seriously piqued French national pride. Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, member of the Rueff 
committee which designed the 1958 economic reform, characterized France’s dependence 
on US aid as “à la fois moralement humiliant et politiquement dangereux”.^ ° His 
impression was that “tous les fonctionnaires ou économistes français ressentaient 
profondément cette humiliation dès qu’ils se trouvaient en contact avec des étrangers”.^  ^
Aid was particularly resented because it gave the US a right to assess and even interfere in 
France’s economic policy.
Table FV.6: US aid to France, 1948-1956 (million US dollars)
1948 1,366
1949 612
1950 480
1951 480
1952 340
1953 340
1954 507
1955 537
1956 96
Source: Revue d ’économie politique, July-October 1956, p.533 and July-October 1957, p.767,
and Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.), 1958, chapter I.
The resentment over France’s reliance on American goodwill and money flared up 
particularly in connection with convertibility in 1954 and 1955. In 1954, and again in 
1955, it seemed possible that Britain or Germany or both would move to convertibility 
soon. The US Finance Ministry judged the situation to be favorable for France to use the 
opportunity to combine franc convertibility with a devaluation.^^ Pierre Mendès-France, 
Foreign Minister at the time and future Prime Minister, vehemently opposed the 
establishment of convertibility for the franc, arguing that the French economy was not
60 Jeanneney comment. Institut Charles De Gaulle (ed.), 1958, chapter I, p. 17.
‘both morally humiliating and politically dangerous’.
‘all French civil servants and economists acutely resented this humiliation when they were dealing with 
foreigners’.
Lynch, “Le franc fr-ançais 1952-1956: Le débat sur la convertibilité”, in Comité pour l’histoire 
économique et financière de la France (éd.). Du franc Poincaré à Vécu, Colloque tenu à Bercy les 3 et 4 
décember 1992, Presses de l’imprimerie nationale, 1993, p.390.
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sufficiently prepared for the step. He criticized US aid for concealing the gravity of
France’s balance of payments problems and for making France dependent on foreign aid.
France should not move to convertibility until it was strong enough to do so on its own,
that is, without foreign help. Therefore, what was needed, was an improvement in French
competitiveness, budgetary consolidation and greater price stability. He advocated
opening the French market up to foreign competition.^^
France was much more sensitive and hostile to foreign intervention in its economy
and economic policy than Germany. One of the paramount concerns of French
policymakers was that nobody, in particular not the US or UK, should have the power to
interfere with, or shape its policy decisions.^ According to Hanrieder, the need for
political and economic independence and diplomatic self-reliance conflicted sharply with
the need to participate in European integration and the dependence on US aid. The strong
French reaction to its dependence on foreign aid can be explained by what Hanrieder
called “a quest for self-definition and self-assurance after living through the humiliating
conditions of the German occupation and the political uncertainties that followed in the
wake of the liberation”. The goal was to regain “freedom of action, flexibility of
diplomacy, international prestige, and national pride”.^  ^In 1955, the Director of Economic
and Financial affairs wrote that:
I’adoption par la France de la convertibilité, qui suppose la ratification, par le 
Parlement, du GATT et, de la part de la France, la recherche d’un soutien positif 
auprès du Fonds Monétaire International, nous mettra obligatoirement dans un état 
de dépendance accru à l’égard de la politique américaine et de la politique 
britannique ... Dans la mesure où nous aurons, en nous engageant dans une telle 
voie, outrepassé nos forces, nous serons amenés à solliciter une aide et des 
dérogations auprès due GATT et du F.M.I., c’est-à-dire auprès du Commonwealth 
britannique pour le premier de ces organismes, et auprès de la Trésorerie
AEF B44744, Pierre Mendès-France to Edgar Faure, Finance and Economies Minister, July 10, 1954. 
See also. Lynch, “Le franc”, p.390.
^  See cooperation chapter for discussion on French attitudes toward foreign advice on how to handle 
economic problems.
Hanrieder, The Foreign Policies, pp. 115-116 & 119.
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américaine pour ce qui est du second. Cette perspective, qui est loin d’être 
encourageante, devrait à elle seule nous amener à prendre une position 
restrictive.^^
Whereas Britain regarded US financial assistance as a prerequisite for a move to sterling 
convertibility, France ideally wanted to establish convertibility, when it was no longer 
dependent on US or other foreign aid, and, consequently, when it was no longer forced to 
listen to foreign advice on how to run its economy.
Table IV.7: French balance of payments, 1950-1960 (million US dollars)
Balance on 
goods & services
Overall balance
1950 3 354
1951 -630 -566
1952 -771 -179
1953 -4 168
1954 356 620
1955 506 745
1956 -686 -718
1957 -1,015 -1,305
1958 -492 25
1959 627 1,590
1960 780 485
Source: OECD, Statistics o f  the Balance o f Payments, 1950-1961.
Throughout the period, the Banque de France took a more favorable stance 
towards convertibility than the successive French governments. From 1952 onwards, the 
stability of the franc was the prime concern of Baumgartner, governor of the Banque de 
France.^  ^He saw convertibility as a way of drawing France out of its inflationary isolation
66 MAE DE CE 203, “Note pour le président” “a.s. Convertibilité des monnaies”, by the Director for 
economic and financial affairs. May 24,1955.
‘the adoption o f convertibility by France, which presupposes the ratification, by Parliament, by 
GATT, and, from the French side, the securing o f IMF support, will necessarily put us in a state 
of increased dependence vis-à-vis US and British p o licy .... To the extent that, in committing us 
in this direction, we will have exceeded our capabilities, we will be forced to plead for financial 
support and for derogations to GATT and the IMF, that is, to the British Commonwealth first o f 
all, and, secondly, to the US Treasury. This prospect, which is far from encouraging, should, on 
its own, lead us to take a restrictive position.’
For a discussion o f the policies and influence o f the French central bank between 1945 and 1958, see 
O. Feiertag, “Entre la défense du franc et les impératifs de l’économie nationale, les pouvoirs de la
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and forcing it to recognize the external constraint. His views are best summarized in his 
dramatic appeal to Edgar Faure, President of the Republic, in 1952 to preserve the value of 
the franc: “La monnaie, c’est l’expression de la valeur d’un pays, le franc, c’est la France. 
La dégradation du franc, c’est l’abaissement de la France.”^^  Baumgartner strongly 
advocated a collective return to currency convertibility. In particular, he worried about the 
effects of a dissolution of the EPU on France’s balance of payments as a result of a move 
to convertibility by Britain or Germany or both.^  ^However, the influence of the French 
central bank on monetary policy was severely curtailed when it was nationalized in 
1945.™
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a key player in the return to currency 
convertibility in France. The influence of this ministry be explained by the fact that 
convertibility was considered an important step for the French economy and for the 
international economic system. Since the economic recovery of France was considered to 
be a stepping stone to the international political recovery of France as a major power, the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry was involved in any issues which were thought to affect the 
French economy, in particular France’s economic relations with the rest of the world. 
Throughout most of the 1950s the Ministry of Foreign Affairs viewed convertibility as
Banque de France et de son gouverneur sous la IV* République”, in Comité pour l’histoire économique et 
financière de la France (éd.), Du franc Poincaré, pp.362-383. 
quoted in Feiertag, “Entre la défense”, p.374.
“Alors qu’il était nettement favorable au rétablissement de la convertibilité du franc, Baumgartner était 
conscient des problèmes qui se poseraient au niveau de la stabilité politique et économique du pays si les 
pays adhérents de l’UEP ne coordonnaient pas leurs politiques au moment du retour à la convertibilité”. 
Lynch, “Le fr-anc”, p.394.
‘While he was clearly in favor o f the return to franc convertibility, Baumgartner was conscious o f the 
problems which presented themselves regarding economic and political stability if  the EPU members did 
not coordinate their policies at in the return to convertibility.’
In 1953, the overseas and foreign office o f the Bank o f  England remarked on the limited power o f the 
Banque de France in matters of exchange control. OV 45/91, “Paris - January 1953”, by R.S.W., January 
16, 1953. Similarly, Kaplan and Schleiminger claimed that in the 1950s, the French central bank was an 
instrumern o f the finance miniatry. Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.268.
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something which was more dangerous to the reconstruction of the French economy, and 
thus to political recovery, than it was beneficial. Frances Lynch asserted that between 
1952 and 1956,
le Quai d’Orsay fut hostile au rétablissement de la convertibilité, en raison à la fois 
d’une optique impérialiste quelque peu désuète et des doutes que ce ministère 
nourrissait à l’égard de l’idéal du libre-échange et de la libre convertibilité des 
monnaies, alors prônés par l’Administration américaine et qu’il prétendait 
invoqués à la seule fin de protéger les intérêts des grandes puissances.^^
Up until 1958, the position of French policymakers, both in the Finance and in the Foreign
Affairs Ministry, regarding convertibility is best summarized by the statement that
France’s national interest “n’est sûrement pas ni de se précipiter dans la convertibilité, ...
ni que les autres pays l’établissent, avant qu’elle ait pu combler son retard”.^  ^In fact, the
strongest opposition to convertibility definitely came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The statement by Pierre Sadrin, Director of Economic and Financial Affairs in the Foreign
Affairs Ministry, made in May 1955, illustrates the view of that ministry:
Toute la philosophie de la convertibilité repose sur une fiction, à savoir que les 
pays, leur monnaie, leurs conditions de développement, leur structure économique, 
sont à peu près comparables et qu’ils sont, par conséquent, interchangeables. Rien 
n’est plus faux.
Les partisans de la convertibilité, pour justifier leur thèse, font miroiter un monde 
où régnerait la concurrence à l’état pur et la non discrimination. Ils ne poursuivent 
en réalité que des chimères, dans la mesure où ils ne cherchent pas à atteindre des 
buts de politique purement nationale.^^
Lynch “Le franc”, p.394.
‘The Quai d’Orsay was hostile to the re-establishment o f convertibility due to a slightly outdated 
imperialist point o f view and the doubts which this ministry harbored regarding free trade and 
currency convertibility which were extolled by the US administration and which the ministry 
claimed were appealed to for the sole purpose o f furthering the interest great powers.’ 
AEF-B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10,1954.
‘was surely not to rush into convertibility,... nor that the other countries established it before it had been able 
to catch up.’
^ MAE DE CE 203, “Note pour le président”, “a.s. Convertibilité des monnaies”, from le Directeur des 
Affaires Économiques et financières, May 24,1955.
‘ The philosophy o f convertibility rests entirely on a ficticious idea, that countries, their 
currencies, their conditions o f development, their economic structure, are roughly comparable 
and that they are consequently, interchangeable. Nothing is more fallacious. The advocates o f  
convertibility, to justify their hypothesis, convey a world where free competition would reign in 
its pur and non-discriminatory form. In reality they are pursuing an illusion, in so far as they are 
merely seeking to reach purely national political goals.’
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The primacy of political and economic renewal limited the room of maneouvre of the 
French Ministry of Finance in the return to convertibility. Moreover, throughout the 
1950s, convertibility was closely linked to questions of European cooperation and 
integration, making it a high politics issue.
In 1949 and 1950, the French economy experienced, what turned out to be a 
brief period of monetary stability, satisfactory gro^vth and a rapid improvement in its 
balance of payments. As a result, the government started to liberalize trade and remove 
exchange control. The liberalization measures were based on the expectation that the 
economy would remain healthy in the future. However, with the outbreak of the Korean 
War inflation shot up, to 23 per cent in 1951, and France’s balance of payments 
deteriorated rapidly.^ "^  In response to the worsening external balance, France quickly 
retreated into protectionism and exchange control, suspending all trade liberalization 
completely in February 1952. When things improved again, the government ventured back 
into trade and payments liberalization in 1954 and 1955. As in 1950, however, the period 
of favorable external balances was ended abruptly in 1956. Again the government 
deliberalized trade and re-introduced exchange controls. In addition, policymakers 
resorted to a multiple exchange rate by increasing both import taxes and export subsidies, 
a practice which ran counter to the spirit of the IMF. The result was an effective 
devaluation of the franc. While the French ministers were willing to progress towards freer 
trade and convertibility when the economic situation was favorable, they did not hesitate
According to Patat and Lutfalla, international circumstances initially pushed up inflation but “le 
relâchement des contraintes de la politique interne y contribue dans une large mesure”. Patat and Lutfalla, 
Histoire monétaire, p. 125.
‘the relaxation o f constraints in the internal policy contributed to a large extent’.
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to reintroduce trade and payments restrictions when conditions deteriorated. Overall, 
Gilles Saint-Paul claimed that “[t]here was no increase in openness of the French economy 
over the period 1946-1959 period”.^  ^ Up until 1958, the resort to trade and payments 
restrictions, and multiple exchange rates, belonged to a range of discretionary policy tools 
with which France managed its economy. Official convertibility would have deprived 
French ministers of the freedom to resort to these three policy tools when the economy 
was faltering. French policymakers were more than reluctant to give up these instruments.
Currency convertibility conflicted with the general policy orientation in France 
throughout most of the 1950s. The ability to exchange money freely was incompatible 
with the protectionism and dirigisme with which policymakers managed the French 
econom yPol icym akers  agreed that France had very little to gain and veiy much to 
lose from establishing convertibility. Successive governments shared the belief that France 
was not ready to open up its economy until French exports had become competitive, price 
stability had improved, budget finances had been consolidated, and both residents and 
non-residents had regained confidence in the franc. The Nathan Commission created to 
examine the root of France’s inflationary problems concluded in 1954 that “la 
convertibilité du franc ne pourrait être rétablie qu’une fois la stabilité des prix assurée, les 
échanges libéralisés et le solde extérieur rééquilibré”.^ ^
In France, convertibility was not attributed the symbolic importance that it was
Saint-Paul, “France”, p.309.
France’s financial system after World War II was characterized by pervasive controls and government 
intervention and allocation. See, for example, J. Mélitz, Monetary Policy in France, Centre for Economic 
Policy Research Discussion Paper No.509, January 1991.
^  Lynch, “Le franc”, p.390. See also de Lattre, Politique économique, p.468 and Lynch, “Restoring 
France”, p.66. See also Ministère des Affaires Financières et Économiques, Commission créée par arrêté 
du 6 janvier 1954 pour l ’étude des disparités entre les prix français et étrangers, 1954.
‘franc convertibility could not be re-established until price stability was assured, trade liberalized and the 
external balance back in equilibrium’.
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in Britain, where it was simultaneously a token of the British claim to its position of 
international financial power and of the Conservative Party’s prestige, and in Germany, 
where convertibility stood for political and economic normalization. Rather, up until 
1958, French ministers viewed convertibility as an important but technical monetary 
condition, the establishment of which depended purely on the achievement of France’s 
economic reconstruction. Successive governments shared the view that restrictions on 
trade and payments could not be removed until the French economy had become 
competitive enough to be opened up to world competition. Since monetary stability was 
accorded secondary importance, after economic reconstruction, the establishment of 
convertibility was also relegated to the group of secondary policy goals.
The development of the French economy in the 1950s led to the grooving 
realization, among policymakers, that state intervention, protectionism and exchange 
control were not having the desired effect of strengthening the French economy. On the 
contraiy, the external balance failed to show lasting improvement and inflationary 
pressures continued to plague economic stability. In response to this realization, 1958 
saw a fundamental change of tactics, which included a change in the policy on 
convertibility.
C h a n g in g  C o u r s e  
The deterioration
In 1956 and 1957, French economic problems exploded. Inflation accelerated and 
the balance of payments deteriorated rapidly (see tables IV.3 and IV.8). In addition, 
budget deficits worsened (see table IV.5). Speculation against the French franc grew at an 
alarming pace, particularly during the Suez crisis, in August and September 1956, and in
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the fall of 1957 (see figure 1 in chapter III). From mid-1957 on, the government 
implemented economic policies that were aimed at improving France’s external economic 
problems.^^ In 1957 Economics and Finance Minister Félix Gaillard suspended 
liberalization and effectively devalued the jfranc by 20 per cent. In addition, measures were 
introduced to reduce rapidly rising budget deficits, which increased from fr658 billion in 
1955 to frl,011 billion in 1956 and fr 1,041 billion in 1957. The discount rate was raised 
from three per cent to four per cent in April 1957 and to five per cent in August 1957. 
Patat and Lutfalla claimed that, starting in spring 1957, France implemented “pour la 
première fois une politique de limitation de la croissance de la monnaie et du crédit, 
particulièrement rigoureuse, et qui peut être considérée comme la première expérience 
française d’encadrement du crédit”.^  ^While the measures were successful in cutting the 
budget deficit for 1958 back to pre-1956 proportions, they failed to reverse the 
deterioration of the balance of payments or to reduce inflationary pressures. Moreover, the 
1959 budget deficit looked likely to exceed again the frl,000 billion threshold. Although 
the combination of restrictive monetary policy, modest budget cuts, the renewed 
suspension of trade liberalization, and a devaluation, granted brief respite, the policies 
failed to correct France’s external economic problems. France’s trade performance 
continued to indicate a structural inability of exports to offset imports even when exports 
were subsidized and imports were taxed. In addition, the franc was volatile and reserves 
remained precariously low.
Accordingly, many observers saw the problems in 1956 and 1957 not as passing
B. de Jouvenel, “France Takes the Big Way”, in The Banker, February 1959, p.91.
Patat and Lutfalla, Histoire monétaire, p. 151.
‘for the first time a particularly rigorous policy o f  limiting the growth o f the money supply and o f credit, 
which can be considered as the first French experience with credit restriction’.
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economic crises, caused by extraordinary circumstances, but as a reflection of the general
malaise that had been troubling the French economy since World War II. In this climate of
economic crisis, the realization grew that a drastic policy change was necessary. Domestic
and foreign criticism of French economic policies became stronger. The OEEC’s 1957
economic report openly criticized French policy for its failure to resist inflationary
pressures and outlined the need for a policy change to restore monetary stability:
The crisis that France now faces, like those of the past, is the result of the fact that 
relatively small adjustments to economic policy were not made at the appropriate 
moment. As a result, France has tended to live beyond its means and to get itself 
into difficulties which have hampered rather than stimulated the economic growth 
of the country...It is essential that adequate steps should be taken now - before the 
Common Market and proposed Free Trade Area come into effect - to extricate the 
economy from its present difficulties, and that the rate of development should be 
limited to the real resources available. Unless such a change occurs, France will be 
unable to play an appropriate leading role in the creation of a freer trade and 
payments system and in the consequential strengthening of the economy of 
Western Europe as a whole.^^
Elsewhere, French governments were criticized for tackling France’s structural problems
with temporary solutions.^ ^ Writing for The Banker, Jo Saxe argued that to restore
economic stability, one would have to “attack the roots of the malaise, an exercise that no
government of the Fourth Republic carried through; few enough had the courage to
identify the true causes of weakness”.*^
At home, some contemporary observers blamed the increased military expenditure
in connection with the war in Algeria, rising petrol prices, currency instability caused by
the Suez crisis, and crop failures for the inflationary pressures that built up in 1956 and
1957.^  ^However, a growing number of policymakers correctly interpreted these factors as
unfortunate circumstances which only made an already bad situation worse.^ Guitton
OEEC, Economic Conditions in France, 1957, p.20.
** The Banker, “Europe’s Problem Currencies”, July 1957, p.428.
J. W. Saxe, “The Economics o f de Gaulle”, in The Banker, July 1958, p.433.
A. Grosser, La IV  République et sa politique extérieure. Librairie Armand Colin, 1961, p. 349 
^ The report by the government commission on the state o f France’s national accounts asserted: “Ces
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spoke of the “hantise...de l’inflation” (‘the ghost of inflation’) which had been present 
throughout the post-war period.^^ Persistent inflationary pressures had eroded the franc as 
illustrated by the three devaluations that had taken place between 1948 and 1957, with a 
fourth devaluation in 1954/5 only avoided by implementing drastic protectionist measures. 
In addition to the French central bank and economists, who had warned about persistent 
inflationary pressures since 1952, by 1957, policymakers began to recognize that inflation 
was a structural problem.^^ Assessing the situation in July 1957, the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry’s finance and economics section warned, in a report to the President of the 
Republic, that current measures to reduce inflation, consolidate the budget deficit and 
deliberalize trade were not sufficient to solve France’s economic problems. Only a 
sweeping economic reform could restore economic stability.^^
The development of France’s foreign exchange reserves reflected very clearly the 
deterioration of the external situation. By mid-1957, France’s reserves had virtually 
disappeared, having dropped rapidly and continuously from their post war peak in January 
1956 of fr656 billion. These figures included France’s drawing rights in the IMF, its EPU 
credit facilities and a special EPU credit, financed mainly by Germany, of $150 million 
accorded in early 1958.
événements exceptionnels ont rendu plus brutal le retournement naturel de notre balance commerciale, 
qui date de la fin de 1955”.
Le Monde, “C’est la perte de nos réserves de devises qui a été le prix de l’expansion”, May 11-12, 1958, 
p.7.
‘These exceptional circumstances have aggravated the natural reversal o f our trade balance, which started 
in the end o f  1955.’
H. Guitton, “Avant-Propos”, in Revue d'économie politique, July-October 1960, p.38.
MAE DE CE 354, “L’instabilité financière en France”, July 25,1957.
MAE DE-CE 362, “Note pour le President”, “a.s. Pénurie de devises et politique externe”, by the 
Department o f Economie and Financial Affairs o f the Foreign Ministry, July 20, 1957.
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Figure IV.l: Gold and foreign exchange reserves, 1950-1958 
(billion fr) (monthly figures)
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Source: Patat, and Lutfalla, Histoire monétaire, p.265.
As a result of the continuous deterioration of foreign exchange reserve holdings, by late 
1957/early 1958, it was clear to most policymakers that drastic and far-reaching measures 
would be necessary to improve France’s balance of payments and to reverse the large 
outflow of reserves.In May 1958, the report by the government commission on the state 
of France’s national accounts stated: “C’est la perte de nos réserves de devises qui a été le 
prix de l’expansion”.^  ^The recent history of repeated franc devaluations and inflationary 
pressures had created an environment in which inflationary expectations had become an 
integral part of people’s economic behavior.^® Inflationary expectations constantly 
threatened price stability and thus international competitiveness.^^ Only a drastic and far-
** MAE DE CE 362, “Note pour le Président, a.s. Pénurie de devises et politique externe”, from the 
direction o f  economic and financial affairs, July 20,1957.
Le Monde, “C’est la perte de nos réserves de devises qui a été le prix de l’expansion”, May 11-12, 
1958, p.7.
Jeanneney, Forces et faiblesses, p. 164.
Amaud-Ameller, La France, pp.73-82.
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reaching economic reform could restore credibility in the French franc and thus create the 
environment necessary for stable growth. The restoration of the stability of the franc had 
to be the principal objective.
The official establishment of convertibility was regarded as an important step
which would profoundly affect the French economy and international economic and
monetary relations. A report by the finance and economics section of the Foreign Affairs
Ministry from 1955 emphasized that there was a big difference between the gradual
relaxation of exchange restrictions which had established de facto convertibility in many
countries, particularly Britain and Germany, by 1955 and the official establishment of
convertibility, as it took place in 1958.
[L]a convertibilité de fait se réalise par étapes insensibles, sans porter gravement 
atteinte aux institutions existantes; surtout elle n’ose pas dire son nom. La 
convertibilité de droit, au contraire, procède d’une action volontaire et 
spectaculaire. Elle s’accompagne moins que la convertibilité de fait des nuances et 
des compromis. Elle repose sur une base psychologique tout autant que sur des 
droits au profit des tiers; elle vit de leur confiance. C’est pourquoi le 
rétablissement de la convertibilité rendrait manifestes des contradictions qui ne 
sont aujourd’hui que virtuelles, cristalliseraient des conflits latents. Elle serait 
inconciliable avec le maintien de 1’U.E.P., elle comprometterait l’œuvre de 
l’O.E.C.E.’^
Throughout the 1950s, it was clear to French policymakers that currency convertibility 
would have to be preceded by or linked with a far-reaching adjustment of the economy
MAE DE CE 198, “Note” “a.s. Quelques aspects de la convertibilité”, by the Department o f Economic 
and Financial Affairs o f the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, April 22, 1955.
‘de facto convertibility can be realized by inconspicuous imperceptible steps, without undermining 
existing institutions; above all it does not dare to say its name. Legal [or official] convertibility, in 
contrast, is a deliberate and conspicuous step. Compared to de facto convertibility it is less 
characterized by degrees and compromises. Instead it is based as much on psychological 
foundations as on rights granted to third parties; it depends on their faith. That is why the re­
establishment o f convertibility would bring to the surface the contradictions which today are only 
potential, it would cristallize dormant conflicts. It would be incompatible with the maintoiaince of 
the EPU, it would compromise the work of the OEEC.’
AEF B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10, 1954. and MAE 
DE CE 203, “Note pour le président” “ a.s. Convertibilité des monnaies”, from the Director o f Economic and 
Financial affairs, May 24,1955.
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Thus, contrary to Britain, ‘a dash to convertibility’ was not considered as a policy option, 
nor as a solution to French economic problems. Neither did French policymakers 
contemplate a floating exchange rate in connection with the establishment of 
convertibility.
Up until 1958, the argument that convertibility could only take place after the 
French economy was stable and competitive was successfully used to justify the 
postponement of convertibility.^"  ^ By 1958, however, the view of convertibility had 
changed. French ministers increasingly realized that painful, and, therefore, unpopular, 
economic adjustment measures would be necessary to restore economic stability. Instead 
of considering convertibility as something that had to be postponed until the French 
economy was ready to face international competition, French policymakers now saw 
collective convertibility as an opportunity which would facilitate the introduction of 
restrictive monetary and fiscal measures. Thus, Cottier from the Finance and Economics 
Ministry commented on the “avantage psychologique de la convertibilité elle-même” (the 
psychological advantage of convertibility itself) which was that it “faciliterait la 
presentation d’une mesure monétaire” (would facilitate the presentation of monetary 
measures).^^ “By setting them [measures for trade and payments liberalization, budget 
cuts, etc.], and the accompanying devaluation, in a wider context of convertibility they 
could be rendered more palatable politically.”^^
Before 1958, France was not ready to make the sacrifices that a ‘cleaning-up’ of 
the French economy would necessitate. However, the balance of payments crisis of 1957
See, for example, Le Monde, “Perspectives monétaires européennes: IV - Le franc”, March 7, 1954,
pin.
AEF B44744, “Les Conséquences de la Convertibilité”, May 24,1954.
^  The Banker, “Convertibility - at what Risk?”, February 1959, p.81.
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and the speculative attack against the franc, exposed the severity of the economic 
problems. Moreover, the crisis revealed to the French population the full extent of the 
economic malaise and thus prepared the ground for cooperation in a painful economic 
adjustment. Thus, the advantage of France’s economic problems was that the severity of 
the crisis ensured that most people understood that a drastic change was needed. De 
Montrial wrote that between 1956 and 1958 there was an increasingly widespread 
concern, that France’s national identity was “menacée de déclin économique” (‘threatened 
by economic decline’) and that financial disaster was imminent.^^ In comparison, such an 
acute and widespread feeling of imminent disaster was missing in Britain. The advantage 
of France’s economic problems was that the severity of the crisis ensured that everybody 
understood that a drastic change was needed.
The redressement
After 1957, the stage was set for the appearance of a hard line economic reformer 
who had been active backstage for years, Jacques Rueff. He designed and orchestrated the 
economic reform of 1958. However, his importance in the ‘redressement’ of the French 
economy must be seen in the context of the political and economic events preceding and 
accompanying his reforms. Without the political change which occurred in mid-1958, 
Rueff would not have been commissioned to reform the economy, and even if he had, he 
would not have been free to take such drastic measures.
The return of de Gaulle to power in May 1958 created a political environment 
which was vital to the implementation of economic reform. As France’s biggest hero of 
the Résistance in World War II, de Gaulle enjoyed a popularity and public support which
De Montbrial, “L’Économie française en 1958”, in Institut Charles de Gaulle (éd.), 1958, pp.7-9. 
‘threatened by economic decline’.
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few, if any, politicians could ever hope to enlicit.^  ^ According to Maurice Pérouse, 
member of de Gaulle’s cabinet, the authority of and public faith in de Gaulle were crucial 
in the public acceptance of the redressement in December 1958, which in turn was vital to 
its success.^^ De Gaulle came to power at a time when France was exhausted by 13 
changes of government since 1950, by the erratic performance of the economy and by the 
Algerian conflict. The population longed for a strong leader to solve the Algerian conflict, 
which was tearing the country apart as well as being an important source of France’s 
monetary instability, and to restore both economic and political stability. De Gaulle 
offered the leadership qualities, which were perceived to be necessary to solve France’s 
problems.
De Gaulle’s choice of Antoine Pinay as his Finance Minister was motivated 
among other things by the latter’s association with the economic stabilization that took 
place in 1952 when Pinay was Prime Minister. At that time the Pinay loan (a large issue 
of government bonds to finance public borrowing) and a “campaign of ‘persuasion’ to 
keep prices down” coincided with a fall in world prices. The result was a temporary 
halting of France’s rampant inflation. Consequently, The Economist vivotQ in 1958: “For 
millions of Frenchmen the small industrialist from St. Chamond is still the man who 
brought postwar inflation to an end.” ®^^ In the summer of 1958, Pinay again resorted to
"L'adoption le 28 septembre de la nouvelle constitution par près de 80% des votants confère au 
referendum une allure de plébiscite et quelques semaines plus tard l’élection d’Une Chambre Introuvable 
témoigne à nouveau de la confiance inconditionnelle accordée par la nation au chef qui, en quelques 
mois, a tout bousculé et tout reconstruit.” R. Courtin, “Avant-Propos”, in Revue d ’économie politique, 
July-October 1959, p. II. See also The Economist, “The Gaullist Tide”, October 4,1958 , pp. 15-16.
‘The adoption on September 28 o f the new constitution by nearly 80% of the voters confers to the 
referendum the air o f plebiscite and a few weeks later the election o f Une Chambre Introuvable 
reconfirms the unconditional confidence granted by the nation to the leader who, in the course o f a few  
months, has first turned everything on its head and then rebuilt it.’
Pérouse comment in Institut Charles de Gaulle (ed.), 1958, chapter 11, p.64.
100 general alone has the stature to make a national appeal and a past that makes him immune to 
charges o f defeatism.” The Economist, “France’s Misdirected Fury”, April 19, 1958, p. 187.
The Economist, “Opération Napoléon”, June 21, 1958, p. 1091.
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the, apparently proven, remedies of a public loan, through the issue of government 
bonds, to stabilize public finances. In addition, a number of measures aimed primarily at 
restoring confidence in the franc, such as limits on salary raises, de-indexation of 
agricultural prices, and supplementary taxes. Finally, the automatic allocation of 
F35,000 in travel allowance for French tourists was suspended. As in 1952, Pinay relied 
on what Didier Bévant called a doctrine of “rigueur et confiance” (‘rigor and 
confidence’) to cure the French economy.
When it became clear in late summer 1958 that the Pinay measures were not 
producing the same success as in 1952, Jacques Rueff was appointed to head a committee 
of financial experts, bankers, economists and government officials, which was to examine 
the state of French economy and suggest policies for improvement. Rueff s economic 
philosophy differed fundamentally from that of Pinay. Paul Fabra highlighted the 
differences between the Rueff and the Pinay approach to economic policy in the 
following comment:
On faisait ... confiance à la ‘politique de confiance’, une notion que Jacques 
Rueff condamne expressément dans la ‘note’ ... qu’il remet personnellement six 
ans plus tard le 10 juin 1958 au ministre des Finances Antoine Pinay. Si Jacques 
Rueff s’en prend à la politique de la confiance, c’est dans la mesure où cette 
dernière vise, par des mesures destinées à produire un effet purement 
psychologique - une baisse autoritaire des prix par exemple - à masquer 
l’absence de toutes dispositions propres à atténuer ou supprimer les causes 
objectives de l’inflation (déficit budgétaire dépassant les possibilités d’emprunt 
sur le marché, interventions massives de la Banque de France sur le marché 
monétaire, etc).*®^
102 D. Bévant, “De l’opération de décembre 1958 au ‘discours sur le crédit’ (décembre 1961), de Jacques 
Rueff’, in Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France (éd.). Du franc Poincaré, p.474. 
’°'’ P. Fabra “Le plan de 1958 dans l’histoire économique contemporaine, une voie alternative aux 
politiques d’austérité”, in Institut Charles de Gaulle (éd.), 1958, p. 139.
‘One was ... placing one’s trust in a ‘policy o f trust’, a notion which Jacques Rueff condemned 
expressly in the ‘note’ ... which he submitted personnally six years later on June 10, 1958 to the 
Minister o f  Finance Antoine Pinay. If Jacques Rueff denigrates the policy o f  trus, it is insofar as 
the latter aims, through measures geared to produce a purely psychological effect - an resolute 
lowering o f prices, for example - to conceal the absence o f  any true measures to weaken or 
eliminate the objective causes o f the inflation (the budget deficit which exceeds the credits 
available in the market, massive interventions by the Banque de France in the monetary market,
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While some observers claim that Pinay persuaded de Gaulle to call in Rueff and a team of 
experts to restore economic stability, it seems more likely that it was de Gaulle who 
decided to create a committee under the leadership of Rueff against the opposition of 
P in a y /P in a y  was one of the strongest opponents of the Rueff plan, within the 
government, when the plan was presented to the cabinet in early December. It is 
unlikely, therefore, that it was his idea to call in Rueff in the first place. De Gaulle’s 
economic advisor, Roger Goetze, asserts, that “[c]’est... sur intervention direct du général 
de Gaulle et malgré les réticences du ministre des Finances ... qu’il fut possible à cette 
commission [Rueff] de voir le jour en temps utile même si les délais limités fixés pour son 
travail allaient se révéler très pregnants”. An appeal by de Gaulle to the French people 
to accept the economic sacrifices necessary for the restoration of budgetary balance, 
monetary stability and French competitiveness in August 1958 shows that de Gaulle 
actively supported the redressement.^®  ^This support was crucial to the success of the plan. 
De Gaulle had two reasons for lending his active support to the economic reforms. First, 
he had greater international ambitions for the franc than his predecessors.*®  ^A strong and 
intemational currency was a characteristic of international power. To be able to contend 
with the United States and Britain as great power, France needed a currency that could
etc.)’
For a discussion, see S. Guillaume, Antoine Pinay ou la Confiance en Politique, Presses de la 
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1984, pp. 169-171.
see Guillaume, Antoine Pinay, pp. 169-179.
Comment by Roger Goetze, technical advisor to De Gaulle, in Institut Charles de Gaulle, 1958, 
chapter II p.50. See also comment by Meo who claims that de Gaulle “s’est engagé personnellement dans 
la réussite de ce plan qui est, avant tout, le sien parce que c’est lui qui l’a rendu possible”, in ibid., p.57.
‘it was on direct intervention o f the General de Gaulle an against the resistance o f the finance ministry ... 
that the Rueff committee was created at the opportune moment even if  the time constraint under which 
the committee had to operate would turn out to be very significant’.
Le Monde, “Le General de Gaulle: je  demande à tous de prendre une part des sacrifices grâce auxquels 
s’ouvrira largement la porte de l’espérance”, August 3-4, 1958, p.5.
’°* E. A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompido; The Politics o f  
Grandeur, Cornell University Press, 1974, pp. 176-210.
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stand its ground against the dollar and the pound. Contrary to previous governments, de 
Gaulle saw a strong franc as an important tool in the pursuit of France’s international 
power ambitions. The first prerequisite for a strong franc was its domestic stabilization. 
The establishment of convertibility was an important step towards increasing the 
international currency status of the franc. The second factor conducive to de Gaulle’s 
support of the Rueff Plan was the imminent coming into force of the Common Market. 
Having decided that the European Economic Community (EEC) was the best channel 
through which to pursue France’s national interests and international aspirations, 
economic reforms were necessary to prepare the economy for the tariff and quota 
provisions of the Rome Treaty that were to come into effect on January 1,1959.^°*
“As soon as M. Rueff was called to organize and lead a committee of experts it 
was clear that there would be something altogether different from mild adjustment.”  ^
Rueff was known to regard inflation as mal des finances françaises” (7/ze evil of 
French finances’) .^ H e  had participated in the successful stabilization of the franc in 
1926.^^  ^He had a reputation for being obsessed with financial stability, having claimed 
that “[s]ans regulation monétaire, la liberté ne peut engendrer que le désordre”.^  By
109 Discussions o f De Gaulle’s policy on Europe can be found in E. Bamavie and S. Friedlander (eds.), 
La politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, Camps, Britain and the European Community, and 
Kolodziej, French International Policy, Presses Universitaires de France, Genève, 1985, pp.235-292.
de Jouvenel, “France”, p.92.
J. Rueff, Combat pour l ’ordre financier, Plon, 1972, p. 176.
Accounts o f the stabilization o f the franc in 1926 are provided in B. Eichengreen, “The Bank of 
France and the Sterilization o f Gold, 1926-1932” and B. Eichengreen and C. Wyplosz, “The Economic 
Consequences o f the Franc Poincaré”, both in Eichengreen, Elusive Stability, pp.57-82 and 153-179. See 
also J. Rueff, “Sur un point d’histoire: Le niveau de la stabilisation Poincaré”, in Revue d ’économie 
politique, March-April, 1959, pp. 168-178.
quoted in J. Guyot, “Les travaux du comité Rueff’, in Institut Charles de Gaulle (éd.), 1958, p.34. 
‘without monetary regulation liberty can only breed disorder’
According to Jean Guyot, a member o f the Rueff Committee, Rueff s economic philosophy was formed by 
two historical experiences in particular: “L’expérience allemande de I’entre-deux guerres a démontré de 
manière implacable l’enchainement qui mène du désordre financier à la généralisation des contrôles, puis à 
la mise au pas des comportements individuels. L’autre souvenir concerne une recette que Lénine enseignait 
aux forces de la révolution: ‘Pour détruire le régime bourgeois, vous devez dégrader sa monnaie.” Guyot, 
“Les travaux”, p.33.
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appointing Rueff, the government sent out the signal that it was ready to take tough, and,
if necessary, unpopular, measures to combat France’s economic problems. Thus, Rueff s
image played an important role in his appointment as head of the Committee. Couve de
Murville acknowledges that the restoration of confidence was an important element of the
Rueff Plan. However, he correctly distinguishes between Pinay’s policy of relying on
largely symbolical acts to restore confidence and Rueff s economic philosophy:
La philosophie même du projet était de ne pas compter sur une confiance a priori, 
mais de créer par des mesures courageuses, pratiques et efficaces une confiance a 
posteriori véritable et durable parce que fondée sur une situation réellement 
assainie, ce qui, d’ailleurs, a été le cas au moins jusqu’en 1963.^ "^^
For Rueff, convertibility was a vital component of the stabilization of the French
economy. Devaluation, anti-inflationary measures and the consolidation of public finance,
were the prerequisites for the restoration of a stable fi*anc. With a currency protected by
exchange control, policymakers might be tempted to revert to their old habits of
inflationary monetary policy and budget deficits, periodically offset by devaluation:
“Seule une très large convertibilité permettra de tester la réalité et la durabilité de la
nouvelle donne monétaire ainsi réalisée”.^  He saw the exchange guarantee, both for
residents and non-residents and into gold as well as into other currencies, as a way of
keeping governments honest.
Depuis la libération, j ’avais utilisé toutes les occasions d’attirer l’attention des 
divers Ministres des Finances sur la nécessité d’un effort d’ensemble, propre à 
résoudre, une fois pour toutes, le problème financier fi:ançais. Inlassablement, je 
leur soumettais les grandes lignes de la politique que pareil effort me semblait 
exiger. En même temps et malgré les sarcasmes des «experts», je marquais la 
nécessité d’un prompt retour à la convertibilité monétaire et la certitude qu’il
Couve de Murville comment in Institut Charles de Gaulle (éd.), 1958, chapter II, p.62.
‘The philosophy itself o f the project was not to rely on confidence ex ante, but to create, through 
courageous, practical and efficient mesures, ex post a confidence which was veritable and lasting 
because it was founded on a truly healthy situation, which, incidentally, was the case at least up 
until 1963.’
Guyot, “Les travaux”, p.30.
‘Only extensive convertibility will test the reality and the durability o f  the new monetary situation thus 
realized’.
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serait, en fait, rapidement accompli/
The existence of the Rueff Committee, which was created on September 30, 1958, was 
kept secret until December, largely to prevent destabilizing speculation.
The aims of the Rueff plan were threefold, namely the restoration of, first, external 
equilibrium, second, price stability, and, third, stable economic growth.'*^ The principal 
means with which these objectives were to be achieved were budgetary consolidation, 
monetary and legal measures aimed at ensuring price stability, the liberalization of trade 
and payments, and a devaluation of the franc. One of the key insights driving the reforms, 
and learned from the experience with the franc devaluations since 1948, was that a 
devaluation could only succeed in restoring exchange rate stability if it was combined with 
disinflationary measures. The Rueff Committee identified budget deficits as the primary 
cause of France’s inflationary problem. Budget deficits had hovered around five per cent 
of GNP between 1950 and 1957 which was significantly higher than in Germany or 
Britain. The Rueff Plan was therefore aimed at restoring budgetary balance. This was to be 
accomplished through expenditure reductions and tax raises.*^* In total, compared to the 
initial 1959 budget proposal, government expenditure was reduced by some fr300 billion, 
largely through the elimination of subsidies and cuts in welfare spending, while 
government revenue was increased by roughly the same amount, largely through raises in
J. Rueff, “La restauration du franc”, in Revue d ’économie politique, November-December 1960, No.6, 
p. 172.
‘Since the liberation, I have used all opportunities to attrace the attention o f various finance 
ministers to the need for a common effort, to solve, once and for all, France’s financial problem. 
Time and time again I presented the grand design o f the policy which I believe such an effort 
requires. At the same time and in spite o f the sarcasm o f the ‘experts’, I emphasized the 
necessity o f a rapid return to monetary convertibility and the conviction that it would, in fact, be 
established rapidly.’
For a detailed analysis o f the redressement see P. Arnaud-Ameller, Mesures économiques et 
financières de décembre 1958, Librairie Armand Colin, 1968, and M. Byé, “L’opération des 27-28 
décembre 1958”, in Revue économique, No.2, March 1959, pp.l 1-200.
Byé, “L’opération”, pp. 166-177.
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value added and income ta x e s /W ith  these measures the projected budget deficit for 
1959 could be brought down firom firl,082 billion to fi:587 billion. In contrast the 1956 and 
1957 budget deficits had been firl,011 billion and fi*l,041 billion, respectively. The 
elimination or downsizing of state subsidies to companies and of price subsidies for 
consumption reduced government expenditure and forced French businesses to become 
more competitive. It was anticipated that the immediate result of the removal of price 
subsidies on consumption would be a rise in the prices of these goods, which in itself 
would push up inflation. The willingness to accept an initial increase in inflation in return 
for a more deregulated and competitive economy revealed the longer term commitment to 
price stability and economic growth. In addition, by abolishing the indexation of salaries 
and prices on certain goods, the government removed an important cause of inflationary 
p re s su re .T h e  Rueff committee rejected the infant industry argument for trade 
protectionism, according to which it is necessary to shelter nascent industries from 
international competition through protectionism or subsidies until they have become 
competitive. The Rueff Plan abolished at one stroke many export subsidies and liberalized 
a large percentage of French import trade fi*om quotas. Thus, trade liberalization which 
had been suspended in 1957 was increased to 90 per cent for OEEC imports, on the basis 
of 1948 imports, and 50 per cent of dollar imports (see table 1 in chapter II). The reversal 
of trade policy and the establishment of convertibility were the most dramatic policy 
changes implemented by the Rueff Plan.
The return to convertibility in France distinguishes itself firom the moves in 
Germany and Britain in that the establishment of non-resident firanc convertibility was 
combined with a sweeping reform aimed, among other things, at ensuring a stable fi*anc.
Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France, p.333. 
The minimum wage remained indexed.
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both internally and externally. According to Paule Armand-Ameller,
[e]n optant pour la convertibilité monétaire, la libération des échanges et une forte 
dévaluation, les auteurs du plan se sont fixés de nouveaux objectifs: à l’expansion 
à tout prix, on a substitué l’expansion dans la stabilité, à un régime de contrôle, 
celui de liberté, au recours à des ajustements périodiques des changes, la volonté 
de s’arrêter à un taux définitif.^^^
The determination to establish monetary stability is accentuated by the fact that the
government reduced public demand at a time when private demand was faltering and most
economic indicators were indicating that France was experiencing a recession. Private
consumption showed signs of weakening, with consumption of durables and of clothing in
1958 falling by 2.8 per cent and 4.6 per cent in real terms, respectively.Agricultural
production remained the same in 1958 as in 1957, and manufacturing production was 1.9
per cent lower in the fourth quarter of 1958 compared to the year-on earlier period.
Unemployment rose by 19 per cent in 1958. Real GDP growth dropped fi-om six per cent
in 1957 to 1.9 per cent in 1958.^ "^^  The sluggish economic activity combined with the
ongoing US recession, which was feared to spill over into Europe led French observers to
anticipate a serious recession for the second half of 1958 and continuing into 1959.^ ^^  In
these conditions, Keynesian demand management theory would have advocated an
expansionary fiscal or monetary policy, or both, to stimulate aggregate demand. However,
instead of increasing government spending to offset the stagnation of private demand, the
government cut public expenditure and devalued the firanc, both ofi which could be
Amaud-Ameller, Mesures économiques, p.9.
‘In opting for monetary convertibiltiy, trade liberalization and a large devaluation, the authors o f  
the plan have set themselves new objectives: they have substituted stable expansion for 
expansion at all costs, liberalization for a regime o f  controls, the will to maintain an exchange 
rate to the resort to periodic exchange rate adjustments.’
OECD Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics 1962.
OEEC Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics 1960.
OECD Statistical Bulletins, General Statistics 1962.
Le Monde, “Le choix entre les restrictions de consommation et le chômage ne peut plus être éludé”, 
May 7, 1958, p.3.
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expected to reduce domestic demand by raising the prices for imported g o o d s /T h e  
willingness of the government to implement contractionary fiscal and monetary policies at 
a time when economic activity was already faltering, and when things were expected to 
deteriorate further in the near future indicated the determination to restore monetary 
stability and create a solid foundation for an improvement in France’s balance of 
payments.
Any economic reform aimed at increasing budgetary discipline and removing 
protectionism is likely to encounter criticism from some economic and political factions 
and the French redressement in 1958 was no exception to this rule. Within the French 
government many ministers opposed the Rueff Plan. In addition to Pinay, who criticized 
in particular the proposed devaluation and tax increases, the head of the Socialist party and 
member of the cabinet, Guy Mollet, offered his resignation in protest against the economic 
reforms. In particular, he opposed the unpopular cuts in government expenditure and the 
abolition of wage indexation. Not surprisingly, the French public did not welcome the 
spending cuts and tax raises with open arms.^^  ^Workers’ and farmers’ organizations were 
the harshest critics of the reforms. The reduction in family allowances combined with the 
discontinuation of government price subsidies for agricultural and consumer products and 
the de-indexation of wages, - with the exception of the minimum wage (SMIG) -, were 
expected to reduce the purchasing power and thus the living standard of low-income 
families disproportionately compared to other income groups. Consequently, the reforms 
were attacked as being socially unjust. Farmers, in turn, were outraged over the massive
An excellent analysis o f the effects o f devaluation on domestic absorption is provided in Corden, 
Inflation.
An analysis o f the national reactions to the reforms can be found in Amaud-Ameller, Mesures 
économiques, pp.91-112.
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cuts in agricultural subsidies. Overall, however, the reforms provoked much less of a 
public outcry than might have been expected. There were no major strikes or incitations to 
boycott or revolt against the new government nor its economic measures. The striking 
feature of the redressement in France in 1958 was, therefore, the general consensus that a 
far-reaching, even painful, reform was necessary: “Aucun commentateur, théoricien, 
politique, syndicaliste, ne contest[ait] la nécessité d’une réforme”. This consensus was 
critical to the success of the reforms.
While the public was aware of the economic crisis France that was facing 
domestically, contemporary observers claim that few realized the severity of France’s 
external economic problem s.Antoine Fleury remarked on the “extraordinaire décalage 
qui existe entre la crise des paiements, dont la gravité est perçue par tous les experts, aussi 
bien français qu’étrangers, et son ignorance par l’opinion publique française, y compris 
dans les milieux politiques”. I f  the French public failed to grasp the severity of the 
external problems, a claim which is difficult to verify 40 years after the fact, then the 
general acceptance of the measures further accentuates the importance of the personal 
support by a leader with the clout of de Gaulle for the viability and the success of the 
Rueff Plan. The “immense prestige” of the general and his personal backing of the 
reforms was crucial in securing popular support for the redressement.'^^ Starting in
The significance o f the relative calm response to the reforms is illustrated by the current wave o f  
massive strikes and labor unrest in response to the tightening o f fiscal and monetary policies in France 
today.
Amaud-Ameller, Mesures économiques, p. 100.
Amaud-Ameller, Mesures économiques, p.lIO, and A. Fleury, “La position des autorités suisses face à 
la crise économique et financière de la France 1956-1958”, in Comité pour l’histoire économique et 
financière de la France (éd.). Du franc Poincaré, p.444.
Fleury, “La position”, p.444.
‘the extraordinary discrepancy which exists between the balance o f payments crisis, the severity o f  which 
is recognized both by foreign and by French experts, and its unawareness by the French public opinion, 
including political circles.’
Amaud-Ameller, Mesures économiques, p. 109.
‘No commentator, theoretician, politician, union official, questioned the necessity o f  reform’.
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August 1958, the government was given emergency powers for a six-month period, 
which enabled it to implement policies necessary for the financial and economic 
recovery vvdthout the consent of Parliament. The popularity of de Gaulle and the severity 
of the economic crisis created a unique situation which gave government a free hand to 
implement far-reaching reforms.
The precarious external financial situation in 1957 and 1958 forced France to seek
special credits from the EPU, the IMF and the US, to ease balance of payments problems
and counteract the depletion of foreign exchange reserves. The EPU granted France a
conditional special credit of $150 million which was to be paid in two installments, with
the payment of the second installment being made dependent on whether the Managing
Board was satisfied vrith French stabilization policies. The IMF granted a similar
conditional credit under its standby arrangements.
Having come to the Fund hat in hand and then undergoing what they regarded as a 
humiliating experience, French financial officials were psychologically receptive 
to President de Gaulle’s expressed determination to make France economically 
strong and to combat what he regarded as Anglo-Saxon domination of 
international monetary affairs.
The elimination of automatic credit facilities upon the termination of the EPU provided a
further incentive to get the economy into shape as quickly as possible. Under the European
Monetary Agreement (EMA), which was to replace the EPU upon the establishment of
convertibility, credits would be granted at much tougher conditions than under the EPU.
Kaplan and Schleiminger claimed that the advice of the EPU Managing Board and
the consistent pressure exerted by the Board on France persuaded the French government
to implement anti-inflationary policies. The importance attributed to the EPU by
133
134
R. Solomon, The International Monetary System 1945-1981, Harper and Row, 1982, p.21. 
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.284.
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Kaplan and Schleiminger in the redressement is exaggerated. While, the humiliation and 
exasperation felt by French policymakers at France’s dependence on conditional credits 
provided an additional motivation to restore France’s finances in order to prevent future 
French dependence on foreign aid, the actual advice or the attempts by the Managing 
Board to exert pressure are unlikely to have influenced French policymaking. As has been 
shown in this chapter, France exhibited a particularly strong resentment to foreign 
interference with, what it considered, its domestic affairs. It is, therefore, unlikely that 
French ministers would have been open to advice or pressure from the EPU Managing 
Board. The redressement was undertaken because France considered it in its best interest 
to do so not because it had suddenly become receptive to outside counseling.
CONCLUSION
In the first decade after World War II, trade balance problems, the fear of opening 
up the economy to international competition, autarky plans, and the reluctance to remove 
controls over trade and payments in general all combined to create a strong national 
opposition to the establishment of currency convertibility. However, in 1958, there was a 
shift in French policy on trade and payments. The continued problems of the balance of 
payments, the weakness of the franc, growing budget deficits, the deterioration of French 
competitiveness, and an inflation that was rising faster than the European average, all led 
to the realization of a need for drastic change in French economic policy away from 
dirigisme and excessive reliance on controls and protectionism and towards economic 
openness and market mechanisms.
According to Saint-Paul, in the Fourth Republic, that is, from 1945 to 1958, trade
282
restrictions, capital and exchange controls and repeated devaluations weakened the 
external constraint of a fixed exchange rate on monetary expansion. By reducing the costs 
of inflation, these policy tools allowed governments to pursue a more inflationary 
monetary policy than they would have been able to otherwise. However, over time, 
repeated recourse to devaluation and the persistence of inflationary pressures, increased 
the costs of inflation, as rising inflationary expectations expressed themselves through 
high wage demands, price rises and adverse currency speculation. Contrary to Britain, 
France never considered the establishment of convertibility as a policy response to adverse 
speculation. Rather, convertibility was considered to be a condition which could only be 
established after France’s external situation had stabilized or jointly with measures which 
would ensure its stabilization.
By 1958, it was clear to policymakers that only a drastic and visible change in 
fiscal and monetary policy could ensure the return to a stable exchange rate for the fi^c . 
The success of such policy changes depended both on their real effects on the economy, - 
for example, reductions in the budget deficit, changes in interest rates, devaluations, etc. -, 
but also on their ability to restore credibility in the government’s ability and willingness to 
control inflation.
By their boldness in the international realm and their toughness in the domestic 
realm, these measures are clearly meant to contrast with the makeshifts that had 
characterized the policies that preceded them, and to challenge at one blow all the 
criticisms that French economic policy had incurred abroad.
Contrary to Britain and Germany, in France the move to convertibility was
135 Saint-Paul, “France”, p.312.
Britain repeatedly considered establishing convertibility at a floating rate as a way to stop speculative 
pressures. One o f the occasions on which this policy was considered was in February 1952 when foreign 
exchange reserves were dwindling and trade deficits rising. Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European 
Payments Union, p. 140.
de Jouvenel, “France”, p.89.
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accompanied by a sweeping economic reform. One of the principal aims of the economic 
measures introduced jointly with convertibility, was to re-establish exchange rate stability. 
The balance of payments crisis made necessary, but also provided the opportunity, for 
undertaking the economic adjustment which allowed France to create the conditions 
necessary for stable economic growth. Though not as drastic, the redressement in 1958 is 
comparable to the economic and currency reform which Germany underwent in 1948 and 
which Rueff thought should have taken place in France much sooner. In Britain, which 
had also experienced severe currency instability and adverse speculation, no similar 
economic adjustment was undertaken when convertibility was established. Similarly, 
Germany failed to accompany the official return to convertibility with any far-reaching 
measures which might have tackled the roots of the growing upward pressure on the DM.
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V: MONETARY COOPERATION AND CONVERTIBILITY; 1958
INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines why and how France, Britain and Germany cooperated in 
the return to convertibility. The first section assesses to what extent changes in 
economic conditions or in economic policies in 1958 explain the decision to establish 
convertibility. British policymakers decided in mid-1958 that the conditions were 
opportune for a move to convertibility. The considerations which determined the British 
choice of timing and of cooperation, before the free trade area negotiations came to play 
an increasing role, differ considerably from those which persuaded France and Germany 
that the moment was right for a collective move.
The second section of this chapter looks in particular at the change in British 
attitude towards cooperation in convertibility. Among other things it focuses on 
European integration as an explanation for both the choice of timing and the decision to 
cooperate in the move. So far, few attempts have been made to analyze, firstly, why 
European countries chose late December 1958 to establish convertibility, and, secondly, 
why they chose to move jointly to convertibility. Moreover, the connection between the 
concurrence of the coming into force of the Customs Union of the Six and the OEEC-wide 
return to convertibility has not been examined.^
In the second half of 1958, rumors spread that a British move to convertibility was 
imminent. This was not the first time, however, that convertibility seemed likely to happen 
in the imminent future. Between 1952 and 1958, government statements and policies 
constantly fed rumors of imminent convertibility. This chapter seeks to understand what
* This can be explained partially by the relatively recent opening o f the archival material, which is crucial 
to understanding national policy priorities and decisions in the policy on convertibility.
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factors convinced Britain to move this time. In particular it establishes an important 
connection between the coming into force of the quota and treaty provisions of the Rome 
Treaty, the negotiations for a European free trade area, and the collective establishment of 
convertibility.
THE ‘RIGHT’CONDITIONS
The IMF explained the timing of the move to convertibility with a concurrence 
of several favorable economic conditions, which corresponded roughly to the conditions 
necessary for a return to convertibility established by the British Treasury.^ Thus, 
according to the IMF’s tenth annual report on exchange restrictions, 1958 witnessed 
both the first UK trade surplus in the postwar period and a current account surplus. In 
addition, 1958 marked a year of improved terms of trade for Western Europe and of 
increases in gold and convertible currency reserves, largely due to the first US trade 
deficit with Europe since World War II which in turn led to a dollar outflow. 
Furthermore, the US recession had been halted in the spring of 1958, allaying fears of 
reduced European exports to the US in the near future. In the course of 1958, Western 
European countries had succeeded in eliminating inflationary pressures, indicating 
sound internal policies. The report argued that all the above developments had led to an 
increase in confidence in the strength of the Western European currencies. Finally, the 
decision to raise IMF quotas announced in New Delhi in October 1958 increased 
international confidence due to the anticipated increase in liquidity. The report 
concluded that, “[f]or these various reasons, the European countries felt more able at the 
end of 1958 than at any previous time since the end of World War II to make a major
 ^IMF, Tenth Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, 1959.
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monetary move toward the elimination of the distinction between dollar and non-dollar 
currencies in their foreign exchange arrangements”.^  Similarly, the Bank for 
International Settlements explained the timing of the move by the strengthening of 
European reserve positions during the year, caused partially by an improvement in 
Europe’s terms of trade.^
 ^ ibid., p.2.
 ^BIS, 29th Annual Report April, I 1958 to March 31, 1959, p. 185.
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Table V.l: Net reserves (end of year; million US dollars; percentage increase in
brackets)
1955 1956 1957 1958
A u str ia 337 392 489 655
(16.3) (24.7) (33 .9)
B elg iu m - 949 951 1,003 1,325
L u xem b ou rg (0 .2) (5 .5) (32 .1)
D en m ark 104 90 136 205
(-13 .5 ) (51.1) (50 .7)
F in land 99 55 63 143
(-44 .4 ) (14.5) (127 .0 )
F ran ce 2,082 1,142 364 687
(-45 .1 ) (-68 .1) (88 .7)
G erm an y 2,518 3,566 4,464 5,138
(41 .6) (25.2) (15 .1 )
G reece 187 193 188 166
(3 .2 ) (-2 .6 ) (-11 .7 )
Ita ly 1,178 1,264 1,496 2,215
(7 .3 ) (18.4) (48 .1)
N eth erlan d s 1,048 904 953 1,335
(-13 .7 ) (5 .4) (40 .1)
N orw ay 136 157 155 210
(15 .4) (-1 .3) (35 .5 )
P ortu ga l 670 693 685 708
(3 .4 ) (-1 .2) (3 .4 )
Sw eden 456 463 445 471
(1 .5 ) (-3 .9) (5 .8)
Sw itzerland 1,706 1,785 1,885 2,053
(4 .6 ) (5 .6) (8 .9 )
T u rk ey -99 -5 -13 14
(95 .0 ) (-160 .0) (208 .0)
U n ited  K ingdom 2,120 2 ,172 2,374 3,105
(Z 5 ) ( 9 3 ) (30 .8)
T ota l 13,491 13,822 14,687 18,430
(Z 5 ) (6 .3) (25 .5 )
Source: BIS, annual reports.
In 1958, the net reserves of all Western European countries, with the exception 
of Greece, were larger than in 1957 (see table V.l).^ Total European reserves increased 
by 26 per cent, compared to six per cent in 1957 and three per cent in 1956. Germany’s 
reserves increased less quickly than most other countries’ reserves (15 per cent) 
Moreover, Germany was the only country, besides Denmark, where reserves increased
BIS, 29th Annual Report April I, 1958 to March 21, 1959, p. 175. For development o f French, British 
and German reserves between 1952 and 1959, see figure 1 in chapter I.
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less than the had in 1957. The increase in German reserves only accounted for one fifth 
of the total improvement in European reserves, as compared to 1957 and 1956 where the 
increases in German reserves alone accounted for the total rise in European reserves. As 
a result, the share of Germany’s reserves as a percentage of total European reserves fell 
from 30.4 per cent in 1957 to 27.9 per cent in 1958. Simultaneously, UK reserves as a 
percentage of total reserves increased slightly from 16.2 per cent to 16.8 per cent, as UK 
reserves increased by 31 per cent over 1957. Thus, there seemed to be a general 
improvement in reserves at the same time as German reserves increased less than 
average, indicating a redistribution of reserves away from the largest reserve holder to 
the rest of Europe. According to Die Weltwirtschqft, the redistribution of reserves from 
Germany to the UK and other European countries was due largely to official capital 
exports.^ Particularly, the improvement in France’s reserves, which increased by 89 per 
cent, can be explained entirely by international credits, of which $100 million came 
from Germany in the form of a special EPU credit. British reserves were bolstered by a 
£89 million credit from the Export/Import Bank ($250 million), the deferment of service 
payments, worth £63 million (approximately $176 million) on the US and Canadian 
loans, and the IMF drawing of $562 million, made in December 1956. The Treasury 
admitted, unofficially, that net of these special borrowings, the UK reserves would only 
amount to £844 million or roughly $2363 million.^
 ^Die Weltwirtschqft; Halbjahresschrift fiir Weltwirtschqft an der Universitat Kiel, 1959, Heft 1, p. 16. 
 ^PRO T236-4820, “Unicom: U.K. External Assets and Liabilities”, November 10, 1958.
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Table V.2: Terms of trade, 1953=100
i UK 1 Germany France
1950 1 100 ! 86 94
1951 I 88 1 83 85
1952 1 95 1 94 92
1953 ! 100 1 100 100
1954 1 100 ! 100 95
1955 I 99 1 97 97
1956 101 1 99 98
1957 104 1 100 96
1958 i 111 1 108 100
Source: OEEC Statistical Bulletins General Statistics, 1960.
The improvement in Britain’s trade balance contributed to the increase in UK 
reserves in 1958. Whereas throughout most of the 1950s Britain’s trade balance had 
been in deficit, in 1958 it swung into a small surplus ($132 million).* The improvement 
in Britain’s trade balance can be attributed solely to the overall improvement in 
Europe’s terms of trade, which was the result of a fall in prices for primary products (see 
table V.2).^ Whereas the volume of British imports remained unchanged, the value of 
imports fell by nearly $500 million compared to 1957 or five per cent. At the same time, 
the volume of exports fell by 3.5 per cent in 1958, corresponding to a fall in the value of 
exports of $280 million or 2.9 per cent.^° Thus, the improvement in Britain’s trade 
balance was explained entirely by the fall in the cost of imports, since there was no 
increase in export volume.
In addition to the favorable developments of Britain’s reserves and its trade 
surplus, in 1958 prices and wages increased more slowly than they had in most of the 
post-war period. The greater price stability can also largely be attributed to the fall in 
import prices. Relatively low price and wage inflation, compared to previous years.
See figure 2 in chapter I.
BIS, 29th Annual Report April I, 1958 to March 3, 1959, p. 150. 
ibid.
" OEEC, Economic Conditions in Member and Associated Countries o f  the OEEC: United Kingdom
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rapidly growing reserves, a trade and current account surplus, and the strengthening of 
sterling on foreign exchange markets, seemed the ideal conditions under which to 
finally take the official step towards sterling convertibility. The Treasury and the Bank 
of England used this line of argumentation to convince the British government to 
establish convertibility. Thus, the Chancellor of the Exchequer wrote to the Prime 
Minister in September: “I feel that we are unlikely to find a better conjuncture to unify 
the sterling rates.”^^  It is true that the economic conditions were favorable for a largely 
symbolical move. However, the question that presents itself is whether the economic 
conditions would remain favorable in the future for the maintenance of a stable 
convertible currency.
A closer inspection of the economic situation reveals that the circumstances 
attributable to the improvement in Britain’s financial and commercial conditions were 
ephemeral. Moreover, it was foreseeable in 1958 that, unless policy was changed, 
continued financial and exchange rate stability could not be assured in the near and 
medium-term future. The international recession in 1958 had led to a fall in raw material 
prices. The resulting large drop in import prices was the determining factor in the 
slowdown in British wage and price inflation, the improvement in the trade balance and 
the increase in reserves. The improved confidence in sterling was a by-product of these 
developments. Since lower import prices, rather than advances in productivity or in 
Britain’s competitiveness, explain the improvement in Britain’s monetary stability and 
trade balance, the situation could be expected to be reversed once the global economy 
came out of the recession. Britain’s exports declined by 2.9 per cent in 1958 while
1958, p .l3.
PRO PREM11-2671, “Exchange rate policy and related matters”, memo by the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer to the Prime Minister, September 8, 1958.
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German exports grew by 2.7 per cent in value terms (see table V.3). When the 
international economy recovered in 1959, German exports increased by 10.9 per cent 
while British exports only rose by 3.4 per cent. After the devaluation and the 
accompanying stabilization measures, French exports increased dramatically by 22.6 per 
cent in 1959, while in 1958, before the reform, they had fallen by 7.4 per cent. These 
figures confirm that there was no improvement in Britain’s competitiveness relative to 
Germany or France after 1958. Correspondingly, the Bank for International Settlements 
observed in mid-1959: “It is unlikely that the very favorable balance on current and 
capital account in 1958 will be repeated in 1959, since imports are expected to rise, both 
in value and in volume, as the United Kingdom moves out of the recession”.
Table V.3: Export development, 1957-1961 (percentage increases)
UK Germany France
value^ volume value1 volume value^ volume
1957 3.9 1.7 16.5 13.9 8.9 10.0
1958 -2.9 -4.1 2.7 3.7 -7.4 4.5
1959 3.4 4.3 10.9 13.8 22.6 19.6
1960 5.8 5.8 17.7 14.9 27.5 17.0
1961 4.2 2.3 11.2 5.5 9.9 5.2
based on figures expressed in US dollars. 
Source; values: OECD Statistics o f  the Balance o f  Payments 1950-1961’, 
volumes: IMF International Financial Statistics.
The Economist voiced similar concerns about the fragility of the improvement of British
economic conditions and criticized the government’s interpretation of the situation. It
described the conditions in 1958 as owing to “quite unusual good luck” in the form of
“the convenient turn in the terms of overseas trade and this past year’s unexpected flight
from the dollar”. As a result of the coincidence of several special circumstances. The
Economist warned, “Sterling ... [set] sail on a long voyage in a fair weather ship at a
moment when the weather forecast is favourable.” "^^ The article cautioned:
BIS, 29th Annual Report April 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959, p. 152. 
The Economist, “An Act o f Bravery?”, January 3, 1959, pp .l 1-13.
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There is no doubt that sterling is at present, and for the short time into the future 
that it is possible to see, strong enough to sustain the burdens of this sort of 
convertibility... There is equally no doubt that the proclamation of strength is 
itself a strengthening factor, just as any confession of weakness (for example by 
contracting out of the emerging European monetary accord) would have 
undermined such strength as there is. But the new currency system, with 
convertibility at fixed rates of exchange, is not designed for a few months. It is 
only prudent to ask how it is likely to work out in circumstances other than the 
present; it is in the middle distance that the doubts lurk.
John Fforde claimed that, when convertibility was established, “[a]ll that had happened,
give or take the local difficulty 'with the French, was that the UK had taken advantage of
a favourable and probably fleeting opportunity to remove the anomaly of the two rates
for convertible sterling into dollars. The underlying problem of sterling remained”.
The unusually large inflow of reserves, unusually stable prices and wages and
the unusually stable sterling presented the government with the unique opportunity to
establish convertibility without making any changes to its general economic policy
orientation. This was precisely the problem and the reason for the doubts expressed by
The Economist. To persuade the government that the moment to act was right, the
advocates of convertibility, in particular Bank officials, pointed to ephemeral conditions
as the fact that the dollar was temporarily somewhat under strain, - something which
nobody expected to last -, and that since Britain had recently weathered a severe sterling
crisis, in 1957, speculators were laying low. In addition, they argued that another reason
for acting was that the public was expecting a move. If Britain disappointed these
expectations by failing to act, then this would hurt confidence in the pound. By
September, the Chancellor of the Exchequer agreed that the time was right since, “[o]n
balance, ..., he felt that the present conjunction of circumstances was as favourable as
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.603.
See, for example, PRO T236-3946, Report by the Bank o f  England: ‘“Pros’ for early amalgamation of 
official and transferable sterling”, March 18, 1958 and “The Arguments in Favour of an Early 
Amalgamation o f Official and Transferable Sterling -Views o f  the Bank o f  England”, April 2,1958.
293
was ever likely to occur”. The criteria defining the right time to establish convertibility 
focused solely on whether the short term conditions could ensure that the move would 
not trigger a run on the pound. Government policy was not concerned with whether the 
underlying state of the economy was conducive to the maintenance of a stable exchange 
rate.^  ^The currency and balance of payments crises that had regularly afflicted Britain 
since World War II, were not interpreted as indicating the need to change economic 
policy to assure price and exchange rate stability. Moreover, no connection was made 
between convertibility and the need to assure monetary stability in the future. In 1958, 
there was no indication that price and wage stability would continue, and that British 
exports would increase, once the global economy came out of its recession. What could 
be anticipated was that imports would increase. In 1958, when unemployment reached 
its highest level since World War II, hourly wages in manufacturing increased by 3.1 
per cent while manufacturing output fell by 0.8 per cent. The wage development showed 
that “[t]he opportunity of making this most favourably-placed of all years the one in 
which to break the wage-price spiral has therefore not been resolutely seized”. 
Moreover, starting in mid-1958, the government began to implement policies which 
were aimed at reflating the economy. Bank Rate was lowered four times between March 
and November 1958, from seven per cent to four per cent. The ceiling on bank advances 
was removed in July and hire-purchase restrictions were reduced in September and 
removed in October. The public investment limit imposed by the former Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Peter Thomeycroft, was removed.^^ In response to these measures.
T236-4820, “Exchange Rate Policy: Note o f  a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W. 1 on 
Wednesday, 5th November, 1958, at 10.15 a.m.”, November 11, 1958.
As an important exception, W. M. Scammell warned o f  the need to adjust the British economy. See 
chapter II.
The Economist “Peace Through Some Inflation?”, May 17, 1958, p.570.
Dow, Management, pp. 105-106.
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private consumption and industrial output increased rapidly in the second half of 1958. 
In contrast to Germany and France, where private consumption growth was slower in 
1958 than it had been in 1956 and 1957, in Britain private consumption in real terms 
grew by 2.4 per cent in 1958 compared to 2.1 per cent and one per cent in 1957 and 
1956. The nominal figures were 5.2 per cent for 1958 and 5.6 per cent and 5.4 per cent 
for 1957 and 1956, respectively.^^ The 12.8 per cent real increase in purchases of 
consumer durables in 1958 indicated that consumer confidence had not suffered from 
the ongoing international recession. In 1957 the increase had been 12.6 per cent, while 
in 1956 purchases of consumer durables fell by 11.5 per cent in comparison. In spite of 
the rapid improvement of domestic demand and output which was already apparent in 
the third and fourth quarter of 1958, the Chancellor Derrick Heathcoat Amory presented 
a strongly expansionary budget in April 1959. Taxes were reduced by approximately 
£360 million and public expenditure was increased. The upcoming elections most likely 
played an important role in the decision to reflate the economy at a time when it was 
already obvious that economic activity was in an upsvring.^^
The move to convertibility was undertaken at a time when sterling and the 
British economy were benefiting from the disinflationary effects of an international 
recession. When the government reflated the economy through strongly expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy, there was no indication that the structural problems of the 
British economy had been removed. Wages continued to rise more rapidly than 
productivity, and prices continued to increase faster than in the competing economies. 
At the same time, British productivity growth, particularly in manufacturing, continued
OECD Statistical Bulletins General Statistics 1962.
Macmillan’s inclination to woo voters with expansionary economic policy, and his willingness to 
sacrifice price stability to that aim, was discussed in chapter II.
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to lag behind when compared to France and Germany?^
Whereas in 1958, Britain’s trade performance was better than before and after, 
Germany’s trade performance was slightly worse than before and after (see figure 2 in 
chapter I). German exports grew much more slowly in 1958, 3.6 per cent, than in 1957, 
15 per cent, as a result of the international recession which depressed demand for 
German goods in the European and US markets. Imports fell by 1.8 per cent in value 
terms, although they grew in volume terms by seven per cent, with Germany also 
benefiting from the fall in world prices of primary commodities. However, fi-om 1959 
onwards exports growth was back at above 10 per cent in value terms and in 1960, at 16 
per cent, export growth was the highest since World War II. Similarly, real GDP growth 
in 1958 was the lowest in the 1950s, at 3.1 per cent, compared to an average growth rate 
of 7.5 per cent between 1951 and 1961 (see table 2 in chapter III). However, in 1959, 
growth was back up to 6.8 per cent. The significantly lower increase in reserve inflow in 
1958 and in 1959 could be attributed to the temporary slowdown in export growth, but 
also to official capital exports, a large share of which was of a non-recurrent nature 
designed to reduce the large inflow of reserves.^ "  ^ The return to rapid export growth, 
rising trade surpluses and large reserve inflows after 1959 indicate that the slight 
deterioration of German balance of payments surpluses was only a limited deviation 
fiom the trend rather than a structural break. Moreover, like in Britain, German policy 
was no different after convertibility than it was before. Thus, after convertibility, 
Germany continued to sterilize the expansionary impact of its balance of payments 
surpluses. According to Scammell,
the existence within any payments system, world-wide or regional, of a chronic
See Crafts, ‘“ You’ve never had it so good?’” and Millward, “Industrial and commercial performance”. 
See chapter III.
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surplus country is a maladjustment. If allowed to continue it leads to the piling up 
of reserves by the surplus country, to measures of self-defence by neighbours 
which may have deleterious effects on the volume of trade, and perhaps to frictions 
due to anticipated or actual movements or exchange rates. Given that a chronic 
surplus by a single country is a maladjustment in the payments system, there is a 
case for removing it.^ ^
Germany lowered the official discount rate to stimulate internal demand in 1958, from 
four per cent in 1957 to 3.5 per cent in January 1958, to three per cent in June 1958, and 
finally to 2.75 per cent in January 1959. However, in September 1959 the rate was 
increased to three per cent and again to four per cent in October even though, according to 
the OEEC, “there were no actual inflationary symptoms”.^  ^ In addition, reserve 
requirements were raised. The decision to tighten monetary policy even before inflationary 
pressures had developed, confirmed that the Bundesbank uncompromising commitment to 
price stability had not changed after convertibility. The rigorous commitment to price 
stability in turn further increased confidence in the current and future strength of the DM, 
especially when Germany’s firm anti-inflationary stance was compared with the economic 
policy orientations of most other European countries, and the United States.
Germany and Britain shared the fact that the move to convertibility was 
facilitated by special circumstances which temporarily reduced pressure on sterling to 
devalue on the DM to revalue. 1958 was not the beginning of a new trend towards 
balance of payments equilibrium or greater exchange rate stability in either of the two 
countries. Rather, the economic situation in 1958 represented a temporary aberration 
from the trend towards a weaker sterling in Britain and a stronger DM in Germany. 
Moreover, the favorable circumstances cannot be ascribed to a change in economic 
policy orientations in either of the two countries. Thus, in the case of Germany and
^ Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p.356.
OEEC, Economic Conditions in Member and Associated Countries in the OEEC; Federal Republic o f  
Germany 1960, p.5.
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Britain, the move to convertibility was undertaken at a time when the pressures for 
economic adjustment had momentarily weakened.
In contrast, in France the move to convertibility was undertaken at a time when 
the problems which had been troubling the French economy throughout the 1950s had 
reached their peak. Consequently, and contrary to Britain and Germany, the 
establishment of convertibility was combined with a sweeping economic adjustment 
which changed the course of the French economy from 1958 onwards. After 1958, and, 
more importantly, after the economic and financial reforms of that year, the French trade 
deficits turned into consistent surpluses. Government budget deficits as a percentage of 
GDP were significantly lower in the decade after convertibility than before. After 14 
years of continuous erosion of the franc, the exchange rate was not readjusted until 
1968, when domestic political instability forced a devaluation. Although inflationary 
pressures were not removed, monetary stability in the decade after convertibility was 
much greater than in the pre-convertible period.^^
This section has shown that the improvement in Britain’s economic and 
monetary conditions in 1958 was only of a fleeting nature and that it could be, and was, 
foreseen that the improvement was only temporary. Similarly, the slackening of the 
buildup of German reserves and the abatement of pressure on the DM to revalue was 
only momentary lull, and in 1959 the upward trend in Germany’s external surpluses and 
its foreign reserve earnings returned with greater vigor than ever. Britain and Germany 
took advantage of the brief respite from pressures to undertake the necessary economic 
adjustment to establish convertibility without taking any accompanying measures to
Sautter, “France”.
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address the causes of the persistent balance of payments disequilibria and currency 
speculation that had been troubling both countries and that could be expected to 
continue to trouble them after convertibility. In contrast to Britain and Germany, France 
established convertibility at a time when economic and monetary conditions were at a 
nadir. France took the opportunity of the critical economic and financial situation to 
implement far-reaching reforms together with the establishment of convertibility. In 
doing so, France laid the foundations for a decade of prosperity and currency stability.
EUROPEAN COOPERATION AND CONVERTIBILITY
E u r o p e a n  c o o p e r a t io n  o n  c o n v e r t ib il it y  b e f o r e  1958
Whereas the previous section looked at the economic and monetary conditions that 
explain why, from mid-1958 onwards, the UK was finally ready to establish convertibility 
after years of hesitation, this section examines the national policy considerations that 
ensured a collective return to convertibility. Chapter III explained why for Germany 
establishment of official convertibility was only envisaged as part of a collective move. 
This section examines why Britain and France cooperated in a OEEC-wide establishment 
of convertibility. It focuses particularly on the connection between British policy towards 
Europe and the British attitude towards cooperation in convertibility, since the analysis 
reveals a significant, interrelated, policy shift in both in 1958, whereas German and French 
policy was fairly consistent in this regard.
Before 1958, several examples show that neither Britain nor France found it 
necessary to consult or cooperate with other countries on their external monetary policies. 
Britain’s decision to devalue its currency by 30 per cent in 1949 was taken without prior 
consultation with the rest of Europe even though continental Europe was strongly affected
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by the step. The unilateral British decision to devalue, without consulting with or 
informing beforehand its European partners, met with strong criticism in France. Britain’s 
apparently dismissive attitude towards continental Europe was regarded as an act of 
betrayal of European cooperation.^* Similarly, France’s neighbors and traditional allies 
only found out about France’s decisions to devalue the franc by 20 per cent effectively, 
through a general import tax and export subsidy, when the French government announced 
the step in the IMF in August 1957.
The British approaches to convertibility up until 1955 are well documented in 
recent literature.^^ Britain’s first convertibility proposal, called Robot, was devised by the 
high-ranking Treasury and Bank of England officials in 1951/2 and envisaged neither 
consultation on nor coordination of policy actions with continental Europe. Robot would 
have inevitably meant the end of the EPU. The principal country to be consulted before 
the move to sterling convertibility, which was to be established jointly with a floating 
exchange rate, was the United States, since their financial support was considered a 
prerequisite for the execution of the plan.^° Cooperation with Europe was not part of the 
plan. Indeed it was incompatible with the aims pursued by Britain, which was to set 
Britain and sterling apart from other European countries and currencies and prove that it 
was an international financial power on par with the US. Robot was motivated by the 
pursuit of foreign policy objectives, namely power, prestige and a close relationship, based 
on equal partnership, with the US.^^
Koch, Histoire de la Banque de France, p. 118.
See Fforde, The Bank q/" England, pp.426-503, Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments 
Union, pp. 157-183, Milward, The European Rescue, pp.347-396.
For an account and analysis o f Robot, see Milward, The European Rescue, pp.351-9. 
ibid., p.354.
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When Britain was denied US support for the operation, policymakers designed the
Collective Approach in 1952:
Its title implied that other EPU members would also be involved; in reality the 
plans were to be discussed first with the Commonwealth, then in a meeting in 
Washington with the US Administration, and only lastly - when all, it was hoped, 
would have been decided - with the European countries/^
In general, the ability to move to convertibility without having to consult or coordinate
with continental Europe was an important element of British policy on convertibility. To
British policymakers cooperation with Europe on convertibility was equivalent to an
admission of weakness both of Britain’s international clout and of its currency. However,
the experience with sterling instability in the 1950s and the US refusal to help Britain go
convertible ahead of the rest of Europe, brought the painful realization that Britain needed
continental Europe, at least Germany and probably France, to be able to establish sterling
convertibility.
In 1954, British policymakers slowly began to realize that they could not simply 
ignore continental Europe in their convertibility plans. They put forward proposals for a 
European Fund which would provide financial assistance both for countries who decided 
to join the UK in making their currencies convertible, and for countries whose currencies 
remained inconvertible.^^ On August 5, 1955, the members of the GEEC members the 
European Monetary Agreement (EMA), according to which the EPU would be terminated 
when countries who jointly accounted for at least 50 per cent of the total EPU quotas 
agreed to establish currency convertibility. At the same time the European Fund would 
come into existence.
The British initiative on the EMA should not be interpreted as an indication that
% ibid., p.358.
for a discussion o f  negotiations on the European Fund see Milward, The European Rescue, pp.383-389. 
See also Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, ch. 12.
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Britain intended to cooperate closely with the rest of Europe on a move to convertibility. 
British plans envisaged a unilateral decision to establish convertibility after which the 
continental European countries would be informed of the British decision. The latter was 
to take place approximately one week before the actual move, the date of which would 
have been set by Britain alone. British policymakers assumed that at least Germany, 
Switzerland and the Benelux countries would simply follow a British initiative towards 
convertibility.
Ever since Britain’s unilateral decision to devalue in 1949, the French were very
skeptical about Britain’s willingness to cooperate with the rest of Europe on monetary
issues. They were suspicious when the British put forward proposals for OEEC
consultations on convertibility, arguing that Britain only consulted with the others because
it had decided that it was not ready for convertibility, and it expected other countries to
advise against a move.
Peut-être, dans ces conditions, après s’être donné une fois de plus le beau rôle, ne 
seront-ils pas fâchés de voir les autres pays accumuler les objections, et les éclairer 
sur une série de considérations dont ils sont, au fond d’eux-mêmes, parfaitement 
conscients. Peut-être avons-nous là l’explication de cette étrange procédure de 
consultation collective et publique, qui est si peu conforme aux habitudes 
britanniques lorsque le Gouvernement anglais est véritablement résolu à prendre 
une décision d’intérêt national, et qui semble si peu susceptible d’aboutir à des 
résultats clairs et positifs, dans la discussion de problèmes aussi complexes, entre 
plus de dix nations dont les conceptions, les intérêts et les politiques ne coïncident 
que très partiellement.^"^
Similarly, “[t]he German central bank suspected that the proposals for a European Fund
AEF B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10,1954.
‘Maybe, in these conditions, after having made themselves look good [by making themselves 
champions o f convertibility], they are not annoyed to see other countries accumulate and express 
their objections on a number o f points, o f which they themselves are perfectly aware. Maybe this is 
the explanation o f this peculiar procedure of collective and public consultation, which is so at odds 
with the way the British government normally proceeds when it is really determined to make a 
decision o f national interest, and which seems so unlikely to result in a clear and positive decision, 
given the discussion of a problem as complex as this one, between more than ten nations whose 
conceptions, interests and policies only overlap marginally.’
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were not even honestly intended, but only a diplomatic smoke-screen, behind which 
Whitehall was still preparing a unilateral declaration of convertibility as soon as the 
government had won a general election” In 1954, when the government and the Bank of 
England were hinting that they might be getting ready to move, the French Finance and 
Economics Ministry maintained that the proclaimed British intentions of establishing 
sterling convertibility in the near future were motivated primarily by the desire to indicate 
to Germany that Britain was ready to act and thus hopefully prevent Germany jfrom 
storming ahead, and, in addition, “pour rompre avec le Continent une solidarité qui depuis 
des années irrite F orgueil britannique”/^
As early as 1953, German central bankers assured Britain that Germany would 
move to convertibility “five minutes after Britain”. With this commitment, Britain was 
assured that Germany would not move before Britain, but also that Britain would not be 
isolated in the move to convertibility when it decided to take the step. In 1953 and 1954, 
officials from the Bank of England and from the Bank deutscher Lander met to discuss 
convertibility. In these meetings, the German delegation repeatedly assured Britain that 
Germany would not act before Britain. However, Germany’s rapid dismantling of 
exchange control aroused concerns that Germany was preparing to establish official 
convertibility.^^ In addition, in spite of these assurances, British fears of a German 
initiative, were stirred further by repeated public statements by Erhard in which he 
indicated Germany’s interest in rapid convertibility.^* As a result, in 1953 and 1954, 
British Treasury and Bank officials worried that Germany might establish convertibility
Milward, The European Rescue, p.385.
AEF B44744, “Le handicap de la France dans la course à la convertibilité”, June 10,1954.
‘to end a solidarity with the continent which has been piquing Britain’s pride for years’
See chapter III.
BoE OV34/39, “Germany and Convertibility”, L.A. Martin to Tansley, October 7, 1953, and “Erhard’s 
statement”, handwritten note by Rootham to the Governors, September 30, 1954.
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before Britain?^ To reinforce its claim to an international currency status of sterling 
Britain wanted to lead Europe into convertibility. As the German economy and the DM 
strengthened in the course of the 1950s, British ministers became concerned that the DM 
might compete with or even take over sterling’s international key currency status."^ ® This, 
Treasury and Bank officials agreed, “would certainly not be a desirable development, 
politically or economically”.^  ^ For these reasons they wanted to avoid Germany beating 
Britain to convertibility.
But the German government was not planning to act unilaterally. Contrary to 
Britain, Germany’s national interests were best served by cooperation in a collective move 
to convertibility. Even Erhard, the most ardent supporter of convertibility, had reasons for 
preferring a collective move under British leadership to a German initiative. The purpose 
of Erhard’s statements is therefore more likely to have been to keep the British on their 
toes and prevent them from dragging their feet too much on convertibility rather than 
revealing actual plans. Uncertainty about German intentions was a good way of making 
sure that Britain kept moving forward.
From the early 1950s onward, France advocated a collective return to 
convertibility by the European currencies. For France, a collective move offered several 
advantages. Among other things, policymakers believed that it would facilitate public 
acceptance of the unpopular monetary adjustments, which would be necessary for the 
franc to become convertible. More importantly, however, by advocating a collective
BoE OV34/39, “Gemiany and Convertibility”, L.A. Martin to Tansley, October 10, 1953, and
40
‘Germany: Convertibility” D. H. Macdonald to Watson, February 18,1954.
BoE OV34/41, “Germany’s progress towards multilateralism”, D.A.H. Byatt to Stone, March 23, 1956. 
PRO T236-3940, R. Hall, suggested redraft o f Rowan’s memo “Why Convertibility” from May 18, 
1956, June 8, 1956.
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move, France hoped to prevent its European partners, particularly Britain and Germany, 
from moving to convertibility before the franc was ready to follow. Up until 1958, France 
was not ready to establish convertibility. By declaring itself in favor of a collective move, 
France sought to influence both the timing and form of convertibility that would be 
established. Between 1953 and 1955, French governments worried that a British move to 
convertibility was imminent."^  ^ In 1954, the French Ambassador in the UK, E. de Crouy 
wrote to Mendès France, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, that France had two 
options when dealing with apparent British plans for inaminent convertibility of sterling. 
France could either openly oppose the British plans and force the British government to 
abandon them by rallying for support from other European countries, or it could accept the 
objectives of the plan and then negotiate modifications on important points to suit 
France’s interests. The Ambassador strongly recommended the more diplomatic latter 
course over open confrontation.'*  ^ The Finance and Economics Ministry advocated a 
similar strategy: “En nous déclarant prêts à participer à la convertibilité, nous pourrions 
essayer d’influencer sa date et ses modalités de la façon la moins désavantageuse pour 
nous...” ^  In this manner, France hoped, ideally, to delay a British move to convertibility. 
Moreover, France sought to ensure that, when convertibility was adopted, it would be as 
limited as possible."*^
For reasons discussed in the previous chapter, France wanted to prevent such a move.
AEF B44744, E. de Crouy (Fr. Ambassador in UK) to Mendès France (Foreign Minister) re. “la 
convertibilité de la Livre”, July 2,1954.
‘By declaring ourselves ready to participate in convertibility, we could try to influence the date and the 
conditions o f its establishment to assure that it would be least disadvantageous for us...’
^  AEF B44744, “Les conséquences de la convertibilité”, May, 24, 1954. 
ibid.
“Quant au type de convertibilité le plus désirable pour nous, nous avons intérêt à ce que les pays européens 
adoptent, au moins à titre de première étape, une convertibilité aussi limitée que possible et compatible avec 
une organisation européenne.”
‘As far as the type o f convertibility the most desirable to us, we wish that the European countries adopt, at 
least in the first stage, a convertibility which is as restricted as possible and compatible with a European 
organization.’
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While working to keep the negotiating channels open with Britain, France actively
campaigned in the US against American financial support for a British move to
convertibility. France argued that a unilateral move would hurt European cooperation and
integration, something which many important factions considered a top priority of
America’s Europe policy. Thus, according to Frances Lynch,
La France bénéficia d’un avantage dans la mesure où la Grande-Bretagne ne put 
rétablir la convertibilité de la livre faute de pouvoir obtenir de crédits des Etats- 
Unis. De plus, dans un premier temps, l’Administration Eisenhower accueillit avec 
autant de bienveillance que ses prédécesseurs les arguments de la France en faveur 
de la création d’institutions européennes capables de stabiliser les situations 
politiques et économiques européennes. Non seulement la Grande-Bretagne se vit 
refuser toute aide américaine susceptible de faciliter la convertibilité de la livre 
mais c’est la France qui reçut un soutien significatif, ostensiblement destiné à 
subvenir aux dépenses militaires en Indochine, à assurer sa contribution à l’OTAN, 
et à permettre également de combler ses déficits vis-à-vis de I’UEP."^ ^
In May 1954, Vanoni the head of the Italian OEEC delegation and Budget
Minister wrote to France to express his concern that Germany and Britain would soon
establish convertibility and that their lead would be followed by the Belgians and the
Dutch. This would leave France and Italy relegated to a second rate group of inconvertible
currency countries, with all the political and economic disadvantages that would entail.
According to Vanoni the only way to prevent such a situation firom occurring was for
France and Italy to engage in
un progrès dans la voie de l’intégration économique de l’Europe qui permettra de 
faire jouer le mécanisme de la solidarité européenne vis-à-vis des Allemands et des
^  Lynch, “Le franc”, p.395. For an analysis o f the US policy on convertibility and European integration, 
see also, F. Romero, “Interdependence and Integration in American eyes: from the Marshall Plan to 
Currency Convertibility”, in Milward et. al.. The Frontier, in particular pp. 162-163 and A. Milward, “La 
livre sterling, le franc et le deutsche Mark 1950-1955”, in Comité pour l’Histoire Économique et 
Financière (éd.). Du Franc Poincaré à VÉCU, 1993.
‘France benefited from an advantage in the sense that Britain could not re-establish sterling 
convertibility due to the US’s denial o f financial assistance. Moreover, initially, the Eisenhower 
Administration was as receptive as its predecessors to France’s arguments in favor o f the creation 
of European institutions capable o f stabilizing European political and economic conditions. Great 
Britain was not only refused any US aid to facilitate sterling convertibility, but France received 
considerable aid, manifestly to subsidize military expenditure in Indochina, to secure its 
contribution to NATO, and to allow it to offset its deficits vis-à-vis the EPU.’
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Anglais, en les convaincant de différer le retour à la convertibilité de leur monnaie 
jusqu’à ce que tous les partenaires européens soient en état d’y procéder pour leur 
part”/^
This statement from 1955 foreshadowed the close link between the return to convertibility 
and European integration that was to emerge in 1958.
By 1955, some French observers thought that the deterioration of Britain’s 
reserves, the weakening of sterling, and domestic inflationary pressures would deter 
Britain from moving to convertibility. Since Britain was unlikely to establish 
convertibility in the near future, the wisest thing for the French government not to voice 
any resistance to British convertibility plans, so as not to risk confrontation."^^
Intergovernmental communication on convertibility between France and Britain 
seems to have been very poor on this topic. This impression is confirmed by the concerns 
expressed by British Treasury officials to the financial attaché at the French embassy in 
London, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, in 1954, regarding the lack of mutual consultation. Thus 
Leroy-Beaulieu reported to the French Finance Ministry that Copleston and Rowan from 
the UK Treasury
m’ont dit tous deux qu’il leur paraissait quelque peu anormal que des 
conversations à un niveau aussi élevé aient eu lieu depuis un an, à deux reprises, 
entre Allemands et Anglais (Erhard et Blücher étaient venus à Londres au mois de 
Juillet dernier), alors qu’il n’y avait pas eu de conversations du même ordre depuis 
longtemps entre Français et Anglais; celles que Rowan a eues avec Guindy 
n’étaient pas du même genre, elles se situaient plutôt sur le plan personnel. Etant 
donné les liens beaucoup plus étroits qui existaient entre l’Angleterre et la France - 
‘alliée traditionelle de l’Angleterre’ -, il serait, à leur avis, souhaitable que les 
Ministres compétents des deux pays et leurs Hauts Fonctionnaires examinent 
ensemble et complètement les questions économiques et finançières qui se posent
AEF B44744, telegram by the French embassy in the UK: communiqué from Rome from May 26, 
Nrs.420/428, May, 30,1954.
‘a progress in the direction o f the economic integration of Europe which would make it possible to 
use the mechanism o f European solidarity vis-à-vis the Germans and the English, and convince 
them to delay the return to convertibility o f their currencies until all the European partners are in a 
position to proceed’.
MAE DE CE 488, memo by Chauvel, no title, April 5, 1955.
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actuellement/^
Anglo-German consultation on convertibility was much fuller than Anglo-French or
Franco-German intergovernmental communication. The lack of intergovernmental
coordination or even consultation between France, on the one hand, and Britain and
Germany, on the other, can be explained by French reluctance to let any foreign players
have a say in what they considered a national concern. In a public speech in 1955,
Baumgartner emphasized that
[a]lthough convertibility is an international problem, for each country the decision 
is a national issue, based on the degree to which the country will be able to face 
outside competition. France is still a protectionist country, although she has 
liberalised to 75 per cent within E.P.U. French industries would have to accustom 
themselves to international competitions but there could be no question of 
reducing any section to a state of unemployment.^®
The need for national reassertion and independence after World War II played a
particularly important role in French economic and monetary policymaking in the 1950s.^^
During the French balance of payments crisis in 1957, France sought a special EPU credit.
In spite of French dependence on the EPU, and other foreign aid, to alleviate its shortage
of gold and foreign exchange reserves, France categorically refused to place its economic
reforms under the supervision or even the advice of international experts. This attitude
explains the French reluctance to communicate with other countries on convertibility.^^
AEF B44744, Leroy-Beaulieu à Sadrin, Directeur des Finances Extérieures (Ministère des Finances): 
“Conversations sur la Convertibilité, May 28, 1954.
‘have both told me that they found it slightly anomalous that such high-level talks had been going 
on, on two occasions, between the Germans and the English (Erhard and Blücher had come to 
London last July), while there had been no similar talks in a long time between the French and the 
English; the talks between Rowan and Guindey had not been o f the same type, they were o f a more 
personal nature. Given the much closer ties between England and France - ‘traditional ally o f  
England’ -, they thought it would be desirable that competent ministers o f both countries and their 
civil servants examine together thoroughly the economic and financial questions that currently 
present themselves’.
BoE OV45/42, “France” by B. W. Gunn, Overseas Dept, June 2, 1955. The quote is from Gunn’s 
summary o f the speech.
m”, p.444.
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See chapter IV.
A. Fleury, “La position
The communication between the French and British central banks worked better 
than between the respective governments and economics ministries, due to a traditionally 
good, and often very personal, relationship between the Banque de France and the Bank of 
England/^ However, the potential for cooperation, or even information was limited by the 
nature of the fact that in both countries, the independence and power of the central bank 
had been severely curtailed after World War II and, in both countries, it was the 
government that held the power of decision making regarding convertibility. In early 
November 1958, when the British government was in the dark, and very concerned, about 
a French reaction to sterling convertibility, the governor of the Bank of France, 
Baumgartner, could only speak for himself and the Banque de France, when he conveyed 
to the Bank of England that he supported a move to convertibility before the end of the 
year. He could not vouch for what the French government would decide to do.^ "^
One of the formal channels of international consultation was the meetings of the 
EPU Managing Board. However, even there, the British members were extremely 
reluctant to inform their foreign counterparts of government intentions regarding 
convertibility. Thus, at the EPU meeting in late March 1953, British officials refused to 
confirm nor deny rumors about an imminent move to sterling convertibility, leading the 
vice governor of theBanque de France, in his report of the meeting, to conclude wryly that 
“les declarations des experts anglais n’ont pas été très précises”.^ ^
Aside firom central bank communication, France and Britain relied on the 
information and observations of their respective embassies about what was going on in the
53 Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.603.
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.596.
AEF B48886, report by the vice-governor o f the Banque de France to the Finance Ministry, “Objet: 
35ième Session du Comité de Direction de l’Union Européenne de Paiements”, no date, late March 1953. 
‘the declarations o f the English experts were not very precise’.
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other country/^ France and Britain shared a reluctance to disclose information about their 
convertibility plans to other countries. In the case of Britain, the reticence or secretiveness 
of policymakers vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts can be explained partially by the fact 
that few, if any officials, knew what would happen with regard to sterling convertibility in 
the near future. Foreign observers were kept on their toes by the fact that Britain’s policy 
on convertibility fluctuated between the contemplation of a ‘dash to convertibility’ and the 
indefinite delay of sterling unification. In addition to the uncertainty and wavering in 
British convertibility policy, however, it was part of Britain’s policy to keep the other 
Europeans in the dark. This strategy was shared by France. Both countries viewed 
cooperation as a renouncement of monetary sovereignty.
Up until 1958, the strongest external influences on British policy on convertibility 
seem to have been US unwillingness to finance a British move and fear that Germany 
would take the initiative away from Britain. French policy was characterized by the effort 
to delay a British or German move until France was ready to participate. In 1956, the 
Director of External Finance in the Foreign Affairs Ministry observed with satisfaction 
that, “[IJ’attitude réservée de la France à l’égard de la politique de la convertibilité a 
sûrement contribué à retarder et, par conséquent, à faire échouer la mise en œuvre du plan 
britannique primitif However, as chapter II has shown, domestic doubts about the 
desirability of convertibility played a greater role than French efforts, or considerations of 
European cooperation, in delaying a British move to convertibility, at least up until 1958.
See, for example, MAE DE CE 761.
AEF B44242, Memo by the director o f external finance, “Note pour le Ministre - Objet: Évolution du 
régime des paiements internationaux - convertibilité et ‘transférabilité’ des monnaies européennes.” 
February 20,1956.
‘France’s reserved policy stance on convertibility has surely contributed to delaying the execution o f the 
original British plan and, consequently, causing it to fail’.
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Thus, the French ambassador to Britain seems to have been more accurate when he wrote 
in June 1955:
Quant aux répercussions politiques de la convertibilité de la £ivre sur la 
coopération européenne, ...il ne semble pas que Ton y ait ici très sérieusement 
songé. Le souci du prestige de la Livre et des profit que la Grande-Bretagne peut 
tirer de la convertibilité parait avoir dominé, jusqu’à présent, exclusivement.^^
Before 1958, both French and British governments were very reluctant to reveal their
intentions to other countries.
1958: C u r r e n c y  c o n v e r t ib il it y  a n d  E u r o p e a n  in t e g r a t io n
In the second half of 1958, the economic conditions appeared increasingly 
favorable for the UK. Reserves had been rising rapidly since the speculative crisis in 
September 1957, Britain was recording a trade surplus for the first time since 1951, 
inflation was moderate, and sterling was continuously strengthening in the parallel 
markets. UK Treasury officials started to discuss the possibility of a unification of the 
sterling rates and the establishment of non-resident convertibility in the coming months. 
By September, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Derrick Heathcoat Amory, was 
convinced that convertibility should be established before the end of the year.^  ^Although 
some Treasury officials remained skeptical whether convertibility should be established in 
the near future, the government had finally been persuaded that financial and economic 
conditions were conducive to taking the step, and timetables were prepared which planned
MAE DE CE 198, French ambassador to the UK to Antoine Pinay, “a.s. Convertibilité de la £ivre”, June 
7, 1955.
‘As far as the political repercussions o f sterling convertibility on European cooperation are 
concerned, ...they do not appear to have been o f great concern here. The concern with the prestige 
o f  sterling and the profit that Great Britain can gain from convertibility seem to have dominated, so 
far.’
PRO PREM11-2671, “Exchange rate policy and related matter”, memo by the Chancellor o f the 
Exchequer, September 8, 1958.
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for a move in November. It was at this point that the deterioration of the European free 
trade area negotiations rose as another obstacle to convertibility.
In the early 1950s, British economic policymakers had cared little about the 
potentially damaging consequences of a move to convertibility for trade with Europe and 
European cooperation and integration.^^ However, after 1955, Europe came to play an 
increasingly determining role in British policy on the timing of convertibility, and, by late 
1958, the European question had become a crucial factor in the decision of when to move 
to convertibility. In particular, Britain had begun to worry about German and French 
reactions to a British move to convertibility. The British went from an attitude of dismissal 
of any considerations for European cohesion in their discussions on the pros and cons of 
convertibility to one in which concern for European cooperation seemed the only 
consideration preventing them from establishing convertibility. This section analyzes the 
reasons for the British change of attitude.
Sterling and European integration: British dilemmas
In the first half of the 1950s, Britain showed little interest in participating in the
nascent European organizations.^* The lack of enthusiasm towards European integration in
the UK was strengthened by the belief that the attempts at European integration by the Six
were a non-starter anyway and that the Common Market would never materialize.^^ In
addition, Britain remained confident of its ability to persuade Europe to form a free trade
^  for a discussion o f the British attitude in the negotiations for EPU renewal in 1954 and 1955, see 
Milward, European rescue, pp.383-9.
for a discussion o f  the UK view o f European integration in the 1950s, see, for example, Milward, 
European rescue, pp.345-395 and pp.425-433, and Camps, Britain and the European Community 1955- 
1963.
Home, Macmillan: 1894-1956, Volume I, pp.362-3.
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area instead of, or in addition to, the EEC.^  ^ After the Messina Conference, however, 
many in the UK began to realize that they had underestimated the vigor of the European 
integration movement. Harold Macmillan was among those who became increasingly 
concerned by late 1956 that the EEC might actually take off while the free trade area 
would not materialize, the combination of which would leave Britain isolated from the 
largest economies in Europe.^ In the course of 1958, it became clear that particularly the 
French were not interested in a European free trade area.^^
By late autumn 1958, the prospects of a successful outcome of the free trade area 
negotiations were very dim. However, the British government had not yet given up hope. 
As French opposition to the British proposals grew, the British government became very 
careful to avoid any action that might allow France to accuse Britain of being anti- 
European and thus precipitate a final breakdown of the negotiations.^^ The UK press 
increasingly warned of the damaging consequences of a breakdown of the free trade area
The free trade negotiations had been initiated by Britain in late 1956 as an alternative or supplement to 
the European Community which the Messina Six were planning to establish. The British did not want to 
join the EEC - for reasons o f national sovereignty and because o f  the trading relations with the 
Commonwealth - but at the same time they did not want to be excluded from a Continental trading bloc. 
Consequently, they had presented the proposal for a European free trade area which would ensure that 
their goods would not be discriminated against in intra-European trade, without forcing them to sacrifice 
their preferential trading arrangements with the Commonwealth and the sterling area, or to devolve 
sovereignty to a supranational body, which the European Community was set to become. In addition to 
economic considerations, Britain feared a loss o f influence over Europe, which it considered one o f its three 
‘spheres o f influence’, next to the United States and the Commonwealth. The British attitude towards 
European integration is analyzed thoroughly in Camps, Britain and the European Community. See also D. 
Robertson, “United Kingdom”, in Graduate Institute o f  International Studies Geneva (eds.). The European 
Free Trade Association and the Crisis o f  European Inte^ation: An aspect o f  the Atlantic Crisis?, Michael 
Joseph Ltd., London, 1968, pp. 163-214, Federation o f  British Industries, European Free Trade Area; A 
survey fo r  industrialists, April, 1957, and A European Free Trade Area, United Kingdom Memorandum to 
the Organisation fo r European Economic Co-operation, Cmnd. 72 February 1957, HMSO.
^  Home, Macmillan, p.386.
Analyses and accounts o f French policy on European integration are provided in Bamavie and 
Friedlander (eds.). La politique étrangère. Camps, Britain and the European Community, Grosser, La 
politique extérieure, Hanrieder, The foreign policies, and Kolodziej, French International Policy.
^  The Soustelle affair in November 1958 demonstrated France’s inclination, almost eagerness, to walk 
out o f the free trade area negotiations at the slightest British provocation which would allowed them to 
blame the British for the breakdown o f negotiations. The French Information Minister, Jacques Soustelle, 
had bluntly stated that France rejected the UK proposal for a free trade area. Jacob J. Kaplan and Giinther 
Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p .310.
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negotiations for Britain and of the need to avoid a rift between Britain and continental 
Europe. In December 1958, in light of the rumors of an imminent UK move to sterling 
convertibility, The Economist cautioned against any British action which might be viewed 
as hostile to the French, since that would only increase solidarity among the Six, thus 
undermining OEEC-vride economic cooperation and further alienating Britain from some 
of its most important commercial partners.^^ There was thus a growing realization in 
Britain of the danger of its isolation and a rift with Europe. In December 1958, Treasury 
Third Secretary Denis Rickett wrote that “Ministers are very anxious not to put themselves 
in a position where the French Government could accuse them of having broken up the 
EPU as some kind of retaliation for the attitude of the Six on the Free Trade Area”.^  ^He 
warned that there were already signs “that the French are putting it about that we want to 
break up the EPU in order to make the Common Market impossible”.^ ^
Why could a British move to convertibility have been viewed as anti-French and 
anti-European? The British view was that the establishment of non-resident current 
account convertibility necessarily implied the end of the EPU and the beginning of the 
EMA, as agreed in 1955. In 1958, France was a huge debtor to the EPU (see table 2 in 
chapter II) and the government was constantly struggling to defend the franc against 
adverse speculation. By October 1958, there were growing expectations of a further 
devaluation of the franc. Upon liquidation of the EPU, France would have to settle its 
considerable EPU debt bilaterally, that is, through bilateral agreements with each of its 
EPU creditor countries. Failing agreement, repayment would have to be over three years, a
The Economist, “Partition o f  Europe”, December 20, 1958, p. 1053. see also The Banker, 
“Convertibility - at what risk?”, February 1959, pp.80-1.
PRO T236-4822, Rickett to Thorold, December 15, 1958. 
ibid.
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relatively short period for paying back such a sizable debt. Understandably, France was 
hoping to reduce its debt to a more manageable size, or eliminate it altogether, before the 
EPU was liquidated. Since the British maintained that convertibility inevitably ended the 
EPU, France was not likely to endorse British convertibility plans in the near future.
The EPU was created to facilitate intra-European payments under conditions of 
currency inconvertibility, and to pave the way for the establishment of convertibility. 
Consequently, the British argued, the introduction of current account convertibility for 
non-residents ended the usefulness of the existence of the EPU.^  ^ For some countries, 
however, the EPU had gradually come to represent European monetary cooperation and 
trade liberalization, thus extending its function and importance beyond its original 
technical purpose. In light of the strong British opposition to the EPU in the past, British 
proposals to end the EPU were viewed by some as attempts to eradicate an important 
forum for European cooperation.^^ In the 1955 negotiations for the EMA, the British had 
successfully lobbied for a post-EPU Europe in which, in matters of intra-European trade 
and payments relations and internal fiscal and monetary policies, the IMF and the GATT 
would replace the EPU Managing Board and the Steering Board for Trade, both OEEC- 
run bodies. Largely due to British pressure, the end of EPU would therefore usher in an 
era in which, “[t]he OEEC as an institution for European integration would be diminished 
for want of effective authority over its members' trade, payments relations, or internal 
fiscal and monetary policies”.^ ^
Thus the Federation o f British Industries wrote in 1957: “If complete currency convertibility is 
achieved the E.P.U. will no longer be necessary.” Federation o f British Industries, European Free Trade 
Area, p. 13.
see, for example, Kaplan and Schleiminger, European Payments Union, pp. 205-8, for an account o f  
the discussion between the British and the Continentals on the transition from EPU to EMA.
According to Kaplan and Schleiminger, Britain's successful lobbying, in 1955, for a less integrative 
European Monetary Agreement than the one originally sought by most Continentals, was partially 
responsible for pushing those countries that "attached great importance to the economic integration o f
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By late 1958, the situation and British thinking had changed. Britain faced the 
dilemma of not wanting to belong to a highly integrated Europe, which would curtail its 
economic sovereignty and threaten its Commonwealth trading system, while, at the same 
time, fearing exclusion from an EEC trading bloc and political association. For countries 
outside the group of Six, the OEEC, through the EMA and its European Fund, offered a 
more moderate form of European cooperation, compared to the EEC, and one, more 
importantly, from which they were not excluded. In 1955, Britain had worried about being 
drawn into a too integrative OEEC-govemed Europe. In 1958, British officials began to 
realize that the OEEC was the only forum that might prevent the Six from building a 
trading bloc that would discriminate against Britain, and instead attract them into a wider 
commercial framework with less political implications.^^
In July 1955 the EPU countries agreed that when a group of countries that 
combined at least 50 per cent of the EPU quotas declared their intention to end the EPU 
and to make their currencies convertible, the EMA would replace the EPU. The EMA 
introduced the following changes to intra-European payments. First, countries declared 
fluctuation bands for their currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar. The fluctuation were 
generally around 0.75 per cent on either side of parity, with only Sweden committing itself
Europe", to "pursue it [economic integration] thereafter through the Common Market negotiations". Thus 
they argue that, partially as a result o f trying to contain European integration in the OEEC, Britain found 
itself confronted with an even more integrative smaller forum for European integration in which it had no 
say since it had chosen not to participate. Faced with the exclusion o f what looked set to become the new 
core institution for European cooperation and integration, the British began to revise their policy o f trying 
to weaken OEEC as a forum for European cooperation. This point remains to be proven, however. 
Kaplan and Schleiminger, European Payments Union, p. 227. see also p. 217.
The EMA and the European Fund were a much less cohesive and integrative bodies than the EPU had been; 
they had less powers, less funds, and less institutionalized forms o f cooperation. According to Guillaume 
Guindey, “In fact the sole function o f the European Monetary Agreement turned out to be the granting o f  
small credits to those OEEC members regarded as developing countries.” G. Guindey, The International 
Monetary Triangle - Myths and Realities, transi, by Michael Hoffinan, Basil Blackwell, 1977, p.24.
Starting on January 1, 1959, the Six would implement the mutual tariff cuts and quota increases agreed 
in the Rome Treaty. January 1,1959 thus marked the beginning o f trade discrimination on the part o f the 
Six against the rest o f the OEEC countries.
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to a much narrower fluctuation band, ±0.03 per cent and Switzerland, which was not a 
member of the IMF, declaring a significantly wider fluctuation band of roughly ±1.8% 
around parity. Second, compared to the EPU, where intra-European payments were settled 
at parity rates and debtors could resort to automatic credits for a share of their debts, intra- 
European payments were now settled 100 per cent in US dollars and at the least favorable 
exchange rate for the country that sought settlement through the EMA. The aim was to 
ensure that most exchange clearings would take place in the foreign exchange markets, 
reducing drastically the scale of inter-central bank clearings.^ "^  Third, the European Fund 
replaced the automatic credit facilities of the EPU, was characterized by “non-automatic 
and much more limited credit facilities” than had existed under the EPU.^  ^Thus, ad hoc 
credits, which could be coupled with stipulations for economic policy changes, replaced 
the automatic credit facilities of the EPU. The European Fund, whose resources were to 
amount to $600 million was to be financed through member contributions and through the 
remaining EPU capital which would be carried over.
The EMA offered a degree of cooperation loose enough for the British to be 
willing to accept it. Consequently, they began to lobby for the EMA, something, which 
they probably would not have thought likely when the EMA was created. For Britain, the 
ideal was a Europe loosely bound together, via the provisions of the EMA, with the OEEC 
as an advisory body without executive power. The problem was that, given its balance of 
payments problems and its chronic shortage of reserves, France was not keen on the EMA
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsbericht fur Dezember 1958, pp.4-5.
Federal Reserve Bank o f New York, Monthly Review, January 1959, p.7.
Members o f the EMA had to “make available limited amounts o f very short term interim finance, and credit 
may be granted to assist in meeting temporary balance o f payments difficulties, the approval o f each 
application being subject to examination o f the merits o f the case”. IMF, Tenth Annual Report on Exchange 
Restrictions, 1959, p.7.
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- particularly not on the European Fund - which was an integral part of the EMA - since it 
would have required it to contribute to the European Fund, where credits would no longer 
be automatic and as easily available as in the EPU, and would have to be repaid quicker.
While the fear of the breakdown of the free trade area negotiations and of French 
hostility deterred the British from unilaterally establishing convertibility in late 1958, the 
impending beginning of the Customs Union put pressure on Britain to act. Britain’s aim to 
terminate the EPU required Germany, and some of the other continental countries, such as 
Belgium and the Netherlands, to join the British in the move to convertibility. Since 1954, 
the UK had been assured that Germany would follow a British lead into convertibility.^^ 
Treasury officials feared that once the customs union came into effect in January 1959, 
Germany might no longer be free or willing to move with Britain. Instead, Germany might 
coordinate its policy on convertibility with its EEC partners, whose plans for convertibility 
were unlikely to coincide with the British plans.^  ^ If it wanted to be certain of German 
cooperation, the UK was under pressure to act before the common external tariff and the 
Treaty of Rome’s separate rules for quota removal came into effect. Again, it was 
particularly the French the British were worried about. They knew that Germany, in 
particular the Economics Ministry, wanted convertibility as soon as Britain was ready. But 
they also knew that, if forced to chose between the UK and France on convertibility, the 
Germans would side with the French. The close relationship between Konrad Adenauer 
and Charles de Gaulle that blossomed in the fall of 1958, strengthened German ties with 
France, making it increasingly unlikely that Germany would follow Britain into 
convertibility if France would be damaged in the process.^^ Moreover, German loyalty
The Economist, “Five minutes after Britain”, June 19, 1954, p.962.
PRO T236-4371, A. France to Rickett, “The Rome Treaty and Convertibility”, May 17, 1957.
One indication o f the closer relationship between Germany and France than between Germany and the 
UK is the official visits o f Adenauer in France compared to Britain. During his period as Chancellor,
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towards France was only likely to grow stronger as European integration progressed. As 
the free trade area negotiations deteriorated and Anglo-French relations on the issue 
become more and more frosty, British fears grew that “[t]he French Government might 
also seek to persuade the German Government to refrain from following our lead in spite 
of their explicit undertakings to us to do so; and a unification of the sterling rates, without 
matching action by Germany, would leave us in a very embarrassing position''/^
If convertibility was contingent upon the transition from EPU to EMA, the French 
were likely to be opposed. But the British saw it as vital that convertibility coincided with 
the beginning of the EMA and the European Fund. The Chancellor of the Exchequer 
argued: “The replacement of automatic credit by the European Fund will put us in a 
position to control assistance from the European Fund to others, including the Six, who 
will therefore be disposed to take more account of our point of view.”*° The authority to 
grant credits increased the power of the European Fund compared to the EPU with its 
automatic credit facilities. As a result, the Fund was hoped to provide an effective 
counterweight to the Common Market. Treasury officials emphasized the importance of 
ensuring that the OEEC remained “the chief forum for economic co-operation in 
Europe”.*^  In order to achieve this it was crucial that the European Fund was established 
as a source of credit together with convertibility. If not, Hubback from the Treasury 
warned, the OEEC would lose a lot of its influence, and, in that case, he asked, “[m]ight
between 1949 and 1963, Adenauer visited France 22 times, more than twice as often as any other 
country, whereas he only visited the UK 6 times. Aufienpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 
Dokumente von 1949-1994; herausgegeben aus Anlafi des 125. Jubilaums des Auswartigen Amtes, 
Auswàrtiges Amt, 1995, p. 1127.
PRO T236-4820, “Exchange Rate Policy: Note o f Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.l on 
Thursday, 27th November, 1958, at 12.15 p.m.”, November 27,1958.
PRO 1236-4818, draft memo by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on exchange rate policy, October 16, 
1958.
** PRO T236-4822, memo from Hubback to France on “A Truncated E.M.A.”, December 16,1958.
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we not then have left the field clear for the Six to operate through their own Fund which,
in the last resort, I suspect the Germans would be ready to finance?”.^  ^“If this happened”,
he worried, “would we not find ourselves shut out of the major policy discussions?”.^ ^
Similarly, as late as December 23, 1958, a telegram from the Foreign Office to UK
embassies in Europe and the US and the UK delegation of the OEEC, reiterated that, when
establishing convertibility and terminating the EPU, “it is of great importance that the
European Fund should be in existence so as to preserve the possibility that E.M.A. should
be a source of credit. This will be evidence of the general desire to maintain financial and
monetary cooperation among the 17 O.E.E.C. countries”.^ "^
Based on its past dependence on foreign aid, France was expected to require
financial assistance in future. German or EEC credits to France would only increase the
cohesion of the Six, thus reducing Britain’s influence. As a Treasury document argued,
it is a major United Kingdom interest to keep O.E.E.C. as the main forum for all 
major matters of economic co-operation, since otherwise we cannot influence 
decisions important to us. If France looked to the Six for aid we should have no 
say about the conditions on which aid was granted. The likelihood of 
discrimination by the Six would increase and the influence of O.E.E.C. would be 
bound to decline.
On balance therefore, we should try to ensure that France continues to look to 
O.E.E.C. for aid, even though this means that we should at any rate have to take on 
a contingent liability for 25 percent of the aid granted.*^
Britain was faced with the problem of how to establish convertibility while at the same
time convincing the French to agree to the adoption of the EMA. At a meeting of the
smaller circle of Ministers in late October 1958, discussions centered on how to gain
French support for a move to convertibility and for the transition from EPU to EMA.*^
ibid.
ibid.
^  PRO T236-4823, telegram from Foreign Office to UK embassies in Europe and the US and to the UK 
delegation at the OEEC, December 23, 1958.
BoE OV 45/48, “Sir Denis Rickett's Working Party Aid for France: Note by the Treasury”, June 2,1958. 
PRO PREMl 1-2671, “Meeting on Exchange Rate Policy”- Record o f Discussions, October 28,1958.
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The British hoped to persuade the French to acquiesce to the transition from EPU to EMA 
by assuring them that the UK would accept repayment periods of longer than three years 
for their EPU debt, and that it would do everything to influence other creditor countries to 
do the same vis-à vis France.*  ^Finally, the UK government proposed a compromise on 
the EMA that was palatable to France: only the settlements system of the EMA was to 
begin with the establishment of non-resident convertibility; the European Fund would be 
suspended for six months thereafter, on condition, however, of firm French commitment 
to activate it on June 30,1959.** This compromise would allow the French some breathing 
space before their contribution would be called up. Also, it would provide time for a 
revision of the structure of the contributions of the European Fund to accommodate for the 
changed conditions since the drafting of the EMA in 1955, something the British also 
considered necessary.*^
The more intransigent the French became with regard to the free trade area 
negotiations, the more anxious the British became to appease them and not to give them 
any occasion for accusing the UK government of being anti-European or of wanting to 
harm the French. The fear was justified. The French press was ready to jump at the 
slightest opportunity to blame the UK for a breakdown in European cooperation.^® On 
October 31, von Mangoldt, German member of the EPU Managing Board said something 
to Ellis-Rees, the head of the British delegation to the OEEC, which the latter “interpreted 
as a warning that we should not break up E.P.U. until the Free Trade Area negotiations
PRO PREMl 1-2671, paper on France, joint paper by the Treasury and the Bank o f England, October 
27, 1958.
** PRO T236-4822, memo from Rickett to Makins, December 19, 1958.
in particular, the British felt that the Germans should contribute more than they were originally asked 
to. PRO PREMl 1-2671, paper on “Transition from E.P.U to E.M.A”, prepared by the Treasury and the 
Bank o f England, October 27,1958.
^  see, for example. Le Monde, “Qui souhaite la fin de l'U.E.P.?”, November 23-24, 1958, p.I (Section Le 
Monde économique et financier), and. Le Monde, “Après l'enterrement de la zone de libre-échange: où 
mène le virage de Bad-Kreuznach?”, November 30-December 1, 1958, p.7.
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were completed or we should have a further accusation from the French, which the Six 
might have to support, that we were taking action Avithout regard to the interests of our 
European partners”
On November 5, 1958, in a meeting with the smaller circle of ministers, including 
the Prime Minister, the only point on the agenda was the decision on whether 
convertibility should be publicly announced on November \1?^ The general consensus of 
the meeting was that both technical and political advantages would be secured from 
immediate sterling rate unification.^^ Nonetheless, the Prime Minister concluded that two 
factors - the imminence of the French elections on November 23 and November 30, and 
the state of the free trade area negotiations - made it inadvisable to take immediate steps to 
unify the rates. In other words, what stopped the British from taking steps to establish 
convertibility on November 17, was the concern that the French might use the opportunity 
to accuse the UK of trying to embarrass the French and divide Europe. The ministers 
concluded that “[wjhile, therefore, any hope remained of salvaging the Free Trade Area 
negotiations, it would be unwise to present the French with an excuse for breaking them 
off’ and that, instead of acting immediately, it was better to wait and see what happened to 
the free trade area negotiations.^"^
The British were ready to establish convertibility in mid-November, if not earlier. 
Fears of a resulting rift with France and the fear that Germany would side with France 
played a significant role in the final phase leading up to convertibility. An interesting 
question is how long this standstill would have continued, had the free trade area
PRO T236-4819, Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees to A.W. France, October 31, 1958.
PRO PREM 11-2671, Macmillan to Heathcoat Amory, October 31, 1958. 
ibid.
PRO PREMl 1-2671, “Meeting on Exchange Rate Policy” - Record o f Discussions, November 5, 1958.
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negotiations been dragged on for months. But on December 10, 1958 Heathcoat Amory, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, sent an almost panicked memo to the Prime Minister: 
“We are informed that the French are urgently considering a change in their exchange 
policy before the end of the year”, which “may take the form of devaluation or of making 
the franc convertible or both”.^  ^Heathcoat Amory believed that a French decision to make 
the franc convertible would be followed by the Germans, Belgians, Swiss and Dutch. He 
wrote that.
In these circumstances I am emphatically of the opinion that we must now decide 
to bring the sterling rates together so as to move as nearly as possible at the same 
time as the French. If we do not do this the recent weakness of sterling, which has 
been due mainly to the appearance of our having lost the initiative, both in regard 
to the Free Trade Area and unification of sterling rates, will be intensified. This 
would obviously be very damaging to our position.
I propose therefore that, when I am in Paris on Monday, I should inform my 
French and German colleagues (and simultaneously the main Commonwealth 
countries should be informed) that we have now decided to unify the rates and 
intend to move not later than the end of the year. I shall take care not to become 
involved in a negotiation with the French or the Germans on this issue, and so 
restrict our freedom of action in a matter which must remain entirely under our 
own control.^^
If the British government had not expected and feared that the French would pre-empt 
them in the establishment of convertibility, then, given the state of the free trade area 
negotiations, it is unlikely for political reasons that the UK would have made a move 
before 1959.^  ^ The free trade area negotiations, specifically the lack of progress in the 
negotiations, and the growing fear of being excluded from Europe had put Britain in a 
difficult dilemma, which Rickett accurately presented as the following:
What Ministers have to weigh, therefore, is the danger on the one hand of taking a
PRO PREMl 1-2671, minute from Heathcoat Amory to Prime Minister, December 10, 1958. 
ibid.
Speedy progress was not helped by the fact that, as has been shown in chapter II, the Prime Minister had 
never been an enthusiastic supporter o f convertibility. He knew that the Board o f Trade, the Trade Union 
Council (TUG) and the Labour Party remained opposed and, particularly in view o f  the upcoming elections, 
he feared that the government would be attacked on the grounds that the move indicated that it was prepared 
to sacrifice economic expansion and full employment to financial interests. PRO PREMl 1-2671, “Meeting 
on Exchange Rate Policy - record o f  discussions”, September 11, 1958.
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step which might still further exacerbate the political atmosphere in Europe and on 
the other hand the danger of allowing the French to have what amounts to a veto 
over any forward move by us, with the result that we might give the impression in 
the foreign exchange markets of having no firm policy.^*
As late as December 12,1958, the British government was still uncertain about the French
reaction to a UK move to convertibility. Fearing a trap, that is, that the French might take
the opportunity of a British move towards convertibility to blame British policy for the
imminent Franc devaluation, Macmillan decided to wait with convertibility until the UK
could be certain that France would participate in the move.^  ^The British government only
acted when it had obtained a written confirmation of French willingness to cooperate on
this move, to ensure that the French would not back out and then accuse the British of
bullying or trying to embarrass them. On December 22, 1958 the UK sought a written
statement by France that the date for convertibility had been “chosen to suit the
convenience of the two Governments”.
In the final days before the joint decision to establish convertibility, on December
15, 1958, Erhard offered de Gaulle a $300 million credit if France devalued and made its
currency convertible together with Germany and Britain, and, on the following day, de
Gaulle reached his decisions about the French budget and about devaluation and trade
liberalization on December 16.*^  ^ On December 17 Amory wrote to Macmillan that in a
meeting with the German and French Finance Ministers in Paris the three countries had
agreed to “a concerted move on the exchange firont between Christmas and the New
Year”.^ ^^  Amory reported that Pinay had told him: “He thought it would help the
discussions on European co-operation in January if we had this piece of co-operation
PRO T236-4822, Rickett to Thorold, December 15, 1958.
^  PRO PREMl 1-2671, Record o f  Cabinet Meeting on exchange rate policy, December 12,1958. 
PRO PREMl 1-2671, no title, December 22, 1958.
Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments Union, p.283.
PRO PREMl 1-2671, letter from Amory to Macmillan, December 17,1958.
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behind us”. With this assurance, the British were finally ready to prepare for the move.
In his account of the return to convertibility, Fforde attributed a central role to 
central bank cooperation between France, the UK and Germany in assuring agreement on 
a joint move.^ ®^  According to Fforde, the British, French and German governments 
communicated largely through the central banks on this issue. The importance attributed 
to the central banks, and, in particular, to the close relations between the French and the 
British governors, Baumgartner and Cobbold, as key negotiators and actors, is 
exaggerated. It is true that the central banks had agreed much earlier than their 
governments that a concerted move would be desirable. However, central bank 
negotiations on the issue were restricted to mutual declarations of goodwill and 
speculation, particularly, on the part of the Banque de France, as to what their respective 
governments would do. Thus, as late as December 15, 1958, the French governor, 
Baumgartner, told his British colleagues that while he personally welcomed devaluation, 
and convertibility, he did not consider it very probable. On December 10, the head of 
the British GEEC delegation. Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees warned Rickett at the Treasury, that “it 
would be unwise to assume that what Baumgartner might say about French concurrence to 
any proposal was necessarily the view of the French Government”.*®^ Communication 
between the French and the British central bank was very good, the only problem was that 
their power to negotiate on the behalf of their respective governments was limited.
The British Prime Minister personally insisted that the announcements of the move 
to press and parliament were changed to emphasize the cooperative element of the move.
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, pp.595-600.
PRO T236-4822, record o f conversation with Baumgartner, December 15, 1958. 
PRO T236-4821, Sir Hugh Ellis-Rees to Denis Rickett, December 10, 1958.
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Thus, the following paragraph was added to the announcements: “This is part of a co­
ordinated European move. The date has been chosen after consultation in the first instance 
between H.M.G. and the French and German Governments”.*®^ The British government 
wanted to make sure that the British would not be seen as following a continental lead 
while at the same time, however, conveying the willingness of Britain to cooperate with 
the rest of Europe.
Conclusion
According to Robert Triffin, “the restoration of an international system of trade 
and payments after the end of the war was ... recognized at an early stage as a problem 
whose solution would require international negotiation and agreement rather than be left to 
unilateral uncoordinated decision by several scores of sovereign countries”.*®^ Similarly, 
Strange argued that between 1952 and 1954, the European countries, including the UK, 
agreed to cooperate in the return to convertibility and to synchronize and co-ordinate 
national policies to achieve a “major change of gear in the international monetary 
system”.*®^ These statements does not apply to British policy on convertibility. Whereas 
Germany and France had been interested in a collective move throughout the 1950s, - 
although for different reasons -, in the UK, up until 1958, consultation and cooperation 
with other European countries conflicted with the national policy goals attached to 
convertibility. Therefore, it was not a foregone conclusion that the three countries would 
cooperate in the return to convertibility. The decision to cooperate with the rest of 
Europe in a joint move to convertibility was the result of a gradual realization, a process 
which was far from finished in 1955 when the EMA was signed, that the UK needed
see, for example, PRO PREMl 1-2671, “UNICORN - Draft Press Announcement”, December 24, 
1958.
Triffm, Europe and the Money Muddle, p.92.
Strange, “International Monetary Relations”, pp.36-37.
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Europe, both for the move to convertibility and to pursue its international economic and 
political ambitions. The development of the free trade area negotiations opened British 
eyes to the the force of the European integration movement and to the limits of Britain’s 
ability to influence the course of events in continental Europe. The pound weakness and 
the increasing fear of exclusion from a European trading bloc led to the realization that 
Britain needed Europe for the fulfilment of its national interests, whereas Europe was not 
dependent on the UK to integrate. As a result of this gradual realization British ministers 
decided to negotiate with continental Europe to ensure a collective return to convertibility. 
This decision constituted a significant departure from previous British policy on 
convertibility, which had paid little attention to the considerations and reactions of, or the 
consequences for, the other European countries of a British move.
The decision to seek a collective move to convertibility thus marks a fundamental 
shift in the UK’s policy towards Europe. Far from being a mere technicality, the return to 
currency convertibility in 1958 was an integral part of a new British attitude towards 
European integration. British policy on convertibility in the second half of 1958 is the first 
manifestation of the change in British policy towards Europe which culminated in the 
application for membership in the EEC in 1961. Previous accounts of the return to 
convertibility fail to place the event in the context of this structural break in British policy 
towards Europe. While acknowledging that the free trade area negotiations affected the 
British choice of timing of the move, they do not establish the connection between the 
change in the UK’s policy on convertibility and the shift in its policy towards Europe.
Britain's dismissive attitude towards the integration efforts by the Six in the first
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, pp.595-600 and Kaplan and Schleiminger, The European Payments 
Union, chapter 17.
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half of the 1950s can only be explained by a belief that the plans would not materialize/^^
This indicates an error of judgment on the part of the British, due in part to an
overestimation of the importance of British membership in any forum for European
cooperation. According to Milward,
British policy was not only based on a complete misunderstanding of the strength 
of the common interest that bound the continental EPU members together, it was 
also a serious misjudgement of the United Kingdom's own economic strength.^
After 1955, the British, particularly Macmillan, began to realize that a Common Market of
the Six was becoming increasingly likely and that the Continentals could advance towards
European integration without British consent or participation. The increasing concern with
the effects of a move to convertibility on European cooperation reflect this realization.
While the temporary strengthening of sterling, and other advantageous economic 
conditions discussed in the previous section, explain why the Treasury was generally 
favorably inclined towards establishing convertibility in the second half of 1958, the final 
decision on when to act was determined by foreign policy considerations. Macmillan was 
not prepared to jeopardize the free trade negotiations and to be accused of being anti- 
European by establishing convertibility. Only when it transpired that the French might be 
getting ready to establish convertibility did the UK Treasury begin its own concrete 
preparations for a move. Even then, however, Macmillan refused to give his consent until 
he had received a written assurance from France that the latter would not use the move to 
entrap the UK. Thus, in the final instance, the desire to prevent a rift with continental
Fforde spoke o f a ‘Euro-blindness’, which afflicted the Bank o f  England and accounts for its proposals 
for convertibility, such as Operation ROBOT, which completely ignored the importance o f Europe. 
Fforde, The Bank o f  England, p.453.
Milward, The European Rescue, p.386. See also the article by Sir Nicholas Henderson in The 
Economist, “Mad John Bull disease”, November 23, 1996, pp.49-52.
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Europe took priority over the international ambitions for sterling. Previous literature on the
topic has failed to recognize the importance of Britain’s policy towards Europe, and, in
particular, the shift in the policy, for the timing of the move towards convertibility and the
decision to cooperate. However, it was foreign policy considerations, rather than economic
or monetary conditions, which explain why convertibility was established in late
December 1958 and why it was established jointly with the rest of Europe.
In 1959 Per Jacobsson, the Executive Director of the IMF wrote:
External convertibility does not in itself imply greater freedom of trade, but the 
very fact that so many countries in Europe could agree on these currency steps at a 
time when discussions on the future of their trade relations were distinctly 
acrimonious may be expected to have a very useful psychological impact.^
As chapter III has shown this psychological impact was very important for German
opponents to the EEC, led by Ludwig Erhard. The timing of the move coincided with the
coming into force of the tariff and quota provisions of the Rome Treaty. It conveyed the
impression that OEEC-wide cooperation could continue in spite of the potentially divisive
effects of the beginning customs union of the EEC. The remarkable thing is that, contrary
to its previous European policy, by 1958, the UK was also very anxious to communicate
such a message. Moreover, by emphasizing the cooperative aspect of the move, in the
public announcements, the government was willing to forgo the benefits for sterling and
for its international financial ambitions which it associated with clear leadership in the
establishment of convertibility in favor of promoting European cooperation.
According to Sir Alec Caimcross, in the 1940s and 1950s, “[a]part from the
dwindling competitiveness of British exports, the main concerns of external economic
policy were to re-establish convertibility and to find some alternative to joining the
' Jacobsson, “Toward More Stable Money”, p.379.
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European Economic C o m m u n ity " /In  1958, the realization of the former policy 
objective, especially a unilateral British initiative, seemed to diminish the chances of 
achieving the latter, revealing a close connection between the two which had not been 
obvious before. Cooperation with France and Germany allowed the UK to establish 
convertibility without jeopardizing the possibility of finding an alternative to joining the 
EEC.
National policy on convertibility in the 1950s reveals discrepancies between the 
UK, France and Germany in the role assigned to monetary policy and the national 
currency, but also in the national political interests that motivate European monetary 
cooperation. The study of the return to convertibility thus provides important insights into 
national decisionmaking and national priorities that determine European integration, and, 
moreover, it provides new evidence of the close links between monetary and political 
cooperation. In the 1970s, Miriam Camps and Fred Hirsch, Michael Doyle and Edward L. 
Morse analyzed the growing role of politics in intemational monetary relations.*The 
German and the British policies on convertibility have showed the importance of political 
considerations in monetary decisionmaking. One of Hirsch and Doyle’s characteristics of 
the increased politicization of intemational economic issues is the greater involvement of 
higher political levels.**  ^ Prime Minister Macmillan’s active involvement in 
decisionmaking on convertibility is a prime example of the politicization of monetary 
issues.
Caimcross, “Economic policy”, p.64.
M. Camps, The Management o f  Interdependence, Council on Foreign Relations, 1974, p.55, and F. 
Hirsch, M. W. Doyle and E. L. Morse, Alternatives to Monetary Disorder, Council on Foreign Relations, 
McGraw-Hill, 1977.
F. Hirsch and M. W. Doyle, “Politicization in the World Economy: Necessary Conditions for an 
Intemational Economic Order”, in Hirsch, Doyle and Morse, Alternatives, pp. 12-13
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CONCLUSION: MONETARY COOPERATION AND EXCHANGE RATE
STABILITY
It is inevitable that individual nations in their approach to intemational monetary 
planning should be influenced by their own economic aspirations. It is best to be 
realistic and to admit that unless a satisfactory answer can be given to the question 
‘what is there in this for us?’ co-operation will be, at best, ephemeral.^
The previous chapters have analyzed the domestic issues that shaped the national
policies of France, Britain and Germany on convertibility. The country chapters showed
that convertibility meant different things and was associated with different issues and
policy aims of each of the three countries. The main focus of this chapter has been to
determine why countries cooperated in the return to currency convertibility and why they
chose December 1958 as the date for the event. It has examined what economic
circumstances and policy objectives ensured that France, Britain and Germany agreed to
cooperate in the move to convertibility. It analyzed the national goals that were pursued in
the coordination of the return to currency convertibility. This section assesses whether the
type of cooperation which took place in the return to currency convertibility in 1958
between France, Britain and Germany enhanced the stability of the intemational monetary
regime.
Ralph C. Bryant identified three different degrees of intemational economic 
cooperation. The lowest degree of cooperation, which he called “traffic regulations”, refers 
to a set of rules or regulations which governments agree upon to “ensure against the worst 
excesses of unconstrained noncooperative behaviour”.^  Examples of such traffic 
regulations are GATT and the IMF Articles of Agreement. The next level of cooperation.
Scammell, International Monetary Policy, p. 8.
R. C. Bryant, “Intergovernmental Coordination o f  Economic Policies: An Interim Stocktaking”, in 
International Monetary Cooperation: Essays in Honor o f  Henry C. Wallich, Princeton Essays in 
Intemational Finance, no. 169, December 1987, p.5.
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“consultation”, implies some intergovernmental exchange of information the purpose of
which is an enhancement of governments’ ability to make decisions “likely to promote
national interests”/F i n a l l y ,  “coordination”, which Bryant identified as the most
ambitious type of cooperation, involves some degree of “centralization of
decisionmaking”. In the case of coordination, “explicit bargaining occurs and the
governments agree to behave differently than they would have behaved without the
agreement”/ I n  general, according to Bryant, economic cooperation is always motivated
by self interest, and thus should not be taken to imply “amity, harmony, or altruism”.
It [coordination] certainly does not imply that national governments have common 
goals, that their goals are compatible, or that some governments must give up their 
own goals in deference to the goals of others.
If monetary coordination can be motivated by the pursuit of incompatible goals, then, to
extend Bryant’s hypothesis, intemational monetary cooperation can be detrimental to
intemational monetary stability. Thus, if monetary cooperation serves to promote
conflicting national interests, then, particularly, in a fixed exchange rate system,
cooperation can actually be destabilizing for the intemational monetary regime. The
pursuit of consistently different national inflation rates in a fixed exchange rate system
could be one of the conflicting national interests which might undermine the intemational
monetary system.
British economic policy in the 1950s was determined by the conflicting objectives 
of full employment and a strong pound. The former objective deterred British 
governments firom maintaining price stability at the level necessary for exchange rate 
stability. The benefit of convertibility was assessed according to its compatibility with
ibid.
ibid.
Bryant, “Intergovernmental Coordination”, p.7.
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these two objectives. Whereas convertibility, at a fixed exchange rate, was considered 
necessary to secure confidence in sterling, it was perceived to be incompatible with the 
pursuit of fiill employment policies. Similarly, German economic policy after World War 
II was characterized by the desire to avoid DM revaluation while at the same time 
continuing to maintain a level of inflation which was lower than that of its trading 
partners. However, in 1958, the temporary convergence of trade and monetary conditions 
in Britain and Germany, presented a unique opportunity to establish convertibility without 
sacrificing either of the two policy objectives. The establishment of convertibility could be 
expected to increase confidence in the pound, at least in the short run, whereas the 
favorable economic circumstances relieved the British government of the need to 
implement disinflationary policies to ensure the success of the move. At the same time, the 
move was unlikely to strengthen the DM, thus easing pressures, on German policymakers, 
for revaluation and monetary expansion. Cooperation and the choice of timing on 
convertibility allowed Germany and Britain to continue to pursue national policy 
objectives which were incompatible with the maintenance of balance of payments 
equilibrium and thus with the stability of the intemational monetary system.
Germany left the choice of the timing of the move to convertibility up to the 
British, secure in the knowledge that the British would pick a moment when the pound 
appeared relatively strong which implied a time when the DM would appear weaker than 
normal. The British press^ ^^  as well as the British Treasury and the Bank of England 
watched very closely the development of the DM and the dollar in the exchange markets. 
Assessments of the strength of the dollar firequently appeared in the memos discussing the
See, for example, The Economist, “Convertibility at Work”, p.55, and “An Act o f  Bravery?”, p. 12, 
both January 3, 1959.
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appropriate moment for sterling convertibility/^^ In the second half of 1958, several 
circumstances and events seemed to moderate the strength of both the DM and the dollar, 
making sterling look relatively stronger than in the years before. The Berlin Crisis initiated 
by Khrushchev in the fall of 1958, and culminating in the ultimatum he presented to the 
Allies on November 27, 1958, raised temporary doubts among the Zurich foreign 
exchange dealers, “whether Germany really is the safest place for their money”, and as a 
consequence, but again only temporarily, bolstered confidence in the pound. At the 
same time, in 1958 the US dollar emerged, according to The Economist, as “this year's 
suspect currency”, benefiting the pound through correspondingly increased trust. These 
circumstances were favorable to Britain’s desire to dispel pressure for a devaluation of the 
pound and December 1958 presented a particularly opportune moment for Britain to Tead’ 
Europe in the collective convertibility move with the aim of convincing the world that 
sterling deserved confidence.
By cooperating and deliberately taking the backseat in the collective establishment 
of convertibility, Germany found an, albeit short-lived, valve to reduce the pressure for 
economic adjustment. The temporary abating of the speculative capital inflows into 
Germany weakened the case of Germany's trading partners who urged, and even tried to 
intimidate, it into appreciating its currency or implementing other changes to correct the
See, for example, PRO T236-3946, Report by the Bank o f England sent to the Treasury: “’Pros’ for 
early amalgamation o f  official and transferable sterling”, March 18, 1958, and PRO T236-3946, Views o f  
the Bank o f England on “The Arguments in Favour o f an Early Amalgamation o f Official and 
Transferable Sterling”, April 2, 1958.
The Economist, “Assessment for Sterling”, November 29, 1958, p.812. For a discussion o f the Berlin 
Crisis, see Schwarz, Die Àra Adenauer: Epochenwechsel.
The Economist, “Assessment for Sterling”, November 29, 1958, p.811.
O f course, leadership in the move to convertibility in itself was not a sufficient sign o f strength o f the 
British currency. A relatively high level o f  foreign exchange and gold holdings is one measure o f the 
'strength' o f a currency, indicating an opportune moment for action. The issue o f timing, and its 
importance for the British, will be discussed in the British chapter o f  this thesis.
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‘structural’ imbalance. The recorded strengthening of the pound, also vis-à-vis the DM 
and the increase in the flow of short-term funds into Britain in the months immediately 
following the collective establishment of convertibility indicate that the policy worked, at 
least temporarily.
Renouncing leadership in favor of the British in the collective convertibility move 
suited Germany’s monetary, and indirectly its economic, policy goals. Most economic 
factions in Germany, led by the Bundesbank, wanted to avoid a revaluation of the DM. 
Throughout the 1950s, as the DM gained confidence concurrently with rising trade 
surpluses, the Economics Ministry took numerous unilateral steps towards import 
liberalization in a continued attempt to reduce the buildup of foreign exchange reserves 
and thus the pressure to revalue. However, reserves continued to swell and with it, 
speculative upwards pressure rose. A unilateral move to convertibility or leadership in a 
collective move, which would have made sense given the outstanding strength of the DM, 
would have surely intensified speculation even further, increasing pressure for a 
revaluation. Letting the British ‘lead’ and taking the backseat in the OEEC-wide move 
dispersed, temporarily, the upward pressure, which unilateral import liberalization failed 
to do. Already in 1957, Germany and Britain had cooperated in a joint effort to prevent 
either a DM revaluation or a pound devaluation. Instead of tackling the underlying real 
causes for the exchange rate pressures, they resorted to a joint statement confirming both 
countries’ commitment in the existing exchange rate. The effect of the statement was to 
reduce temporarily currency speculation, thus merely postponing the economic adjustment
See The Economist, "Convertibility Markets”, January 3, 1959, pp.60-2, “Foreign Exchange: 
Convertible Pounds in Demand”, January 10, 1959, pp. 151-2, “Sterling's Strength”, January 17, 1959, 
pp.244-6, “Foreign Exchange: Foreign Funds to London”, January 24, 1959, pp.340-3, “Convertibility 
Debate: The Next Move”, January 31, 1959, p.431, “Convertibility: Sterling Pulls in the Gold”, February 
7, 1959,pp.513-4.
Giersch, Paqué and Schmieding, The Fading Miracle, pp.l 10-111.
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necessary to return the two currencies to their purchasing power parities.
The temporary reduction in the pressure to revalue also momentarily took the 
steam out of the pressure exerted by Germany’s trading partners to implement policies to 
correct the structural imbalance which continuing surpluses seemed to reflect. The 
artificial dampening of the confidence in the DM corresponding to the artificial boost to 
the strength of the pound as a result of the collective move under British leadership 
allowed Germany to continue to sterilize the expansionary effect of the balance of 
payments surpluses on the domestic economy. In this way, Germany’s cooperation in the 
collective move actually undermined the Bretton Woods system by preventing the 
adjustment mechanism of a fixed exchange rate system from establishing equilibrium. 
While, on the surface, the Bretton Woods system appears to have been a period of 
exchange rate stabihty and economic cooperation aimed at assuring this stability, a closer 
look at some of the examples of monetary cooperation reveals that often countries were 
joined by a common desire to prevent the adjustments necessary for maintenance of 
balance of payments equilibrium, and thus for the viability of the intemational monetary 
system.
When both monetary and fiscal coordination are considered, we find potentially 
important gains to cooperation. When only monetary policy is considered, we 
find the gains are relatively small.
One implication of these results is that it is likely to be easier to achieve 
coordination of monetary policies rather than coordination of both fiscal and 
monetary policies.
In the case of the coordinated move to convertibility, monetary cooperation was a way 
of reducing the pressure for fiscal policy coordination. By cooperating on this external 
monetary policy, German and Britain avoided fiscal policy coordination. Britain and
W. J. McKibbin and J. D. Sachs. Global Linkages: Macroeconomic Interdependence and Cooperation 
in the World Economy, The Brookings Institution, 1991, p. 187. See also K. Dam, The Rules o f  the Game: 
Reform and Evolution in the International Monetary System, University o f Chicago Press, 1982, p.l2.
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Germany’s preference of monetary coordination over fiscal coordination is rational 
since,
monetary coordination alone implies policy settings that are close to ones that a 
government would follow in its own self-interest. Coordinating both fiscal and 
monetary policies, in contrast, implies policy adjustments that are quite different 
from ones that a country acting alone would pursue.
Whereas it is true, as Eichengreen claimed, that “[ijntemational monetary stability has
always required intemational cooperation and collaboration”, intemational cooperation
and collaboration, at least when it is limited to monetary cooperation, is not necessarily
conducive to intemational monetary stability.^^® In the retum to official convertibility,
monetary cooperation preserved present exchange rate stability in the very short term at
the expense future stability.
In contrast to Germany and Britain, French policymakers viewed cooperation in 
convertibility as an opportunity to introduce unpopular economic adjustment measures. 
By combining the economic reform with a collective move to convertibility, the 
government found it easier to convince the French public that economic adjustment was 
necessary if the French economy was to keep up with the rest of Europe. France coupled a 
fundamental change in its extemal policy direction, from a very closed to a relatively open 
economy, with an equally big change in its domestic economic policy orientation, from a 
strongly state-controlled, wage-and price indexed and inflationary economy to 
deregulation, de-indexation, and price stability. In Germany and Britain, the move was not 
accompanied by a change in economic policy. On the contrary, the moment for 
convertibility was chosen to ensure that a policy change would not be necessary when 
undertaking the move. Since in the French case, monetary cooperation was sought to
McKibbin and Sachs, Global Linkages^ p. 190. 
Eichengreen, Elusive Stability, p. 12.
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facilitate public acceptance of economic adjustment, French cooperation, as opposed to 
British and German cooperation was conducive to longer term exchange rate stability.
In contrast to Germany and France, Britain decided very late that cooperation in 
the retum to currency convertibility was in its best interest. The change in British policy 
on convertibility can be ascribed to two realizations. The first was the realization that 
European integration was a more powerful force than Britain had reckoned with, and, that 
it could prosper without, and even against the wishes of, Britain. The development of the 
free trade area negotiations made this painfully clear. As a result, policymakers in the UK 
gradually understood that they could not ignore European concerns if they wanted to have 
a say in Europe. The second realization relates to the fragility of sterling. As again the free 
trade area negotiations had shown, British policymakers realized that they could not take 
for granted that the rest of Europe would obediently follow a British lead into 
convertibility. However, after having lived through a decade of recurring sterling crises, 
British ministers became increasingly apprehensive of a bold unilateral move towards 
convertibility and they were increasingly anxious to assure themselves that above all 
Germany would follow a British move.
Favorable economic circumstances in 1958 offered the opportunity to establish 
convertibility without triggering a run on the pound. Thus, as the Treasury had wished, the 
move to sterling convertibility was undertaken from a position of strength. However, the 
causes for the improvement in British economic conditions, were exogenous and 
ephemeral. Consequently, the problems of sterling could be expected to retum once the 
intemational economy came out of its recession. The momentary monetary stability 
allowed the government to move to convertibility at a time when it was implementing
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economic policies aimed at stimulating domestic economic activity. A move to 
convertibility combined with a tightening of fiscal and monetary policy, as undertaken in 
France, would have been politically unacceptable in Britain. It would have been attacked 
by the opposition parties as indicating the government’s willingness to sacrifice full 
employment and expansion to extemal monetary objectives.
Similar to Britain, the establishment of DM convertibility made no lasting impact 
on the conduct of monetary and fiscal policy in Germany. There was no reason to assume 
that, after convertibility, Germany would change its policy of sterilizing the expansionary 
effect of balance of payments surpluses and of trying to get away with higher than average 
price stability while avoiding revaluation.
The French move to convertibility marked a clear change in economic policy 
orientation. Before convertibility was established, France had been one of the most closed 
and protected economies in Europe. For France, convertibility and trade liberalization 
presented a much larger step than for Germany and Britain, where the move was largely 
symbolic. France’s decision to take this plunge, at a time when economic and financial 
conditions were worse than they had been in a decade, indicated that France was willing to 
make a change. By combining the step with far-reaching economic reforms, the 
government made a clear break with the past. French cooperation in convertibility was 
motivated by the desire to make the new economic policy orientation more palatable to the 
public. German and British cooperation in convertibility was motivated by the desire to 
preserve policies and stmctures which had already proven to be inconducive to exchange 
rate stability and thus to intemational monetary stability.
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CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has shown that the assumption that countries were united by a common 
desire to establish convertibility because of its benefits for multilateral trade is simplistic 
and erroneous. Chapter I argued that existing explanations fail to provide a satisfactory 
answer to why Western Europe moved jointly to convertibility in 1958. The most 
widespread explanation is that the later than expected fulfilment of certain preconditions 
for convertibility, in particular, the insufficiency of reserves, forced Western Europe to 
postpone convertibility longer than originally planned. Taking a different approach, the 
Eichengreen hypothesis argued that the preconditions for a move to convertibility were 
fulfilled by the early 1950s, and, that the delay in convertibility can be attributed to a 
collective desire to protect the post-war settlement by maintaining the European Payments 
Union. Both explanations assume that countries agreed fi-om the beginning that 
convertibility would only established collectively and that they shared a commitment to 
convertibihty and to the stability of the intemational monetary system. This thesis refutes 
these assumptions, arguing instead that there was no widespread consensus on 
convertibility nor on the need to cooperate in a collective move. The comparison of the 
key countries’ policies on convertibility reveals fundamental differences in national 
economic policy objectives.^
Chapters II, III, and IV, analyzed the British, German and French national policies 
on convertibility, respectively. The country chapters show that, depending on their 
diverging economic policy orientations, the three key countries associated very different 
benefits and costs with currency convertibility. The reasons for delaying convertibility
' A light-hearted but revealing essay written in the 1950s which mocked the differences in national views 
on convertibility is reproduced in Appendix B.
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until 1958 varied according to the national objectives pursued with the move. Moreover, 
the motivations for monetary cooperation in convertibility differed significantly from 
country to country. The analysis of national policy goals shows that the only interest that 
bound France, Britain and Germany together in the move to convertibility was the 
attraction offered to each country by a cooperative move.
The intemational currency role of sterling and the traditional trade dependence 
should have made Britain one of Europe’s most fervent advocates of convertibility. The 
Conservative Party declared convertibility one of its top economic goals in 1952. Contrary 
to public statements, however, in Britain convertibility was a much more controversial 
issue than in France or Germany. British policy on convertibility was tom between 
intemational ambitions for sterling and the rejection of an extemal constraint on 
expansionary domestic economic policy. Moreover, trade considerations mitigated 
against, rather than in favor of, a speedy retum to convertibility. From its inception, 
British governments questioned the desirability of two of the foundation stones of the 
Bretton Woods system, namely convertibility and a pegged exchange rate. Sterling’s 
weakness cannot be explained by an irrational lack of confidence in the pound. Rather, 
monetary policy which failed to stabilize prices and wages weakened the pound and in 
addition undermined confidence in the pound, which in tum further increased spculation 
against the pound. The lack of consensus on convertibility and the frequent tumarounds in 
British policy contributed to the erosion of confidence in sterling. Policymakers’ attraction 
to a floating exchange rate combined with a commitment to full employment policies, at a 
time when employment was already at historically low levels, undermined the stability of 
sterling and thus of the entire intemational monetary system. British policy dilemmas and 
the conflicted view on convertibility are illustrated by the fact that, when the government
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finally took the step in 1958, it made a deliberate decision to avoid the term
‘convertibility’ in the announcement of the event of the move to the public:
It would be easy to compare convertibility with the retum to the gold standard in 
1925, since both operations were based on the principle of a fixed parity; and both 
the Parliamentary Opposition and organised labour would undoubtedly take 
advantage of this fact to maintain that the Government were abandoning the 
protection which the economy derived from the flexibility of dual rates and were 
sacrificing employment and production to the interests of the intemational bankers. 
Moreover, this criticism would not be wholly without foundation in-as-much as 
convertibility necessarily entailed the maintenance of a disinflationary intemal 
policy and might therefore make it more difficult for the Government to embark on 
the expansionary measures which they had under consideration at the moment. For 
these reasons it would be desirable that, if the rates were unified in the near future, 
the Government should seek to minimise the psychological impact of the operation 
by representing it not as constituting the full convertibility of sterling but as 
representing only a further step towards the ultimate goal of convertibility.^
The official establishment of convertibility which was intended to be one of the
showpieces of the Conservative Party’s policy successes, was thus downplayed for fear of
domestic opposition to the move.
In Germany, trade considerations were much more conducive to the rapid retum to 
convertibility than in Britain. In addition, and in total contrast to Britain, the unique 
combination of historical experience, economic conditions and political circumstances laid 
the foundation for a widespread, even grassroots, consensus on the desirability of 
convertibility. However, whereas sterling’s special role and Britain’s intemational power 
aspirations were best served by a unilateral British move to convertibility before the rest of 
Europe, German economic and political interests were best served by a collective move to 
convertibility. The priority attributed to cooperation in convertibility explains why 
Germany waited for Britain and the rest of Europe, when its economic and financial
 ^ 1236-4819, “Exchange Rate Policy: Note o f a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, S.W .l, on Tuesday, 
28th October, 1958, at 12.15 p.m.”.
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conditions would have allowed it to establish DM convertibility as early as 1954. In 
contrast to Britain, the consistency of German policy on convertibility reinforced the 
strength of its currency.
French policy on convertibility can be divided into a pre-1958 and a post-195 8 
period. Before 1958, the reality of trade deficits, currency instability and higher than 
average inflation combined with the politically motivated quest for self-sufficiency made 
convertibility a secondary priority. Convertibility was relegated to a distant and utopian 
future in which France was prosperous, competitive and financially stable. The generous 
and firequent resort to multiple exchange rates and high import barriers indicated that the 
statutes of Bretton Woods were did not play an important role in economic policy making. 
However, the deterioration of the extemal balance and intemal price stability led to a 
growing realization that current policies were not working. Policymakers began to look to 
other policy options to cure the French economy of its ills. Prominent economists, led by 
Jacques Rueff, who had been preaching the virtues of monetary stability and convertibility 
for years, were no longer ignored. In 1958, political instability, exacerbated by the 
Algerian war, joined with financial instability to create a general atmosphere of national 
crisis. The circumstances demanded a strong leader who was willing to implement drastic 
policies to get France back on its feet. General Charles de Gaulle fit the role perfectly. The 
economic reformers were called in to clean up the mess left by more than a decade of lax 
fiscal and monetary policy, inflation, and price-distorting government intervention. 
Convertibility was an intricate part of the package of measures adopted in the 
‘redressement’ of the French economy.
The extraordinary popular support and respect which de Gaulle enjoyed were the
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ideal prerequisite for the implementation of far-reaching and painful economic measures. 
The similarities and differences between 1958 and the situation in France in 1996 are 
striking- Then as now, France had to cut public spending and deregulate to renew to create 
favorable conditions for economic growth and to prepare the economy for the next phase 
in European economic integration. In 1958 it was the Common Market and the 
commitment to trade liberalization while today it is the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and the necessity to meet the three convergence criteria, relating to the budget deficit, 
inflation and interest rates. Then as now, economic conditions demanded unpopular 
economic policies. However, whereas in 1958 the public responded favorably to the 
measures, even though large segments of the population experienced real income losses, in 
1996, the reforms have met with massive protests which in tum are undermining the 
political stability of an already vulnerable government. Considering the current difficulties 
in pushing through reforms aimed at economic and monetary stabilization, the turnaround 
in French policy and the success of the widespread economic reform is all the more 
remarkable. The combination of extreme political and economic crisis and a strong and 
popular leader created a favorable setting for the imposition of far-reaching economic 
reforms which, in tum paved the way for a decade of rapid growth with relative monetary 
stability. In contrast, Britain lacked the consensus and the political mandate to make 
possible a similar change in policy.
Contrary to France, both Britain and Germany resisted economic adjustment 
throughout the 1950s. The bi-annual sterling crises indicated that the state of the British 
economy was unconducive to the stability of sterling. Higher than average inflation 
combined with lower than average unemployment confirmed a policy orientation which
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placed economic expansion above monetary stability. Conversely, the strength of the DM 
on foreign exchange markets and the repeated bouts of speculative capital inflow, reflected 
a structural surplus problem in the German balance of payments. Germany sterilized its 
balance of payments surpluses and thus prevented the automatic adjustment mechanism 
from restoring balance of payments equilibrium. Consequently, inflation rates remained 
lower than average while trade surpluses continued to grow. Neither Britain nor Germany 
were inclined to letting their economic policies be dictated by extemal pressures on the 
exchange rate. In 1958, the exceptional economic and financial conditions temporarily 
removed the pressure on both Germany and Britain to adjust their economies and thus to 
change their economic policy orientation (see chapter V). 1958 was therefore the 
opportune moment to establish convertibility. However, as a result of the failure to remove 
the origins of the stmctural extemal imbalances, once intemational economic conditions 
had retumed to normal, and the international economy had come out of the recession, the 
problems, and with them currency speculation, retumed. By 1959, the trade balance was 
back in deficit, wages and prices were rising and sterling was back in hot water.^ 
Similarly, rapidly growing trade surpluses and speculative capital inflows retumed in 
Germany in 1959/1960, and, in 1961 the DM was revalued. Cooperation in the move to 
convertibility and the choice of the timing of the move only allowed Germany and Britain 
to postpone further the economic adjustment measures which would have been necessary 
to ensure lasting balance of payments equilibrium and exchange rate stability. Whereas
“Between 1959 and 1964 the vital currency was sterling. Had the pound been capable o f assuming the role 
of key currency to which the British Government aspired, had it been backed by a stronger balance o f  
payments, more skilful monetary policy and had it not been subject to repeated speculative attacks by lagged 
payments and hot money movements, then the suspicion which clouded it would probably not have been 
extended to the dollar later in the decade. As it was the period from 1959 to 1964 was punctuated by 
recurrent sterling crises which marked the end of its career as a key currency.” Scammell, The International 
Economy, p. 120.
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Germany wanted to avoid both revaluation and inflation, Britain sought to fend off 
devaluation and disinflation. The resistance of both countries against the convergence of 
inflation rates revealed an unvrillingness to subscribe to the rules of game, of a fixed 
exchange rate system.
Up until 1958, European cooperation on convertibility was obstructed by British 
and French reluctance to share their intentions with other countries. Mutual consultation 
was viewed as an infringement of each country’s right to self-determination and a threat to 
both Britain’s and France’s aspirations for leadership in Europe. The maintenance of 
sterling’s intemational currency role, in particular, demanded unilateral and assertive 
British decision-making. Policy cooperation was considered to be an admission of 
insecurity, on the part of British policymakers, regarding sterling’s strength. However, 
after 1958, there was a gradual change of British policy on cooperation. British ministers 
paid increasing attention to the development of European integration on the continent. A 
growing fear of losing influence over continental Europe was exacerbated by the 
unsuccessful negotiations for a European free trade area. At the same time, sterling’s 
unsatisfactory track record heightened British awareness that a successful move to 
convertibility depended Germany and as many other countries as possible following a 
British lead. The two factors led Britain to adopt a cooperative stance on convertibility in 
the second half of 1958. The decision to consult and cooperate with France and Germany 
in the move to convertibility marked a significant change in Britain’s policy on 
convertibility.
Whereas Britain only discovered the advantages of cooperation at a very late stage, 
in Germany, cooperation had always been a pre-condition for a German move to
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convertibility. Due to Germany’s unique situation after World War II, cooperation 
presented no threat to its self-determination. On the contrary, it was the only way for 
Germany to regain sovereignty. Germany’s economic and political orientation generated 
an early consensus on the desirability of both convertibility and cooperation.
Articles IV and VIII of the Articles of Agreement committed countries to 
establishing and maintaining currency convertibility for current transactions at a fixed 
exchange rate, with a permitted fluctuation of 1 per cent on either side of the par value, 
and to “collaborate with the Fund to promote exchange stability” (Art. IV, Sec. 4(a)). In 
addition, by signing the Articles of Agreement, member countries subscribed to the 
principles of the Intemational Monetary Fund (IMF) which included the purpose “To 
promote intemational monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which 
provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on intemational monetary 
problems” (Art. I (i)). Throughout the 1950s, policymakers in the UK hesitated to commit 
to a fixed exchange rate, currency convertibility and intemational monetary cooperation. 
Governments’ deep-rooted scepticism of the tenets of the Bretton Woods system and 
particularly public awareness of policymakers’ reluctance to espouse the principles of the 
Bretton Woods constitution significantly contributed to the weakness of sterling in the 
1950s and 1960s. Similarly, Germany’s policy of sterilizing balance of payments 
surpluses and maintaining German inflation below the European average meant that the 
DM was consistently judged to be undervalued. While, on the surface, the Bretton Woods 
system appears to have been a period of exchange rate stability and economic cooperation 
aimed at ensuring this stability, a closer look at some cases of monetary cooperation 
reveals that often countries were brought together by a shared intention to prevent the
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adjustments necessary for the smooth functioning of a fixed exchange rate system.
Martin Feldstein claimed that “[ajithough the Bretton Woods Agreement was
accepted by the United States and all the other major nations of the non-Soviet world,
the system never worked the way that it was designed to do”."^ Feldstein listed as the
three reasons why the Bretton Woods rules were never followed, firstly, changing
economic conditions, secondly, changing views on the most suitable intemational
monetary system, and thirdly, “an unwillingness of major countries to accept the
constraints imposed by the Bretton Woods Agreement when it conflicted with national
interests”.^  This thesis has shown that the national policies towards convertibility of
some of the key countries of the intemational monetary system revealed a lack of
commitment to the tenets of a fixed exchange rate system with convertible currencies,
and a refusal to follow the rules of the game. If countries never played by the rules of
the game established in the Bretton Woods Agreement, then the it can be argued that the
conference at Bretton Woods created “[a] system that never was”.^
Axel Leijonhufvud attributed a cmcial role to expectations in the definition of a
monetary regime. Thus he defined a monetary regime as
first, a system of expectations governing the behavior of the public. Second, it is 
a consistent pattem of behavior on the part of the monetary authorities such as 
will sustain these expectations.^
Public awareness of governments’ doubts about the Bretton Woods principles
undermined the stability of the fixed exchange rate regime and consequently eroded the
 ^ M. Feldstein, “Lessons o f the Bretton Woods Experience”, in Bordo and Eichengreen (eds.), A 
Retrospective, p.613.
 ^ibid.
 ^ibid.
 ^Leijonhufsoid’s definition o f  monetary regimes differed from previous ones which defined a monetary 
standard by the institutions and arrangements regulating the money supply. See A. Leijonhufvud, 
“Constitutional constraints on the monetary powers o f  government”, in R. B. McKenzie (ed.). 
Constitutional Economics, Lexington Books, 1984, p.95 and Bordo and Jonung, Monetary Regimes, p.2.
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very foundation that Bratton Woods was built on. This thesis has shown that the 
exchange rate imbalances which racked the Bretton Woods system in the 1960s were 
already foreseeable in the 1950s. From its inception, a lack of commitment on the part of 
some of its most important members eroded the Bretton Woods system and led to its 
collapse in the early 1970s.
349
APPENDIX A: The Institutional Setting: 
Ludwig Erhard And The Struggle For Power
Germany’s loss of sovereignty after World War II included the loss of sovereignty 
over its exchange policy (‘Devisenhoheit’). When the Federal Republic regained that 
sovereignty in 1952, the authority over Germany’s exchange policy was not clearly 
assigned. The economic bodies had undergone a restructuring process in which authorities 
over policy domains had been newly assigned, leaving, however, uncertainty on the 
authority over exchange policy and convertibility.^ A parliamentary working committee 
was formed to examine where the decision-making power over the exchange liberalization 
process lay or should lie. In the report on its first meeting in January 1954, the committee 
established that:
Das Gesetz wird den Waren- und Dienstleistungsverkehr grundsatzlich freistellen, 
jedoch bestimmte umrissene Gebiete genehmigungspflichtig machen, um es dann 
auf Grund einer Ermachtigung dem BMW zu überlassen, den jeweiligen Grad der 
Auflockerung zu bestimmen. Die Fragen der Zustandigkeit, insbesondere bei der 
Deviseniiberwachung sind nocht nicht entschieden.^
As long as Germany monetary sovereignty rested in the hands of the Allies, the
assignment problem did not present itself, but as Germany gained greater degrees of
independence over its exchange policy, the issue of who would be allowed to decide what
became a pressing and contentious one. Exchange policy presented an unchartered
territory, a no man's land waiting to be claimed. The undefined situation pitted the three
bodies responsible for economic and monetary matters in Germany, - the Bank deutscher
* for an account o f the restructuring o f the German banking system by the military government see 
Horstmann, “Die Entstehung der Bank deutscher Lander”.
^BA B 102-55740, “Bericht iiber die erste Sitzung des Devisen-Arbeitskreises in Bonn am 18.1.1954 unter 
Leitung von Herm Dr. Frentzel”, January 22, 1954.
‘The law will permit the free trade o f  goods and service in general, excepting, however, certain 
specified areas which will require permission from the BMW, leaving it up to the BMW to 
determine the degree o f liberalization. The questions regarding responsibility, in particular 
regarding exchange control, have not yet been decided upon.’
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Lander (BdL), later to become the Deutsche Bundesbank (DBB), the Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Economics -, in an acrimonious struggle for power over Germany’s 
exchange policy. These three economic policymaking bodies were already engaged in a 
fight for power in general. Thus, Finance Minister Schaffer tried to gain control of the 
monetary policy of the BdL and to reduce the decisionmaking powers of the Economics 
Ministry in his favor.  ^ The fight for authority over German exchange policy continued 
throughout the 1950s and played a considerable role in the relations between the three 
rival institutions as late as the time of the passing of the AuiBenwirtschaftsgesetz, the law 
regulating Germany’s external economic relations, in 1957. The struggle for the power 
over exchange policy probably contributed to the delay of the passing of the law which 
had been under discussion since 1953.
Germany regained sovereignty over its external monetary policy in 1953 as a 
result of the London Debt Agreement, - which is also the year the FRG became a member 
of the IMF and the World Bank and when the DM was recognized as an international 
currency -, making the question of who would manage that sovereignty a very topical 
one."^  The debate flared up in 1953 in the discussions following the proposal for a currency 
law (‘Devisengesetz’) put forward by the Economics Ministry. The official aim of the 
currency law was to supersede the laws passed by the military government which 
generally prohibited any transactions between residents and non-residents of Germany, 
except where explicitly permitted. The law proposed by Erhard turned the general 
prohibition on international transactions between Germans and non-Germans into a 
general permission.
Der Spiegel, “In Schaffers Kompetenzsack”, No.5, Jan.30, 1952, pp.7-10. 
Gutmann, Hochstrate and Schliiter, Die Wirtschaftsverfassung, pp.245, 247 & 256.
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In a letter written in September 1953, the BdL strongly protested in a letter to 
Erhard against a draft of the law drawn up in the Economics Ministry which reduced the 
decisionmaking power of the BdL on currency matters to the area of the obligation to hand 
in foreign exchange (‘Devisenablieferungspflicht’). The BdL letter pointed to the London 
Debt Agreement in which the BdL and the central banks of the Lander were assigned the 
task of carrying out the Debt Agreement/ Dr. Schulz from the Economics Ministry 
accused the BdL of resisting a currency law because it refused to give up its power to pass 
decrees (‘Rechtsvorschriften’), which it had been given by the Allied forces.^ According 
to official from the Economics Ministry, this decree-passing power violated constitutional 
law, by which only the government was permitted to pass decrees.
In the same month, Erhard wrote to Schaffer, the Finance Minister, obviously in 
response to some claim staked by the latter on the finance ministry’s say in currency 
matters, to remind him that parliament had decided that exchange control and payments 
restrictions should be supervised by the ‘Oberfinanzdirektion’ which, however, as Erhard 
pointed out gleefully, had to act on the instructions of the Minister of Economics.^ The 
Justice Minister confirmed Erhard’s interpretation of the law.  ^ Moreover, already in 
October 1951, the German parliament had voted in favor of officially assigning the 
responsibility for money and credit to the Economics Ministry, and not to the Finance 
Ministry.^ The Finance Ministry was eliminated from the competition for power over 
Germany’s exchange policy early on, leaving the Economics Ministry and the BdL to 
fight it out.^° In a letter written to the Economics Minister in 1954 the Minister of Justice
^BA B 102-55740, BdL to Erhard re.”Deutsches Devisengesetz”, September 8,1953.
B 102-55740, Note by Dr. Schulz (VD2), February 17, 1954.
 ^BA B 102-55740, Erhard to Schaffer re. “Neues Devisengesetz”, September 1953.
* BA B 102-55740, Justice Minister to Economics Minister re. “Neues Devisengesetz”, March 8,1954.
’ Der Spiegel, “In Schaffers Kompetenzsack”, No.5, January 30, 1952, p.9.
In 1955, the Finance Ministry received a request for information on the establishment o f convertibility in 
Canada in 1951 by a Ph.D. student. An official o f the Finance Ministry wrote back to the Ph.D. student,
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declared that the Economics Minister could restrict the import or export of goods or 
payments without requiring the explicit agreement by the BdL/^ That left open the 
question, however, of who retained the power to decide on removing restrictions on 
payments.
The written exchanges between the Economics Ministry and the BdL on 
convertibility indicate that, in practice, the two bodies negotiated agreements on each of 
the significant steps towards the lifting of exchange restrictions and the establishment of 
convertibility, but that the Economics Ministry had the greater and final say. Each 
institution published its own announcement of the individual steps taken to liberalize 
payments. But while the decrees (‘Runderlasse AuBenwirtschafT) by the Economics 
Ministry were published ‘with the agreement o f the Finance Ministry and the BdL - “im 
Einvemehmen mit” -, the general permissions (‘Allgemeine Genehmigungen’) produced 
by the BdL were published after having been approved by the Economics Ministry and 
Finance Ministry. More importantly, when the British initiated talks between them and 
Germany on the issue of the pace of the establishment of convertibility in 1953, they 
invited Erhard and Schaffer and not Vocke or any other representative of the BdL.^  ^
Indirectly, the Economics Ministry benefitted firom the strength of the UK Treasury 
relative to the Bank of England, since if the latter had had the greater say over 
convertibility in Britain, then it is possible that the BdL and not the Economics Ministry
regretting that the Finance Ministry possessed no such material, and suggesting instead that the student turn 
to the Economics Ministry or the BdL who would be more likely to be able to provide the information 
requested. BA B 126-7746, Bernard (Finance Ministry) to Jungmann re. “Konvertibilitât bei festen oder 
schwankenden Wechselkursen, hier: Einfuhrung der Konvertierbarkeit in Kanada im Jahre 1951, 
Unterlagen und Erfahrungsmaterial”, January 23, 1955.
" BA B 102-55470, Minister o f Justice to Minister o f Economics, “Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur 
Verinfachung des AuBenwirtschaftsrechts - AuBenwirtschaftsgesetz - (Fassung vom 4. September 1954)”, 
September 22, 1954.
*^BA B 102-57658, Westrick (Economics Ministry) to Vocke (President o f  the BdL), April 5, 1954, and, 
BA B 102-57708 “Entwurf betr: Rechtsgeschafte und Zahlungen ausserhalb des Waren-, Dienstleistungs- 
und Kapitalverkehrs”, November 1955.
Der Spiegel, “Goldwahrung: In einer andem Welt wieder”, No.24, June 10, 1953, p.20.
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would have been approached in Germany. The power relations between the UK Treasury 
and the Bank of England further consolidated the Economics Ministry’s hold over 
convertibility policy. Domestically, the Economics Ministry had already managed to 
wrestle a significant amount of control over currency policy away from the BdL, which 
traditionally held the scepter in monetary matters.
Several factors explain Erhard’s successful assertion of power in this matter. First, 
the repercussions of the liberalization of payments extended beyond the monetary domain 
into the larger economic, political and diplomatic sphere. The effects of liberalization, or 
restriction, of payments, spilled over into trade and capital flows. The intertwined nature 
of payments and trade and capital liberalization allowed Erhard, as the minister 
responsible for Germany’s external economic relations, to stake his claim on authority 
over policy regarding exchange and convertibility. Moreover, the coordination of the 
collective convertibility move depended on and influenced Germany’s plans for European 
integration.^^ Erhard’s power within the government had already allowed him to gain 
control over Germany’s European policy in a power struggle with the foreign ministry. 
His clout within the government, combined with his grip on Germany’s Europe policy and 
the importance of convertibility for European cooperation gave Erhard, and thus the 
Economics Ministry, a way to squeeze himself into the driver’s seat of the convertibility 
truck.
According to Owen Smith, the post-war history has witnessed increasing government involvement in the 
central bank's traditional policy domain, exchange rate control. He claimed that while “an independent 
central bank has dictated the course of monetary policy”, “exchange-rate considerations have involved the 
Federal government in monetary policy matters”. E. Owen Smith, The German Economy, Routledge, 1994, 
PP.13&140.
' Dickhaus, Zwischen Europa und der Welt, p. 168.
H. J. Küsters, “Der Streit um Kompetenzen und Konzeptionen deutscher Europapolitik”, in Herbst, 
Biihrer and Sowade (eds.), Vom Marshallplan, p.369. See also Koerfer, “Wirtschaftspolitische 
Kontroversen”, pp.33-45.
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The marginalization of the Finance Ministry in the policymaking process
regarding the move to convertibility eliminated the body which, out of the three,
consistently exhibited the most skepticism and hesitation vis-à-vis the rapid removal of
exchange restrictions and establishment of convertibility. In 1952, Hartmann from the
Finance Ministry expressed his strong disapproval to Erhard about the latter's efforts
towards reducing exchange control before Germany’s external debts, as decided in the
London Debt Agreement, had been repaid and the London Debt Agreement had expired.
The London Debt Agreement was set to expire in 1980. Hartmann claimed that
Der Artikel 10 [des Londoner Schuldenabkommens] macht es der Bundesrepublik 
zur Pflicht, die Devisenbewirtschaftung bis zur Erledigung aller Verpflichtungen 
aus dem Londoner Schuldenabkommen aufrecht zu erhalten.^^
The official from the Finance Ministry declared that Germany’s external debts and the
duration of the London Debt Agreement “stehen den Bestrebungen zur Einfuhrung einer
auch nur begrenzten Konvertibilitât der D-Mark als absolutes Hindemis entgegen”.*^  In a
letter to the Bank deutscher Lander, Hartmann expressed the same strong opposition to
any lifting of exchange restrictions on the use of Sperrmark.^^ Erhard rejected the Finance
Ministry’s interpretation of Article 10 of the London Debt Agreement as “vollkommen
abwegig”.^ ®
Germany’s progress towards convertibility took place within an environment of 
fluid lines in the assignment of exchange policy authority and, moreover, in an
B 102-56894, Hartmann (finance ministry) to Erhard re., "Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats 
beim Bimdeswirtschaftsministeriums zur Frage der Konvertibilitât", December 16, 1952.
‘Article 10 [of the London Debt Agreement] makes it the obligation o f the Federal Republic to 
maintain exchange control until the all liabilities from the London Debt Agreement have been 
repaid.’
ibid.
‘present an insurmountable obstacle to efforts to establish even a limited DM convertibility’
BA B 102-57705, Finance Ministry to BdL (signed by Hartmann) re,, “Verwendung von gesperrter D- 
Mark”, December 16, 1952.
BA B 102-56894, Erhard to Schaffer re., “Gutachten des Wissenschaftlichen Beirats zur Frage der 
Konvertibilitât”, January 8, 1953.
‘completely o ff  the mark’
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environment in which the power struggle between the BdL or DBB, the Economics 
Ministry and the Finance Ministry could have easily hampered or even paralyzed the 
process. Instead, Germany pressed ahead with payments liberalization at a much faster 
pace than other countries - such as Britain and France -, where responsibilities for 
exchange policy were much more clearly defined, which were not tied down by 
outstanding settlements of war debts, which enjoyed full sovereignty over exchange 
policy, and where, consequently, progress might not have been obstructed by an 
ambiguous institutional setting. Erhard’s position within the German government and the 
economy and the stronger general consensus, than in Britain or France on the desirability 
of convertibility sooner rather than later explain Germany’s ability to set the pace in 
Europe’s progress towards de facto convertibility.
It is frequently suggested that the independence of the German central bank is the 
secret to Germany’s price stability and its economic success.^  ^ While the independence of 
the German central bank and its clear commitment to price stability provided an anchor for 
inflationary expectations, this factor was not instrumental in assuring rapid liberalization 
of payments. The fast pace at which the Federal removed exchange restrictions cannot be 
explained by the independent central bank pursuing the establishment of currency 
convertibility, as the Bank of England did in the case of sterling. Rather, Germany’s 
policy on convertibility can be attributed to the combination of a widespread consensus on 
the desirability of currency convertibility and Ludwig Erhard’s personal crusade for DM 
convertibility. Similarly, the decision to wait with the official establishment for the rest of 
Europe is explained by a consensus on the disadvantages associated with a unilateral 
move.
See, for example, Bordo and Eschweiler, Rules, pp.22-3.
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APPENDIX B: La convertibilité racontée à Juliette^
L’intellettuale di destra; Mi pare che ne parlasse anche il Manzoni nel famoso capitolo 
suirinnominato.
L’intellettuale di sinistrà: Nel processo di progressiva disintegrazione del mondo 
capitalistico, la convertibilià appare, deterministicamente, corne il tentativo délia classe 
sociale dominante di appropriasri con manovre monetarie di un’ulteriore frazione del 
plusvalore.
Il prof. Erhard: Konvertibilitât über ailes.
Le fonctionnaire de F Office des Changes: La convertibilité devrait être subordonnée à 
une condition essentielle préalable, celle d’un reclassement équitable du personnel de 
l’Office des Changes dans le cadre de l’Institut d’Emission.
Il grande oratore italiano: Mentre nella lontana tormentata giungla, si spengono i 
bagliori di un conflitto che avrebbe forse potuto segnare la fine di una meravigliosa 
evoluzione biologica, palpitano sulle rive de Tamigi, fra le sofferenze di una laborica 
creazione, i primi fremiti di una fragile creatura destinata a recare aile nostre invecchiate 
monete il messaggio di una nuova gioventù.
Il grande oratore inglese: Gentlemen, ...ehm... convertibility...euhm...well...wider 
system...ehm...financial stability...ehm.. I daresay....
L’industriale milanese: Sa cosa ci dico? La convertibilité l’é una bella cosa e bisogna 
farla. Ma le tasse; dove Le mette Lei le tasse? Ma lo sa, caro Lei, che io non so più 
come fare a andare avanti? Il Vanoni la faccia pure la convertibilità, ma tenga conto dell 
nostre aspirassioni.
L’Uomo di Stato: Sur le plan socioligique et moral, la convertibilité est la pièce 
maitresse de l’intégration économique de l’Europe.
L’Uomo politico: In assenza delle necessarie precauzioni, la convertibilità é suscettibile 
di arrestare nettamente il processo di integrazione economica dell’Europa.
Le Résident: Ah. les salauds! Ils m’ont recalé. J’espère d’y réussir à la rentrée, si le 
professeur Ehrard [sic] le veut bien.
Il Non Residente: Dopo tutte le fregature che ha preso in questi ultimi vent’anni, era 
giusto che una riparazione mi fosse dovuta.
Juliette: Elle fait beaucoup de manière, cette fille. J’ai entendu dire qu’il faut y aller 
doucement. En tout cas, il y a en a de ceux qui n ’en veulent pas.
* AEF, B44744, undated extract from an Italian publication. The likely date o f publication is August 
1954.
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L’Appassionato di cinematografo: Anche se é piena, alla convertibilità io preferisco la 
Lollobrigida.
L’Expert de TOECE (à la conference de Presse): Après des recherches approfondies et 
une longue discussion, le Comité est arrivé à la conclusion que la convertibilité 
monétaire suppose le rétablissement et le maintien de la stabilité financière intérieure.
Il Giomalistà (al suo giomale, prima délia conferenza stampa): Flash Si apprende da 
insicrezdoni che il Comitato, prima di ripristinare la convertibilità, deciderà il 
mantenimento délia stabilità interna.
Il lettore assiduo di giomali: Ho letto nei giomali del lo giugno di una medicina molto 
energica che non puô essere somministrata senza pericoli a tutti malati. Deve essere 
certamente lo Stalinon.
L’Amico di Juliette (à Juliette): Tu sais mon chou, il y a trois espèces de convertibilité: 
la convertibilité anglaise (“convertibility without tears”), la convertibilté allemande 
(“Konvertibilitât Durch Freude”) et la convertibilité latine (“convertibilitas et dollares 
americanos).
Il giovane Segretario di Ambasciata: La convertibilità? Mi porti i precedenti.
Le Chargé de Mission d’un petit Pays: La convertibilité produira certainement un 
écrasement du cours parallèle du dollar sur le cours officiel. Elle aura donc une 
incidence directe sur le montant mensuel des indemnités de mission.
L’Economista classico: Si la convertibilité signifie autre chose que le rétablissement de 
l’étalon-or, elle est une plaisanterie.
L’Economista neo-classico: Il vertice dell’evoluzione monetaria intemazionale è 
costituito da un sistema eve il rigido mantenimento dei controlli valutari è unicamente 
destinato ad impedire i movimenti di capitali.
L’Uomo délia Strada: Sarà una buona cosa? Converrà vendere i Buoni del Tesoro? 
Ribasserà l’oro?
Il portavoce de Patronat: La convertibilité doit être réalisée dans le cadre du maintien 
d’une protection suffisante des branches moins compétitives de l’économie nationale.
L’Alto Funzionario dell’OECE: La convertibilità non deve in alcun modo mettere in 
periocolo la struttura dei Comitati orizzontali e verticali dell ’ organisazione. Ove cio 
devesse invece awenire, bisognerebbe rinunciare, sia pure a malinciore, ad iscrivere la 
convertibilità ffa gli scopi délia politica economica intemazionale postbellica.
Il Funzionario dell’Alta Autorità: Le marché commun de la monnaie est une initiative 
susceptible de favoriser le développement de la CECA et les efforts vers la création du 
po”em <sic> vert.
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Il militante del P.G.: La convertibilità permetterà finalmente un grande sviluppo del 
lavoro del nostro uffîcion cambio, che per tanti anni è stato passivo. L’introduzione dei 
cambi mobili, poi, si ripercuoterà in maggiori utili dell’ufficio arbitraggi.
Il poratvoce délia C.G.T.: La convertibilità sera acceptée par les travailleurs à la seule 
condition qu’elle soit accompagnée d’une augmentation substantielle du salaire 
minimum interprofessionnel garanti.
L’Amico di Juliette (à Juliette): Insomma, per riassumere, ti pagheranno in dollari e tu 
potrai cambiarli in lire senza riempire i moduli alla banca.
Juliette: Je fais ça depuis dix ans à Piazza Colonna sans la convertibilité.
Le concierge: Qu’est ce que vous en penser? Vous croyez qu’il y aura la guerre?
Lo scattico moralista (non esperto di questioni monetarie): La convertibilità è il diritto 
di esercitare quella libertà che, se fosse da tutti esercitata, provocherebbe 
immediatamente l’abolizione del diritto di esercitarla ed il ripristino délia primitiva 
felice situazione di rifare con rinnovato piacere le stesse cose divenute nuovamente 
proibite. Edonisticamente, la convertibilità è in sostanza una provisoria diminuzione del 
piacere.
Il Prate Protestante:  And the eigth Day, Butler created a convertible currency (The
new Bible).
Il Poeta: Di franchi, dollari, sterline e marchi.
Le cortesie e le adaci imprese io canto, 
l’aspre guerre di cui menaron vanto 
Gli aller, gli onori di cui furen carchi.
Di conversion dirô L’audace parto,
Che in allegria iniziô e fini in pianto.
 : E la prowigione del 0,60 per cento dove la mettiamo?
Mendès-France: ''Gouverner c’est choisir”. Le choix de la convertibilité est le choix du 
sacrifice et de l’austérité monétaire. Nous sommes aujourd’hui le 3 Août; si aucune 
solution satisfaisante du problème de la convertibilité n’aura pu aboutir avant la minuit 
du 20 Avril 1955, mon Gouvemment remettra sa demission au Président de la 
République.
Scelba: Il Govemo Italiano non subordina la propria adesione alla convertibilità alla 
soluzione del problema di Treste.
Foster Dulles: Convertibility is the missing link in our common system of defense 
against Communist tide ni Western Europe.
Butler: Wait and see.
Adenauer: Heil Konvertibilitât
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De Gaulle: Le jour suivant celui du rétablissement de la convertibilité monétaire, je me 
rendrai seul à l’Arc de Triomphe. Seul. Le peuple de Paris sera là ecc.
Sir Winston: Her Majesty’s convertibility will be declared tomorrow at 12 noon.
Molotof: La proposta sovietica di un sistema di sicurezza collettiva in Europa 
costituisce un contributo alia Pace del mondo di gran lunga più efficace di quanto lo 
siano i piani di convertibilità delle cricche guerrafondaie americane.
Ivar Rooth: We shall stand by.
Le BIRD: Sorry gentleman, we can’t help. Convertibility is not a definite project within 
the meaning of the Bank’s articles of agreement.
La F.O.A.: Questo Fondo Europeo ci ha I’aria di essere un pozzo senza fondo. 
L’Amministrazione Doganale Americana: We shall... Watch.
II filosofo: II controllo dei cambi? Tutto cio che non è proibito è obbligatorio. La 
convertibilità? Tutto è libero, fiorché I’obbligaotio e il proibito.
The U.S. Republican Partv: I like convertibility.
(continua) NB. Prossima puntata:
Le huron au Pavs des Convertibles.
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